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Introductory	remarks,	scope	of	the	work,	methodology,	structure	and	literature	
review	
	
It	 is	commonly	said	that	 international	arbitration	 is	the	most	popular	method	
of	 dispute	 resolution	 for	 international	 commercial	 disputes.	 This	 is	 probably	 even	
truer	 with	 regard	 to	 international	 disputes	 which	 involve,	 on	 the	 one	 side,	 private	
investors	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 the	 States	 where	 such	 investors	 made	 their	
investments	(so-called	international	 investment	arbitration).	 It	 is,	 indeed,	possible	to	
say	that	investment	arbitration	has	become	the	natural	judge	of	this	kind	of	disputes,	
due	–	 first	of	all	 –	 to	 the	perceived	bias	of	 the	main	other	available	 form	of	dispute	
settlement,	i.e.	litigation	in	national	courts	of	the	host	State,	and	–	secondly	–	to	the	
impossibility	to	foresee	the	possible	outcomes	of	the	traditional	remedy	provided	by	
international	law,	i.e.	diplomatic	protection.	
The	 huge	 growth	 of	 the	 number	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 cases	 is	 a	 recent	
phenomenon.	 At	 the	 beginning	 of	 its	 activity,	 the	 International	 Centre	 for	 the	
Settlement	 of	 Investment	 Disputes	 (ICSID),	 established	 by	 the	 1965	 Washington	
Convention	 and	 today	 the	 main	 institution	 administering	 investment	 arbitration	
proceedings,	 registered	 very	 few	 cases	 per	 year.	 However,	 the	 entry	 into	 force	 of	
thousands	 of	 Bilateral	 Investment	 Treaties	 (BITs),	 as	 well	 as	 of	 several	 investment	
contracts	containing	arbitration	clauses,	has	 lead	to	a	 rapid	change	of	 this	situation.	
BITs	 always	 contain	 an	 offer	 (i.e.	 an	 advanced	 consent)	 by	 the	 State	 hosting	 the	
foreign	 investment	 to	 arbitrate	 future	 possible	 disputes	 with	 investors	 with	 the	
nationality	of	the	other	signatory	State	before	neutral	arbitral	tribunals.	Such	arbitral	
tribunals	will	 be	 entitled	 to	 settle	disputes	by	usually	 applying	 the	provisions	of	 the	
same	BITs,	international	law	and	the	law	of	the	host	State.	The	abovementioned	offer	
is	 aimed	at	encouraging	 foreign	 investments,	by	guaranteeing	 to	 investors	 that	any	
dispute	 against	 the	 host	 State	 will	 not	 be	 settled	 by	 national	 courts,	 which	 are	
perceived	to	be	biased	in	favour	of	the	host	State.	
States’	consent	to	arbitration	is	usually	expressed	in	very	broad	terms.	Indeed,	
it	involves	disputes	arising	from	all	kind	of	investment	encompassed	the	definition	of	
“investment”	contained	in	the	same	BIT.	Such	a	definition	usually	refers	to	“every	kind	
of	asset”,	including	also	shares	and	indirect	interests	in	companies	incorporated	in	the	
host	State.	
The	 expansion	 of	 investment	 arbitration,	 however,	 is	 also	 due	 to	 the	 very	
flexible	approach	that	arbitrators	have	had	in	assuming	jurisdiction.	Indeed,	tribunals	
have	usually	strictly	applied	the	criteria	for	treaty	interpretation	set	forth	in	the	1969	
Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties	(in	particular,	among	such	criteria,	tribunals	
have	usually	stressed	the	importance	of	a	literal	interpretation	of	consent	expressed	in	
BITs	and	of	definitions	of	investment)	and	this	approach	has	entitled	them	to	broaden	
the	number	of	disputes	that	potentially	may	be	brought	before	investment	arbitration	
tribunals,	due	to	the	already	mentioned	very	wide	formulation	of	such	clauses.	
	 5	
This	has	 lead	 to	 the	 risk	of	 possible	 abuses	by	 investors.	By	 structuring	 their	
companies	 with	 a	multinational	 structure,	 investors	may	 take	 advantage	 of	 several	
BITs	 at	 the	 same	 time	 and	 start	 several	 parallel	 proceedings	 arising	 from	 the	 same	
facts.	The	same	may	happen	if	several	shareholders	of	the	same	company,	all	of	them	
having	the	right	to	start	an	investment	claim,	all	start	separate	investment	claims	for	
the	same	damage	suffered	by	the	company.	It	may	also	happen	that,	being	a	contract	
between	 the	 host	 State	 and	 the	 investor	 in	 force,	 the	 investor	 starts	 both	 an	
arbitration	 under	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 contained	 in	 the	 contract	 and	 another	
arbitration	according	to	the	offer	contained	in	the	BIT.	
In	 all	 these	 cases,	 from	 a	 formal	 point	 of	 view,	 investors	 are	 exercising	 their	
rights	and	are	 fully	entitled	 to	do	so.	Moreover,	 if	one	analyses	parallel	proceedings	
from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 three	 requirements	 commonly	 used	 to	 identify	 a	 legal	
dispute	(namely	identity	of	the	parties,	of	the	object	and	of	the	ground	of	the	claim),	
the	parallel	proceedings	are	usually	formally	different,	due	to	the	lack	of	identity	of	at	
least	one	of	such	requirements.	This	means	that,	if	the	traditional	rules	on	preclusion	
(such	 as	 res	 judicata)	 are	 strictly	 applied	 (and	 such	 a	 strict	 application,	 requiring	
perfect	identity	of	all	the	above	requirements,	is	currently	endorsed	by	the	majority	of	
Authors	 and	 arbitral	 tribunals),	 there	 is	 no	 bar	 to	 the	 continuance	 of	 the	 second	
duplicative	process.	
However,	several	policy	considerations	militate	against	this	outcome.	 Indeed,	
in	today’s	international	commerce,	values	such	as	coherence,	finality	of	decisions	and	
efficiency	 of	 the	methods	 of	 dispute	 resolution	 are	 of	 extreme	 importance.	 Parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	lead	to	never	ending	disputes,	they	undermine	
legal	 certainty	with	 the	 risk	of	 conflicting	outcomes	and	 increase	 time	and	costs	 for	
the	parties	of	the	dispute.	These	problems	are	even	greater	if	one	considers	that	one	
of	 the	 parties	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 a	 State,	 which	 takes	 part	 to	 these	
proceedings	 by	 spending	 public	 resources.	 Furthermore,	 these	 disputes	 usually	
involve	 sectors	of	 the	States’	 economy	 that	 are	 essential	 for	 the	public	 life,	 such	as	
water,	 electricity,	 and	 telecommunications.	 For	 the	 above	 reasons,	 parallel	
proceedings	constitute	a	waste	of	public	money	and	 risk	 to	have	bad	effects	on	 the	
quality	of	life	of	people	of	the	State	involved	in	the	dispute.	
Finally,	allowing	parallel	proceedings	would	mean	also	undermining	the	same	
function	 of	 arbitration	 as	 a	 method	 of	 dispute	 settlement.	 It	 is	 strongly	 arguable,	
indeed,	 that	 arbitration	 fulfils	 its	 function	 if	 and	 when	 it	 finally	 settles	 the	 dispute	
underlying	 the	 claims	of	 the	parties.	 If,	when	proceedings	 terminate,	 the	 claims	are	
settled	 but	 the	 dispute	 between	 the	 parties	 still	 exists	 and	 is	 pending	 in	 another	
arbitration,	 which	 is	 only	 formally	 different	 from	 the	 first	 one,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	
arbitration	 has	 failed	 in	 fulfilling	 its	 function.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	 prevalence	 of	 the	
formalities	of	the	process	over	the	real	substance	of	legal	relationships	may	lead	to	a	
lack	of	trust	in	arbitration	as	a	method	of	dispute	settlement.	
A	solution	is	therefore	required.	
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Such	 a	 solution,	 however,	 may	 not	 be	 found	 at	 the	 jurisdictional	 stage	 of	
arbitral	proceedings.	 Indeed,	 jurisdiction	in	arbitration	is	based	on	the	golden	rule	of	
consent	 and	 arbitrators	 do	 not	 have	 the	 power	 to	 decline	 a	 validly	 conferred	
jurisdiction.	All	solutions	that	have	been	imagined	for	solving	the	problem	of	parallel	
proceedings	at	 the	 jurisdictional	 stage	are	 therefore	 very	artificial	 (indeed,	 it	 is	 very	
unlikely	that	an	investor	will	renounce	to	its	right	to	bring	its	separate	claim).	
On	 the	 contrary,	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	of	 parallel	 proceedings	might	 be	
found	at	the	admissibility	stage	of	arbitral	proceedings,	 i.e.	the	stage	of	proceedings	
where	arbitrators	may	decide	that	the	exercise	of	the	validly	conferred	jurisdiction	is	
not	appropriate	for	the	interest	of	justice.	Here,	by	way	of	preliminary	objections,	the	
parties	 may	 ask	 to	 arbitrators	 to	 examine	 certain	 merit	 issues,	 which	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 absorb	 (i.e.	 to	 preclude)	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 entire	 dispute.	 Such	
preliminary	 questions	 may	 be	 related	 to	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 previous	 award	 (or	 of	
already	pending	proceedings)	on	the	same	dispute.	
The	 goal	 of	 this	 book	 is	 to	 identify	 the	 existence	 of	 certain	 principles	 of	
international	 law	 that	may	be	used	by	arbitrators	 in	order	 to	 justify	a	declaration	of	
inadmissibility	of	duplicative	proceedings.	Such	principles	might	be	 identified	 in	 the	
principle	of	good	faith	and	the	principle	of	 finality	 (ne	bis	 in	 idem).	The	former	 is	the	
legal	basis	 for	 the	application	of	 the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process,	while	 the	 latter	 is	
the	 concept	 underlying	 the	 doctrines	 of	 claim	 preclusion	 (res	 judicata)	 and	 issue	
preclusion	 (collateral	 estoppel).	 The	 core	 of	 the	 analysis	 will	 therefore	 be	 aimed	 at	
understanding	 whether	 abuse	 of	 process,	 res	 judicata	 and	 collateral	 estoppel	 may	
constitute	useful	tools	in	order	to	prevent	the	issuance	of	two	awards	arising	from	the	
same	dispute.		
The	 central	 thesis	 underlying	 this	 research	 is	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	 should	
endorse	 a	 flexible,	 pragmatic	 and	 substance	 oriented	 approach	 to	 the	 principles	 of	
abuse	of	 process,	 res	 judicata	and	 collateral	 estoppel	 in	 order	 to	 limit	 the	 effects	 of	
parallel	 proceedings,	 to	 prohibit	 abuses	 of	 the	 method	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 by	
investors	 and,	 finally,	 to	 safeguard	 the	 credibility	 of	 investment	 arbitration.	 Such	 a	
transactional	approach,	which	has	been	several	times	defined	as	highly	desirable	and	
which	 has	 recently	 found	 some	 disparate	 applications	 in	 investment	 arbitration,1	is	
not	 the	 product	 of	 the	 imagination	 of	 the	 author,	 but	 comes	 from	 a	 re-elaborated	
version	 of	 several	 theories	 originated	 in	municipal	 systems	 (and	 sometimes	 already	
applied	in	international	law)	as	adapted	to	the	framework	of	international	investment	
arbitration.	
	
Scope	of	the	work	and	delimitation	
This	 book	will	 assume	 the	 perspective	 of	 an	 arbitral	 tribunal	 dealing	with	 an	
international	 investment	dispute	 in	 the	context	of	 two	or	more	parallel	proceedings	
																																																													
1	S	Grynberg,	Stephen	M	Grynberg,	Miriam	Z	Grynberg,	and	RSM	Production	Corporation	v	Grenada,	ICSID	
Case	No	ARB/10/6,	Award,	10	December	2010;	Apotex	Holdings	Inc.	and	Apotex	Inc.	v.	United	States	of	
America,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/12/1,	Award,	25	August	2014.	
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and	will	 try	 to	 understand	 how	 such	 a	 tribunal	 can	manage	 the	 issues	 arising	 from	
such	 a	 situation.	 This	 research	 does	 not	 cover	 the	 issue	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	
between	 arbitral	 tribunals	 and	 national	 courts,	 as	well	 as	 between	 arbitral	 tribunals	
and	 other	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals.	 It	 only	 covers	 parallel	 proceedings	
between	two	arbitral	tribunals	dealing	with	 investment	disputes	and	the	 legal	 issues	
strictly	related	or	functional	to	the	analysis	of	the	main	topic	of	the	research.	
	
Methodology	
The	entire	analysis	carried	out	in	this	book	is	based	on	a	main	assumption,	i.e.	
that	 	 international	 investment	 arbitration	 fulfils	 a	 public	 and	 substantial	 function.	
Indeed,	 as	 already	 stated,	 the	 author	 starts	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 investment	
arbitration	 is	not	only	a	way	to	settle	the	claims	that	are	brought	before	arbitrators,	
but	 is	 a	 way	 to	 finally	 settle	 the	 underlying	 disputes	 and	 to	 finally	 stabilize	 the	
underlying	 legal	 relationship.	 This	 approach	 is	 due,	 inter	 alia,	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	
ensure	that	a	form	of	arbitration	that	has	several	public	features	and	that	decides	on	
issues	that	are	of	vital	importance	for	the	involved	States	cannot	be	administered	for	
the	sole	interest	of	the	formal	parties	and	by	giving	prevalence	to	the	interests	of	the	
investors	over	the	ones	of	the	States.	
The	 research	 will	 be,	 therefore,	 policy-oriented.	 The	 necessities	 to	 promote	
coherence,	predictability	of	solutions	and	legal	certainty,	as	well	as	to	ensure	finality	
and	reduce	times	and	costs	in	arbitration,	will	be	the	main	drivers	of	the	research.	It	is	
strongly	 arguable,	 indeed,	 that	 international	 investment	 arbitration	 has	 today	
become	the	natural	forum	for	disputes	on	foreign	investment	and,	therefore,	 it	shall	
not	only	be	driven	by	the	interest	of	investors	(possibly	aimed	at	increasing	the	forums	
which	could	hear	the	same	dispute	in	order	to	get	more	chances	of	success)	but	also	
by	 policy	 considerations	 developed	 by	 scholars	 and	 practitioners	 aimed	 at	 granting	
the	 reliability	 and	 the	 credibility	 of	 this	method	 of	 dispute	 settlement.	 This	 kind	 of	
reasoning,	 deeply	 developed	 by	 Thomas	 Hale,2	is	 an	 essential	 policy	 driver	 of	 this	
research.	 If,	 as	 stated	 by	 Hale,3	institutions	 and	methods	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 are	
considered	reliable	by	operators	on	the	basis	of	the	policy	outcome	of	their	decisions	
(i.e.	 the	degree	of	satisfaction	of	both	parties	 involved	 in	the	dispute,	which	directly	
affects	their	credibility),	it	is	essential	that	phenomena	like	parallel	proceedings,	which	
																																																													
2	Hale,	Between	Interests	and	Law	(2015),	9	and	ss.	and	51	and	ss.	This	Author,	at	11,	states	that	“within	
the	boundaries	imposed	by	material	interests,	legal	ideas	and	the	communities	of	experts	that	promote	
them	have	often	been	the	most	proximate	drivers	of	 institutional	variation”,	even	against	the	market	
powers	 of	 market	 actors	 which	 have	 created	 and	 used	 an	 institution	 and/or	 a	 method	 of	 dispute	
settlement	 in	order	to	serve	their	 interests.	All	considerations	de	 jure	condendo	made	 in	this	book	are	
therefore	 aimed	 at	 a	 policy	 driven	 improvement	 of	 international	 investment	 arbitration	 aimed	 at	
granting	the	credibility	and	the	reliability	of	this	method	of	dispute	settlement.	
3	Id.	52	and	ss.	The	Author	speaks	about	a	requirement	of	neutrality	for	arbitral	institutions,	which	shall	
not	 give	 prevalence	 to	 the	 interests	 of	 one	 of	 the	 categories	 involved	 in	 the	 dispute:	 in	 the	 case	 of	
investment	 arbitration,	 if	 arbitral	 tribunals	 are	 perceived	 to	 be	 biased	 in	 favor	 of	 investors,	 they	will	
loose	credibility	from	the	perspective	of	States.	Considering	that	States	are	the	subjects	which	finally	
grant	the	existence	of	investment	arbitration,	such	a	loss	of	credibility	may	finally	put	at	risk	the	same	
existence	of	investment	arbitration	as	a	method	of	dispute	settlement.	
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–	being	perceived	as	an	undue	disadvantage	for	the	interests	of	the	State	involved	in	
the	dispute	–	undermine	the	credibility	(and,	finally,	the	same	existence)	of	the	entire	
method	of	dispute	resolution	given	by	investment	arbitration,	are	avoided	or	at	least	
limited.	This	could	be	done,	as	 it	will	be	seen	 in	Chapter	3	of	 this	book,	by	applying	
already	 existing	 legal	 rules	 (such	 as	 abuse	 of	 process,	 res	 judicata	 and	 collateral	
estoppel)	 in	 a	 less	 formal	way,	 as	 proposed	 by	 several	 scholars	 and,	 today,	 also	 by	
certain	 arbitral	 tribunals.	 This	 approach	 follows	 the	 idea	 that	 “[t]he	 practice	 of	 law	
forces	actors	to	logically	deduce	a	‘correct’	principle	from	a	body	of	text	and	practice,	
and	 so	 we	 should	 expect	 logics	 of	 appropriateness	 to	 be	 particularly	 prominent”	
(emphasis	 added). 4 	This	 means	 that,	 among	 the	 various	 interpretations	 of	 the	
aforementioned	 legal	 principles,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 adopt	 the	 one	 that	 better	
safeguards	the	credibility	of	investment	arbitration,	by	striking	a	balance	between	the	
various	interests	involved	in	investment	disputes.	
However,	it	is	not	possible	to	ignore	some	values	that,	in	principle,	may	conflict	
with	 the	aforementioned	policy	 considerations.	The	 reference	goes,	 in	particular,	 to	
the	necessity	to	ensure	party	autonomy	and	due	process,	as	well	as	to	the	desirability	
to	have	awards	that	are	the	most	possible	fair	and	just.	For	this	reason,	the	author	has	
tried	 to	 highlight	 in	 the	 text	 these	 clashes	 of	 values	 anytime	 they	 may	 realize	 in	
practice	 and	 has	 also	 tried	 to	 offer	 some	 balanced	 solutions	 to	 such	 clashes	 that	
should	 not	 undermine	 any	 of	 the	 aforementioned	 values.	 Striking	 this	 balance	 is	
essential	 in	 order	 to	 safeguard	 all	 the	 interests	 involved	 in	 investment	 disputes,	
without	giving	prevalence	to	State	parties	or	investors.	
Finally,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 subject	 of	 this	 book	 involves	 several	
terminological	problems.	Labels	such	as	“parallel	proceedings”,	“lis	pendens”,	“ne	bis	
in	 idem”	and	 “res	 judicata”	are	often	used	with	different	meanings	and,	 seldom,	 the	
recourse	 to	 such	 names	 is	 made	 improperly.	 For	 this	 reason,	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	
confusion,	in	the	course	of	the	book	the	meaning	with	which	this	labels	are	used	will	
be	always	clarified.	
	
Structure	of	the	work	
The	first	question	that	this	book	tries	to	answer	–	in	introduction	to	Section	1	–		
is	whether	a	dissertation	on	parallel	proceedings	in	 investment	arbitration	is	actually	
required.	In	order	to	answer	to	such	a	question,	this	work	starts	from	an	analysis	of	the	
main	criticisms	that	have	been	moved	against	investment	arbitration,	namely	that	it	is	
a	 partial	 (pro-investor)	method	of	 dispute	 settlement,	 that	 it	 lacks	 of	 openness	 and	
accountability	and	that	it	lack	of	coherence,	predictability	and	legal	certainty.	It	will	be	
demonstrated	 that	 all	 these	 criticisms	 have	 been	 remedied	 by	 operators	 unless	 the	
lack	 of	 coherence,	 predictability	 and	 legal	 certainty	 (Paragraph	 0.1).5	This	 lack	 of	
coherence	 is	 particularly	 due	 to	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 parallel	 proceedings,	 i.e.	
																																																													
4	Hale	(2015)	(n.	2),	74.	
5	European	Federation	 for	 Investment	Law	and	Arbitration	 (EFILA),	A	response	 to	 the	criticism	against	
ISDS,	17	May	2015	(2015).	
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substantially	 identical	 disputes	 which	 have	 the	 potential	 to	 end	 with	 very	 different	
outcomes,	which	undermine	the	credibility	of	investment	arbitration.	The	paradigm	of	
this	 situation	 is	 represented	 by	 the	 well	 known	 Lauder6	and	 CME7	cases,	 where	 the	
final	owner	of	a	chain	of	companies	and	one	of	such	companies	initiated	two	parallel	
disputes	against	 the	Czech	Republic,	arising	 from	the	same	 facts,	which	ended	with	
opposite	judgments.	However,	prior	to	say	that	a	solution	to	this	situation	is	required,	
it	will	be	also	necessary	to	ascertain	whether	a	certain	degree	of	orderliness	is	required	
in	 investment	 arbitration:	 if	 one	 says	 that	 investment	 arbitration	 tribunals	 operate	
without	taking	into	account	the	work	of	each	other,	this	means	that	there	is	no	need	
of	 coherence.	 Anyway,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 there	 are	 several	 systemic	 features	 in	
investment	 arbitration,	 which	 lead	 us	 to	 talk	 about	 a	 network	 requiring	 internal	
coherence	(Paragraph	0.2).	This	imposes	to	seek	for	a	solution	to	parallel	proceedings.	
In	 dealing	 with	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings,	 the	 research	 starts,	 in	
Chapter	1,	with	a	description	of	the	taxonomy	of	parallel	proceedings	(Paragraph	1.1)	
and	with	an	analysis	of	the	most	likely	reasons	behind	the	growth	of	this	phenomenon	
(Paragraph	 1.2).	 Chapter	 1,	 finally,	 deeply	 analyses	 the	 already	 mentioned	 policy	
considerations	at	the	basis	of	the	research	(Paragraph	1.3).	
The	following	structure	of	 the	research	follows	the	temporal	sequence	of	 the	
various	 phases	 of	 arbitration	 where	 the	 problem	may	 emerge,	 namely	 jurisdiction,	
admissibility	and	post-award.	
The	 analysis	 starts	 –	 at	 Chapter	 2	 –	 by	 examining	 the	 jurisdictional	 stage,	
where,	 as	 it	will	 be	demonstrated,	 there	 are	no	 solutions	 to	 the	problem	of	 parallel	
proceedings.	 Indeed,	this	phase	 is	based	on	the	grundnorm	of	consent	and	there	are	
no	available	legal	tools	that	allow	arbitrators	to	decline	jurisdiction	disregarding	party	
autonomy	(Paragraph	2.1).	Similarly,	remedies	based	on	a	sole	exercise	of	discretion	
(such	as	comity)	are	not	reliable	in	order	to	find	a	predictable	solution	to	the	problem	
of	parallel	proceedings	(Paragraph	2.2).	
The	research	then	moves	to	the	analysis	of	the	remedies	available	at	the	stage	
of	admissibility.	This	methodologically	imposes	to	preliminary	deal	with	several	other	
questions,	 such	 as	 the	 legal	 foundation	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	
admissibility	(Paragraph	3.1),	the	analysis	of	the	inherent	powers	(if	any)	of	arbitrators	
to	 safeguard	 the	 interests	 of	 justice	while	 administering	 their	 proceedings,	 and	 the	
law	applicable	 in	 international	 investment	arbitration	 (with	a	particular	 focus	on	 the	
applicability	of	general	principles	of	international	law)	(Paragraph	3.2).	We	will	first	of	
all	demonstrate	that	international	law	provides	us	with	some	instruments	in	order	to	
avoid	parallel	 proceedings	 (not	 including	 lis	 pendens,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	Paragraph	
3.3),	namely	the	principles	of	good	faith	and	finality	(Paragraph	3.4).	These	principles	
respectively	furnish	the	grounds	for	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process,	on	the	one	side,	
and	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel,	on	the	other	side.	It	will	be	then	necessary	to	
understand	 how	 and	whether	 these	 tools	may	 be	 applied	 in	 investment	 arbitration	
																																																													
6	Ronald	S.	Lauder	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award,	3	September	2001.	
7	CME	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award	14	March	2003.	
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(Paragraphs	3.5,	3.6	and	3.7).	This	will	require,	firstly,	an	analysis	of	these	doctrines	in	
international	law	and,	secondly,	a	comparative	analysis	of	how	they	have	been	applied	
in	different	municipal	systems	(with	a	particular	focus	on	the	distinction	between	civil	
law	and	 common	 law	 systems).	 It	will	 finally	 emerge	 that	 such	doctrines	have	been	
applied	also	in	a	flexible	and	substance-oriented	way,	which	would	be	very	helpful	in	
order	to	limit	parallel	proceedings.	This	approach	is,	indeed,	highly	desirable.	Chapter	
3	also	demonstrates	how	these	doctrines	may	operate	in	concrete	(Paragraph	3.8)	and	
put	forward	a	proposal	of	amendment	of	rules	of	international	arbitration	in	order	to	
limit	 parallel	 proceedings	 and,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 ensure	 the	 respect	 of	 due	process	
(Paragraph	3.9).	
Finally,	remedies	available	at	post-award	stage	will	be	examined	in	Chapter	4.	
These	 remedies	 are	 different	 with	 regard	 to	 ICSID	 awards	 –	 being	 ICSID	 a	 self-
contained	 regime	 –	 and	 with	 regard	 to	 non-ICSID	 awards,	 which	 shall	 be	 enforced	
according	to	the	provisions	of	the	1958	New	York	Convention	on	the	Recognition	and	
Enforcement	of	Foreign	Arbitral	Awards.	In	the	former	case,	we	will	try	to	understand	
whether	the	remedy	of	annulment	provided	by	the	ICSID	Convention	may	be	useful	in	
order	 to	avoid	 the	existence	of	 two	duplicative	awards	 (Paragraph	4.1).	 In	 the	 latter	
case	the	only	available	means	to	preclude	the	enforcement	of	a	duplicative	award	 is	
the	public	policy	exception	set	forth	in	Art.	V(2)(b)	of	the	New	York	Convention.	The	
analysis	 of	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 involves	 several	 difficulties	 due	 to	 the	
involvement	 of	 municipal	 laws	 and	 courts	 and	 will	 require	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
national	 rules	 of	 private	 international	 law	 regulating	 the	 problem	 of	 conflicting	
judgments	(Paragraph	4.2).	Finally,	Paragraph	4.3	will	try	to	understand	whether	the	
existence	of	 duplicative	 awards	may	be	 a	 ground	 for	 annulment	 at	 the	place	of	 the	
seat	of	arbitration.	
	
Literature	review	
The	subject	of	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration,	as	of	today,	has	
not	 been	widely	 discussed.	 There	 are,	 however,	 four	monographs	 that	 –	 directly	 or	
indirectly	–	regard	the	subject,	as	well	as	some	articles.	Finally,	the	International	Law	
Association,	 due	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 related	 to	 this	 topic,	 has	 issued	 certain	
Recommendations	 on	 Lis	Pendens	 and	Res	 Judicata	 in	 International	Arbitration.8	Such	
Recommendations,	 issued	 for	 the	 context	 of	 commercial	 arbitration,	 may	 be	
somehow	helpful	for	an	analysis	regarding	investment	arbitration,	provided	that	one	
keeps	 always	 into	 account	 the	 differences	 existing	 between	 these	 two	 forms	 of	
arbitration.	
The	 starting	point	of	 a	 research	aimed	at	 assessing	 concurring	 jurisdiction	 in	
international	 law	 is	 Yuval	 Shany’s	 seminal	 work	 on	 “The	 Competing	 Jurisdictions	 of	
																																																													
8	De	Ly,	Sheppard,	 ILA	Final	Report	on	Lis	Pendens	and	Arbitration,	Arbitration	 International	 (2009),	 3	
and	 ss.;	 De	 Ly,	 Sheppard,	 ILA	 Final	 Report	 on	 Res	 Judicata	 and	 Arbitration,	 Arbitration	 International	
(2009),	35	and	ss.	
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International	Courts	and	Tribunals”.9	This	book	 is	 very	helpful	 in	order	 to	understand	
the	relations	and	possible	interactions	between	international	courts	and	tribunals,	as	
well	as	between	international	courts	and	tribunals	and	national	courts.	Furthermore,	
this	book	is	one	the	first	works	that	has	proposed	a	flexible	approach	to	the	doctrines	
applicable	in	order	to	avoid	parallel	proceedings.	
The	 second	 main	 source	 for	 a	 work	 on	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	 investment	
arbitration	 is	Prof.	McLachlan’s	book	 recalling	his	 course	held	 in	 2009	at	 the	Hague	
Academy	 of	 International	 Law,	 entitled	 Lis	 Pendens	 in	 International	 Litigation,10	in	
which	the	application	of	lis	pendens	and	res	judicata	in	arbitration	(mainly	commercial)	
is	largely	debated.	
Another	 good	 source,	 encyclopaedic	 in	 its	 exposition,	 is	 prof.	 Hober’s	 book	
recalling	his	course	held	in	2013	at	the	Hague	Academy	of	International	Law,11	which	
has	discussed	the	subjects	also	from	the	perspective	of	investment	arbitration,	even	if	
without	being	particularly	innovative.	
Finally,	 the	 main	 (and	 only)	 book	 directly	 regarding	 the	 subject	 is	 Hanno	
Wehland’s	monograph	entitled	The	Coordination	of	Multiple	Proceedings	in	Investment	
Treaty	Arbitration.12	However,	this	book	largely	differs	in	its	scope	and	goals	from	the	
present	one.	First	of	all	 it	largely	examines	the	issue	of	parallel	proceedings	between	
investment	tribunals	and	national	courts	 (that	 is	not	within	the	scope	of	the	present	
book).	Secondly,	and	mainly,	it	endorses	a	very	formalistic	approach	to	the	doctrine	of	
res	judicata	that	is	rejected	by	the	present	Author.	Finally,	it	does	not	deal	with	abuse	
of	process	and	collateral	estoppel,	which	are	largely	discussed	in	the	present	book.	In	
conclusion,	Wehland’s	book,	helpful	for	its	wide	analysis	of	the	subject	and	for	its	very	
extensive	 bibliography,	 does	 not	 propose	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings.	
Only	four	articles	directly	deal	with	the	issue	of	abuse	of	process	in	investment	
arbitration	from	the	perspective	of	parallel	proceedings.13	With	regard	to	res	 judicata	
and	investment	arbitration,	it	is	worth	highlighting	six	articles14	and	one	legal	opinion	
issued	 in	 the	 framework	of	an	 investment	case.15	Finally,	only	one	 recent	article	has	
																																																													
9	Cambridge	University	Press	(2013).	
10	Publications	of	The	Hague	Academy	of	International	Law,	(2009).	
11	Hober,	Res	Judicata	and	Lis	Pendens	in	International	Arbitration,	Recueil	de	courses	vol.	366	103	(2013).	
12	Oxford	University	Press	(2013).	
13	Ascensio,	 Chinese	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 (2014),	 763	 and	 ss.;	 De	 Brabandere,	 Journal	 of	
International	Dispute	Settlement	(2012),	609	and	ss.;	Gaffney,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	
(2010),	515	and	ss.;	Brown,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2011),	1	and	ss.	
14	Reinisch,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(2004),	37	and	ss;	Reinisch,	The	
Backlash	 against	 Investment	Arbitration	 (2010),	 113;	Martinez	 Fraga,	 Samra,	Northwestern	 Journal	 of	
International	 Law	 and	 Business	 (2012),	 419	 and	 ss.;	 Shany,	
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=999021	 (2007),	1	and	ss.;	 Id.,	American	Review	of	
International	Law	(2005),	835	and	ss.,	Dodge,	Hastings	International	&	Comparative	Law	Review	(2000),	
357	and	ss.	
15	Schreuer,	Reinisch,	Legal	opinion	in	the	CME	v.	Czech	Republic	case,	www.italaw.com	(2002)	
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dealt	 with	 collateral	 estoppel	 in	 investment	 arbitration.16	Some	 books	 and	 articles	
have	dealt	with	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	in	general	terms.17	
Due	to	this	scarcity	of	sources,	it	has	been	necessary	to	make	recourse,	first	of	
all,	 to	books	and	articles	related	to	general	 international	 law,18	secondly	to	works	on	
international	 commercial	 arbitration19	and,	 thirdly,	 to	 works	 related	 to	 municipal	
systems.20	All	 these	 sources	 have	 been	 of	 extreme	 utility	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 new	
approaches	and	solutions	for	investment	arbitration.	
Finally,	with	 regard	 to	 ILA’s	Recommendations,	 they	are	useful	because	 they	
recall	 the	 current	 practice	 of	 national	 laws,	 as	 well	 as	 of	 international	 courts	 and	
tribunals,	in	order	to	offer	the	complete	framework	regarding	the	current	status	of	res	
judicata	 in	investment	arbitration.	However,	such	Recommendations	are	not	decisive	
for	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 present	 book,	 first	 of	 all	 because	 they	 are	 mainly	 directed	 to	
international	commercial	arbitration	practitioners	and,	secondly,	because	their	scope	
																																																													
16	Kotuby,	Egerton-Vernon,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2015)	486	and	ss.	
17	Cremades,	 Lew	 (eds.),	 Parallel	 States	 and	 Arbitral	 Procedures	 in	 International	 Arbitration	 (2005),	
Savarese,	 www.federalismi.it	 (2009),	 Cremades,	 Madalena,	 Parallel	 Proceedings	 in	 International	
Arbitration,	 24	Arbitration	 International	 (2008),	 507	 and	 ss.,	 Carver,	 Journal	 of	World	 Investment	 and	
Trade	 (2004),	 23	 and	 ss.,	 Spoorenberg,	 Vinuales,	 Law	&	 Practice	 of	 International	 Courts	&	 Tribunals	
(2009),	91	and	ss.,	Hansen,	Modern	Law	Review	(2010)	523	and	ss.,	Klein,	Journal	of	World	Investment	
and	 Trade	 (2004),	 19	 and	 ss.,	 Yannaca-Small,	 The	 Oxford	 Handbook	 of	 International	 Investment	 Law	
(2008),	1010	and	ss.	
18	For	the	aim	of	the	present	book	the	following	are	some	very	significant	works:	Lowe,	African	Journal	
of	 International	&	Comparative	Law	 (1996),	 38	and	 ss.,	 Id.,	Australian	Yearbook	of	 International	Law	
(1999),	191	and	ss.,	Scobbie,	Australian	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(1999),	299	and	ss.,	Al-Qahtani,	
The	Law	and	Practice	of	 International	Courts	and	Tribunals	 (2003),	269	and	ss.,	Bonafè,	La	protezione	
degli	interessi	di	Stati	terzi	davanti	alla	Corte	internazionale	di	Giustizia	(2014),	Palombino,	Gli	effetti	della	
sentenza	 internazionale	 nei	 giudizi	 interni	 (2008),	Oellers-Frahm,	Max	Panck	UNYB	 (2001),	 67	 and	 ss.,	
Gaja,	 The	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	 (2012),	 Cannizzaro,	 European	 Journal	 of	 Legal	
Studies	www.ejls.eu	 (2007),	 Abi-Saab,	New	York	University	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	Politics	
(1999),	919	and	ss.,	Treves,	New	York	University	Journal	of	 International	Law	and	Politics	 (1999),	809	
and	 ss.,	 Charney,	 New	York	University	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	 Politics	 (1999),	 697	 and	 ss.,	
Dupuy,	 New	 York	 University	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	 Politics	 (1999),	 791	 and	 ss.,	 Romano,	
International	 Law	 and	 Politics	 (1999),	 709	 and	 ss.,	 Palchetti,	 Max	 Planck	 UNYB	 (2002),	 139	 and	 ss.,	
Forlati,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 internazionale	 (2002),	 99	 and	 ss.,	 Virzo,	 Il	 regolamento	 delle	 controversie	 nel	
diritto	del	mare:	rapporti	tra	procedimenti,	(2008),	Zoppo,	La	soluzione	delle	controversie	commerciali	tra	
Stati	 tra	multilateralismo	e	 regionalism	 (2013),	Palombino,	Leiden	Journal	of	 International	Law	 (2010),	
909	and	ss.	
19	See,	 inter	alia,	Radicati	di	Brozolo,	ssrn.com/abstract=1842685	(2011),	Gunes,	Transnational	Dispute	
Management	(2015),	1	and	ss.,	de	Lotbiniére	McDougall,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2012),	1	
and	 ss.,	 Brekoulakis,	 American	 Review	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2005),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Ricci,	 Rivista	 di	
diritto	 processuale	 (1989),	 655	 and	 ss.,	 Hanotiau,	 Hanotiau,	 Complex	 Arbitrations:	 Multiparty,	
Multicontract,	Multi-Issue	and	Class	Actions	(2006),	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	(ed.),	Multiple	Party	
in	 International	 Arbitration	 (2009),	 Brekoulakis,	 Third	 Parties	 in	 International	 Commercial	 Arbitration	
(2010).	
20	See,	 inter	 alia,	 Allorio,	 La	 cosa	 giudicata	 rispetto	 ai	 terzi	 (1935),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Carnelutti,	 Istituzioni	 del	
processo	 civile	 italiano	 (1956),	 79,	Carnelutti,	Studi	di	diritto	processuale	 (1925),	 443,	Vestal,	St.	 Louis	
University	Law	 Journal	29	 (1964-1965),	Vestal,	 Iowa	Law	Rev.	 (1968)	 1	 and	 ss.,	Casad,	Clermont,	Res	
Judicata,	 An	 Handbook	 on	 Its	 Theory,	 Doctrine	 and	 Practice	 (2001),	 Volpino,	 L’oggetto	 del	 giudicato	
nell’esperienza	 americana	 (2007),	 Chizzini,	 L’intervento	 adesivo	 (1991),	 Gestri,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	
internazionale	(1999),	5	and	ss.,	Byers,	McGill	Law	Journal	(2002),	389	and	ss.	
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is	 not	 to	 offer	 new	 solutions,	 but	 only	 to	 provide	 the	 reader	 with	 the	 state	 of	 art	
regarding	the	applicability	of	the	doctrine.	
In	conclusion,	as	of	 today,	 the	available	 literature	on	 the	subject	 is	very	poor	
and	there	is	a	lack	of	solutions	for	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	
arbitration.	
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SECTION	1	
The	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	in	international	investment	arbitration:	the	necessity	
for	a	solution	beyond	party	autonomy	
	
Introduction	
Parallel	proceedings	as	a	crucial	problem	of	investment	arbitration	
	
0.1	 The	criticism	relating	to	 investment	arbitration.	A	critic	 to	the	critics	and	
the	 reaffirmation	 of	 arbitration	 as	 the	 preferred	 form	 of	 investment	
dispute	settlement.	
	
In	recent	times	investment	arbitration	has	attracted	severe	criticisms1	and,	as	a	
consequence,	 the	 reactions	of	many	States	against	 this	 form	of	dispute	 resolution.2	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 whole	mechanism	 has	 been	 considered	 non-respondent	 to	
the	necessities	of	a	form	of	justice	that	involves	by	definition	strong	features	of	public	
law	 adjudication,	 and	 arbitrators	 have	 been	 accused	 of	 pro-investors	 bias.3	This	
introduction	will	make	a	very	brief	analysis	of	such	critics	and	of	the	answers	that	have	
been	 found	 for	 the	 majority	 of	 them.	 The	 results	 of	 this	 analysis	 will	 lead	 us	 to	
understand	 why	 it	 is	 today	 essential	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 below,	 indeed,	 it	 actually	
appears	 that	 parallel	 proceedings	 are	 the	 only	 completely	 unanswered	 problem	 of	
investment	 arbitration.	 The	 research	 for	 a	 solution	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	 appears	
therefore	essential	in	order	to	stop	the	critics	and	confer	more	legitimacy	to	such	form	
of	dispute	resolution.	
Starting	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 a	 form	of	 public	
adjudication,	 investment	 arbitration	 has	 been	 subject	 to	 four	 main	 critics.	 In	
particular,	 according	 to	 Gus	 Van	 Harten,	 a	 dispute	 resolution	 mechanism	 should	
satisfy	 four	 main	 requirements:	 independence,	 openness,	 accountability	 and	
																																																													
1	See	Perry	(2014),	reporting	a	debate	regarding	the	various	 issues	concerning	investment	arbitration.	
See	also	Waibel,	Kaushal,	Chung	and	Balchin	(2010),	1	and	ss.,	and	Campbell,	Nappert,	Nottage	(2013),	i	
and	ss..	See	also	Sornarajah,	Appeals	Mechanism	in	 International	 Investment	Disputes	(2008),	55	and	
ss.,	who	has	strictly	related	the	legitimacy	crisis	of	international	investment	law	–	that	will	be	discussed	
in	paragraph	1.5.1	below	–	to	the	expansive	approach	of	international	investment	tribunals.	
2	Bolivia,	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	have	withdrawn	from	the	ICSID	Convention	and	terminated	many	of	
their	 BITs.	 Australia	 has	 declared	 that	 it	 will	 stop	 including	 provisions	 setting	 forth	 investment	
arbitration	 in	 its	 investment	 treaties,	while	 Indonesia	 has	 terminated	 some	 of	 its	 BITs.	 According	 to	
Cosmas,	 International	 Journal	 of	 Scientific	 and	 Research	 Publications	 (2013),	 2	 and	 ss.,	 also	 South	
Africa,	 Zimbabwe,	 Liberia,	 Russia,	 Thailand,	 Senegal,	 Kyrgyzstan	 and	 Germany	 have	 shown	
dissatisfaction	with	investment	arbitration.		
3	Van	Harten,	Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	and	Public	Law	(2007),	152	and	ss.	See	also	Cosmas,	(2013),	
(n.	 2),	 1-3	 who	 referred	 to	 inconsistent	 decisions,	 lack	 of	 transparency,	 lack	 of	 impartiality	 and	
independence,	lack	of	an	appeal	mechanism	and	very	high	costs.	
	 15	
coherence.4	In	 the	 opinion	 of	 such	 Author	 none	 of	 the	 mentioned	 requirements	 is	
currently	satisfied	by	investment	arbitration.		
With	regard	to	the	first	of	such	requirements,	it	is	argued	that	arbitrators	lack	
independence	 because	 they	 depend	 from	 appointing	 authorities	 and	 prospective	
claimants	 and	 therefore	 they	 act	 in	 order	 to	 appease	 such	 people.	 Concerning	
openness,	Van	Harten	has	stated	that	the	public	does	not	have	access	to	information	
about	adjudicative	decision-making.	Accountability	is	allegedly	lacking	because	there	
are	no	appeal	methods	in	order	to	render	accountable	the	public	for	the	interpretation	
of	public	law	(i.e.	 international	investment	law).	Finally	the	incapability	of	arbitrators	
to	 resolve	 inconsistencies	 arising	 from	 conflicting	 decisions	 generates	 the	 lack	 of	
coherence	of	 investment	arbitration.	 In	 conclusion,	 the	mechanism	of	 settlement	of	
investment	 disputes	 should	 be	 reformed	 through:	 (i)	 the	 provision	 of	 an	 increased	
domestic	 scrutiny	 of	 arbitral	 awards;5	(ii)	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 permanent	 international	
investment	 court. 6 	Starting	 from	 Van	 Harten’s	 critics,	 a	 long	 debate	 on	 the	
appropriateness	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 to	 solve	 disputes	 between	 States	 and	
investors	has	taken	place.	The	last	episode	of	this	saga	has	been	the	issuance	by	the	
European	Federation	for	Investment	Law	and	Arbitration	(EFILA)	of	“A	response	to	the	
criticism	against	ISDS”,7	where	an	attempt	to	reply	to	some	of	such	criticism	has	been	
made.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 below,	 such	 attempt	 may	 be	 considered	 successful	 with	
regard	 to	 all	 the	 critics	 that	 have	been	moved	 to	 investment	 arbitration,	 unless	 the	
one	regarding	inconsistency	and	incoherence	of	investment	arbitration.	
Prior	 to	 move	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 abovementioned	 criticisms,	 it	 is	 worth	
noting	that	these	problems	have	arisen	very	recently.	Indeed,	has	it	has	been	recently	
noted,	“a	system	[i.e.	investment	arbitration],	working	quietly	in	the	background	and	
virtually	unknown	to	those	outside	this	field	fifteen	years	ago,	has	garnered	influence,	
developed	 internal	 contradictions	 and	 attracted	 political	 vitriol	 that	 threatens	 to	
destroy	 it”.8	In	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 present	 author,	 in	 fact,	 many	 of	 the	 criticisms	
directed	 to	 investment	 arbitration	 depend	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 certain	 rules	 of	
international	commercial	arbitration	(e.g.	confidentiality)	have	been	often	applied	to	
investment	 disputes,	 disregarding	 the	 circumstance	 that	 investment	 arbitration	
presents	 many	 differences	 from	 the	 classical	 private	 international	 commercial	
disputes.	 Investment	 arbitration,	 indeed,	 involves	 the	 participation	 of	 a	 State	 and,	
																																																													
4	Van	Harten	(2007)	(n.	3),	152	and	ss.	See	also	D’Agostino,	Virginia	Law	Review	(2012),	203	and	ss.,	who	
has	 talked	about	 seven	main	problems	of	 the	mechanism,	namely:	 (i)	 endless	 chain	of	 claimants;	 (ii)	
multiple	recovery;	(iii)	multiple	venues	and	forum	shopping;	(iv)	inconsistent	results;	(v)	equally	worthy	
non-parties	recovering	nothing;	(vi)	local	investors’	treatment	differs	from	that	of	foreign	investors;	and	
(vii)	 no	 closure.	 Such	 categories	 may	 be	 easily	 inserted	 in	 Van	 Harten’s	 broader	 classification.	 In	
particular	points	(i)	to	(iv)	and	(vii)	may	be	involved	in	the	lack	of	coherence,	point	(v)	and	(vi)	may	be	
categorized	as	involved	in	the	lack	of	openness	and	accountability.	
5	Van	Harten	(2007)	(n.	3),	175	and	ss.	
6	Id.,	180	and	ss.	
7	EFILA,	A	response	to	the	criticism	against	ISDS	(2015),	1	and	ss.	
8	D’Agostino,	(2012)	(n.	4),	200.	
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therefore,	 considerations	 of	 public	 interest	 are	 at	 stake.9	This	 circumstance	 renders	
inappropriate	 a	 full	 reliance	 on	 the	 rules	 of	 a	 system	 of	 adjudication	 –	 such	 as	
commercial	arbitration	–	that	is	private	and	confidential	by	definition.10	This	problem	
has	clearly	emerged	with	the	recent	growth	of	the	number	of	international	investment	
disputes.	
However,	 it	 is	 also	 true	 that	 arbitrators	 and	 academics	 are	 gradually	 finding	
answers	to	the	problems	of	investment	arbitration	through	the	adaptation	of	existing	
rules	 to	 the	 needs	 and	 features	 of	 such	 form	 of	 dispute	 settlement.	 The	 present	
author	shares	the	view	of	those	who	think	that	investment	arbitration	is	still	the	best	
mechanism	 for	 the	 settlement	of	 investment	disputes	 and	 that	 the	 solutions	 to	 the	
challenges	that	 investment	arbitration	 is	 facing	shall	be	found	within	the	same	 legal	
framework	of	investment	arbitration.11	The	following	sub-paragraphs	will	be	therefore	
aimed	 at	 demonstrating	 that	 three	 of	 the	 four	 Van	 Harten’s	 critics,	 namely	
independence,	 openness	 and	 accountability,	 are	 ill	 founded	 in	 light	 of	 the	 recent	
evolution	of	 investment	arbitration.	As	 it	will	be	seen	 in	 the	paragraph	1.4,	 the	only	
true	 critical	 point	 of	 the	mechanism	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 coherence	 generated	 by	 parallel	
proceedings.	The	rest	of	the	book	will	be	aimed	at	finding	a	solution	for	this	issue.	
	
0.1.1	 Independence	
	
	 Starting	 from	 the	 arbitrator’s	 alleged	 lack	 of	 independence,	 Van	 Harten	 has	
stated	that	it	is	“the	most	troubling	issue	that	arises	from	the	use	of	private	arbitration	
to	resolve	regulatory	disputes”.12	As	already	said,	this	is	allegedly	due	to	the	fact	that	
arbitrators	 are	 appointed	 on	 a	 case-by-case	 basis;	 from	 this	 circumstance	 it	 should	
therefore	derive	that	arbitrators	are,	by	definition,	pro-investors	biased	because	they	
would	be	willing	to	get	new	appointments.		
In	this	regard	it	should	be	first	of	all	noted	that	Van	Harten’s	statement	“is	not	
supported	 by	 any	 empirical	 evidence”. 13 	On	 the	 contrary,	 evidence	 shows	 that	
respondent	 States	 win	 the	majority	 of	 investment	 disputes.14	Perhaps	 critics	 of	 the	
																																																													
9	Mistelis,	Arbitration	International	(2005),	211.	For	an	analysis	of	the	differences	between	commercial	
and	 investment	 arbitration	 see	 Bockstiegel,	 Arbitration	 International	 (2012),	 577	 and	 ss.	 The	 Author	
focuses	 on	 the	 following	 elements	 of	 difference:	 (i)	 interests	 at	 stake;	 (ii)	 legal	 framework	 and	
applicable	 law;	 (iii)	 arbitrators	 (selection	 and	 challenge);	 (iv)	 jurisdiction;	 (v)	 case	 management;	 (vi)	
confidentiality	and	transparency;	and	(vii)	predictability	of	decisions.	
10	Mistelis,	(2005)	(n.	9),	211.	
11	Spoorenberg,	 Vinuales,	 The	 Law	 and	 Practice	 of	 International	 Courts	 and	 Tribunals	 (2009),	 91.	
Boddicker,	American	University	International	Law	Review	(2010),	1070.	This	Author,	speaking	about	the	
impossibility	of	a	global	reform	of	investment	arbitration,	has	focused	on	the	necessity	of	adapting	pre-
existing	rules	to	the	features	of	investment	arbitration.	
12	Van	Harten	(2007)	(n.	3),	167.	
13	Meyers,	 works.bepress.com/Daniel_meyers/2	 (2008),	 17.	 On	 the	 matter	 see	 also	 Schultz,	 Dupont,	
ssrn.com/abstract=2399179		(2014),	1	and	ss.	
14	EFILA	 (2015)	 (n.	 7),	 6	 and	 ss.	 In	 this	 regard	 see	 also	 Franck,	 Harvard	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	
(2009),	 440,	 who	 stated	 that	 “there	 are	 reasons	 to	 be	 cautiously	 optimistic	 about	 the	 system	 of	
investment	treaty	arbitration	and	its	relationship	with	development	variables”.	The	Author,	at	445	and	
ss.,	has	empirically	demonstrated	that	the	system	is	not	biased	against	developing	countries.		
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system	 are	 confusing	 the	 fact	 that	 Tribunals	 have	 assumed	 jurisdiction	 in	 the	 vast	
majority	 of	 the	 cases	 (even	 if	 such	 cases,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 below,	 may	 appear	 as	
abuses	of	 investment	arbitration)	with	a	pro-investor	bias.	 In	this	regard	it	should	be	
noted,	first	of	all,	that	“there	is	no	causal	link	between	a	finding	of	jurisdiction	and	an	
arbitral	 tribunal	 ultimately	 being	 pro-investor	 on	 the	 merits	 of	 the	 case”15	and,	
secondly,	that	(as	explained	in	paragraph	1.2	above)	the	same	States	have	generated	
the	abovementioned	pro-jurisdictional	approach	through	very	broad	clauses	defining	
investments	and	investors	in	BITs.16	
Moreover,	 even	 if	 one	 would	 accept	 Van	 Harten’s	 idea	 that	 investment	
arbitration	Tribunals	are	pro-investor	biased,	this	does	not	mean	that	another	forum	
would	be	 less	biased.	 In	particular,	 national	 courts	 (at	 least	 in	 several	 countries)	 are	
not	–	in	the	opinion	of	this	author	–	better	positioned	in	order	to	issue	a	decision	that	
is	by	definition	more	fair	and	neutral	than	the	one	issued	by	arbitrators.17	Indeed	“the	
problem	with	most	state	courts	is	that	they	are	not	–	or	at	least	they	are	not	perceived	
to	be	–	 sufficiently	neutral	 in	 resolving	disputes	between	 foreign	 investors	 and	host	
states”,18	nor	“the	courts	of	third	states	are…	better	placed	to	offer	effective	dispute	
settlement	 between	 investors	 and	 host	 states”.19	On	 the	 contrary,	 as	 we	 will	 see	
below,	the	possible	recourse	to	national	courts	has	been	usually	perceived	as	a	barrier	
to	the	development	of	foreign	investments.	The	protection	of	investors	through	BITs	
and	 investment	 arbitration	 has	 increased	 because	 “States	 realize[d]	 that	 by	
broadening	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 protection	 of	 investors	 and	 investments	 they	 increase	
their	chances	to	attract	FDI”.20	
Finally,	and	more	importantly,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	–	while	in	the	past,	in	
particular	 in	 ICSID	arbitration,	 arbitrator’s	 independence	and	 impartiality	have	been	
only	 rarely	 considered	 lacking	 –	 today	 the	 situation	 has	 totally	 changed.21	Indeed,	
while	 in	 the	past	 the	 requirement	of	 independence	set	 forth	by	Art.	 14	of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention 22 	has	 been	 interpreted	 as	 requiring	 an	 effective	 manifest	 lack	 of	
																																																													
15	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	11-12.	
16	Id.,	8	and	ss.	
17	In	 this	 regard	 it	 should	 instead	be	 considered	 that	 arbitrators	 have	 an	 interest	 in	 issuing	 a	 fair	 and	
neutral	award	considering	that	they	have	their	own	reputation	to	protect.	See	Meyers	(2008)	(n.	13),	14.	
18	Brower,	Schill,	Chicago	Journal	of	International	Law	(2009),	479.	
19	Ibid.	
20	EFILA	(2015),	(n.	7),	8.	
21	See,	inter	alia,	Sheppard,	in	The	Oxford	Handbook	on	International	Investment	Law	(2008),	131	and	ss.,	
Bernasconi-Osterwalder,	 Johnson,	 Marshall	 (2010),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Giorgetti	 (2014),	 Horn,	 New	 York	
University	Journal	of	Law	and	Business	(2014),	349	and	ss.,	Karadelis	(2014).	
22	On	 the	 issue	 of	 disqualification,	 Article	 57	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 provides	 that	 “a	 party	 may	
propose	to	a	commission	or	tribunal	the	disqualification	of	any	of	its	members	on	account	of	any	fact	
indicating	a	manifest	lack	of	the	qualities	required	by	paragraph	(1)	of	Article	14.	A	party	to	arbitration	
proceedings	may,	 in	addition,	propose	the	disqualification	of	an	arbitrator	on	the	ground	that	he	was	
ineligible	for	appointment	to	the	Tribunal.’	(Emphasis	added).	
Article	 58	 of	 ICSID	 Convention	 further	 provides	 that	 the	 decision	 to	 disqualify	 an	 arbitrator	 shall	 be	
taken	 by	 the	 other	members	 of	 the	 tribunal,	 however	where	 the	 disqualification	 proposal	 involves	 a	
sole	arbitrator	or	a	majority	of	them,	or	where	the	co-arbitrator	cannot	agree,	the	Chairman	of	 ICSID	
Administrative	Council	should	decide.	
	 18	
independence	and	 impartiality,23	now	the	threshold	has	been	 lowered:	an	appearance	
of	 manifest	 lack	 is	 considered	 sufficient. 24 	This	 circumstance	 renders	 the	 ICSID	
threshold	more	similar	to	the	ones	set	forth	by	the	UNCITRAL	Rules25	and	by	the	IBA	
Guidelines	on	Conflicts	of	Interest	in	International	Arbitration,26	whose	threshold	was	
lower	than	the	one	established	by	ICSID	Tribunals.	
	 0.1.2	 Openness	
																																																													
23	See,	e.g.,	Amco	v.	Indonesia,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/1,	Decision	on	Disqualification	of	24	June	1982,	
reported	 in	 Reisman,	 Craig,	 Park,	 Paulsson,	 International	 Commercial	 Arbitration	 (1997),	 624-631,	
where	it	has	been	said	that	the	mere	feeling	of	“non	reliability”	does	not	suffice,	Universal	Compression	
v.	Venezuela,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/10/9,	Decision	on	the	Proposal	to	Disqualify	Prof.	Brigitte	Stern	and	
Prof.	 Guido	 Santiago	 Tawil,	 Arbitrators,	 20	 May	 2011,	 and	 Suez,	 Sociedad	 General	 de	 Aguas	 de	
Barcelona	S.A.,	and	Vivendi	Universal	S.A.	v.	Argentina	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/19,	Decision	on	a	Second	
Proposal	for	the	Disqualification	of	a		Member	of	the	Arbitral	Tribunal,	12	May	2008.	
24	See	 Burlington	 Resources	 Inc.	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Ecuador,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/08/5,	 Decision	 on	 the	
Proposal	 for	 Disqualification	 of	 Professor	 Francisco	 Orrego	 Vicuna,	 13	 December	 2013,	 Blue	 Bank	
International	 &	 Trust	 (Barbados)	 Ltd.	 v.	 Bolivarian	 Republic	 of	 Venezuela,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/12/20,	
Decision	 on	 the	 Parties’	 Proposal	 to	 Disqualify	 a	 Majority	 of	 the	 Tribunal,	 12	 November	 2013,	 and,	
finally,	Caratube	International	Oil	Company	LLP	&	Mr	Devincci	Salah	Hourani	v.	Republic	of	Kazakhstan,	
ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/13/13,	Decision	on	the	Proposal	for	Disqualification	of	Mr.	Bruno	Boesch,	20	March	
2014,	that	has	been	the	first	ICSID	case	in	which	the	disqualification	of	an	arbitrator	has	been	decided	
by	the	two	other	panellists.	
25	Under	 the	UNCITRAL	 Rules,	 Articles	 11-13	 deal	with	 the	 disclosure	 obligation	 and	 challenge	 of	 an	
arbitrator.	Article	 11	 requires	 the	 arbitrator	when	approached	 for	 a	 possible	 appointment	 to	disclose	
any	circumstance	 likely	to	give	rise	to	 justifiable	doubts	as	to	his	or	her	 impartiality	or	 independence.	
The	obligation	 to	disclose	 to	 the	parties	and	the	other	arbitrators	 is	a	continuing	one	which	 is	 to	 last	
throughout	 the	 arbitration	 proceeding.	 Article	 12,	 inter	 alia,	 provides	 that	 “an	 arbitrator	 may	 be	
challenged,	if	circumstance	exist	that	give	rise	to	justifiable	doubts	as	to	the	arbitrator’s	impartiality	or	
independence.”	Further,	Article	12(3)	provides	that	an	arbitrator	that	fails	to	act,	or	in	the	event	of	the	
de	 jure	 or	 de	 facto	 impossibility	 of	 performing	 his	 or	 her	 function,	 the	 procedure	 in	 respect	 to	 the	
challenge	of	an	arbitrator	contained	in	Article	13	shall	apply.	Article	13	provides	for	the	time	line	within	
which	a	notice	of	challenge	to	the	appointment	of	an	arbitrator	is	to	be	made.	It	further	provides	that	
when	this	notice	is	made,	all	the	parties	may	agree	to	the	challenge	and	consequentially	the	arbitrator	
may	withdraw	from	his	or	her	office.	It	is	however	provided	that	this	is	not	to	imply	acceptance	of	the	
validity	of	the	grounds	of	challenge.	
26	Under	 the	 general	 standard	 regarding	 impartiality,	 independence	 and	 disclosure,	 the	 IBA	 General	
Principle	stipulates	that	“every	arbitrator	shall	be	impartial	and	independent	of	the	parties	at	the	time	
of	accepting	an	appointment	to	serve	and	shall	remain	so	during	the	entire	arbitration	proceeding	until	
a	 final	 award	 has	 been	 rendered	 or	 the	 proceeding	 has	 otherwise	 finally	 terminated.”	 The	 General	
Standard	2(a)	provides	that,	“an	arbitrator	shall	decline	to	accept	an	appointment	or,	if	the	arbitration	
ha[s]	already	commenced,	refuse	to	continue	to	act	as	an	arbitrator	if	he	or	she	has	any	doubts	as	to	his	
or	her	ability	to	be	impartial	or	independent.”	   General	Standard	2(b)	stipulates	that	“the	same	principle	
applies	if	facts	or	circumstance	exist,	or	have	arisen	since	the	appointment,	that	from	a	reasonable	third	
person[’s]	point	of	view	having	knowledge	of	the	relevant	facts,	give	rise	to	 justifiable	doubts	as	to	the	
arbitrator’s	 impartiality	or	 independence,	unless	the	parties	have	accepted	the	arbitrator	in	accordance	
with	the	requirement	set	out	in	General	Standard	(4)”	(emphasis	added).	General	Standard	2(c)	explains	
that	 doubts	 are	 justifiable	 if	 a	 reasonable	 and	 informed	 third	 party	would	 reach	 the	 conclusion	 that	
there	was	a	likelihood	that	the	arbitrator	may	be	influenced	by	factors	other	than	the	merit	of	the	case	
as	presented	by	the	parties	in	reaching	his	or	her	decision.	Further	General	Standard	2(d)	clarifies	that	
justifiable	 doubts	 necessarily	 exist	 as	 to	 the	 arbitrator’s	 impartiality	 or	 independence	 if	 there	 is	 an	
identity	between	a	party	and	the	arbitrator;	 if	 the	arbitrator	 is	a	 legal	 representative	of	a	 legal	entity	
that	is	a	party	in	the	arbitration,	or	if	the	arbitrator	has	a	significant	financial	or	personal	interest	in	the	
matter	at	stake.	
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The	second	criticism	that	has	been	moved	to	 investment	arbitration	 is	that	 it	
prohibits	 that	 the	 public	 has	 “access	 to	 information	 about	 adjudicative	 decision	
making” 27 	and	 therefore	 it	 is	 not	 transparent.	 As	 a	 consequence	 investment	
arbitration	 is	 “immune	 from	public	 scrutiny	 and	 [this	 causes	 that]	matters	 affecting	
the	community	at	large	could	be	routinely	decided	in	secret”.28	
This	 criticism	 does	 not	 keep	 into	 account	 the	 current	 strong	 tendency	 of	
investment	 arbitration	 towards	 transparency.29 	This	 is	 manifested	 by	 two	 main	
elements,	namely,	the	publication	of	the	awards,	and	the	amici	curiae’s	involvement	in	
the	proceedings.		
The	movement	 towards	 transparency	 has	 culminated	 in	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	
2014	 UNCITRAL	 Rules	 on	 Transparency	 and	 the	 publication	 in	 2015	 of	 the	 United	
Nations	 Convention	 on	 Transparency	 in	 Treaty-based	 Investor-State	 Arbitration	
(providing,	at	certain	conditions,	for	the	automatic	application	of	the	UNCITRAL	Rules	
on	Transparency).30	According	to	the	UNCITRAL	rules	the	vast	majority	of	information	
regarding	an	 investment	arbitration	case	will	be	publicly	available	and	electronically	
stored.31	The	UNCITRAL	Rules	on	Transparency	have	been	already	adopted,	inter	alia,	
by	Art.	X.33	of	the	negotiated	text	of	the	EU	Canada	Free	Trade	Agreement	(i.e.	the	
Comprehensive	Trade	and	Economic	Agreement	(CETA)).32	
Generally	 speaking,	 the	 fact	 that	 investment	 disputes	 involve	 States	 and	
general	public	 interest	has	shifted	“the	emphasis	 from	privacy	and	confidentiality	to	
knowledge	 and	 accountability.	 Knowledge	 implies	 the	 use	 of	 specialist	 expertise	 in	
the	 form	 of	 amicus	 briefs	 and	 consequently	 limited	 confidentiality,	 while	
accountability	 more	 or	 less	 mandates	 the	 publication	 of	 awards	 and	 arbitration	 at	
even	the	interim	stages	of	procedure”.33	It	can	be	therefore	shared	the	opinion	of	who	
has	stated	that,	notwithstanding	the	fact	 that	“the	 ICSID	Convention	and	most	BITs	
say	 little	 or	 nothing	 on	 whether	 the	 proceedings	 and	 awards	 shall	 be	 treated	 as	
confidential…	 in	 practice,	 today,	 little	 confidentiality	 is	 left	 in	 investment	
arbitration”. 34 	This	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 “the	 most	 striking	 difference	 between	
commercial	and	investment	arbitration”.35	
																																																													
27	Van	Harten	(2007)	(n.	3),	159.	
28	Ibid.,	161.	
29	See	 EFILA	 (2015)	 (n.	 7),	 14	 and	 ss.	 In	 this	 regard	 it	 is	 also	worth	 to	mention	 the	 International	 Law	
Institute,	Tokyo	Session,	Resolution	of	13	September	2013,	article	6	of	which	recognizes	the	importance	
of	transparency	and	amici	curiae	in	investment	arbitration.	
30	Opened	 for	 signature	 in	Port	Louis,	Mauritius,	on	 17	March	2015,	 and	 thereafter	 at	United	Nations	
Headquarters	 in	New	York	by	any	 (a)	State;	or	 (b)	 regional	economic	 integration	organization	 that	 is	
constituted	 by	 States	 and	 is	 a	 contracting	 party	 to	 an	 investment	 treaty.	 At	 the	 present	 date	 the	
Convention	has	16	signatory	States.	
31	See	Wilkie,	kluwerarbitrationblog.com	(2013).	
32	Available	at	http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf.	
33	Mistelis	(2005)	(n.	9),	211.	
34	Bockstiegel	(2012)	(n.	9),	586.	
35	Ibid.,	587.	In	this	regard	it	should	be	mentioned	Article	29	of	the	US	Model	BIT	which	impose	that	all	
memorials,	 minutes,	 orders,	 hearings	 and	 awards	 of	 the	 tribunal	 shall	 be	 open	 to	 the	 public.	 This	
practice	is	quite	developed	in	NAFTA	and	CAFTA	countries.	See	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	14-15.	With	regard	
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In	 parallel	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 today	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 investment	 awards	 are	
public,36	it	 shall	 be	 mentioned	 that	 today	 many	 “voluntary	 third	 parties	 seek	 to	
participate	 in	 a	 specific	 investment	 arbitration	 dispute	 in	 order	 to	 provide	 a	 neutral	
and	 a	 well	 supported	 opinion	 regarding	 an	 issue	 of	 public	 concern”.37	Such	 third	
parties,	 usually	 NGOs,	 are	 known	 as	 amici	 curiae.38	The	 involvement	 of	 amici	 in	
investment	arbitration	–	and	in	particular	in	disputes	regarding	common	goods	–	has	
“supported	 the	 development	 of	 transparency	 in	 investment	 arbitration,	 by	 enabling	
issues	 concerning	 general	 public	 interest	 to	 be	 considered	 within	 the	 arbitral	
process”.39	
In	conclusion	it	can	be	said	that	the	recent	evolution	of	investment	arbitration	
can	be	considered	as	a	de	facto	reply	to	criticism	related	to	the	openness	of	such	form	
of	dispute	resolution.40	
	
0.1.3	 Accountability	
	
With	regard	to	this	requirement,	 it	 is	argued	that	investment	arbitration	does	
not	allow	a	party	to	appeal	an	award	for	matters	regarding	legal	interpretation	and	it	
is	therefore	not	accountable	to	the	public.41	
Concerning	 this	 aspect,	 the	 EFILA	 response	 limits	 itself	 to	 saying	 that	
“investment	treaty	arbitration	contains	a	number	of	different	control	mechanisms	to	
ensure	accountability”.42	The	present	author	shares	such	view;	it	is	however	worth	to	
give	a	brief	explanation	of	the	reasons	for	which	accountability	shall	not	be	considered	
a	problem	in	investment	arbitration.	
First	 of	 all,	 as	 it	 has	been	noted,	 all	 ICSID	arbitrations	 are	 subject	 to	 the	 self	
contained	 mechanism	 of	 review	 given	 by	 articles	 50	 and	 followings	 of	 the	 1965	
Washington	Convention,43	while	ad	hoc	 arbitrations	are	 still	 subject	 to	 challenges	at	
the	 courts	 of	 the	 seat	 and	 to	 the	 provision	 of	 article	 V	 of	 the	 1958	 New	 York	
Convention,	concerning	the	refusal	to	enforce	an	international	arbitration	award.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
to	the	 issue	of	confidentiality,	see	Bywater	Gauff	 (Tanzania)	Ltd.	v.	United	Republic	of	Tanzania,	 ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/05/22,	Procedural	Order	No.	3,	29	September	2006.	
36	See	Mistelis	(2005)	(n.	9),	218,	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	16.	
37	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	15.	
38	See	Mistelis	 (2005)	 (n.	9),	220	and	ss.,	Bastin,	Cambridge	Journal	of	 International	and	Comparative	
Law	(2012),	208	and	ss.,	Fach	Gomez,	Fordham	International	Law	Journal	(2012),	510	and	ss.	As	arbitral	
awards	 regarding	 the	 amicus	 curiae	 figure,	 see	 Bywater	 Gauff	 (Tanzania)	 Ltd.	 v.	 United	 Republic	 of	
Tanzania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/22,	Procedural	Order	No.	5,	2	February	2007,	Suez,	Sociedad	General	
de	Aguas	de	Barcelona	S.A.,	and	Vivendi	Universal	S.A.	v.	Argentina	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/19,	Order	in	
Response	to	a	Petition	for	Transparency	and	Participation	as	Amicus	Curiae,	19	May	2005.	
39	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	16.	
40	For	 an	 opinion	 against	 transparency	 in	 arbitration	 see	 Sabater,	 Berkeley	 Journal	 Int’l	 L.	 Publicist	
(2010),	47	and	ss.	
41	Van	Harten	(2007)	 (n.	3),	154.	Problems	related	to	the	control	mechanism	in	the	 ICSID	system	have	
been	analysed	by	Reisman,	Duke	Law	Journal	(1990),	740	and	ss.	
42	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	14.	
43	See	Meyers	(2008)	(n.	13),	14.		
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Secondly,	“the	potential	for	errors	of	law	is,	to	a	certain	degree,	minimized	by	
the	special	concern	that	arbitrators	in	the	ITA	system	–	as	opposed	to	tenured	judges	
–	have	their	own	reputation”44	to	be	protected.	
Finally,	and	most	importantly,	those	who	criticize	the	lack	of	accountability	of	
investment	 arbitration	 seem	 to	 forget	 that	 –	 when	 the	 parties	 choose	 to	 refer	 to	
arbitration	in	general	and	to		investment	arbitration	in	particular	–	they	are	opting	for	
a	 one-stop	 adjudication.	 In	 transnational	 commerce	 (and,	 therefore,	 also	 in	
investment	 disputes)	 parties	 are	 commercial	 people,	 wanting	 only	 one	 means	 of	
dispute	 resolution.45	When	 referring	 to	 arbitration,	 parties	 are	 looking	 for	 a	 neutral,	
effective	and	extremely	qualified	means	of	dispute	resolution,	without	having	regard	
to	 the	 future	 involvement	 of	 national	 courts	 and	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 rendering	 the	
public	 accountable	 of	 the	 dispute	 (that	 is	 anyway	 ensured	 by	 the	 growing	
transparency	in	 investment	arbitration	analysed	in	paragraph	1.3.2	above).	This	 is,	 in	
effect,	what	investment	arbitration	grants	to	the	parties.	
	
0.2 Systemic	 features	 in	 investment	 arbitration:	 a	 network	 needing	 internal	
coherence	
	
The	 fourth	 criticism	 that	 is	 moved	 to	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 most	 strictly	
related	 to	 the	 issue	of	parallel	 proceedings.	 It	 is	 indeed	argued	 that	 investment	 law	
and	 arbitration	 lack	 internal	 coherence	 and	 consistency,	 i.e.	 the	 “capability	 of	 an	
adjudicative	system	to	resolve	inconsistencies	that	arise	from	different	decisions,	and	
to	ensure	that	the	law	is	interpreted	in	a	uniform	and	relatively	predictable	manner	to	
allow	those	affected	by	the	rules	to	plan	their	conduct”.46	
In	the	opinion	of	the	present	author,	prior	to	talk	about	a	lack	of	coherence	and	
consistency,	one	should	ascertain	whether,	in	investment	arbitration,	a	certain	degree	
of	orderliness	is	required	and	therefore	if	coherence	and	consistency	shall	be	ensured.	
In	fact,	if	it	is	ascertained	that	systemic	features	-	even	if	at	an	embryonic	status	-	are	
lacking,	 investment	 arbitration	 tribunals	 will	 appear	 (and,	 actually,	 shall	 be	
considered)	 only	 as	 unrelated	 entities	 which	 move	 in	 different	 directions	 without	
caring	 of	 each	 other	 and	 not	 needing	 any	 sort	 of	 interaction.	 It	 will	 be	 therefore	
useless	to	search	for	ways	for	ensuring	consistency	between	arbitral	awards	by	means	
of	an	effective	management	of	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
																																																													
44	Ibid.	
45	In	this	regard	see	Sulamerica	CIA	Nacional	de	Seguros	SA	v.	Enessa	Engenharia	SA,	 I	Lloyd’s	Rep	275	
(2012).	 See	 also	 Fiona	 Trust	 v.	 Privalov,	 UKHL	 40	 (2007),	 where	 it	 has	 been	 said	 that	 there	 exist	 a	
presumption	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 one-stop	 arbitration.	 The	 House	 of	 Lords	 excluded	 the	 possibility	 that	 a	
commercial	party	would	create	a	system	involving	various	steps	for	the	same	dispute.	
46	Van	Harten	(2007)	(n.	3),	164.	The	same	Author,	at	165,	has	explained	that	this	problem	is	not	limited	
to	investment	treaty	arbitration,	but	regards	international	law	in	general.	According	to	its	critic	“at	the	
international	level,	the	challenge	of	coherence	confronts	all	treaty-based	adjudication”,	because	there	
is	no	hierarchical	structure	and	therefore	in	international	investment	arbitration	a	point	of	synthesis	is	
lacking.	
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As	a	preliminary	remark,	it	shall	be	noted	that	there	is	no	agreement	even	on	
the	definition	of	a	 legal	 system.47	It	 is	 therefore	possible	 that	 investment	arbitration	
might	be	considered	as	a	system	according	to	certain	definitions	but	not	according	to	
other	 definitions.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 consideration	 (and	 of	 the	 circumstance	 that	 the	
present	book	 is	not	a	study	on	 legal	 theory),	we	will	not	give	here	an	answer	on	the	
question	 whether	 international	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 a	 system.	 The	 present	
paragraph	will	only	try	to	ascertain	the	existence	of	systemic	 features	 in	 investment	
arbitration,	in	order	to	determine	–	if	such	features	will	be	found	–	whether	a	certain	
degree	 of	 coherence	 and	 consistency	 between	 investment	 arbitration	 awards	 is	
required	 and	 therefore	 if	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 is	
necessary.	
For	reasons	of	simplicity	we	will	adopt	as	a	parameter	only	one	definition	for	
the	word	“system”,	which	seems	to	be	broad	enough	to	constitute	a	point	of	reference	
for	 the	 present	 research.	 According	 to	 Yuval	 Shany,	 “a	 system	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	
purposeful	 arrangement	 or	 constellation	 of	 inter-related	 elements	 or	 components,	
which	 cannot	 accurately	 be	 described	 and	 understood	 in	 isolation	 from	 one	
another”.48	In	this	regard,	it	shall	be	highlighted	that	the	word	“system”	is	very	often	
used	improperly	with	regard	to	international	investment	law:	rather	than	using	it	with	
the	meaning	indicated	above,	several	Authors	talk	about	“the	investment	arbitration	
system”	 or	 the	 “ISDS	 system”	 just	 referring	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 dispute	 resolution,	
regardless	 of	 an	 analysis	 of	 whether	 actually	 there	 are	 systemic	 features	 in	
international	investment	law	and	arbitration.	The	common	referral	the	word	“system”	
that	many	Authors	make,	therefore,	is	not	an	indication	of	the	existence	of	a	system	
in	its	proper	meaning.	
Several	 scholars	 have	 tried	 to	 understand	 if	 investment	 arbitration	 may	 be	
qualified	as	a	system.49	Some	Authors	have	expressed	the	opinion	that	 international	
investment	 law	 is	 a	 system,50 	others	 have	 declared	 that	 it	 is	 a	 sub-system	 of	
international	law,51	and	others	have	stated	that	there	is	no	system	at	all.52		
																																																													
47	Shany,	 The	 Competing	 Jurisdictions	 of	 International	 Courts	 and	 Tribunals	 (2003),	 	 87	 and	 ss.,	 has	
examined	 the	 theories	of	 several	 very	authoritative	 scholars,	 such	as	Hart,	Kelsen,	Raz,	Romano	and	
Abi-Saab.	The	reference	goes	to	Hart,	The	Concept	of	Law	(1994),	Kelsen,	Introduction	to	the	Problem	of	
Legal	 Theory	 (1934),	 Raz,	A	 Concept	 of	 a	 Legal	 System,	 Romano,	L’ordinamento	 giuridico	 (1917),	 Abi-
Saab,	Recueil	des	Cours	(1996).	
48Ibid.,	87.		
49	The	question	has	arisen	also	with	regard	to	international	law.	In	this	regard	see	Shany	(2003)	(n.	47),	
87	 and	 ss.,	 who	 has	 concluded	 for	 the	 orderliness	 of	 international	 law	 notwithstanding	 the	
fragmentation	 of	 the	 judiciary,	 and	Abi	 Saab,	New	York	University	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 and	
Politics	 (2009)	 921	 and	 924.	 This	 Author	 argues	 that	 “we	 do	 not	 seem	 to	 have	 a	 ‘judicial	 system’,	
properly	so-called	in	international	law”	but	that	“it	is	true	that	occasionally	some	vague	lineaments	of	a	
structure	become	perceptible”.	See	also	T.	Franck,	The	American	Journal	of	 International	Law	(1988),	
705	and	ss.,	Kumm,	European	Journal	of	International	Law	(2004),	907	and	ss.	
50	Schill,	 Virginia	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 (2011),	 94,	 stated	 that	 “there	 are	 several	 factors	
suggesting	that	international	investment	treaties	are	not	bilateral	treaties	in	the	sense	of	quid	pro	quo	
bargains	 between	 two	 countries,	 but	 rather	 form	 part	 of	 a	 treaty-overarching	 system	 of	 investment	
protection	 –	 in	 other	words,	 a	 framework	 that	 is	multilateral	 in	 nature	 even	 though	 it	 has	 taken	 the	
form	of	bilateral	treaties”.	The	same	Author,	in	the	Inaugural	Conference	of	the	Society	of	International	
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The	 starting	 point	 for	 the	 discussion	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 arbitral	 tribunal	 are	
constituted	on	an	ad	hoc	basis.	If	this	is	true,	as	a	matter	of	principle,	their	task	should	
be	 only	 to	 resolve	 the	 dispute	 at	 hand,	without	 caring	 about	 the	 decisions	 of	 other	
Tribunals,	 even	 though	 on	 the	 same	 matter.53	This	 explains	 why	 an	 authoritative	
scholar	said	that	“in	international	law,	every	tribunal	is	a	self-contained	system	(unless	
otherwise	 provided).	 Consequently	 there	 are	 no	 general	 rules	 by	 which	 to	 sort	
questions	of	coordination	and	conflict.	Theses	questions	are	to	be	solved	within	each	
‘self	contained	system’	–	in	other	words,	within	the	context	of	the	international	court	
or	 tribunal	 in	 which	 the	 case	 has	 been	 brought”.54	The	 circumstance	 that	 every	
tribunal	is	constituted	ad	hoc	is	therefore	the	first	argument	against	the	existence	of	a	
system.55	
The	 second	 argument	 against	 the	 possible	 existence	 of	 a	 system	 is	 the	 fact	
that	 international	 investments	 are	 today	 regulated	 by	 a	 “chaotic	 and	 unsystematic	
aggregate”56	of	Bilateral	 Investment	Treaties.	 “Rather	 than	constituting	a	consistent	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Economic	Law	(2008),	3,	has	talked	about	a	“truly	multilateral	system”	and,	in	The	Multilateralization	of	
International	 Investment	 Law	 (2009),	 278,	 of	 an	 “autopoietic,	 self	 referential	 and	 normatively	 closed	
system	of	 law,	that	overarches	the	myriad	of	bilateral	 investment	treaty	relations,	unites	them	under	
common	principles	 governing	 international	 investment	 relations	 and	 contributes	 to	providing	 a	 legal	
framework	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 the	 global	 economic	 system”.	 See	 also	 Salacuse,	 in	 Making	
Transnational	Law	Work	in	the	Global	Economy	(2010),	430,	who	has	talked	about	a	“regime”.	Finally,	
see	Alvarez,	Recueil	des	Cours	(2009),	193-544	and	Hansen,	Modern	Law	Review	(2010),	526-527.	 It	 is	
worth	noting	that	McLachlan,	Lis	Pendens	in	International	Litigation	 (2009),	75,	has	gone	even	further,	
stating	 “it	 is	probably	no	 longer	an	exaggeration	 to	 say	 that	 international	commercial	 arbitration	has	
become	 its	own	 legal	 system”	 (emphasis	added).	This	position	seems	to	be	unacceptable,	due	to	 the	
lack	of	any	systemic	feature	in	commercial	arbitration.	
51	Savarese,	 La	 nozione	 di	 giurisdizione	 nel	 sistema	 ICSID	 (2012),	 233,	 Di	 Benedetto,	 International	
Investment	Law	and	the	Environment	(2013),	22	and	ss.	seems	to	espouse	this	second	theory.	This	last	
author,	 at	 43,	 criticizes	 Schill’s	 position	 saying	 that	 “the	 thesis	 claiming	 that	 investment	 rules	 have	
already	 been	 harmonized	 and	 multilateralized	 would	 appear	 to	 be	 somewhat	 premature	 (…)	 [and]	
would	 risk	 fostering	 a	 view	 of	 this	 subsystem	 of	 law	 as	 being	 detached	 from	 international	 law	 as	 a	
whole,	and	would	thus	ultimately	lead	to	characterizing	international	investment	law	and	arbitration	as	
a	 self-contained	 regime”.	 Finally,	 at	 42,	 Di	 Benedetto	 says	 that	 Schill	 “underlined	 the	 fact	 that	
investment	 tribunals	 have	 frequently	 referred	 to	 past	 decisions	 and	 awards,	 each	 of	 them	 usually	
applying	different	IIAs,	but	disregards	their	equally	important	tendency	to	refer	to	the	case	law	of	non-
investment	tribunals	and	courts.	On	this	last	subject	see	Pellet,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2013),	223	and	ss.	
52	Vadi,	Manchester	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	(2011),	24.	
53	Di	Benedetto	(2013)	(n.	51),	22-23,	talks	about	a	“patchwork”	of	“a	multiplicity	of	autonomous	legal	
instruments	 and,	 by	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 settlement	 of	 investment	 disputes	 by	 independent	
investment	tribunals”.	For	this	reason	“rules	or	principles	belonging	to	different	regimes	may	apply	to	
the	same	matter	in	a	potentially	conflicting	way”.	
54	Treves,	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	(1999),	809.	
55	Savarese	(2012)	(n.	51),	232.	Shany	(2003)	(n.	47),	86,	 In	this	regard	has	stated	that	“it	 is	possible	to	
imagine	 a	 body	 of	 norms	which	 constitutes	 a	 coherent	 legal	 system	 but	 is	 being	 applied	 by	 judicial	
bodies	 that	 do	 not	 form	 a	 meaningful	 judicial	 system.	 Hence,	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 halfway	 model,	
whereby	 judicial	 bodies	 are	 only	 loosely	 related	 to	 each	 other,	 mainly	 through	 their	 reference	 to	 a	
common	normative	system,	must	also	be	explored”.	In	this	regard,	note	that	McLachlan,	Lis	Pendens	in	
International	Litigation	(2010),	254,	has	stated	that	“in	public	international	law	it	is	possible	to	take	as	a	
point	 of	 departure	 the	 proposition	 that,	 however	 disparate	may	 the	 jurisdictions	 of	 particular	 courts	
and	tribunals,	they	all	ultimately	owe	their	origin	to	a	single	legal	system.	They	are	creatures	of	treaty.	
Treaties	only	gain	their	force	by	virtue	of	the	existence	of	a	general	legal	system”.	
56	Schill,	www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-Conference.html		(2008),	2.	
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and	coherent	system	of	law,	one	would	[therefore]	expect	an	extreme	divergence	and	
fragmentation	in	this	area	of	international	cooperation”.57	
However,	even	if	the	above	arguments	are	well	founded	and	reflect	part	of	the	
reality	with	 regard	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 orderliness	 in	 investment	 law	 and	 arbitration,	 it	 is	
also	 true	 that	 there	are	other	 characteristics	of	 this	area	of	 international	 law,	which	
can	be	properly	seen	as	systemic	features.	The	reference	goes,	in	particular,	to:	(i)	the	
strict	 correlation	 (that	 may	 be	 often	 equalized	 to	 a	 complete	 overlap)	 existing	
between	 the	 standards	 contained	 in	 almost	 all	 existing	 BITs;	 and	 (ii)	 the	 so-called	
“taking	 into	account	approach”	with	 regard	 to	 the	 issue	of	precedent	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	
With	regard	to	the	first	aspect,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	“these	treaties	[i.e.	
BITs]	 contain	a	wide	variety	of	often	broadly	worded,	cross-referencing	provisions	–	
making	 for	 a	 ‘spaghetti	 bowl’	 of	 investment	 agreements	 imposing	 overlapping	
obligations	from	which	it	is	difficult	to	distil	clear-cut	rules	for	application	in	individual	
cases”.58	In	 fact,	 “what	 one	 can	 observe	 is	 a	 convergence,	 not	 a	 divergence	 in	
structure,	 scope	 and	 content	 of	 existing	 investment	 treaties.	 Unlike	 genuinely	
bilateral	 treaties,	 BITs	 do	 not	 stand	 isolated	 in	 governing	 the	 relation	 between	 two	
States:	 they	 rather	 develop	 multiple	 overlaps	 and	 structural	 interconnections	 that	
create	 a	 relatively	 uniform	 and	 treaty-overarching	 regime	 for	 international	
investments”	 (emphasis	 added).59	It	 is	 in	 fact	 true	 that	 some	 BIT	 provisions	 and	
standards	of	protection,	such	as	the	fair	and	equitable	treatment,	the	most	favoured	
nation,	the	full	protection	and	security	and	the	arbitration	clause	are	present	in	almost	
all	BITs	and	they	cannot	be	seen	in	isolation	from	each	other.	Moreover,	the	wording	
of	such	clauses	is	usually	very	simple	and	broad,	so	that	the	real	content	of	the	various	
standards	 has	 been	 determined	 by	 the	 case	 law	 and	 the	 interpretation	 by	 arbitral	
tribunals.	It	is	therefore	worth	sharing	the	opinion	of	who	has	stated	that	“investment	
treaties	 are	 a	 ‘network’	 of	 inter-related	 provisions,	 notwithstanding	 the	 formal	
autonomy	 of	 each	 treaty	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 other	 treaties.	 Such	 inter-relation	 is	
realized	 through	 two	 phenomena.	 On	 one	 side	 investment	 treaties	 are	 based	 on	 a	
structure	 and	 on	 clauses,	 which	 are	 repeated	 in	 all	 treaties	with	 very	 similar,	 if	 not	
identical,	modalities.	On	the	other	side,	by	means	of	the	most	favoured	nation	clause,	
several	structural	and	not	occasional	recalls	operate	between	the	various	treaties,	so	
that	investors	may	rely	on	uniform	standards	of	protection”	(emphasis	added).60	
																																																													
57	Ibid.	
58	Bekker,	Harvard	Journal	of	International	Law	Online	(2013),	5.	
59	Schill	(2008)	(n.	56),	3.	
60	Savarese	 (2012)	 (n.	 51),	 26.	 The	 concept	 of	 network	 has	 been	 used	 also	 by	 Franck,	 Fordham	 Law	
Review	(2005),	1523	and	1546,	by	Salacuse,	in	Appeals	Mechanism	in	International	Investment	Disputes	
(2008),	 7	 and	 –	with	 particular	 emphasis	 –	 by	Geiger,	Appeals	Mechanism	 in	 International	 Investment	
Disputes	(2008),	18	and	ss.	This	Author	has	demonstrated	that	there	is	a	certain	degree	of	convergence	
in	investment	protection	provisions	and	that	“investment	treaties	provide	a	strong	signal	that	investors	
can	rely	on	the	existence	of	international	law	obligations.	On	the	meaning	of	the	most	favoured	nation	
clause	 see	 Faya-Rodriguez,	 Joubin-Bret,	 UNCTAD	 Series	 on	 Issues	 in	 International	 Investment	
Agreements	II	(2010),	1	and	ss.,	Parker,	The	Arbitration	Brief	(2012),	30	and	ss.,	Houde,	OECD	Papers	on	
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Regarding	the	existence	of	a	system	of	precedent	in	 international	 investment	
arbitration,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 this	 is	 one	 of	 the	 recently	 most	 debated	 issues	
regarding	 this	 form	 of	 dispute	 settlement.	 In	 order	 to	 discuss	 about	 precedent	 in	
arbitration	it	is	worth	making	a	preliminary	reference	to	the	recourse	to	precedent	in	
national	 law	systems.	Usually	 the	 referral	 to	 “precedent”	 is	 intended	as	a	 referral	 to	
the	common	law	doctrine	of	stare	decisis,	i.e.	“the	obligation	to	follow	prior	decisions	
even	 those	 the	 judge	 disagrees	 with”. 61 	Civil	 law	 countries,	 on	 the	 contrary,	
historically	have	not	had	a	strong	doctrine	of	precedent	and	have	mainly	focused	on	
the	concept	of	“jurisprudence	constante”.	According	to	this	theory,	the	starting	point	
for	 a	 judge	 in	 making	 a	 decision	 shall	 be	 the	 codified	 law;	 “secondarily,	 but	 not	
insignificantly,	 tribunals	 would	 next	 turn	 to	 the	 decisions	 of	 other	 tribunals	
considering	identical	or	similar	treaty	language”.62	Hence,	in	common	law	jurisdictions	
precedents	 should	 have	 binding	 force,	while	 in	 civil	 law	 countries	 they	 should	 have	
only	 a	 persuasive	 authority.	 In	 this	 regard	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	we	 are	 currently	
assisting	 to	a	progressive	 convergence	of	 the	 common	and	civil	 law	 systems.63	As	 it	
has	been	noted	“common	law	countries	renounced	to	a	very	rigid	idea	of	precedent,	
while,	 symmetrically,	 civil	 law	 jurisdictions	 have	 developed	 a	 less	 reductive	 idea	 of	
it”.64	What	is	therefore	emerging	from	an	analysis	of	national	law	systems	is	a	duty	for	
judges	to	consider	precedents,	known	as	“taking	into	account	approach”.	
Furthermore,	 two	 other	 clarifications	 are	 required.	 First	 of	 all,	 when	we	 talk	
about	 precedent	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 we	 refer	 to	 horizontal	 stare	 decisis.	 This	
means	 that	we	are	not	considering	a	hierarchical	 relationship	between	 international	
courts	 and	 tribunals	 and	 the	 consequent	 duty	 to	 follow	 the	 decisions	 of	 the	
hierarchically	 higher	 one,	 but	 only	 a	 horizontal	 relationship	 in	 which	 courts	 and	
tribunals	follow	the	ratio	decidendi	of	each	other	due	to	the	similarity	of	the	issues	at	
hand.65	Furthermore,	 we	 are	 not	 referring	 to	 a	 form	 of	 de	 jure	 stare	 decisis	 (i.e.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
International	Investment	(2004),	1	and	ss.,	Fietta,	International	Arbitration	Law	Review	(2005),	131	and	
ss.	MFN	 treatment	 in	 IIAs	 is	meant	 to	 ensure	 an	 equality	 of	 competitive	 conditions	 between	 foreign	
investors	of	different	nationalities	 seeking	 to	 set	up	an	 investment	or	operating	 that	 investment	 in	a	
host	country.	The	presence	of	such	a	clause	in	a	BIT	ensures	that	the	host	State	will	guarantee	to	the	
nationals	 of	 the	 other	 contracting	 State	 the	 best	 treatment	 that	 it	 assures	 to	 foreign	 investors	
according	to	other	investment	treaties.	
61	Zekos,	 Journal	 of	 World	 Investment	 and	 Trade	 (2009),	 482;	 this	 Author	 carries	 out	 an	 historical	
analysis	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 precedent.	 In	 this	 regard	 see	 also	 de	 Prada	 Rodriguez,	 Munoz	 Rojo,	 El	
proceso	civil	inglés	(2014),	5	and	ss.,	Taruffo,	Precedente	e	giurisprudenza	(2007),	1	and	ss.	The	definition	
comes	 from	 the	 Latin	 “stare	 decisis	 et	 non	 quieta	 movere”,	 meaning	 “to	 stand	 by	 and	 adhere	 to	
decisions	and	not	disturb	what	is	settled”.	See	Vadi,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2008),	2.	
62	Bjorklund,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2010),	272.	
63	Palombino,	Gli	 effetti	 della	 sentenza	 internazionale	 nei	 giudizi	 interni	 (2008),	 3-4.	 See	 also	 Taruffo,	
Revista	da	Faculdade	de	Direito	da	UFPR	(2001),	27	and	ss.	
64	Palombino,	 Il	 trattamento	 giusto	 ed	 equo	 degli	 investmenti	 stranieri	 (2012),	 175	 and	 ss.	 The	 Author	
makes	 reference	 to	a	Practice	Statement	 issued	by	 the	House	of	Lords	 in	1966,	 (1966)	1	W.L.R.	1234	
(Eng),	according	to	which	a	rigid	adherence	to	precedents	may	lead	to	injustice.	Therefore	precedents	
shall	be	always	considered	but	may	be	disregarded	when	concrete	needs	so	require.	With	regard	to	civil	
law	countries,	a	 reference	shall	be	made	to	art.	477,	par.	3,	of	 the	Spanish	Ley	de	Enjuiciamento	Civil	
(2000)	and	to	art.	65	of	the	Italian	Law	on	judicial	organization	(Regio	Decreto	n.	12	of	1941).	
65	See	Haynes,	Journal	of	International	Dispute	Settlement	(2014),	501.		
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mandated	by	 law)	but	 to	a	de	 facto	 form	of	 it.	This	means	 that	courts	and	 tribunals	
take	into	account	each	other’s	decision	due	to	“a	complex	mix	of	quasi-legal	factors	–	
that	include	the	habit	-	or	customary	practice	-	of	the	adjudicator,	the	expectations	of	
the	parties	 involved	in	the	dispute,	the	need	for	efficiency	in	dispute	resolution	–	i.e.	
avoidance	 of	 ‘reinventing	 the	wheel’	 –	 an	 overall	 sense	 of	 fairness	 embodied	 in	 the	
principle	that	 like	cases	should	be	treated	alike,	and	the	widespread	opinion	of	 legal	
and	non-legal	scholars	and	practitioners”.66	
Several	international	courts	and	tribunals	have	followed	a	horizontal,	de	facto,	
taking	into	account	approach.67	In	this	regard	it	is	worth	mentioning	the	ICJ’s	decision	
in	 the	Cameroon	v.	Nigeria	 case,68	where	 it	has	been	said	 that	–	even	 if	according	 to	
article	59	of	the	ICJ	Statute	the	effects	of	an	award	should	regard	only	the	parties	in	
the	dispute	 –	 any	 change	of	 approach	of	 the	Court	with	 regard	 to	 similar	 questions	
shall	be	adequately	motivated.69	
Given	the	above,	it	is	now	time	to	understand	what	has	been	the	approach	of	
international	investment	tribunals	and	scholars	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	precedent.	
In	 this	 regard	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 –	 as	 a	 preliminary	 (and	 general)	 remark	 –	 two	
common	 statements	 are	 commonly	 made	 by	 scholars	 with	 regard	 to	 arbitral	
precedent:70	(i)	 in	 investment	 arbitration,	 arbitrators	 are	 (at	 least	 in	 principle)	 not	
bound	by	any	 system	of	precedent;	but	 (ii)	 a	de	 facto,	 horizontal	 and	very	powerful	
system	of	precedent	“constrains	arbitrators	to	account	for	prior	published	awards	and	
to	stabilize	international	investment	law”.71	This	phenomenon	is	particularly	related	to	
the	 very	 strong	 doctrinal	 tendency	 to	 call	 for	 the	 application	 of	 precedents	 in	
international	investment	law.72		
From	 the	 perspective	 of	 arbitral	 tribunals,	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 applying	
precedents	 has	 been	 described	 as	 the	 “natural	 desire	 of	 any	 court	 to	 maintain	
consistency	 in	 the	application	of	 law”.73	Precedent	has	 therefore	been	considered	as	
																																																													
66	Bhala,	American	University	International	Law	Review	(1998),	938-939.	See	also	Haynes	(2014)	(n.	65),	
502.	
67	The	 problem	 of	 precedent	 in	 international	 law	 has	 been	 dealt	 with	 by	 Miller,	 Leiden	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	(2002),	489	and	ss.	The	Author,	at	498,	has	concluded	that	“it	should	be	clear…	that	
international	tribunals	do	 interact	with	one	another,	 if	not	at	the	robust	 level	 found	 in	domestic	 legal	
systems.	Each	of	the	tribunals	under	consideration	has	referred	to	the	jurisprudence	of	another”.	In	this	
regard	Cassese,	Diritto	 Internazionale	(2006),	277,	has	noted	that	“due	to	the	rudimental	character	of	
international	 law,	to	the	 lack	of	a	central	normative	authority	and	of	a	 judicial	 institution	having	final	
and	binding	 jurisdiction,	awards	 issued	by	 the	most	authoritative	 international	 tribunals	 (in	particular	
the	 ICJ)	 will	 have	 a	 crucial	 importance	 in	 the	 evaluation	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 customary	 rules,	 in	 the	
limitation	of	their	scope	of	application	or	applicability	and	in	the	development	of	new	doctrines”.	
68	See	Preliminary	Decision	of	11	June	1998,	par.	28.	
69	Palombino	(2012)	(n.	64),	184-187,	has	demonstrated	that	such	an	approach	has	been	taken	also	by	
the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	and	by	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union.	
70	For	a	contrary	opinion	see	Brower,	Ottolenghi,	in	International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century:	
Essays	in	Honour	of	Christoph	Schreuer	(2009),	851	and	ss.	
71	Cheng,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2008),	1016.	
72	See,	in	particular,	Kaufmann-Kohler,	Arbitration	International	(2007),	357	and	ss.	
73	Brierly,	in	The	Basis	of	Obligation	in	International	Law	(1958)	29.		
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the	 “essence	 of	 the	 orderly	 administration	 of	 justice”.74	Andres	 Rigo	 Sureda	 has	
identified	other	 four	 reasons	for	applying	precedents:	 (i)	 the	parties’	expectations	to	
be	treated	in	accordance	with	the	principle	of	equality	before	the	law;	(ii)	precedents	
are	 repository	 of	 legal	 experience;	 (iii)	 to	 follow	 precedent	 is	 a	 way	 to	 avoid	 the	
appearance	of	any	excess	of	judicial	discretion;	and	(iv)	judges	are	reluctant	to	admit	
that	 they	 were	 wrong. 75 	Many	 other	 Authors	 have	 described	 the	 recourse	 to	
precedent	 as	 a	 social	 practice,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 the	 very	 small	 community	 of	
investment	arbitrators	it	 is	common	to	keep	into	consideration	the	other	arbitrators’	
decisions.76		
Hence,	from	a	practical	perspective,	arbitrators	have	usually:	(1)	identified	prior	
relevant	 decisions;	 (2)	 compared	 the	 aggregate	 costs	 of	 departure	 from	 prior	
decisions	with	 the	 aggregate	 consequences	 of	 following	 prior	 decisions,	 taking	 into	
account	whether	the	policies	underlying	those	prior	decisions	remain	relevant	under	
contemporary	conditions;	(3)	decided	which	prior	decisions	to	follow	or	depart	from;	
and	(4)	articulated	reasons	for	their	decision.77		
Given	the	above,	on	the	basis	of	their	approach	to	precedent,	arbitral	awards	
have	 been	 classified78	in	 four	 categories:	 (a)	 arbitral	 awards	 which	 have	 considered	
precedents	 as	 persuasive	 authority;79	(b)	 arbitral	 awards	 which	 have	 operated	 a	
distinguishing	 from	 precedents; 80 	(c)	 arbitral	 awards	 which	 have	 considered	
precedents	as	a	supplementary	means	of	interpretation	according	to	article	32	of	the	
1969	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties;81	and	(d)	arbitral	awards	which	have	
considered	 that	 to	 follow	 precedents	 is	 a	 duty	 due	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	 ensure	 the	
harmonious	development	of	international	investment	law.82		
In	 light	 of	 what	 has	 been	 said,	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 present	 author,	 the	
heterogeneity	of	arbitral	decisions	shows	that	the	most	correct	analysis	with	regard	to	
the	 existence	 of	 a	 doctrine	 of	 precedent	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 the	 one	 that	
summarizes	 all	 the	 above	 approaches	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 abovementioned	 “taking	
																																																													
74	Lauterpacht,	The	Development	of	International	Law	by	the	International	Court	(1958,	reprinted	2010),	
14.	
75	Rigo	 Sureda,	 in	 International	 Investment	 Law	 for	 the	 21st	 Century:	 Essays	 in	 Honour	 of	 Christoph	
Schreuer	(2009),	832-833.	Purcell,	California	Law	Review	(1997),	869	has	talked	about	a	public	function	
of	precedents:	“a	correct	judgment	should	logically	influence	the	behaviour	of	future	litigants	and	guide	
the	decisions	of	future	courts”.	
76	See	 Hirsch,	 The	 Hebrew	 University	 of	 Jerusalem	 Research	 Paper	 No.	 13-13	 (2013),	 20	 and	 ss.,	
Weidemaier,	William	and	Mary	Law	Review	(2010),	1900.	
77	Cheng	(2008)	(n	71),	1031.	
78	Rigo	Sureda	(2009)	(n.	75),	836.	
79	Liberian	 Eastern	 Timber	 Corporation	 (LETCO)	 v.	 The	 Republic	 of	 Liberia,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/83/2,	
Award,	31	March	1986.	
80	RosInvest	Co	UK	Ltd	v.	The	Russian	Federation,	SCC	Case	No.	Arb.	V079/2005,	Award	on	Jurisdiction,	
October	2007,	para.	37.	
81	Canadian	Cattlemen	for	Fair	Trade	v.	United	States,	NAFTA,	Award	on	Jurisdiction,	28	January	2008,	
para.	50.	
82	See	 Saipem	 S.p.A.	 v.	 The	 People’s	 Republic	 of	 Bangladesh,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/05/7,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction,	 21	 March	 2007,	 para.	 57,	 and	 	 Bosh	 International,	 Inc	 and	 B&P	 Ltd	 Foreign	 Investments	
Enterprise	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/08/11,	Award,	25	October	2012.	
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into	 account	 approach”.83	This	 means	 that	 arbitrators	 cannot	 decide	 a	 case	 just	
ignoring	 the	 previous	 awards	 that	 have	 analysed	 similar	 or	 connected	 issues.84	This	
has	been	perfectly	demonstrated	by	the	empirical	analysis	carried	out	by	Commission,	
according	 to	whom	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 take	 into	 account	 previous	
decisions.85	
Given	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 conclude	 that,	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 fact,	 when	
analysing	the	current	framework	of	 international	 investment	 law	and	arbitration,	we	
are	in	front	of:	(1)	a	network	of	interrelated	BITs;	and	(2)	a	network	of	tribunals,	“which	
act	as	 if	 they	are	part	of	a	 single	 system	of	dispute	 resolution”	 (emphasis	added).86	In	
this	 regard,	 Joost	 Pauwelyn	 has	 talked	 about	 investment	 law	 and	 arbitration	 as	 a	
“complex	 adaptive	 system”,	 i.e.	 “a	 system	 in	 which	 large	 networks	 of	 components	
with	no	central	 control	and	 simple	 rules	of	operation	give	 rise	 to	 complex	collective	
behaviour,	 sophisticated	 information	 processing,	 and	 adaptation	 via	 learning	 or	
evolution”.87	As	a	consequence,	according	to	Pauwelyn,	foreign	investment	law	has	a	
“minimum	structure	of	continuity	(free	enough	to	change,	but	stable	enough	to	stay	
recognizable),	[and]	it	distinguishes	itself	from	purely	chaotic	systems…	which	are	too	
																																																													
83	Palombino	 (2012)	 (n.	 64),	 187	 and	 ss.	 The	Author	 refers,	 in	 particular,	 to	 the	 cases	El	 Paso	 Energy	
International	 Co.	 V.	 Argentina,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/03/15,	 Award,	 31	 October	 2011,	 BP	 American	
Production	Co.	et	al.	V.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/8,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	27	July	2006,	Pan	
America	Energy	LLC	and	BP	Argentina	Exploration	Co.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/13,	Decision	
on	Preliminary	Objections,	27	July	2006.	Similarly,	Brown,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2008),	
3,	has	talked	about	a	“cross	fertilization”	between	investment	arbitral	tribunal.	
84 	Schill	 (2008)	 (n.	 56),	 21,	 stated	 that	 “precedent	 has	 become	 both	 quantitatively	 as	 well	 as	
qualitatively	the	premier	determinant	for	the	outcome	of	investor-State	disputes.	Even	though	arbitral	
precedent	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 non-binding,	 it	 has	 a	 considerable	 de	 facto	 force	 to	 the	 extent	 that	
divergences	 in	 investment	 jurisprudence	 become	 rather	 rare.	 Notably,	 even	 in	 cases	 of	 conflicting	
decisions,	tribunals	employ	various	strategies	to	uphold	consistency	in	investment	treaty	arbitration”.	
85	Commission,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(2007),	129	and	ss.	As	a	confirmation	of	the	above,	
we	will	see	that	only	in	the	(see	Chapter	1	footnote	198)	National	Gas	award,	the	tribunal	has	taken	into	
account	 other	 17	 arbitral	 awards.	 See	 also	 Castro	 de	 Figuereido,	 www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com	
(2014).	 With	 a	 more	 general	 perspective,	 Conforti,	 Rivista	 giuridica	 degli	 studenti	 dell’Università	 di	
Macerata	(2010),	24,	stated	that,	with	the	sake	of	understand	the	content	and	meaning	of	international	
rules,	it	is	essential	to	start	from	the	activity	done	(and	interpretation	given)	by	international	courts	and	
tribunals	(and	in	particular	of	the	ICJ).	
86	Palombino	 (2012)	 (n.	 64),	 195.	 See	 also	 Kurtz	 (2013),	 1,	 who	 has	 talked	 about	 a	 “diffuse	 and	
heterogeneous	network”.	In	this	regard,	note	that	–	talking	about	general	international	law	–	Bjorklund,	
Nappert	 (2011),	 7,	have	exposed	their	 idea	of	a	 “inter	nuclei	communication”,	 “whereby	 international	
tribunals	 look	 to	 each	 other’s	 decisions,	 in	 appropriate	 cases,	 for	 influence	 and	 guidance	 in	 areas	 of	
international	 law	 involving	similar	concepts”.	This	 is	a	“wilful	awareness	by	tribunals	 in	one	sphere	of	
international	 law	 of	what	 goes	 on	 in	 other	 related	 spheres,	 and	 an	 exercise	 of	 canvassing	 the	 views	
expressed	 by	 other	 tribunals	 in	 these	 related	 spheres	 for	 guidance	 to	 inform,	 or	 test,	 one’s	 own	
analysis.	 This	 is	 especially	 important	 for	 those	 areas	 of	 international	 law	which,	 like	 investment	 law,	
have	 not	 fully	matured”.	 This	 is	 also	 confirmed	 by	Di	 Benedetto	 (2013)	 (n.	 51),	 127,	who	 stated	 that	
“proof	 of	 the	 significant	 coherence	 of	 IIL	 [i.e.	 international	 investment	 law],	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 its	
multiple	sources	are	 independent	of	each	other,	 is	given	by	the	circular	process	existing	between	the	
interpretations	 of	 authors	 or	 tribunals	 and	 the	 drafting	 techniques	 set	 out	 by	 investment	 treaties”.	
Dupuy,	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	(1999),	796,	has	strongly	criticized	
the	existence	of	sub-systems	in	international	law.		
87	Pauwelyn,	http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2271869		(2014),	20.	
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volatile	and	random	to	survive”.88	In	the	opinion	of	the	present	author,	however,	such	
systemic	features	cannot	exist	autonomously	but	have	always	to	be	collocated	within	
the	 bigger	 framework	 of	 international	 law.	 This	 is	 testified	 both	 by	 the	 fact	 that	
certain	 substantive	 rules	 of	 international	 investment	 law	 originated	 in	 public	
international	law	and	by	the	fact	that	international	investment	tribunals	usually	make	
reference	to	public	international	law	rules	(e.g.	the	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	
Treaties)	and	to	the	case	law	of	public	international	law	courts	and	tribunals.89	
	 If	the	above	is	true,	coherence,	consistency	and	finality	are	values	that	cannot	
be	 ignored	 in	 a	 framework	 such	 as	 the	 one	 that	 has	 been	 just	 described.90	It	 is	 an	
oxymoron,	 in	 fact,	 to	 talk	 about	 a	 network	 of	 treaties	 and	 tribunals,	 which,	
respectively,	are	interpreted	and	operate	disregarding	each	other.	This	circumstance,	
therefore,	imposes	to	find	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings.	
	 In	 this	 regard	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that,	 as	 of	 today,	 the	 issues	 of	 coherence,	
consistency,	and	finality	of	awards	have	been	often	dealt	with	in	an	unsatisfactory	and	
superficial	 way.	 Authors	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 problem	 but	 have	 rarely	 given	
answers	to	it.	As	an	example,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	EFILA,	in	its	2015	“Response	
to	critics	against	ISDS”,	has	stated	that	inconsistency	is	a	“natural	consequence	of	the	
system”.91	It	is	therefore	true	that	“the	lack	of	coherence	within	the	ITA	system	likely	
has	 become	 the	 ground	 upon	 which	 the	 system	 is	 most	 frequently	 criticized	 by	
scholars	and	commentators”.92	
	 This	 book	 will	 therefore	 try	 to	 give	 an	 answer	 to	 this	 problem,	 focusing	 in	
particular	on	the	existing	structure	of	BITs	and	ad	hoc	investment	tribunals,	which	–	in	
the	opinion	of	the	present	author	–	still	offer	some	tools	to	be	used	in	order	to	face	the	
issue	of	parallel	proceedings	and	 the	 consequent	 lack	of	 coherence	and	consistency	
within	investment	law	and	arbitration.	
	 Chapter	1	will	be	aimed	at	providing	the	readers	with	the	taxonomy	of	parallel	
proceedings	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 at	 analysing	 the	 policy	 considerations	 at	
																																																													
88	Id.,	10	(footnotes	omitted).	
89	Our	opinion,	in	this	regard,	is	similar	to	the	one	expressed	by	Di	Benedetto	(2013)	(n.	51),	42-43.	It	is	
therefore	 possible	 to	 refer	 to	 a	 legal	 definition	 of	 “self-contained	 regime”	 within	 the	 framework	 of	
public	international	law	given	by	the	International	Law	Commission	(Fifty-eight	session),	Fragmentation	
of	 International	 Law:	 Difficulties	 Arising	 from	 the	 Diversification	 and	 Expansion	 of	 International	 Law,	
Report	 of	 the	 Study	 Group	 of	 the	 International	 Law	 Commission	 finalized	 by	 Martti	 Koskenniemi,	
A/CN.4/L.682,	 13	 April	 2006,	 according	 to	 which	 “this	 legal	 notion	 may	 concern	 entire	 fields	 of	
international	 law	 (such	 as	 human	 rights	 law,	 trade	 law,	 etc.)	 and	 implies	 that	 “rules	 of	 general	
international	 law	 are	 assumed	 to	 be	modified	 or	 even	 excluded	 in	 the	 administration	 (interpretation	
and	application	of	rules)	of	these	fields”.	However,	as	noted	by	Di	Benedetto,	the	fact	that	international	
investment	 law	may	be	 considered	as	 a	 sub-system	of	general	 international	 law	does	not	mean	 that	
international	 investment	 law	 cannot	 derogate	 to	 public	 international	 law,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	
international	 investment	 law	 is	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 lex	 specialis	 within	 the	 general	 framework	 of	
public	 international	 law.	With	regard	to	the	possible	orderliness	of	public	 international	 law	see	Shany	
(2003)	(n.	47),	77	and	ss.	
90	In	 this	 regard	 see	 also	Alvarez,	Appeals	Mechanism	 in	 International	 Investment	Disputes	 (2008),	 32,	
who	has	based	the	legitimacy	of	international	investment	law	on	the	coherency	of	its	rules.	
91	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	12	and	ss.	
92	Meyers	(2008)	(n.	13),	15.	
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the	basis	of	 the	need	of	consistency,	coherence	and	finality	 in	 the	 in	 the	network	of	
international	investment	law	and	arbitration.	
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Chapter	1	
International	investment	arbitration	and	the	need	for	coherence	
	
	 This	 Chapter	 will	 introduce	 the	 topic	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	 First	 of	 all	 it	will	 give	 a	definition	of	 the	problem	and	 it	will	 provide	 the	
reader	with	an	analysis	of	the	taxonomy	of	multiple	proceedings	(Paragraph	1.1)	and	a	
search	 for	 the	 historical	 reasons	 behind	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 problem	 (Paragraph	
1.2).	It	will	be	demonstrated	that	–	as	investment	arbitration	is	today	configured	–	it	is	
quite	 inevitable	 to	have	 (at	 least	 the	 risk	of)	parallel/multiple	proceedings	 related	 to	
the	 same	 claim.	 Secondly,	 and	mainly,	 the	Chapter	 is	 aimed	 at	 demonstrating	why	
parallel	proceedings	shall	be	avoided.	Policy	considerations	and	issues	related	to	the	
emergence	of	parallel	proceedings	will	be	therefore	deeply	analysed.	
	 In	 this	 Chapter	 the	 author	 will	 try	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 issue	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	 has	 not	 only	 procedural	 implications.	 Indeed	 this	 problem	 involves,	 on	
the	one	hand,	systemic	issues	and,	on	the	other	hand,	substantive	implications	on	the	
rights	 of	 the	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 dispute	 from	 which	 parallel	 proceedings	 arise.	
Therefore,	there	are	several	policy	considerations	(which	will	be	analysed	in	Paragraph	
1.3)	 that	 lead	 us	 to	 search	 for	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 issue	 at	 stake:	 such	 considerations	
pertain	to	procedural	and	substantive	aspects.	
	 Procedural	aspects	mainly	regard	efficiency	in	arbitration	and	the	need	to	save	
costs	and	time	in	order	to	let	investment	arbitration	maintain	its	key	advantages.	
	 Concerning	 the	 substantive	 implications	 of	 parallel	 proceedings,	 it	 will	 be	
demonstrated	 that	 the	 existence	 of	 several	 claims	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 same	 dispute	
(with	the	related	risk	of	conflicting	outcomes)	will	undermine	the	essential	elements	
of	a	legal	relationship	between	two	parties	and	destroy	the	principle	of	legal	certainty.	
	 Finally,	 after	 having	 explained	 (in	 Paragraph	 1.4)	 the	 main	 objective	 of	 this	
book	 (i.e.	 to	 provide	 a	 general	 remedy	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	
investment	 arbitration)	 it	 will	 be	 explained	 what	 are	 the	 proposed	 tools	 to	 move	
forward	 from	the	 impasse	generated	by	parallel	proceedings.	We	will	 finally	provide	
the	plan	of	the	rest	of	the	work.	
	
1.1 The	 taxonomy	 of	 multiple	 claims	 and	 their	 inevitability	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	
	
Parallel	 proceedings	 in	 international	 arbitration	 have	 been	 defined	 as	
“proceedings	pending	before	[a	domestic	court	or]	another	arbitral	tribunal	 in	which	
the	parties	and	one	or	more	of	the	issues	are	the	same	or	substantially	the	same	as	the	
ones	before	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	the	current	arbitration”	(emphasis	added).1		
This	 definition,	 which	 looks	 at	 parallel	 proceedings	 from	 a	 substantive	
perspective,	considers	as	parallel	the	proceedings	in	which:	
																																																													
1	Erk-Kubat,	Parallel	Proceedings	in	International	Arbitration:	A	Comparative	European	Perspective	(2014),	
15.	
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1) the	purpose	of	the	claims	is	the	same;	
2) the	facts	on	which	the	claims	are	based	are	the	same;	
3) the	parties	in	the	two	proceedings	represent	the	same	interest,	even	if	they	are	
not	formally	identical.	
In	 the	 present	 study,	 we	 will	 refer	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	 also	 in	 case	 of	
proceedings	that	are	not	concurrently	pending,	even	though	they	substantially	involve	
the	same	purpose,	facts	and	interests	between	the	same	parties.	In	regard	to	this	last	
category	 of	 proceedings,	 it	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 that	 it	 would	 be	 maybe	 more	
appropriate	to	speak	about	multiple	proceedings.	However,	for	the	sake	of	clarity,	we	
will	 discuss	 about	 parallel	 proceedings	 as	 a	 general	 category,	 involving	 both	
concurrent	and	subsequent	proceedings	(based,	as	already	said,	on	the	same	purpose,	
facts	and	interests).	
It	 is	 self-evident	 that,	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 today’s	 very	 complex	 investment	
operations,	 involving	several	 (and	complex)	 legal	 instruments	(i.e.	treaties,	contracts	
and	laws)	and	various	related	entities	(usually	from	the	investor’s	side),	it	is	quite	easy	
that	two	proceedings	could	fall	into	the	aforementioned	definition.	
As	 it	 has	 been	 stated	 by	 several	 authors,	 parallel	 proceedings	 are	
“fundamentally	 undesirable”2	in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 incur	 very	 high	 costs,	
generate	 the	 risk	 of	 conflicting	 outcomes	 and	 also	 undermine	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	
adjudicatory	 system.	 As	 the	 former	 President	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	
(“ICJ”),	Gilbert	Guillaume,	stated	in	1995,	“it	would	be	most	regrettable	if,	on	specific	
problems,	different	 courts	were	 to	 take	divergent	positions”.3	In	 the	 years	 following	
Guillaume’s	 statement	 a	 further	 dramatic	 expansion	 of	 the	 number	 of	 international	
proceedings	started	by	individuals	against	States	occurred	(in	particular	in	the	field	of	
international	 investment	 law),	 with	 the	 consequent	 growth	 of	 the	 risk	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	and	conflicting	awards.4	
The	 proliferation	 of	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 (and	 the	 related	 risks,	
such	as	 conflicting	outcomes,	 rise	of	 costs	 and	 legitimacy	 crisis)	 is	 indeed	a	general	
phenomenon	 of	 international	 law,5	which	 has	 one	 of	 its	 greatest	 manifestations	 in	
international	 investment	 law.	 	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 particular	 features	 of	 investment	
operations	 and	 to	 the	 characteristics	 of	 legal	 instruments	 governing	 international	
investments,	as	well	as	(as	we	will	see	below)	to	a	rigid	application	of	the	principle	of	
party	autonomy	by	investment	tribunals,	regardless	of	the	policy	considerations	that	
go	against	parallel	proceedings	and	conflicting	awards.		
																																																													
2	Wehland,	The	Coordination	of	Multiple	Proceedings	in	Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	(2013),	2.	
3	Guillaume,	ICLQ	(1995)	862.	
4	Oellers-Frahm,	Max	Planck	UNYB	(2001),	67,	Romano,	Int’l	Law	and	Politics	(1999)	709,	Buergenthal,	
Leiden	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 (2001),	 267.	 The	 problem	 of	 the	multiplication	 of	 tribunals	 was	
already	mentioned	by	Quadri,	Diritto	Internazionale	Pubblico	(1968),	262	and	ss.	
5	It	 is	not	possible	here	 to	give	a	general	overview	of	 the	phenomenon.	 In	 this	 regard,	please	 refer	 to	
Shany,	The	Competing	Jurisdictions	of	 International	Courts	and	Tribunals	 (2003),	1	and	ss.,	Giorgetti,	
ICSID	Review	(2015),	98	and	ss.,	and	van	Aaken,	Finnish	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(2006),	91	and	
ss.	
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The	 following	 sub-paragraphs	 will	 examine	 the	 features	 of	 investment	
operations	that	mainly	affect	(and	fragment)	the	jurisdiction	of	investment	arbitration	
tribunals,	and	 in	particular:	 (i)	 the	difference	between	contract	and	treaty	claims;	 (ii)	
the	 entitlement	 of	 company’s	 shareholders	 to	 bring	 an	 investment	 claim;	 (iii)	 the	
entitlement	 of	 each	 entity	 of	 a	 group	 to	 bring	 its	 autonomous	 claim;	 and	 (iv)	 the	
availability	of	several	means	of	dispute	resolution	within	the	same	legal	instrument.		
	
1.1.1	 Contract	and	treaty	claims	
	
	 Historically,	 foreign	 investments	 involved	 the	 signing	 of	 a	 contract	 between	
the	investor	and	the	host	State.6	These	contracts	set	forth	the	standard	of	treatment	
of	 investors	and,	 in	 the	past,	generally	provided	for	 the	resolution	of	disputes	 in	 the	
national	courts	of	the	host	state	according	to	the	law	of	the	host	State.7	
	 With	the	evolution	of	the	standing	of	individuals	before	international	tribunals,	
investment	contracts	have	evolved,	also	providing	for	the	possibility	to	settle	disputes	
before	ad	hoc	tribunals	or	internationally	administered	arbitrations.8	
	 In	 parallel,	 in	 particular	 in	 the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 20th	 century,9	a	 system	 of	
bilateral	treaties	for	the	promotion	and	protection	of	 investments	 	 (BITs),	 regulating	
the	treatment	of	investors	of	one	of	the	signatory	States	in	the	other	signatory	State,	
has	 emerged.10	Usually,	 according	 to	 such	 BITs,	 the	 relationship	 between	 investors	
and	host	States	shall	be	governed	by	international	law.11	
																																																													
6	Sacerdoti,	I	contratti	tra	stati	e	stranieri	nel	diritto	internazionale	(1972),	1	and	ss.	
7	Tonini,	 La	 tutela	 internazionale	 dei	 diritti	 contrattuali	 degli	 investitori	 stranieri	 (2011),	 4	 and	 ss.,	
Savarese,	La	nozione	di	giurisdizione	nel	 sistema	 ICSID,	http://paduaresearch.cab.unipd.it/3532/	 (2012),	
12,	 Amerasinghe,	 International	 Arbitral	 Jurisdiction	 (2011),	 3-13.	 During	 the	 20th	 century	 foreign	
investments	have	not	always	been	accepted	by	developing	countries,	which	claimed	their	sovereignty	
on	natural	resources.	For	this	reason	the	so-called	Calvo	Doctrine,	requiring	that	all	disputes	between	
investors	and	the	host	state	should	have	been	resolved	in	national	courts	of	the	host	state,	emerged.	In	
this	regard	see	also	Conforti,	Diritto	Internazionale	(2013),	248	and	ss.	Disputes	between	investors	and	
states	 have	been	 traditionally	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 the	discipline	 of	 state	 responsibility	 for	 injury	 to	
aliens.	See	also	Lillich,	International	law	of	State	responsibility	for	injury	to	aliens	(1983),	Amerasinghe,	
State	Responsibility	for	Injury	to	Aliens	(1967).	For	a	general	approach	to	the	law	applied	to	investor	–	
States	 contracts	 see	 Bernardini	 in	 Law	 of	 International	 Business	 and	 Disputes	 Settlement	 in	 the	 21st	
century	–	Liber	Amicorum	Karl-Heinz	Bockstiegel	(2004),	51	and	ss.	
8	Radicati	di	Brozolo,	Rivista	di	Diritto	Internazionale	(1982),	299	and	ss.	
9	Alexandrov,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2006),	387,	has	talked	about	the	occurrence	of	a	
“baby	boom”	of	investor-State	arbitrations	in	the	’90s.	
10	Vandevelde,	 Bilateral	 Investment	 Treaties	 (2010),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Mauro,	 Gli	 accordi	 bilaterali	 per	 la	
promozione	e	protezione	degli	investimenti	(2003)	1	and	ss.	The	first	BIT,	between	Germany	and	Pakistan	
has	been	entered	into	in	1959.	Today,	according	to	Savarese	(2012)	(n.	7),	15,	there	are	about	3000	BITs	
in	force.	See	also	Bockstiegel,	Paper	given	at	the	Conference	50	Years	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	–	
Taking	Stock	and	Look	to	the	Future	Frankfurt	(2009),	2	and	ss.	With	regard	to	the	general	content	of	
BITs	 see	Valenti,	Gli	 standard	 di	 trattamento	 nell’interpretazione	 dei	 trattati	 in	materia	 di	 investimenti	
stranieri	(2009),	26	and	ss.,	and	Valenti,	Diritto	del	Commercio	Internazionale	(2004),	973	and	ss.	
11	See	Schreuer,	McGill	Journal	of	Dispute	Resolution	(2014),	1	and	ss.	
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	 The	standards	of	treatment	 involved	in	such	treaties	are	usually	very	broad.12	
As	 an	 example,	 it	 could	 be	 mentioned	 that	 under	 the	 label	 of	 “fair	 and	 equitable	
treatment”	 arbitrators	 have	 involved	 standards	 of	 due	 process,	 legitimate	
expectations	and	proportionality.13	It	often	happens,	therefore,	that	the	violation	of	a	
standard	 included	 in	 a	 contract	 can	 be	 considered	 also	 as	 a	 violation	 of	 a	 treaty	
standard.14		 Often	 –	 in	 fact	 –	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 contractual	 breach	 is	 seen	 as	 an	
indicator	of	 the	 fact	 that	 there	has	also	been	a	breach	of	a	broader	 treaty	standard.	
This	may	happen,	in	particular,	when	BITs	contain	a	so-called	“umbrella	clause”,	which	
–	 according	 to	 the	majority	 of	 scholars	 –	 equalizes	 all	 the	 violations	 of	 contractual	
duties	to	violations	of	treaty	duties.15		
Hence,	regarding	the	claims	arising	from	an	investment	contract,	“the	question	
emerges	 as	 to	 which	 dispute	 resolution	 procedure	 must	 be	 applied	 –	 the	 one	
contained	in	the	applicable	BIT	or	the	one	indicated	by	the	investment	contract	which	
the	 investor	 itself	 stipulates	 with	 the	 host	 State”. 16 	As	 a	 matter	 of	 principle,	
considering	 that	 “there	 is	 no	 a	 priori	 limitation	 on	 the	 scope	 or	 content	 of	 treaty	
obligations...	 There	 is	 no	 a	 priori	 definition	 of	what	 is	 or	 is	 not	 international,	 nor	 is	
there	 any	 presumption	 of	 the	 restrictive	 interpretation	 of	 treaties”,17	it	 is	 logical	 to	
deduce	 that	 “where	 there	 is	a	BIT	between	 the	 investor’s	Home	State	and	 the	Host	
State,	then	the	investor	might	pursue	its	treaty	rights”	notwithstanding	the	existence	
of	a	contract	protecting	similar	–	if	not	the	same	–	rights.18	
	 This	 view	 has	 developed	 since	 the	 very	 well-known	 decision	 in	 the	 Vivendi	
annulment	 proceedings.	 According	 to	 the	 ad	 hoc	 committee	 “as	 to	 the	 relation	
between	 breach	 of	 contract	 and	 breach	 of	 treaty…	 a	 state	 may	 breach	 a	 treaty	
without	breaching	a	contract	and	vice	versa…	In	accordance	with	this	general	principle	
																																																													
12	BITs	are	aimed	at	the	promotion	and	protection	of	foreign	investments.	With	this	scope	such	treaties	
provide	for	very	broad	standard	of	treatment	such	as	“full	protection	and	security”,	“fair	and	equitable	
treatment	 and	 “most	 favoured	 nation”.	 All	 these	 standards	 are	 protected	 through	 the	 right	 of	 the	
investor	 to	 initiate	 an	 arbitration	 directly	 against	 the	 host	 state	 before	 an	 international	 arbitration	
panel.	
13	Palombino,	Il	trattamento	giusto	ed	equo	degli	investimenti	stranieri	(2012),	61	and	ss.	
14	Hariharan,	Journal	of	World	 Investment	and	Trade	(2013),	1019	and	ss.,	Shany,	American	Journal	of	
International	Law	(2005),	835	and	ss.,	Alexandrov,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2004),	555	
and	ss.,	Yannaca	Small,	OECD	Working	Papers	on	International	Investments	(2006),	26	and	ss.	
15	According	to	part	of	the	case	law,	umbrella	clauses	have	the	scope	of	converting	all	contract	claims	in	
treaty	 claims.	 However,	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 umbrella	 clauses.	 See	 the	
different	approaches	in	Société	Générale	de	Surveillance	S.A.	v.	 Islamic	Republic	of	Pakistan,	where	the	
tribunal	 denied	 the	 possibility	 to	 interpret	 extensively	 an	 umbrella	 clause,	 and	 Société	 Générale	 de	
Surveillance	S.A.	v.		Republic	of	the	Philippines,	where	the	tribunal	consented	to	such	an	interpretation.	
See	Zivkovic	 (2011),	 10	and	ss.,	Bergamini,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	 (2005),	118	and	ss,	Carlevaris,	Rivista	
dell’arbitrato	 (2004),	 431	 and	 ss.,	 Wendlandt,	 Texas	 International	 Law	 Journal	 (2008),	 523	 and	 ss,	
Weissenfels	(2007),	1	and	ss,	Yannaca	Small,	OECD	Working	Papers	on	International	Investment	(2006),	
1	and	ss.,	Schill,	Minnesota	Law	Journal	 (2009,	1	and	ss.,	Wong,	Geo.	Mason	Law	Journal	 (2006),	135	
and	ss.	This	subject	will	be	further	examined	in	paragraph	1.6	below.	
16	Savarese,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2007),	409.	
17	Crawford,	Arbitration	International	(2008),	353.	As	stated	by	this	author,	the	authority	for	the	above	
statement	is	“The	Wimbledon”	(1923)	PCIJ	Ser.	A	No.	1.	
18	Cremades,	 Cairns,	 in	 Arbitrating	 Foreign	 Investment	 Disputes.	 Procedural	 and	 Substantive	 Legal	
Aspects	(2004),	325.	
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(which	 is	 undoubtedly	 declaratory	 of	 general	 international	 law)	 whether	 there	 has	
been	 a	 breach	 of	 the	 BIT	 and	 whether	 there	 has	 been	 a	 breach	 of	 contract	 are	
different	questions.	Each	of	 these	claims	will	be	determined	by	 reference	to	 its	own	
proper	or	applicable	 law	–	 in	the	case	of	the	BIT,	by	 international	 law;	 in	the	case	of	
the	contract,	by	the	proper	law	of	the	contract,	in	other	words,	the	municipal	law”.19	
“In	a	case	where	the	essential	basis	of	a	claim	brought	before	an	international	tribunal	
is	a	breach	of	contract,	the	tribunal	will	give	effect	to	any	valid	choice	of	forum	clause	
in	the	contract”.20	“On	the	other	hand,	where	the	‘fundamental	basis	of	the	claim’	is	a	
treaty	laying	down	an	independent	standard	by	which	the	conduct	of	the	parties	is	to	
be	judged,	the	existence	of	an	exclusive	jurisdiction	clause	in	a	contract	between	the	
claimant	and	the	respondent	state	or	one	of	its	subdivisions	cannot	operate	as	a	bar	to	
the	application	of	the	treaty	standard.	At	most,	it	might	be	relevant	–	as	municipal	law	
will	often	be	relevant	–	in	assessing	whether	there	has	been	a	breach	of	the	treaty”.21		
	 The	immediate	consequence	of	what	stated	above	is	that	the	investor	has	the	
choice	to	pursue:	(i)	the	contract	claim;	(ii)	the	treaty	claim;	or,	in	theory,	(iii)	both	the	
contract	 and	 the	 treaty	 claim.22	It	 is	 therefore	 obvious	 that	 the	 dualism	 between	
contract	and	treaty	claims	creates	and/or	increases	the	risk	of	parallel	proceedings.	
	 This	is	what	has	happened	in	the	RSM	Production	Corporation	v	Grenada23	and	
in	 the	 Rachel	 S.	 Grynberg,	 Stephen	 M.	 Grynberg,	 Miriam	 Z.	 Grynberg	 and	 RSM	
Production	 Corporation	 v	 Grenada24	cases.	 Such	 cases	 arose	 from	 the	 same	 facts,	
concerning	 the	 circumstance	 that	 Grenada	 dismissed	 a	 petroleum	 license	 that	 it	
granted	to	RSM,	due	to	an	untimely	application	by	the	 latter.	RSM	started	an	 ICSID	
arbitration	(on	the	basis	of	the	investment	agreement)	whereupon	the	Tribunal	found	
that	 Grenada	 did	 not	 violate	 any	 BIT	 obligation.	 RSM	 than	 filed	 a	 petition	 for	
annulment	(which	was	later	dismissed	due	to	RSM’s	failure	to	pay	annulment	costs).25	
In	 the	meanwhile,	 RSM’s	 shareholders	 (jointly	with	 the	 same	RSM)	 started	 another	
																																																													
19	Compania	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	SA	and	Compagnie	Générale	des	Eaux/Vivendi	Universal	v.	Argentine	
Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	97/3,	Decision	on	Annulment,	3	July	2002,	paras.	95-96.	In	this	regard	see	
Gaillard,	 Transnational	 Dispute	 Management	 (2004),	 6	 and	 ss.	 Similarly,	 note	 Lanco	 Int’l	 Inc.	 v.	
Argentina	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/97/6,	 decision	 on	 jurisdiction,	 Salini	 Costruttori	 S.p.A.	 and	
Italstrade	 S.p.A.	 v.	 Kingdom	 of	 Morocco	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/00/4,	 final	 award,	 Sempra	 Energy	
International	 v.	 Argentina,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/16,	Decision	 on	Objections	 to	 Jurisdiction,	 11	May	
2005.	With	regard	to	the	distinction	drawn	up	by	the	ad	hoc	committee	it	should	be	noted	that	it	is	not	
always	easy	to	distinct	between	contract	and	treaty	claims.	On	this	point	see	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	2),	21.	
This	statement	has	also	been	confirmed	by	 investment	tribunals	such	as	 Impregilo	v.	Argentina,	 ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/07/17,	Award	of	21	June	2011,	para.	175.	
20	Ibid.	para.	98.	
21	Ibid.	 para.	 101.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 substantive	 law	 applicable	 to	 contract	 and	 treaty	 claims	 see	
Wehland	(2013)	(n.	2),	22.		
22	Cremades,	Cairns	(2004)	(n.18),	326.	
23	RSM	Production	Corporation	v	Grenada,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/05/14,	Award,	13	March	2009.	
24	Rachel	 S	 Grynberg,	 Stephen	 M	 Grynberg,	 Miriam	 Z	 Grynberg,	 and	 RSM	 Production	 Corporation	 v	
Grenada,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/10/6,	10	December	2010.	
25	RSM	Production	Corporation	v	Grenada,	 ICSID	Case	No	ARB/05/14,	Annulment	Proceedings,	28	April	
2011.	
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claim	pursuant	to	the	U.S.	–	Grenada	BIT	on	the	basis	of	the	same	facts.	As	we	will	see	
in	Chapter	3,	the	second	claim	was	dismissed	by	the	Tribunal.	
	 In	this	regard,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	order	to	avoid	a	conflict	of	jurisdiction	
between	 arbitral	 tribunals	 and	 national	 courts,	 some	 treaties	 contain	 a	 so-called	
“waiver	clause”.26	As	an	example	it	is	possible	to	cite	art.	1116	(b)	NAFTA,	according	to	
which	“the	investor…	waives	its	right	to	initiate	or	continue	before	any	administrative	
tribunal	or	court	under	the	law	of	any	Party,	or	other	dispute	settlement	procedures,	
any	proceedings	with	respect	to	the	measure…	that	is	alleged	to	be	a	breach…	except	
for	proceedings	for	injunctive,	declaratory	or	other	extraordinary	relief”.27	In	the	same	
vein,	 other	 treaties	 contain	 the	 so-called	 “fork-in-the-road”	 provisions,	 which	 apply	
the	Latin	maxim	electa	una	via	altera	non	datur.	An	example	of	this	provisions	is	article	
10(2)	 of	 the	 Greece-Albania	 BIT	 which	 provides	 that	 if	 disputes	 cannot	 be	 settled	
amicably,	 "the	 investor	or	 the	Contracting	Party	 concerned	may	 submit	 the	dispute	
either	 to	 the	 competent	 court	 of	 the	 Contracting	 Party	 or	 to	 an	 international	
arbitration	tribunal...".28	
	 However,	in	reference	to	such	clauses	it	should	be	noted	that	“it	is	impossible	
to	 generalize	 on	whether	 a	 ‘fork-in-the-road’	 clause	 or	waiver	 forces	 an	 investor	 to	
elect	 between	 treaty	 and	 contract	 claims,	 because	 it	would	 seem	 to	depend	on	 the	
exact	wording	 of	 the	 treaty”.29	These	 clauses	 therefore	may	not	 be	 considered	 as	 a	
general	remedy	against	parallel	national	and	arbitration	proceedings.	
Furthermore,	and	more	importantly	for	the	aim	of	the	present	book,	such	clauses	
are	 not	 applicable	 in	 the	 cases	 of	 conflicts	 of	 jurisdiction	 between	 two	 arbitral	
tribunals,	i.e.	in	cases	the	contract	provides	for	a	form	of	arbitration	and	the	treaty	for	
another	form	of	arbitration.	In	these	cases,	according	to	the	wording	of	the	two	legal	
instruments,	 it	 is	possible	and	perfectly	 legitimate	 for	 the	 investor	 to	 start	both	 the	
contract	and	the	treaty	claims.	Waiver	clauses	will	be	further	examined	in	Chapter	2.	
	 In	conclusion,	from	the	perspective	of	the	present	book	the	difference	between	
contract	and	treaty	claims	is	very	relevant,	being	one	of	the	most	relevant	sources	of	
parallel	 arbitration	 proceedings.30	It	 is	 finally	 worth	 considering	 that,	 in	 light	 of	 the	
fact	that	contract	claims	and	treaty	claims	are	not	necessarily	governed	by	the	same	
																																																													
26	See	Romanetti,	Stockholm	International	Arbitration	Review	(2009),	75	and	ss.	
27	This	provision	has	been	applied	 in	Waste	Management	 Inc	v.	United	Mexican	States,	 ICSID	case	No.	
ARB	 (AF)/98/02,	Arbitral	Award	of	2	 June	2000,	15	 ICSID	Rev	FILJ	235-236,	where	 the	 tribunal	 stated	
that	“when	both	legal	actions	have	a	 legal	basis	derived	from	the	same	measures,	they	can	no	longer	
continue	simultaneously	in	light	of	the	imminent	risk	that	the	claimant	may	obtain	the	double	benefit	
in	its	claim	for	damages.	This	is	precisely	what	NAFTA	art.	1121	seeks	to	avoid".	
28	Dahlberg	(2009).	For	a	general	analysis	of	the	relevance	of	 local	remedies	 in	 investment	arbitration	
and	for	the	interaction	of	some	remedies	with	investment	arbitrations	see	Foster,	Columbia	Journal	of	
Transnational	Law	(2011),	204	and	ss.	Such	author,	at	265,	proposes	a	narrow	interpretation	of	fork-in-
the-road	provisions. 
29	Cremades,	Cairns	(2004)	(n.	18),	333.	
30	See	Savarese,	Diritto	del	 commercio	 internazionale	 (2004),	955	and	ss.	The	case	of	multiple	claims	
started	 under	 contract	 and	 treaties	 is	 conceptually	 identical	 to	 the	 one	 of	 several	 claims	 started	
according	 to	 various	 treaties	 (e.g.	 the	 Energy	Charter	 Treaty	 and	 a	 BIT)	 or	 according	 to	 a	 BIT	 and	 a	
national	law.	For	this	reason	we	will	refer	only	to	contract	and	treaty	claims	in	the	rest	of	the	book.	
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substantive	 law,	 it	 is	possible	 that	 two	arbitrations	 related	 to	 the	 same	 facts	will	be	
concluded	with	different	outcomes.		
	
	 1.1.2	 Majority	and	minority	shareholders	(or	company	and	its	shareholders)	
	
	 The	wording	of	the	vast	majority	of	the	existing	BITs	usually	has	a	very	broad	
definition	 of	 investment.31	Therefore,	 BITs’	 definitions	 are	 not	 anymore	 “enterprise	
based	definitions”32	–	involving	the	direct	realization	of	an	enterprise	in	the	host	state	
or,	at	 least,	an	amount	of	shares	 in	a	company	equal	 to	the	effective	control	of	such	
company	 –	 but	 have	 evolved	 as	 “asset	 based	 definitions”	 –	 involving	 portfolio	
investments	 and	 the	 mere	 ownership	 of	 shares,	 without	 specifying	 the	 necessary	
amount	 of	 shares. 33 	As	 stated	 by	 Schreuer,	 “the	 participation	 in	 the	 locally	
incorporated	company	becomes	the	 investment”.34	As	a	consequence,	 it	 is	now	very	
common	to	talk	about	an	“every	kind	of	asset	approach”,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	the	
mere	 ownership	 of	 an	 asset	 in	 a	 foreign	 company	 might	 be	 considered	 as	 an	
investment.35	
First	of	all,	Tribunals	have	often	accepted	the	possibility	of	autonomous	claims	
by	majority	shareholders,	both	on	the	basis	of	the	wording	of	BITs	and	on	the	basis	of	
the	circumstance	that	the	concept	of	“control”	referred	to	in	the	ICSID	Convention	(if	
applicable)	should	be	logically	associated	to	the	idea	of	a	majoritarian	position	in	the	
company’s	shares	stock.36		
																																																													
31	Schreuer,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2005),	6	and	ss.	
32	See	 the	BIT	 between	Denmark	 and	Poland	 of	 1	May	 1990	 stating	 that	 “(a)	 The	 term	 "investment"	
shall	mean	any	kind	of	assets	 invested	in	accordance	with	the	laws	of	the	Contracting	Party	receiving	
the	investment	in	its	territory	in	particular:	(i)	movable	and	immovable	property	and	any	other	property	
rights	such	as	mortgages,	 liens	or	pledges,	 (ii)	 shares	 in	and	stock	and	debentures	of	a	company	and	
any	other	form	of	participation	 in	a	company,	(iii)	claims	to	money	or	other	rights	relating	to	services	
having	 a	 financial	 value,	 (iv)	 industrial	 and	 intellectual	 property	 rights,	 technology,	 trademarks,	
goodwill,	know-how	and	any	other	similar	rights,	 (v)	business	concessions	having	financial	value,	that	
are	 required	 to	 conduct	 economic	 activity	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law	 of	 the	 Contracting	 Party	
concerned	 and	 are	 conferred	 by	 law,	 administrative	 decision	 or	 contract,	 including	 concessions	 to	
search	for,	cultivate,	extract	or	exploit	natural	resources.	(b)	The	said	term	shall	refer:	to	all	investments	
in	companies	made	for	the	purpose	of	establishing	lasting	economic	relations	between	the	investor	and	the	
company	and	giving	the	investor	the	possibility	of	exercising	significant	influence	on	the	management	of	
the	company	concerned”	(emphasis	added).	
33	See	 the	 2008	 UK	 Model	 BIT,	 stating	 that:	 ““investment”	 means	 every	 kind	 of	 asset,	 owned	 or	
controlled	 directly	 or	 indirectly,	 and	 in	 particular,	 though	 not	 exclusively,	 includes:	 (i)	 movable	 and	
immovable	property	and	any	other	property	 rights	 such	as	mortgages,	 liens	or	pledges;	 (ii)	 shares	 in	
and	stock	and	debentures	of	a	company	and	any	other	form	of	participation	in	a	company;	(iii)	claims	to	
money	or	to	any	performance	under	contract	having	a	financial	value;	(iv)	intellectual	property	rights,	
goodwill,	 technical	 processes	 and	 know-how;	 (v)	 	business	 concessions	 conferred	 by	 law	 or	 under	
contract,	including	concessions	to	search	for,	cultivate,	extract	or	exploit	natural	resources”	(emphasis	
added).		
34	Schreuer	(2005)	(n.	31),	6.	
35	See	Tonini	(2011)	(n.	7),	38	and	ss.	
36	See	Dumberry,	Valasek,	ICSID	Rev.	FILJ	(2011),	45	and	ss.	The	authors	refer	to	the	cases	Gas	Natural	
SDG	S.A.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/10,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	17	June	2005,	Antoine	Goetz	
and	others	v.	Republic	of	Burundi,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB	95/3,	Award,	para.	89,	10	February	1999,	and	Suez	
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Concerning	 the	 position	 of	 minority	 shareholders,	 while	 in	 the	 Vacuum	 Salt	
award	 the	 tribunal	 held	 that	 the	 ownership	 of	 a	minority	 percentage	 of	 shares	 in	 a	
company	could	not	be	considered	as	a	source	of	foreign	control	in	light	of	the	fact	that	
a	minority	position	is	merely	technical	and	not	managerial,37	the	following	authorities	
show	that	claims	by	minority	shareholders	are	today	common	practice	in	international	
investment	arbitration,	both	administered	by	ICSID	tribunals	and	in	other	forms.	
With	particular	regard	to	the	ICSID	Convention,	art.	25(2)(b)	allows	claims	from	
companies	 incorporated	 in	 the	 host	 State	 by	 attributing	 this	 right	 to	 “any	 juridical	
person	which	had	the	nationality	of	the	Contracting	State	party	to	the	dispute	on	that	
date	and	which,	because	of	foreign	control,	the	parties	have	agreed	should	be	treated	
as	a	national	of	another	Contracting	State”	(emphasis	added).38	In	this	regard	it	should	
be	highlighted	that	the	Convention	does	not	define	the	concept	of	foreign	control	and,	
therefore,	arbitral	tribunals	have	usually39	interpreted	such	concept	on	the	basis	of	the	
wording	of	the	relevant	BIT,	thus	allowing	claims	brought	by	a	company	incorporated	
in	the	host	State,	of	which	only	a	minority	shareholder	had	the	nationality	of	the	other	
contracting	party	in	the	BIT.40	
	 Furthermore,	on	the	basis	of	the	wording	of	BITs,	tribunals	have	admitted	that	
minority	shareholders	have	their	autonomous	claim,	 independently	 from	that	of	 the	
main	 company.	 In	 CMS,	 where	 the	 claimant	 owned	 29,42%	 of	 the	 shares	 of	 the	
company,	the	Tribunal	stated	that	 it	“finds	no	bar	 in	current	 international	 law	to	the	
concept	 of	 allowing	 claims	 by	 shareholders	 independently	 from	 those	 of	 the	
corporation	concerned,	not	even	if	those	shareholders	are	minority	or	non-controlling	
shareholders”.41	Tribunals	have	 therefore	 assumed	 jurisdiction	on	 claims	brought	by	
shareholders	 representing	 even	 14,18%	 of	 the	 company’s	 shares.42	In	 Lanco,	 the	
Tribunal	 stated	 that	 “as	 regards	 shareholder	 equity,	 the	Argentina-U.S.	 Treaty	 says	
nothing	 indicating	that	the	 investor	 in	the	capital	stock	has	to	have	control	over	the	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Sociedad	 General	 de	 Aguas	 de	 Barcelona	 S.A.,	 and	 InterAguas	 Servicios	 Integrales	 del	 Agua	 S.A.	 v.	
Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/17,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	16	May	2006.	
37	Vacuum	 Salt	 v.	 Ghana,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/92/1,	 Award	 of	 16	 February	 1994,	 where	 the	 Tribunal	
stated	“it	stands	to	reason,	of	course,	that	100	per	cent	foreign	ownership	almost	certainly	would	result	
in	 foreign	 control,	 by	 whatever	 standard,	 and	 that	 a	 total	 absence	 of	 foreign	 shareholding	 would	
virtually	preclude	the	existence	of	such	control.	How	much	is	enough,	however,	cannot	be	determined	
abstractly	(…).	Interests	sufficiently	important	to	be	able	to	block	major	changes	in	the	company	could	
amount	to	controlling	interests	(...)	Control	could	in	fact	be	acquired	by	persons	holding	only	25%	of	the	
company’s	capital	(...)	51%	of	the	shares	may	not	be	controlling	while	for	some	purposes	15%	may	be	
sufficient	 (…).	 The	 concept	 of	 control	 is	 broad	 and	 flexible	 (…).	 The	 question	 is	 (…)	 whether	 the	
nationality	 chosen	 represents	 an	 exercise	 of	 a	 reasonable	 criterion	 (…).	 A	 tribunal	 may	 regard	 only	
criterion	based	on	management,	voting	 rights,	 shareholding	or	any	other	 reasonable	 theory	as	being	
reasonable	for	the	purpose”. See	Moreland	Currents	Int’l	Trade	Law	J.	(2000),	20.	
38	On	this	point	see	Moreland,	(2000)	(n.	37),	19.	
39	See	paragraph	1.6	below,	mentioning	the	Vacuum	Salt	case,	where	an	opposite	conclusion	has	been	
reached	by	the	Tribunal.	
40	As	 it	will	 be	 seen	below,	Art.	 25(2)(b)	 of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 has	 been	 usually	 interpreted	 in	 the	
sense	that	it	is	aimed	at	expanding	jurisdiction	and	not	at	restricting	it.	
41	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Co.	v.	Republic	of	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	
para.	34,	17	July	2003.	
42	GAMI	Investments	Inc.	v.	Mexico,	NAFTA	(UNCITRAL),	Award,	para.	37,	15	November	2004.	
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administration	of	the	company,	or	a	majority	share;	thus	the	fact	that	Lanco	holds	an	
equity	share	of	18,3%	in	the	capital	stock	of	the	Grantee	allows	one	to	conclude	that	it	
is	an	investor	in	the	meaning	of	Article	I	of	the	Argentina-U.S.	Treaty”.43	
	 The	 practice	 of	 assuming	 jurisdiction	 on	 claims	 brought	 by	 minority	
shareholders	 is	 today	 so	 diffused	 that	 some	Authors	 have	 argued	 that	 a	 customary	
rule	of	international	law	has	developed	in	this	regard.44	
	 It	 should	 be	 also	 noted	 that	 the	 possibility	 of	 direct	 claims	 by	 minority	
shareholders	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 the	 case	 of	 damages	 directly	 suffered	 by	 them	 and	
expressly	protected	by	an	international	law	rule.45	The	reference	goes	also	to	damages	
suffered	 by	 the	 main	 company	 and	 only	 indirectly	 affecting	 shareholders’	 right,	
generally	due	to	a	loss	of	value	of	their	shares.		
In	 international	 law	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 “claims	 based	 on	 a	 reflective	 injury	 to	
shareholders	 are	 generally	 barred”.46	In	 this	 regard	 it	 is	 worth	 citing	 what	 the	 ICJ	
stated	in	the	Diallo	case:	“The	Court,	in	the	Barcelona	Traction	case,	recognized	that	
“a	wrong	done	to	the	company	frequently	causes	prejudice	to	its	shareholders”.	But,	it	
added,	damage	affecting	both	company	and	shareholder	will	not	mean	that	both	are	
entitled	 to	 claim	 compensation…	 It	 is	 only	 one	 entity	 whose	 rights	 have	 been	
infringed”47	and	such	entity	is	the	company.	
A	recent	study	has	also	shown	that	the	practice	of	claims	for	indirect	damages	
suffered	by	shareholders	has	a	very	limited	application	in	national	law	systems.48	As	it	
has	 been	 stated	 by	 the	 English	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 in	 Gardner	 v.	 Parker,	 “The	
shareholder’s	loss	will	be	made	good	if	the	wronged	company,	which	has	the	primary	
claims,	enforces	in	full	its	claims	against	the	wrongdoer”.49	
International	 arbitral	 awards	 show	 that	 in	 international	 investment	 law	 the	
practice	 is	 opposed	 to	 the	 one	 followed	 in	 national	 law	 systems	 and	 in	 general	
international	 law.50	Arbitral	 tribunals	have	 in	 fact	“found	that	shareholders	can	bring	
																																																													
43	Lanco	Int’l,	Inc.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/97/6,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	para.	10,	8	December	
1998.	
44	See,	 e.g.,	McLachlan,	 Shore,	Weininger,	 International	 Investment	 Arbitration:	 Substantive	 Principles	
(2007),	186.	For	a	contrary	opinion	see	Dumberry,	Michigan	State	Journal	of	International	Law	(2010),	
365	and	ss.	
45	In	this	regard	it	should	be	noted	that	since	the	ICJ	Barcelona	Traction	case	(Barcelona	Traction,	Light	
and	Power	Co.,	Ltd.	(Belgium	v.	Spain),	Judgement,	5	February	1970	ICJ	Rep.	4,	35)	it	has	been	admitted	
that	 shareholders	 (or,	 in	 cases	 regarding	 diplomatic	 protection,	 their	 State	 of	 nationality)	 may	
autonomously	 bring	 a	 claim	 arising	 from	 a	 rule	 that	 directly	 protects	 a	 shareholder’s	 right.	 This	 has	
further	been	confirmed	 in	 the	ELSI	 case	 (Elettronica	Sicula	S.p.A.	 (ELSI)	 (U.S.	v.	 Italy),	 Judgement,	20	
July	1989,	ICJ	Rep.	15,	42.	
46	Gaukrodger,	OECD	Working	Paper	on	International	Investment	(2013),	22.	
47 	Ahmadou	 Sadio	 Diallo	 (Republic	 of	 Guinea	 v.	 Democratic	 Republic	 of	 the	 Congo),	 Decision,	 30	
November	2010,	I.C.J.	Rep.,	639.	
48	Gaukrodger	(2013)	(n.	46),	15	and	ss.	
49	Gardner	v.	Parker,	[2004]	1	BCLC	417,	430	(Eng.	Ct.	App.	2004).	
50	Gaukrodger	(2013)	(n.	46),	25	and	ss.	Bottini,	U.	Pa.	J.	Int’l.	Law	(2010)	563	and	ss.	
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autonomous	claims	even	when	the	company	has	effective	recourse”.51	The	decisions	
in	Azurix,52	LG&E,53	Enron54	and	Siemens55	may	be	cited	as	examples	of	this	practice.56	
In	 light	of	 the	above	 it	 is	 easy	 to	understand	 that,	 if	 any	 shareholder	has	his	
autonomous	claim,	“nothing	would	prevent	all	these	different	shareholders	from	filing	
their	own	separate	claims	against	the	host	State	for	the	same	treaty	breach”.57	This	is	
what	 has	 happened	 in	 the	 cases	 regarding	 Sempra	 v.	 Argentina58	and	 Camuzzi	 v.	
Argentina,59	where	 the	majority	shareholder	 (Camuzzi)	and	the	minority	shareholder	
(Sempra)	 of	 the	 companies	 Sodigas	 Sur	 S.A.	 and	 Sodigas	 Pampeana	 S.A.	 filed	 two	
separate	requests	for	arbitration	on	the	basis	of	the	same	facts	(in	this	case,	as	it	will	
be	 seen	 below,	 the	 same	 Tribunal	 heard	 both	 the	 claims).	 Similarly,	 in	 CMS	 v.	
Argentina 60 	and	 Total	 v.	 Argentina 61 	the	 two	 claimants	 were	 both	 minority	
shareholders	 of	 the	 company	 TGN	 and	 filed	 two	 separate	 claims	 arguing	 that	 the	
different	dates	of	the	purchase	of	the	TGN	shares	was	an	element	for	distinguishing	
the	two	claims	which	arose	from	the	same	facts.	As	it	will	be	shown	below,	in	this	case	
the	 two	 proceedings	were	 not	 coordinated	 and	 the	 two	 tribunals	 in	CMS	 and	Total	
reached	different	conclusions	on	the	same	issues.		
A	 very	 complex	 scenario	 also	 appeared	 in	 the	 disputes	 arising	 from	 the	 very	
well	 known	Yukos	 saga,	where	 several	 shareholders	 of	 the	 Russian	 company	 Yukos	
started	 different	 claims	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 same	 facts.62	Various	 arbitration	 cases	
																																																													
51	Gaukrodger	(2013)	(n.	46),	29.	
52	Azurix	Corp.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/12,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	para.	1,	8	
December	2003.	
53	LG&E	 Energy	 Corp.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/1,	 Decision	 on	 Objections	 to	
Jurisdiction,	para.	1,	30	April	2004.	
54	Enron	 Corp.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/3,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 para.	 1,	 14	
January	2004.	
55	Siemens	 A.G.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	No.	 ARB/02/8,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 para.	 23,	 3	
August	2004.	
56	For	more	cases	see	Bottini	(2010)	(n.	50),	584	and	ss.	For	a	contrary	case	see	Consorzio	Groupement	
L.E.S.I.	Dipenta	v.	Algeria,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/8,	Award,	para.	1,	10	January	2005.	 In	this	regard	 it	
should	be	noted	 that	–	 in	principle	–	also	 the	company’s	 creditors	who	have	suffered	an	 indirect	 loss	
might	be	entitled	to	file	a	claim.	
57	Dumberry,	Valasek	(2010)	(n.	36),	71.	
58	Sempra	 Energy	 International	 v.	 Argentina,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/16,	 Decision	 on	 Objections	 to	
Jurisdiction,	11	May	2005.	
59	Camuzzi	Int’l	S.A.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/2,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	11	May	2005.	The	
two	investors	further	agreed	that	a	single	tribunal	would	have	heard	both	claims.	
60	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Company	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	Award,	12	May	2005.	
61	Total	S.A.	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/04/1,	Decision	on	Liability,	27	December	2010.	
62	The	 facts	are	perfectly	described	 in	para.	62	of	 the	PCA	Final	Award	of	18	 July	2014,	mentioned	 in	
footnote	63	below.	 In	particular,	quoting	 the	PCA	Tribunal,	 “The	disputes	between	the	Parties	 to	 the	
present	 proceedings	 involve	 various	 measures	 taken	 by	 Respondent	 [Russia]	 against	 Yukos	 and	
associated	companies	primarily	in	the	period	between	July	2003	and	November	2007,	when	Yukos	had	
emerged	after	 the	dissolution	of	 the	Soviet	Union	 to	become	 the	 largest	oil	 company	 in	 the	Russian	
Federation.	 The	 measures	 complained	 of	 include	 criminal	 prosecutions,	 harassment	 of	 Yukos,	 its	
employees	 and	 related	 persons	 and	 entities;	 massive	 tax	 reassessments,	 VAT	 charges,	 fines,	 asset	
freezes	and	other	measures	against	Yukos	to	enforce	the	tax	reassessments;	the	forced	sale	of	Yukos’	
core	oil	production	asset;	and	other	measures	culminating	in	the	bankruptcy	of	Yukos	in	August	2006,	
the	 subsequent	 sale	of	 its	 remaining	 assets,	 and	Yukos	being	 struck	off	 the	 register	 of	 companies	 in	
November	 2007.	 Claimants	 contend,	 and	 Respondent	 denies,	 that	 Respondent	 failed	 to	 treat	
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emerged63	and,	 as	 will	 be	 seen	 below,	 the	 same	 Tribunal	 has	 heard	 three	 of	 such	
claims.	
It	 could	 also	 well	 happen	 that	 two	 claims	 are	 started	 by	 the	 company	 who	
materially	 made	 the	 investment	 and	 one	 or	 more	 of	 its	 shareholders.	 Any	 of	 the	
tribunals	 involved	 in	the	disputes	arising	 in	this	scenario	could	well	consider	 itself	as	
having	jurisdiction	on	the	single	claim	that	the	same	tribunal	is	going	to	face.	
As	a	consequence,	the	entitlement	of	the	company	and	of	each	shareholder	to	
bring	his	autonomous	claim	–	for	direct	and	indirect	losses	–	shall	be	considered	as	the	
second	main	source	of	parallel	proceedings	and	conflicting	outcomes	in	international	
investment	arbitration.	In	this	regard,	it	is	worth	mentioning	what	has	been	stated	by	
Zachary	 Douglas,	 according	 to	 whom	 “it	 is	 difficult	 to	 imagine	 why	 a	 shareholder	
would	 elect	 to	 bring	 a	 claim	 for	 the	 account	 of	 its	 company	 if	 it	 had	 the	 option	 of	
bypassing	the	company	altogether.	The	company	might	be	able	to	pay	creditors,	local	
taxes	and	discharge	other	obligations	before	distributing	the	residual	amount	of	any	
damages	 recovered	 to	 the	 shareholders”.64	It	 is	 therefore	 obvious	 that,	 from	 the	
perspective	of	a	shareholder,	starting	an	autonomous	claim	against	the	host	State	is	
the	preferable	option.	
	
	 1.1.3	 Chain	of	entities	of	the	same	group	
	
	 “In	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 cases	 investors	 are	 companies…	 Corporations	 are	
owned	by	shareholders	who	may	themselves	be	companies”.65	Investments	very	often	
present	 a	 complex	 structure	 consisting	 of	 companies	 incorporated	 in	 different	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Claimants’	 investments	 in	Yukos	 in	a	 fair	and	equitable	manner	and	on	a	non-discriminatory	basis,	 in	
breach	of	Article	10(1)	of	the	ECT,	and	that	Respondent	expropriated	Claimants’	investments	in	breach	
of	Article	13(1)	of	the	ECT.	Claimants	seek	full	reparation	in	excess	of	USD	114	billion”.		
63	Arbitrations	 started	 by	minority	 shareholders:	Quasar	 de	 Valores	 SICAV	 S.A.	 v.	 Russian	 Federation,	
Stockholm	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce	 (SCC)	 Award,	 20	 July	 2012,	 RosInvest	 Co	 UK	 Ltd	 v.	 The	 Russian	
Federation,	 SCC	 Case	 No.	 Arb.	 V079/2005,	 Final	 Award,	 12	 September	 2010.	 Arbitrations	 started	 by	
majority	 shareholders:	Hulley	 Enterprises	 Ltd	 v.	 Russia,	 Yukos	Universal	 Limited	 v.	 Russia	 and	Veteran	
Petroleum	Limited	v.	Russia,	UNCITRAL,	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration,	Interim	Award	on	Jurisdiction	
and	 Admissibility,	 30	 November	 2009,	 and	 Final	 Award,	 18	 July	 2014.	 In	 order	 to	 understand	 the	
percentages	of	majority	shareholding	in	Yukos,	it	is	worth	quoting	paras	65-69	of	the	Final	Award	of	18	
July	2014:	“65.	The	three	Claimants	in	these	related	cases	are	all	part	of	the	Yukos	group	of	companies,	
which	 had	 at	 its	 center	 Yukos,	 headed	 by	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer	 Mr.	 Mikhail	 Khodorkovsky.	 66.	
Claimant	in	PCA	Case	No.	AA	226,	Hulley,	was	incorporated	in	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	on	17	September	
1997	and	was	a	100	percent	owned	subsidiary	of	YUL	[Yukos	Universal	Limited].	67.	Claimant	 in	PCA	
Case	No.	AA	227,	YUL,	was	incorporated	on	24	September	1997	in	the	Isle	of	Man	(a	Dependency	of	the	
United	 Kingdom).	 68.	 Claimant	 in	 PCA	 Case	 No.	 AA	 228,	 VPL	 [Veteran	 Petroleum	 Limited],	 was	
incorporated	in	the	Republic	of	Cyprus	on	7	February	2001.	69.	Hulley	held	approximately	56.3	percent,	
YUL	held	approximately	2.6	percent	and	VPL	held	approximately	11.6percent	of	the	outstanding	shares	
in	Yukos.	Collectively	 therefore,	Claimants	approximately	had	a	70.5	percent	 shareholding	 in	Yukos”.	
See	 also	 footnotes	 137	 and	 138	 below	 (referring	 also	 to	 the	 claim	 before	 the	 ECtHR	 and	 the	 ICC	
arbitration	Tribunal).	With	regard	to	the	aspect	that	the	final	owner	of	the	whole	group	was	the	Russian	
citizen	Mr.	Khodorkovsky,	please	refer	to	paragraph	1.1.3	below.	
64	Douglas,	The	international	Law	of	Investment	Claims	(2009),	452.	
65	Schreuer	(2005)	(n.	31),	1.	
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jurisdictions	 and	 owned	 by	 nationals	 of	 different	 countries.66	It	 is	 possible,	 in	 this	
regard,	 to	 talk	 about	 “strategic	 structuring”;67 	companies	 are	 therefore	 “readily	
established	in	order	to	allow	their	owners	to	benefit	from	certain	advantages	related	
to	their	place	of	incorporation”.68	
This	practice	is	commonly	accepted	by	international	investment	tribunals.	It	is	
worth	mentioning	that	the	Aguas	del	Tunari	Tribunal	stated	that	“it	is	not	uncommon	
in	practice,	and	–	absent	a	particular	limitation	–	not	illegal	to	locate	one’s	operations	
in	a	jurisdictions	perceived	to	provide	a	beneficial	regulatory	and	legal	environment	in	
terms,	for	example,	of	taxation	or	the	substantive	law	of	the	jurisdiction,	including	the	
availability	 of	 a	 BIT”. 69 	Similarly,	 the	 HICEE	 tribunal	 stated	 that	 structured	
investments	“are	not	unusual,	nor	is	there	anything	in	the	least	reprehensible	about	it;	
structured	investments	are	commonplace.	The	purpose	is	to	secure	advantages	from	
incorporation	or	operation	 in	a	particular	 jurisdiction;	…	The	advantages	anticipated	
often	include	the	protection	of	particular	bilateral	(or	other)	treaties	covering	foreign	
investment”.70	This	 shall	 be	 added	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 “some	 States	 actively	 promote	
themselves	 as	 favourable	 venues	 for	 corporate	presence	and	access	 to	 a	 favourable	
network	 of	 investment	 treaties…	 Such	 an	 approach	 may	 also	 boost	 investment	
inflows”.71	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 BITs,	 usually	 considering	 as	 foreign	
investors	 companies	 which	 have	 the	 nationality	 of	 the	 other	 contracting	 state	
(regardless	of	the	effective	control	of	the	company),	tribunals	have	therefore	assumed	
jurisdiction	in	the	following	cases:72	
1) claimant	 which	 have	 an	 indirect	 interest	 in	 a	 locally	 incorporated	
company	 through	 their	 participation	 in	 another	 corporation,	 which	
may	have	the	nationality	of	 the	claimant	 investor,73	the	host	State74	
and	of	a	third	State;75	
																																																													
66	Wisner,	Gallus,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2004),	927.	
67	Sinclair,	ICSID	Rev.	FILJ	(2005),	357.	See	also	Schreuer,	The	Fordham	Papers	(2012),	17	and	ss.	
68	Ibid.,	363.	
69	Aguas	del	Tunari	S.A.	v.	Republic	of	Bolivia,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/3,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	para.	
330	21	October	2005.	
70	HICEE	v.	Slovakia,	UNCITRAL,	PCA	Case	No.	2009-11,	Partial	Award.	23	May	2011.	
71	Sinclair	(2005)	(n.	67),	363.	
72	See	Dumberry,	Valasek	(2010)	(n.	36),	51	and	ss.	The	following	examples	are	taken	by	Dumberry	and	
Valasek’s	article.	
73	Siemens	A.G.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/8,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	3	August	2004,	
where	the	German	claimant	(Siemens)	owned	100%	of	another	German	corporation	(Siemens	Nixdorf	
Informationssysteme),	which	–	 in	 turn	–	created	and	controlled	an	Argentinian	company	 (Siemens	 IT	
Services	S.A.).	
74	Enron	Corp.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/3,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	14	January	2004,	
where	the	U.S.	corporation	Enron	owned	a	participation	in	an	Argentinian	company	(Transportadora	de	
Gas	del	Sur),	which	had	several	participations	in	other	Argentinian	companies.	
75	Waste	Management	Inc	v.	United	Mexican	States	(II),	ICSID	case	no.	ARB	(AF)/00/3,	Award	of	30	April	
2004.	 Here,	 the	 U.S.	 claimant	 owned	 two	 holding	 corporations	 incorporated	 in	 Grand	 Cayman	 (UK)	
(AcaVerde	Holdings	Ltd.	and	Sun	Investment	Co.),	which	–	in	turn	–	owned	the	company	incorporated	
in	the	host	State	(Acaverde).	
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2) claimant	 which	 are	 intermediate	 (“holding”,	 “shell”	 or	 “mailbox”)	
corporations.	 Such	 companies	 “are	 typically	 incorporated	 in	
favourable	tax	jurisdictions.	They	usually	have	no	significant	assets	or	
operations	and	are	established	for	the	sole	purpose	of	owning	shares	
of	other	corporations”.76	
With	 particular	 reference	 to	 the	 cases	mentioned	 under	 2),	 arbitral	 tribunals	
and	 scholars	 have	 sometimes	 expressed	 their	 perplexities	 concerning	 the	 risk	 of	
abuses	 of	 investment	 arbitration,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 such	 “shell”	 companies	 have	
been	 incorporated	 in	 countries	 of	 convenience	 for	 the	 mere	 purpose	 of	 gaining	
jurisdiction	 in	 international	 investment	arbitrations.	 It	 is	 interesting	 to	note	 that	 the	
problem	 has	 also	 arisen	 even	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 ultimate	 owner	 had	 the	 same	
nationality	of	the	host	State.	This	happened,	inter	alia,	in	Tokios	Tokeles,77	Rompetrol78	
and	 Yukos.79	With	 particular	 reference	 to	 the	 last	 mentioned	 case,	 the	 tribunal	 has	
clearly	 stated	 that	 the	 definition	 of	 “investor”	 in	 the	 Energy	 Charter	 Treaty	 (ECT)	
(Article	 1(7))	 does	 not	 function	 to	 deny	 standing	 to	 shell	 companies	 incorporated	
under	the	laws	of	a	signatory	State,	even	if,	as	in	the	present	case,	the	claimant	was	
owned	 by	 the	 Russian	 citizen	 Mr.	 Khodorkovsky.	 The	 ECT,	 in	 fact,	 refers	 to	 “a	
company	 or	 other	 organization	 organized	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law	 applicable	 in	
that	Contracting	Party”,	thus	precluding	an	analysis	of	the	effective	control	on	the	real	
management	of	the	company.	The	tribunal	accepted	jurisdiction	and	stated	that,	on	
the	basis	of	the	ECT,	it	was	“not	entitled	to	find	otherwise”.	The	Tribunal	applied	the	
“plain	meaning	 doctrine”	 and	 interpreted	 the	 ECT	 in	 its	 literary	 sense.	Quoting	 the	
Saluka80	Tribunal,	 it	 stated	 that	 it	 had	 “some	 sympathy	 for	 the	 argument	 that	 a	
company	which	 has	 no	 real	 connection	with	 a	 State	 party	 to	 a	BIT,	 and	which	 is	 in	
reality	a	mere	shell	company	controlled	by	another	company	which	is	not	constituted	
under	 the	 laws	of	 that	State,	 should	not	be	entitled	 to	 invoke	the	provisions	of	 that	
treaty”;	however	the	Tribunal	declared	not	to	have	alternatives	to	give	weight	to	what	
the	parties	have	expressed	in	the	arbitration	clause	and	assumed	jurisdiction.81		
	 The	 above	 approach	 of	 arbitral	 tribunals	 –	 which,	 to	 the	 knowledge	 of	 the	
present	 author,	 has	 been	 (partially	 and	 in	 different	 circumstances,	 that	 will	 be	
																																																													
76	Dumberry,	Valasek	(2010)	(n.	36),	55.	
77	Tokios	 Tokeles	 v.	 Ukraine,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/18,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 29	 April	 2004.	 This	
award	 has	 been	 strongly	 criticized	 by	 Alexeyev,	 Voitovich,	 Journal	 of	 World	 Investment	 and	 Trade	
(2008).	The	Authors	 in	particular	 criticized	 the	very	 formalistic	approach	of	 the	Tribunal	disregarding	
commercial	reality.	
78	The	Rompetrol	Group	N.V.	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/3,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	18	April	
2008.	
79	Yukos	Universal	v.	Russian	Federation,	(UNCITRAL)	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration,	Interim	Award	on	
Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility.	30	November	2009.	
80	Saluka	Investments	BV	v.	Czech	Republic,	(UNCITRAL)	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration,	Partial	Award,	
17	March	2006.	
81	For	a	general	analysis	of	the	award	see	Blyschak,	Richmond	Journal	of	Global	Law	&	Business	(2011),	
179.	
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examined	 in	paragraph	1.2	and	1.4)	put	 in	discussion	only	 in	 the	TSA82	and	National	
Gas83	awards	–	has	generated	a	practice	known	as	“treaty	shopping”.84	Such	concept	
has	 been	 defined	 as	 a	 “commonly	 used	 scheme	 for	 multinational	 corporations	 to	
‘steal’	 not	 only	 higher	 levels	 of	 protection,	 advantage	 or	 benefit,	 but	 also	 the	
jurisdiction	of	arbitral	tribunals.	With	a	significantly	growing	number	of	 international	
investment	 treaties,	 the	 practice	 of	 treaty	 shopping	 has	 become	 increasingly	
rampant”	 (emphasis	 added).85	Bernardo	 Cremades	 has	 talked,	 in	 this	 regard,	 about	
“gambling	methods”.86	Blyschak	has	referred	to	an	investor	which	“freeloads”	onto	a	
treaty	that	was	not	properly	intended	to	apply	to	the	investor.87	
	 The	direct	consequence	of	 the	above	 is	 that	several	entities	belonging	to	the	
same	 group	 of	 companies	 (and	 protecting	 the	 same	 interests)	 may	 start	 different	
claims	 according	 to	 the	 terms	 of	 different	 BITs	 (the	 BITs	 that	 the	 various	 States	 of	
nationality	of	 such	entities	concluded	with	 the	host	State)	 in	order	 to	seek	 relief	 for	
the	alleged	damage	that	the	group	(rectius	the	final	owners)	suffered.	
	 This	 is	what	has	happened	 in	the	CME88	and	Lauder89	cases.	Ronald	Lauder,	a	
U.S.	 national,	 was	 the	 ultimate	 beneficiary	 of	 an	 investment	 in	 a	 Czech	 operating	
company	 (CNTS)	 providing	 television	 services.	 The	 investment	 was	 performed	
through	 an	 intermediate	 corporation	 (CME).	 After	 the	 host	 State	 took	 certain	
measures	 concerning	 TV	 licenses,	 Lauder	 started	 an	 ad	 hoc	 arbitration	 in	 London	
under	the	U.S.A.	–	Czech	Republic	BIT	and	CME	started	a	SCC	arbitration	under	the	
Netherlands	 –	 Czech	 Republic	 BIT.	 The	 two	 tribunals	 reached	 completely	 opposite	
conclusions	with	regard	to	the	evaluation	of	the	same	facts.	
	 As	 it	 will	 be	 better	 seen	 in	 paragraph	 1.4	 below,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	
practice	 of	 treaty	 shopping	 is	 fully	 justifiable	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 the	
majority	 of	 BITs	 and	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 literal	 interpretation	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	
have	 given	 of	 arbitration	 clauses	 contained	 in	 these	 treaties	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
necessity	of	 respecting	the	principle	of	party	autonomy	as	expressed	 in	 the	relevant	
arbitration	clause.90	
																																																													
82	TSA	Spectrum	de	Argentina	S.A.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/5,	Award,	19	December	
2008.	For	a	comment	on	this	case	 in	comparison	to	 the	approach	taken	 in	Tokios	Tokeles	 see	Martin,	
Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2011).	
83			National	Gas	S.A.E.	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/7,	Award,	3	April	2014.	As	it	will	
be	 seen	 below	 (paragraph	 1.6)	 these	 awards	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 deviation	 from	 the	 main	
approach	described	in	the	text.	
84	See	Kirtley,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2009),	427	and	ss.,	Burgstaller,	Journal	of	World	
Investment	and	Trade	(2006),	857	and	ss.	
85	Zhang,	Contemp.	Asia	Arb.	J.	(2013),	50.	
86	Cremades,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2004),	89.	
87	Blyschak	(2011)	(n.	81),	195.		
88	CME	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	SCC	Partial	Award,	13	September	2001.		
89	Ronald	S.	Lauder	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award,	3	September	2001.	
90	Zhang	(2013)	(n.	85),	51.	A	possible	stop	to	this	phenomenon	could	be	realized	through	the	so-called	
“denial	of	benefits	 clauses”,	 aimed	at	 limiting	 the	protection	afforded	by	 investment	 treaties	only	 to	
foreign	 companies	 which	 have	 an	 actual	 connection	 with	 the	 State	 in	 which	 they	 are	 incorporated.	
Examples	of	such	clauses	are	article	17	of	the	Energy	Charter	Treaty	and	article	II.14	of	the	Trans-Pacific	
Partnership	Treaty,	which	denies	the	protection	of	the	treaty	to	shell	companies.	In	this	regard	it	should	
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As	any	form	of	forum	shopping,91	this	practice	has	very	controversial	effects,92	
but	 it	 is	 not	 forbidden	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 plain	 reading	 of	 the	 relevant	 sources.93	
Tribunals	 have	 therefore	 allowed	 treaty	 shopping	 and	 corporate	 manoeuvring,94	
unless	the	cases	of	abuses	that	they	have	deemed	manifest	on	the	basis	of	 the	very	
short	time	passed	between	a	change	of	the	corporate	structure	(aimed	at	gaining	the	
protection	of	a	certain	BIT)	and	the	beginning	of	the	arbitration.95	
	 	
	 1.1.4	 Different	adjudication	systems	provided	in	the	same	legal	instrument	
	
The	 last	and	 residual	 source	of	parallel	proceedings	 (the	 interest	 for	which	 is	
more	theoretical	than	practical)	 is	given	by	the	circumstance	that	arbitration	clauses	
in	 several	 BITs	 or	 in	 investment	 agreements	 often	 provide	 for	 various	 means	 of	
dispute	 resolution	 (e.g.	 ICSID	arbitration,	ad	hoc/UNCITRAL	arbitration,	 institutional	
commercial	arbitration,	national	courts).			
As	an	example,	it	can	be	mentioned	Article	8	of	UK	Model	BIT,	stating	that:		
(1)	 (…)	
(2)		 Where	 the	 dispute	 is	 referred	 to	 international	 arbitration,	 the	
national	or	company	and	the	Contracting	Party	concerned	in	the	
dispute	may	agree	to	refer	the	dispute	either	to:		
																																																																																																																																																																																		
be	 noted	 that	 such	 clauses	 are	 not	 unanimously	 perceived	 as	 an	 effective	mechanism	 to	 limit	 treaty	
shopping.	 See	 Blyschak	 (2011)	 (n.	 81),	 191	 and	 ss.	 The	 Author	 refers	 to	 the	 Yukos	 case	 in	 order	 to	
demonstrate	 the	 limited	applicability	of	 these	clauses	 in	order	 to	 limit	 treaty	shopping.	For	a	general	
overview	of	 the	subject	see	Mistelis,	Baltag,	Penn	State	Law	Review	(2009),	1301	and	ss.	For	a	major	
focus	on	procedural	 requirements	see	Gastrell,	Le	Cannu,	 ICSID	Review	FILJ	 (2015),	 78	and	ss.	 In	 this	
regard,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 as	 it	 will	 better	 explained	 in	 paragraph	 1.6	 below,	 article	 X.3	 of	 the	
investment	provisions	of	the	EU-Canada	Free	Trade	Agreement	(Comprehensive	Economic	and	Trade	
Agreement	 –	 CETA)	 defines	 as	 investors	 only	 entities	 and	 natural	 persons	 which	 have	 a	 real	 and	
substantial	business	 in	 the	territory	of	one	of	 the	signatory	States.	Such	provision	therefore	excludes	
claims	by	shell	companies.	
91	Bassett,	North	Carolina	Law	Review	(2005-2006),	333	and	ss.,	Koch,	The	Geneva	Papers	(2006),	293	
and	ss.,	Maloy,	QLR	(2005-2006),	25	and	ss.	The	Authors	argue	that	forum	shopping	–	notwithstanding	
the	very	negative	opinions	related	to	this	practice	–	is	a	perfectly	legitimate	option	for	lawyers,	which	
have	the	duty	to	find	the	best	forum	for	their	clients.	In	particular	Bassett,	335,	explains	her	opinion	that	
forum	 shopping	 and	 strategic	 choices	 are	 not	 a	 form	 of	 “cheating”,	 but	 a	 “legitimate,	 expressly	
authorized	action	when	more	than	one	forum	satisfies	the	requisite	legal	criteria”.	The	same	Author,	at	
336,	 states	 that	 “to	 the	 extent	 that	 strategy	 and	 choice	 play	 a	 role	 in	 litigation,	 forum	 shopping	
encompasses	both”.	According	to	the	Author	the	result	of	forum	shopping	is	not	necessarily	unfair.	For	
a	 general	 analysis	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 forum	 shopping,	 see	 Ferrari	 (2013),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Brower,	 North	
Carolina	Law	Review	(1993),	649	and	ss.	
92	See	Schreuer	(2012)	(n.	67),	26-27.	
93	See	Sacerdoti,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2004),	97.		
94	See	Aguas	del	 Tunari	S.A.	 v.	Republic	 of	Bolivia,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/3,	Decision	on	 Jurisdiction,	
para.	 330	21	October	2005,	Mobil	Corporation,	Venezuela	Holding	BV,	Mobil	Cerro	Negro	Holding,	Ltd.,	
Mobil	Venezolana	de	Petroleos	Holdings,	Inc.,	Mobil	Cerro	Negro	Ltd.,	and	Mobil	Venezolana	de	Petroleos,	
Inc.	 v.	 Bolivarian	 Republic	 of	 Venezuela,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/07/27,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 10	 June	
2010.	See	also	Blyschak,	Journal	of	World	Energy	Law	and	Business	(2011),	32	and	ss.	
95	See	Phoenix	Action	Ltd.	v.	The	Czech	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/5,	Award,	15	April	2009,	Banro	
American	Resources,	 Inc.	and	Société	Aurifére	du	Kivu	et	du	Maniema	S.A.R.L.	v.	Democratic	Republic	of	
Congo,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/98/7,	Award,	1	September	2000.	For	further	explanation	on	the	concepts	of	
abuse	of	rights	and	abuse	of	process	please	see	Chapter	3.	
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(a)		 the	 International	 Centre	 for	 the	 Settlement	 of	
Investment	 Disputes	 (having	 regard	 to	 the	 provisions,	
where	applicable,	of	the	Convention	on	the	Settlement	
of	 Investment	 Disputes	 between	 States	 and	 Nationals	
of	other	States,	opened	for	signature	at	Washington	DC	
on	 18	 March	 1965	 and	 the	 Additional	 Facility	 for	 the	
Administration	 of	 Conciliation,	 Arbitration	 and	 Fact-
Finding	Proceedings);	or		
(b)		 the	Court	of	Arbitration	of	the	International	Chamber	of	
Commerce;	or		
(c)		 an	international	arbitrator	or	ad	hoc	arbitration	tribunal	
to	be	appointed	by	a	 special	agreement	or	established	
under	 the	 Arbitration	 Rules	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	
Commission	on	International	Trade	Law.		
Similar	provisions	are	contained	in	many	other	BITs.96	
In	the	absence	of	 fork-in-the-road	provisions,	this	situation	might	give	rise	to	
parallel	 and	 un-coordinated	 proceedings.	 A	 party	 in	 bad	 faith	 could,	 indeed,	 start	
more	than	one	proceeding	related	to	the	same	facts	in	the	various	fora	set	forth	in	the	
arbitration	 clause	 and	 –	 in	 theory	 –	 each	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunals	 could	 assume	
jurisdiction	 on	 the	 dispute	 (this	 issue	 will	 be	 better	 examined	 at	 paragraph	 2.1.1	
below).	 In	 this	 regard,	 anyway,	 it	 shall	 be	 considered	 that	 some	 Authors	 have	
expressed	the	view	that	once	a	choice	under	a	treaty	has	been	made,	the	others	are	
precluded.	 Such	 a	 view	 is	 certainly	 correct	 in	 principle,	 but	 could	 be	 more	 easily	
accepted	in	presence	of	a	clarifying	provision	to	that	effect.97	
	
1.2	 The	 reason	 behind	 parallel	 proceedings:	 the	 historical	 necessity	 to	
incentivize	investments		
	
It	is	now	worth	considering	the	reasons	behind	the	proliferation	of	fora	for	the	
settlement	of	investment	disputes.		
In	this	regard	it	is	helpful	to	start	from	the	words	of	Eloise	Obadia,	who	in	2002	
–	 referring	 to	 the	 activities	 of	 ICSID,	 today	 the	most	 applied	 form	 of	 resolution	 of	
investment	disputes	–	stated	that	“during	the	first	30	years	of	its	existence,	ICSID	was	
somewhat	 of	 a	 ‘Sleeping	 Beauty’,	 with	 an	 average	 of	 one	 or	 two	 cases	 being	
registered	 each	 year.	 It	 is	 with	 the	 widespread	 development	 of	 bilateral	 and	
multilateral	investment	treaties	that	the	activities	of	ICSID	have	awakened…	In	a	way,	
these	bilateral	and	multilateral	investment	treaties	are	to	ICSID	what	Prince	Charming	
was	to	Sleeping	Beauty,	having	stirred	the	activities	of	the	Centre”.98	
																																																													
96	See,	e.g.,	article	24(3)	of	the	U.S.	Model	BIT.	
97	See	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	2),	100.	
98	Obadia,	Investment	Treaties	and	Arbitration	(2002),	67-68.	
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This	statement	is	strictly	related	to	the	following	considerations:	(i)	prior	to	the	
“baby	 boom”	 of	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties	 (and	 of	 the	 related	 investor	 –	 State	
arbitrations)99	the	number	of	foreign	investments	was	very	limited	due	to	the	mistrust	
of	investors	in	the	developing	States’	systems	of	justice	(and	to	the	international	form	
of	 relief	 given	 by	 diplomatic	 protection);	 (ii)	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 the	
activity	 of	 ICSID	 (and	 the	 existence	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 in	 general)	 was	 very	
limited;100	and,	as	a	consequence,	 (iii)	States	and	arbitral	 tribunals	have	assumed	an	
approach	aimed	at	incentivizing	the	recourse	to	international	investment	arbitration.	
In	 light	 of	 the	 three	 above	 considerations,	we	will	 now	 try	 to	 analyse	 the	 historical	
process	at	the	basis	of	the	 jurisdictional	 fragmentation	occurred	within	 international	
investment	law,	prior	from	the	perspective	of	States	that	negotiated	BITs	and	further	
looking	at	the	approach	assumed	by	arbitral	tribunals	in	assuming	jurisdiction.	
From	 the	 first	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 between	 States	 and	
foreign	investors	was,	in	fact,	until	the	second	half	of	the	20th	century,	reserved	to	the	
jurisdiction	of	national	courts.	Only	when	the	investor,	having	before	exhausted	all	the	
available	 local	 remedies,	 did	 not	 receive	 any	 sort	 of	 satisfaction,	 the	 State	 of	
nationality	of	the	investor	had	the	right	to	seek	international	relief	through	diplomatic	
protection. 101 	Such	 form	 of	 international	 protection	 is	 a	 right	 of	 the	 State	 of	
nationality	of	the	 investor	who	enjoys	maximum	discretion	 in	making	recourse	to	or	
waiving	 it,	even	on	the	basis	of	political	considerations.	Furthermore,	the	rule	of	the	
prior	exhaustion	of	local	remedies	rendered	the	process	very	slow.	It	is,	in	this	regard,	
sufficient	to	think	that	the	whole	proceedings	(i.e.	national	and	international)	related	
to	the	well-known	Barcelona	Traction102	case	has	taken	22	years.103What	stated	above	
shall	 be	 summed	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that,	 after	 World	 War	 II,	 developing	 States	
claimed	 their	 full	 sovereignty	 on	 natural	 resources	 and	 therefore	 considered	
themselves	 entitled	 to	 expropriate	 investments	 without	 any	 sort	 of	 protection	 for	
investors	 (i.e.	 without	 paying	 a	 prompt,	 adequate	 and	 effective	 compensation	
according	 to	 the	 so-called	Hull	 Formula).	 Moreover,	 such	 States	 –	 applying	 the	 so-
called	Calvo	Doctrine104	–	requested	to	insert	in	investment	contracts	a	so-called	Calvo	
Clause,	pursuant	to	which	they	renounced	to	any	form	of	diplomatic	protection.105		
																																																													
99	See	Alexandrov	(2006)	(n.	9),	387.	
100 	See	 Bernardini,	 Journal	 of	 World	 Investment	 (2001),	 where	 it	 is	 said	 that:	 “The	 experience,	
particularly	 in	 the	 1960s	 and	 1970s,	 of	 one	 of	 the	 sectors	 of	 economic	 activity	 which	 has	 most	
significantly	mobilized	the	industrialized	world’s	resources	towards	developing	areas	–	the	exploitation	
of	mining	resources	and,	more	specifically,	petroleum	–	shows	how	difficult	it	was	during	this	period	to	
reconcile	the	parties’	different	objectives”.	
101	On	the	concept	of	diplomatic	protection	see	Conforti	(2013)	(n.	7),	248	and	ss.	
102	The	 reference	 goes	 to	 the	 Barcelona	 Traction,	 Light	 and	 Power	 Co.,	 Ltd.	 (Belgium	 v.	 Spain),	
Judgement,	5	February	1970	ICJ	Rep.	4,	35	case	and	to	the	related	national	proceedings.	
103	See	Tonini	(2011)	(n.	7),	9-10.	
104	Such	 a	 doctrine	was	 ideated	by	 the	Argentinian	diplomatic	Carlos	Calvo	 in	 the	 second	half	 of	 the	
19th	century.	
105	On	the	Calvo	Doctrine,	see	Conforti	(2013)	(n.	7),	250,	stating	that	the	effect	of	the	Calvo	Clause	in	an	
investment	contract	shall	be	minimized,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	such	contracts	were	signed	by	investors	
and	 host	 States	 and	 investors	 could	 not	 bind	 their	 State	 of	 nationality,	 that	 were	 the	 only	 entities	
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From	the	above	 it	 is	evident	 that	 foreign	 investors	carrying	out	businesses	 in	
developing	 States	 enjoyed	 very	 little	 protection	 and,	 therefore,	 they	 where	 not	
incentivized	 in	 investing	 abroad.	 For	 this	 reason,	 in	 order	 to	 attract	 investments,	
States	 have	 started	 to	 enter	 into	 BITs	 with	 very	 broad	 standards	 of	 protection,	
definitions	of	investments	and	providing	for	a	neutral	arbitration	to	be	started	directly	
by	investors	in	one	of	the	different	fora	provided	therein.	This	has	been	described	by	
Prof.	 Sacerdoti	 as	 a	 “reaction”	 to	 the	 ICJ	Barcelona	 Traction	 decision,	 according	 to	
which	 the	 State	 of	 nationality	 of	 shareholders	 was	 not	 entitled	 to	 seek	 diplomatic	
protection	for	damages	suffered	directly	by	the	company	(that	actually	performed	the	
investment)	 and	 indirectly	 (i.e.	 loss	 of	 value	 of	 the	 shares)	 by	 shareholders.106	It	 is	
therefore	clear,	if	it	is	true	that	–	as	we	have	seen	above	–	the	main	sources	of	parallel	
proceedings	are	related	to	the	definitions	of	“investors”	and	“investments”	contained	
in	 BITs,	 that	 the	 first	 reason	 leading	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	 is	 the	 same	 States’	
willingness	 to	 attract	 foreign	 investments	 through	 BITs	 very	 favourable	 to	 foreign	
investors	(and	setting	forth	various	fora	for	the	settlement	of	investment	disputes).	In	
this	 regard	 it	 is	 worth	 quoting	 Anthony	 Sinclair’s	 words,	 stating,	 with	 concern	 to	
overlapping	jurisdiction	in	international	investment	law,	that	“the	inherent	flexibility	–	
or	patent	undesirability	–	of	this	potential	overlap	(depending	on	which	side	you	sit)	is	
the	product	of	a	modern	treaty	regime	that	typically	couples	a	very	broad	definition	of	
investments	directly	or	indirectly	held	with	frequently	no	more	than	a	formalistic	test	
of	nationality	to	establish	standing”.107	
In	regard	to	the	practice	of	arbitral	tribunals,	it	is	worth	beginning	the	analysis	
by	 looking	 at	 the	 very	 limited	number	 of	 investment	 cases	 until	 the	 end	of	 the	 last	
century.	 It	 is	 here	 sufficient	 to	mention	 that	 “the	 first	 ICSID	 case	was	 registered	 in	
1972.	The	first	ICSID	case	under	an	investment	treaty	was	registered	in	1987…	at	the	
end	of	1994,	ICSID	had	before	it	only	three	cases	between	foreign	investors	and	host	
governments	under	investment	treaties.	The	first	year	in	which	more	than	five	ICSID	
cases	were	registered	was	1997”.108	How	can	this	date	be	joined	with	the	circumstance	
that	57	cases	in	2013109	and	42	in	2014110	arising	from	arbitration	clauses	contained	in	
international	investment	treaties	have	been	initiated?		
First	 of	 all,	 the	 data	 regarding	 the	 very	 high	 number	 of	 BIT	 arbitrations	 are	
clear	 evidence	 that,	 as	 of	 today,	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 considered	 (and,	 in	 the	
opinion	of	the	present	author,	as	it	will	be	seen	below,	still	is)	the	most	reliable	means	
for	the	resolution	of	disputes	between	States	and	foreign	investors.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
entitled	 to	 make	 recourse	 to	 diplomatic	 protection.	 See	 also	 de	 Gramont,	 Transnational	 Dispute	
Management	(2006),	18.	
106	Sacerdoti,	Appeals	Mechanism	in	International	Investment	Disputes	(2008),	133.	
107	Sinclair	(2005)	(n.	67),	361.	
108	Alexandrov	(2006)	(n.	9),	387.	
109	See	UNCTAD,	Recent	Developments	in	Investor-	State	Dispute	Settlement,	published	on	1	April	
2014.	
110	See	UNCTAD,	Recent	Trends	in	IIAS	and	ISDS,	published	on	19	February	2015.	
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Trying	 to	 analyse	 the	 reasons	 for	 the	 significant	 growth	 of	 the	 recourse	 to	
investment	arbitration	(and	in	particular	to	ICSID),	one	of	the	main	of	them	seems	to	
be	 (on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 approaches	 taken	 by	 tribunals	 at	 the	
jurisdictional	stage	of	proceedings),111	the	very	flexible	approach	taken	by	tribunals	in	
assuming	jurisdiction.112	The	reference	goes	 in	particular	to	the	recourse	by	tribunals	
to	 the	 doctrine	 of	 “piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil”,	 i.e.	 the	 determination	 of	 the	
nationality	 of	 a	 company	 through	 the	 ascertainment	 of	 the	 nationality	 of	 a	
corporation’s	predominant	shareholders.113		
In	particular,	as	demonstrated	by	the	cases	that	will	be	reported	below,	from	
an	 analysis	 of	 the	 jurisdictional	 awards	 it	 emerges	 that:	 (i)	 tribunals	 have	 used	 to	
pierce	the	corporate	veil	when	necessary	in	order	to	assume	jurisdiction;	and	(ii)	when	
the	 claim	 has	 been	 brought	 by	 a	 shell	 company,	 tribunals	 do	 not	 have	 pierced	 the	
corporate	 veil,	 even	 if	 the	 actual	 beneficiary	 of	 the	 investment	 had	 the	 same	
nationality	of	the	host;	and	(iii)	in	case	of	claims	started	by	the	company	incorporated	
in	 the	host	State,	only	 in	 two	cases	Tribunals	have	accepted	to	pierce	the	corporate	
veil,	while	 in	 all	 the	others	 they	 stopped	at	 the	 first	 level	 of	 control.	 Such	a	 flexible	
(and	 often	 incoherent)	 approach	 has	 been	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 literal	
interpretation	of	the	relevant	BITs.	
As	an	example	of	the	approach	described	under	(i)	it	is	worth	mentioning	one	
of	the	oldest	ICSID	cases,	SOABI	v.	Senegal,114	where	a	Panamanian	company	owned	
the	 locally	 incorporated	company’s	 shares;	 such	Panamanian	company	was,	 in	 turn,	
owned	 by	 Belgians.	 Panama	 was	 not	 a	 signatory	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention	 and	
therefore	 the	 respondent	 State	 argued	 that	 the	 Panamanian	 company	 was	 not	
entitled	to	the	protection	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	The	Tribunal,	on	the	contrary,	held	
that	ultimate	control	was	sufficient	to	establish	its	jurisdiction.	The	Tribunal	stated	“it	
is	obvious	that,	just	as	a	host	state	may	prefer	that	investments	be	channelled	through	
a	company	incorporated	under	domestic	law,	investors	may	be	led	for	reasons	of	their	
own	 to	 invest	 their	 funds	 through	 intermediary	 entities	 while	 retaining	 the	 same	
degree	of	control	over	 the	national	company	as	they	would	have	exercised	as	direct	
																																																													
111	See	Dolzer,	Schreuer,	Principles	of	 International	 Investment	Law	 (2012),	50	and	ss.,	Nadakavukaren	
Schefer,	International	Investment	Law	(2013),	113	and	ss.,	Sornarajah,	The	international	Law	on	Foreign	
Investment	 (2010),	 323	 and	 ss.,	 McLachlan,	 Shore,	 Weiniger	 (2007)	 (n.	 44),	 131	 and	 ss.	 See	 also	
Bernardini,	in	Global	reflections	on	international	law,	commerce	and	dispute	resolution	–	Liber	amicorum	
in	honour	of	Robert	Briner	(2005),	103	and	ss.	
112	This	could	be	sociologically	explained,	using	the	words	of	Hale,	Between	Interests	and	Law	(2015),	11,	
by	 saying	 that	 “[d]ispute	 settlement	 institutions	 (be	 they	 domestic,	 intergovernmental,	 or	
transnational)	have	almost	never	run	against	the	interests	of	dominant	economic	groups”.	
113	See	 Kryvoi,	 Global	 Business	 Law	Review	 (2011),	 173,	who	 has	 defined	 the	 “piercing	 the	 corporate	
veil”	as	“disregarding	the	separation	between	entities	organized	in	corporate	form	with	limited	liability	
of	 shareholders”.	 See	 also	 Lyons,	 Syracuse	 J.	 Int’l	 &	 Comp.	 Law	 (2005-2006),	 525.	 For	 a	 general	
approach	to	the	“piercing	the	corporate	veil”	doctrine	see	Beyer,	Maryland	Journal	of	International	Law	
(1990),	233	and	ss.	
114	Société	Ouest	Africaine	des	Bétons	Industriels	v.	Senegal,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/82/1,	Award,	25	
February	1988.	
	 50	
shareholders	 of	 the	 latter”.115	As	 a	 consequence,	 the	 Tribunal	 pierced	 the	 corporate	
veil	 and	 asserted	 its	 jurisdiction.	 Such	 an	 approach	 has	 been	 applied	 by	 other	
Tribunals	 whenever	 it	 has	 been	 necessary	 to	 pierce	 the	 corporate	 veil	 in	 order	 to	
assume	jurisdiction.116	
Moving	 to	 the	 approach	 mentioned	 under	 (ii)	 it	 shall	 be	 noted	 that	 several	
times,	when	assuming	jurisdiction	in	cases	brought	by	holding	companies	(mentioned	
in	 paragraph	 1.1.3),	 Tribunals	 should	 have	 had	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 if	 they	 had	
applied	the	piercing	the	corporate	veil	doctrine.	In	this	regard	it	is	worth	mentioning,	
inter	 alia,	 the	 Tokios	 Tokeles 117 	and	 Rompetrol 118 	decisions,	 where	 the	 ultimate	
controller	 of	 the	 investment	 was	 a	 national	 of	 the	 respondent	 State	 and	 several	
authors	have	considered	the	assumption	of	jurisdiction	as	an	allowance	of	an	abuse	of	
the	investment	arbitration	system.	In	this	regard	the	strong	dissenting	opinion	issued	
by	Prof.	Prosper	Weil	 in	 the	Tokios	 Tokeles	 decision	 is	 a	 significant	 example	of	 such	
criticisms.119		
Notwithstanding	 such	 criticisms,	 in	 the	 majority	 of	 cases	 Tribunals	 have	
refused	to	pierce	the	corporate	veil	in	order	to	avoid	declining	their	jurisdiction	under	
a	certain	BIT.120	This	could	lead	to	a	situation	(already	analysed	in	paragraph	1.1.3)	in	
which	various	companies	of	the	same	group	(that	represent	the	same	interests)	bring	
two	separate,	but	substantially	identical,	claims	arising	from	the	same	facts.	
As	to	the	situation	mentioned	under	(iii),	the	only	two	cases	in	which	a	Tribunal	
has	 pierced	 the	 corporate	 veil	 in	 order	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 have	 been	 TSA	 v.	
Argentina121	and	National	Gas	v.	Egypt.122	In	the	first	of	these	cases,	the	claimant	TSA	
was	an	Argentinean	company.	TSA’s	controlling	company	TSI	was	incorporated	in	The	
Netherlands	with	the	sole	purpose	to	make	the	disputed	investment	and	take	benefit	
of	the	Netherland	–	Argentina	BIT.	The	majority	of	TSI’s	controllers	were	French	and	
Argentinian	 nationals.	 In	 order	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 pursuant	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 the	
nationality	requirement	set	forth	in	the	Dutch	–	Argentinian	BIT,	the	Tribunal	had	to	
pierce	the	corporate	veil.	In	this	case	the	Tribunal	did	so,	stating	that	“only	a	genuinely	
																																																													
115	Ibid.,	para.	37.	
116	See,	e.g.,	Mr.	Franz	Sedelmayer	v.	The	Russian	Federation	(through	the	Procurement	Department	of	
the	 President	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation),	 Arbitration	 Award	 of	 7	 July	 1998	 rendered	 at	 the	 Place	 of	
Arbitration	 Stockholm,	 available	 at	 www.investmentclaims.com/decisions/Sedelmayer-Russia-
JurisdictionandFinalAward-7Jul1998.pdf.	
117	Tokios	Tokeles	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/18,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	29	April	2004.	
118	The	Rompetrol	Group	N.V.	v.	Romania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/3,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	18	April	
2008.	
119	Tokios	Tokeles	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/18,	Dissenting	Opinion	of	Prosper	Weil.	According	
to	Prof.	Weil	the	origin	of	capitals	shall	be	highly	relevant	in	the	assessment	of	jurisdiction	pursuant	to	
the	 ICSID	Convention.	 If	 the	capitals	come	from	the	respondent	State,	 the	claimant	 is	not	entitled	to	
make	recourse	to	ICSID.		See	McLachlan,	Shore,	Weiniger	(2007)	(n.	44),	149	and	ss.	
120	See,	 e.g.,	 Aguas	 del	 Tunari	 S.A.	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Bolivia,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/3,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction,	para.	330	21	October	2005.		
121	TSA	Spectrum	de	Argentina	S.A.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	Arb/05/5,	Award,	19	December	
2008.	
122	National	 Gas	 S.A.E.	 v.	 Arab	 Republic	 of	 Egypt,	 ICSID	 Case	No.	 ARB/11/7,	 Award,	 3	 April	 2014.	 See	
Blanke,	www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com	(2014).	
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foreign	 investment	 should	 be	 protected	 by	 the	 ICSID	mechanism”.123	In	 the	 second	
case,	in	which	the	tribunal	has	applied	a	very	similar	reasoning	and	reached	the	same	
conclusion	of	 the	TSA	Tribunal,	 the	claimant	National	Gas	was	an	Egyptian	national	
and	the	final	controller	of	the	investment	was	also	Egyptian.	With	regard	to	these	two	
cases,	it	should	be	highlighted	that	a	piercing	of	the	corporate	veil	has	been	possible	
only	 because	 the	 claimant	was	 a	 company	 incorporated	 in	 the	 host	 State.	 This	 has	
consented	to	the	Tribunals	to	search	for	the	foreign	control	requested	by	art.	25(2)(b)	
of	the	 ICSID	Convention.	The	research	for	the	foreign	control	 is	actually	not	allowed	
by	the	same	ICSID	Convention	when,	under	a	certain	BIT,	the	claimant	is	a	national	of	
the	 other	 contracting	 State	 and	 not	 a	 company	 incorporated	 in	 the	 host	 State.124	
However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 in	many	 other	 cases	 (the	 circumstances	 of	which	
were	 similar	 to	TSA	 and	National	Gas),	 such	 as	AUCOVEN	 v.	 Venezuela,125	Tribunals	
have	stopped	to	the	first	level	of	control	and	refused	to	pierce	the	corporate	veil	even	
in	cases	of	claims	started	by	companies	incorporated	in	the	host	State.		
Given	 the	whole	 discussion	 above,	 it	 is	 evident	 that	 in	 order	 to	 improve	 the	
number	of	 foreign	 investments,	 the	possibility	of	 recourse	 to	 investment	arbitration	
has	 been	 broadened,	 first	 of	 all,	 by	 States,	 which	 have	 negotiated	 BITs	 with	 very	
broad	 “investors”	 and	 “investments”	 definitions.	 Tribunals,	 in	 turn,	 have	 assumed	 a	
very	incoherent	approach	concerning	their	jurisdiction	and	have,	on	the	basis	of	BITs’	
broad	 wording,	 very	 rarely	 declined	 jurisdiction	 due	 to	 a	 lack	 of	 the	 nationality	
requirement.	Indeed,	as	it	has	been	noted	in	a	very	meaningful	comment	to	the	Tokios	
Tokeles	 decision,	 the	 search	 for	 the	effective	 control	has	been	used	only	 in	order	 to	
expand	jurisdiction,	but	not	to	restrict	it.126	If,	as	it	will	be	seen	in	paragraph	1.4	below,	
tribunals’	approach	is	fully	justifiable	in	light	of	the	relevant	international	law	rules,	it	
is	also	true	that	it	has	lead	to	the	proliferation	of	fora	for	the	settlement	of	investment	
																																																													
123	Ibid.,	para.	118-120.	For	a	general	comparison	of	the	Tokios	and	TSA	decisions	see	Martin	(2011),	(n.	
82),	1	and	ss.	
124	This	is	perfectly	confirmed	by	the	award	rendered	in	Burimi	SRL	and	Eagle	Games	SH.A	v.	Republic	of	
Albania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/18,	Award,	29	May	2013.	As	it	will	be	seen	in	paragraph	1.6	below,	the	
Tribunal	 has	 looked	 at	 the	 foreign	 control	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 claim	 presented	 by	 the	 locally	
incorporated	company	Eagle	Games,	while	 it	did	not	do	so	with	regard	to	the	claim	filed	by	the	shell	
company	Burimi	SRL.	This	on	the	basis	of	a	literal	interpretation	of	the	relevant	BITs	and	of	the	ICSID	
Convention.	
125	Autopista	 Concesionada	 de	 Venezuela,	 C.A.	 (AUCOVEN)	 v.	 Bolivarian	 Republic	 of	 Venezuela,	 ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/00/5,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	27	September	2001,	para.	116.	In	this	case,	AUCOVEN	was	
originally	owned	by	a	Mexican	company	and	–	therefore	–	the	Convention	was	not	applicable	because	
Mexico	 is	 not	part	of	 ICSID.	Anyway,	 the	 investment	was	based	on	an	agreement,	 a	 clause	of	which	
provided	 that	 in	 case	 AUCOVEN	 ownership	 should	 pass	 to	 a	 national	 of	 a	 contracting	 state,	 ICSID	
jurisdiction	was	available	and	the	consent	was	given.	Once	AUCOVEN	shareholding	became	American	
(even	 if	 the	 indirect	 ownership	was	Mexican),	 the	 ICSID	 tribunal	 declared	 to	 have	 jurisdiction	on	 the	
basis	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 party	 autonomy:	 the	 party	 expressly	 identified	 the	 principle	 of	 majority	
shareholding	as	the	criterion	to	be	applied	to	identify	ratione	personae	jurisdiction.	They	have	chosen	
to	subordinate	their	consent	to	ICSID	arbitration	to	no	other	criteria.	The	tribunal	was	not	empowered	–	
according	 to	 the	 Convention	 –	 to	 change	 the	 agreement	 of	 the	 parties.	 The	 tribunal	 furthermore	
refused	 to	 consider	 Icatech	 (AUCOVEN	 American	 shareholder)	 as	 a	 convenience	 corporation,	
considering	 that	 it	 has	 become	 shareholder	 of	 AUCOVEN	 various	 years	 prior	 to	 the	 arising	 of	 the	
dispute.	
126	See	Savarese,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(2005),	387	and	389.	
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disputes	and	to	the	risk	of	parallel	proceedings	and	conflicting	awards.	In	this	regard	it	
is	worth	citing	what	has	been	stated	by	Gaillard	and	Pinsolle:	“With	the	proliferation	
of	 complex	 deals	 and	 the	 corresponding	 proliferation	 of	 a	 related	 contracts	 and	
agreements	 drafted	 in	 a	 different	 manner,	 there	 is	 room	 for	 playing	 with	 parallel	
proceedings	that	can	really	make	the	difference	on	the	outcome	of	the	case”.127	
In	 conclusion,	 if	 tribunals’	 approach	 has	 probably	 given	 a	 contribution	 in	
reaching	the	objective	of	improving	the	number	of	foreign	investments,128	it	is	evident	
that,	as	we	have	seen	in	the	introduction	to	Section	1,	it	has	generated	some	mistrust	
in	 the	 investment	 arbitration	 system.	 Indeed,	 such	 an	 approach	 seems	 to	 struggle	
against	several	policy	considerations	that	are	essential	for	the	survival	of	any	method	
of	 dispute	 settlement.	 Such	 policy	 considerations	 will	 be	 analysed	 in	 the	 following	
Paragraphs.	
	
1.3 Policy	considerations	against	parallel	proceedings	
	
In	the	1599	case	Ferrer	v.	Arden,129	Lord	Coke	made	a	clear	statement	in	favour	
of	 finality	 and	 consistency	 and	 against	 the	multiplication	 of	 proceedings	 (involving	
same	 facts,	 purposes	 and	 interests).	 He	 stated	 that	 “[f]or	 it	 hath	 been	 well	 said,	
interest	 reipublicae,	ut	 sit	 finis	 litium;	otherwise	great	oppression	may	be	done	under	
																																																													
127	Gaillard,	Pinsolle,	in	The	Art	of	Advocacy	in	International	Arbitration	–	Second	Edition,	174	and	ss.	
128 	See	 Bernardini,	 (2001)	 (n.	 100),	 236,	 who	 –	 referring	 to	 the	 “denationalization”	 or	
“internationalization”	 of	 investment	 contracts	 has	 stated	 that	 “It	 is	 a	matter	 of	 common	 experience	
that	 such	 techniques	 have	 shown	 their	 efficacy	 thanks	 to	 the	 particular	 dispute	 settlement	method	
chosen	 by	 the	 parties”	 (i.e.	 investor	 –	 State	 arbitration).	 This	 has	 been	 because	 “the	 international	
arbitrator	 has	 given	 full	 effect	 to	 the	 above-described	 clauses	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 parties’	 (or,	 at	
least,	the	private	investor’s)	intent.	The	same	Author,	at	245,	stated	that	“BIT’s	provisions	in	the	field	of	
dispute	 settlement	 through	 international	 arbitration	 represent	 an	 effective	 protection	 of	 the	
investment”.	 It	 is	 therefore	 likely	 that	 the	 possibility	 to	 make	 recourse	 to	 this	 means	 of	 dispute	
settlement	 has	 incentivized	 the	 number	 of	 foreign	 investments.	 This	 idea	 is	 fully	 accepted	 by	 the	
European	Federation	for	 Investment	Law	and	Arbitration.	See	EFILA	(2015)	(n.	7),	3.	See	also	Meyers,	
works.bepress.com/Daniel_meyers/2		(2008),	5-6,	stating	that	“In	the	absence	of	a	reliable	and	efficient	
mechanism	for	the	resolution	of	foreign	investment	disputes,	the	international	community	feared	that	
prospective	 investors	would	 be	 discouraged	 from	 investing	 abroad…	 The	 absence	 of	 a	 reliable	 legal	
structure	to	protect	foreign	investments	was	viewed	not	only	as	an	impediment	to	foreign	investment	
itself,	 but	 also	 to	 economic	 development	 and	 the	 multitude	 of	 benefits	 associated	 therewith.	 To	
overcome	this	 impediment,	the	international	community	established	what	has	today	become	the	ITA	
(i.e.	investment	treaty	arbitration)	system.	Accordingly,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	the	very	purpose	of	the	ITA	
system	 is	 to	 encourage	 foreign	 investment	 and	 thereby	 to	 further	 economic	 development	 in	 host	
States.	 Indeed,	 this	 purpose	 is	 recited	 in	 the	 preambulary	 provisions	 of	 nearly	 every	 bilateral	
investment	 treaty…	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 ITA	 system	 was	 based	 on	 two	 fundamental	
premises.	First,	that	increasing	the	legal	protections	for	foreign	investments	would	increase	the	volume	
of	foreign	investments.	And	second,	that	increasing	the	volume	of	foreign	investments	would	increase	
economic	development”.	The	same	Author	has	noted	that	there	is	no	certain	evidence	of	the	fact	that	
the	growing	number	of	 investments	has	been	due	 to	 the	development	of	 the	 investment	 arbitration	
system.	For	a	positive	opinion	on	the	influence	of	BITs	on	the	number	of	foreign	investments	see	also	
Geiger,	 Appeals	 Mechanism	 in	 International	 Investment	 Disputes	 (2008),	 25.	 For	 sure,	 according	 to	
Meyers,	 there	 is	no	evidence	of	 the	 fact	 that	with	 the	development	of	 investment	arbitration	 foreign	
investments	have	decreased.	For	a	contrary	opinion	see	Hallward-Driemeier	(2003),	1	and	ss.	
129	VI	Coke	7a.	On	this	point	see	Harnon,	Israel	Law	Review	(1966),	542-543.		
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colour	and	pretence	of	 law;	 for	 if	 there	 shall	not	be	an	end	of	 suits,	 then	a	 rich	and	
malicious	man	would	infinitely	vex	him	who	hath	right	by	suits	and	actions;	and	in	the	
end	 (because	 he	 cannot	 come	 to	 any	 end)	 compel	 him	 to	 yield	 to	 his	 charge	 and	
vexation	and	to	leave	and	relinquish	his	right;	all	which	was	remedied	by	the	rule	and	
reason	of	 the	Common	 law,	 the	neglect	of	which	 rule…	hath	with	 it	brought	 in	 four	
great	 inconveniences:	 1.	 Infiniteness	 of	 Verdicts,	 Recoveries,	 and	 Judgments	 in	 one	
and	the	same	case.	2.	Sometimes	contrarieties	of	Verdicts	and	Judgments	one	against	
the	other.	3.	The	continuance	of	suits	for	twenty,	thirty,	and	forty	years,	to	the	utter	
impoverishing	of	the	parties.	4.	All	the	same	tendeth	to	the	dishonour	of	the	Common	
Law,	 which	 utterly	 abhorreth	 infiniteness,	 and	 delaying	 of	 suites,	 wherein	 is	 to	 be	
observed	the	excellency	of	the	Common	Law;	for	the	rejection	the	true	institution	of	it	
doth	 introduce	 many	 inconveniences,	 and	 the	 observation	 thereof	 is	 alwaies	
accompanied	with	rest	and	quietness,	which	is	the	end	of	all	humane	Laws."	
This	statement,	archaic	in	its	wording	but	still	very	actual	in	its	meaning,	in	fact	
reflects	the	status	of	all	 legal	systems,	where	consistency	and	finality	are	considered	
to	 be	 fundamental	 and	 irrevocable	 values.130	It	 is	 not	 a	 case,	 therefore,	 that	 the	
majority	of	investment	law	scholars	call	for	the	application	of	such	principles.131	
In	particular,	three	main	policy	considerations	appear	to	be	at	the	basis	of	the	
need	for	consistency	and/or	finality:132	(i)	ensuring	the	reliability	and	the	legitimacy	of	
the	 adjudication	 process	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty;	 (ii)	 protecting	 judicial	
economy	and	efficiency	 in	the	decision	making	process,	thus	avoiding	vexations	and	
harassment	 for	 the	 defendant	 State;	 and	 (iii)	 the	 necessity	 to	 ensure	 that	 disputes	
come	to	an	end,	notwithstanding	the	desire	to	ascertain	the	truth	with	regard	the	case	
at	hand.	
	 We	will	deal	with	all	these	policy	considerations	separately.	
	
1.3.1 Reliability	and	legitimacy	of	the	adjudication	process	and	the	principle	
of	legal	certainty	
	
Investment	 arbitration	 is	 by	 definition	 a	 public	 form	 of	 dispute	 resolution.133	
Indeed,	 vital	 areas	 of	 the	 life	 and	 economy	of	 a	 State	 are	 often	 conditioned	by	 the	
settlement	of	 international	 investment	disputes	and	this	puts	 investment	arbitration	
																																																													
130	In	1966	Prof.	Harnon	already	stated	“the	need	for	finality	of	judgement	is	recognized	by	many,	if	not	
all,	systems	of	law”.	See	Harnon	(1966)	(n.	129),	539.	Similarly,	Pinos,	Osgoode	Hall	Law	Journal	(1988),	
718,	 stated	 that	 “the	 final	 resolution	 of	 disputes	 therefore	 can	 be	 considered	 to	 be	 central	 to	 the	
effective	functioning	of	the	system	of	justice”.	
131	V.	 Kaufmann-Kohler,	 in	 Precedent	 in	 Investment	 Arbitration	 (2008),	 136	 and	 ss.	 For	 a	 contrary	
opinion,	see	Schultz	(2013),	19,	who	has	stated	that	“an	ossified,	consistent,	predictable,	bad	regime	is	
worse	 than	 a	 loose,	 inconsistent,	 bad	 regime,	 because	 the	 former	 creates	 greater	 constraints	 for	
decision-makers	in	individual	cases”.		
132	As	 noted	 by	 Gaukrodger	 (2013)	 (n.	 46),	 29	 and	 ss.,	 such	 policy	 considerations	 have	 often	 been	
underestimated.	 Douglas	 (2009)	 (n.	 64),	 455	 and	 ss.,	 has	 underlined	 that	 investment	 tribunals	 have	
acted	as	if	the	policy	considerations	against	the	risk	of	conflicting	outcomes	are	not	their	problem.		
133	See	 Van	 Harten,	 Investment	 Treaty	 Arbitration	 and	 Public	 Law	 (2007),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 De	 Brabandere,	
Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	as	Public	International	Law	(2014),	1	and	ss.	
	 54	
in	 a	 position	 of	 very	 high	 visibility.	 Therefore	 it	 is	 worth	 analysing	 the	 influence	 of	
parallel	 proceedings	 on	 the	 perception	 that	 States	 and	 public	 opinion	may	 have	 of	
investment	arbitration.	
This	 task	 may	 be	 analysed	 through	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	 possible	 dramatic	
outcomes	of	parallel	proceedings	on	the	reliability	of	the	adjudication	process	and	on	
the	 principle	 of	 legal	 certainty.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 worth	 recalling	 the	 CME134	and	
Lauder135	cases,	briefly	mentioned	above.	As	already	stated,	notwithstanding	that	the	
facts	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 two	 claims	 were	 perfectly	 the	 same,136	the	 two	 tribunals	
reached	 completely	 opposite	 solutions	 on	 the	 issues	 of	 expropriation,	 fair	 and	
equitable	treatment	and	full	protection	and	security.	In	the	CME	case,	indeed,	the	SCC	
Tribunal	 (the	 conclusions	 of	 which	 were	 upheld	 by	 the	 Sweden’s	 SVEA	 Court	 of	
Appeal)	 found	 a	 violation	 of	 all	 the	mentioned	 standards,	while	 the	ad	 hoc	 London	
Tribunal	in	the	Lauder	case	stated	that	no	violation	occurred	in	the	present	case.	
	 It	 shall	 be	 mentioned	 that	 the	 outcome	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 is	 not	
necessarily	 so	 dramatic.	 In	 the	 disputes	 started	 by	Yukos’s	majority	 shareholders,137	
the	same	Tribunal	heard	the	three	cases	and	issued	–	on	the	same	day	–	three	almost	
identical	awards.	In	this	case,	as	well	as	in	the	other	disputes	related	to	the	Yukos	saga	
(i.e.	 the	 cases	 started	 by	 minority	 shareholders),138	it	 is	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 -	 in	
concrete	-	Tribunals	have	tried	to	give	a	reasonable	practical	solution	to	the	 issue	of	
parallel	proceedings,	at	 least	 taking	 into	account	 the	 facts	and	 the	outcomes	of	 the	
related	disputes.		
																																																													
134	CME	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	SCC	Partial	Award,	13	September	2001	
135	Ronald	S.	Lauder	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award,	3	September	2001	
136 	The	 CME	 and	 Lauder	 litigations	 regarded	 the	 granting	 of	 a	 TV	 license	 to	 Central	 European	
Development	Corporation	 (CEDC),	a	vehicle	company	of	 the	Dutch	company	CME	and	 the	American	
citizen	Mr.	Lauder,	for	establishing	a	new	private	television	(TV	Nova)	in	Czech	Republic.	After	several	
bureaucratic	problems,	TV	Nova	received	its	licence,	but	in	1995	a	change	in	Czech	Media	Law	strongly	
affected	 CME	 and	 Lauder’s	 investment	 (giving	 advantage	 to	 the	 business	 of	 the	 Czech	 citizen	 Dr.	
Zelezny,	 a	 former	 partner	 of	 Mr.	 Lauder).	 As	 already	 stated,	 two	 claims	 were	 started	 (one	 by	 CME	
according	to	the	Dutch-Czech	BIT	before	the	SCC	and	one	ad	hoc	in	London	by	Lauder	according	to	the	
US-Czech	 BIT)	 and	 the	 Tribunals	 reached	 completely	 opposite	 conclusions.	 For	 a	 more	 detailed	
description	of	the	facts	see	Franck,	Fordham	Law	Review	(2005),	1559-1668.	
137	Yukos	Universal	Ltd.	(Isle	of	Man)	v.	Russian	Federation,	PCA	Case	No.	AA	227,	Award	of	18	July	2014,	
Hulley	Enterprises	Limited	 (Cyprus)	v.	The	Russian	Federation,	PCA	Case	No.	AA	226,	Award	of	18	July	
2014,	and	Veteran	Petroleum	Limited	(Cyprus)	v.	The	Russian	Federation,	PCA	Case	No.	AA	228,	Award	of	
18	July	2014.	
138	Quasar	 de	 Valores	 and	 others	 v.	 The	 Russian	 Federation,	 SCC	 Case	 No.	 24/2007,	 Award	 of	 20	 July	
2012,	RosInvest	 UK	 Ltd	 v.	 The	 Russian	 Federation,	 SCC	 Case	 No.	 V079/2005,	 Award	 of	 2	 September	
2010.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	Yukos	saga	involved	also	a	case	before	the	European	Court	of	Human	
Rights,	OAO	Neftyanaya	Kompaniya	Yukos	v.	Russia,	App.	No.	14902/04,	ECtHR,	Judgement	(Merits)	of	
20	 September	 2011,	 and	 a	 ICC	 commercial	 arbitration,	Yukos	 S.a.r.l.	 v.	 Rosneft,	 which	 involved	 also	
proceedings	before	Dutch,	English	and	US	Courts.	As	explained	by	Giorgetti	(2015	(n.	5),	112,	in	Quasar,	
“when	reaching	its	conclusions,	the	SCC	Tribunal	reviewed	both	Yukos	[i.e.	the	proceedings	before	the	
ECtHR]	and	RosInvest.	It	explained	why	it	disagreed	with	the	Yukos	decision.	It	also	briefly	referred	to	
the	similarities	with	the	RosInvest.	The	Yukos	litigation	is	particularly	interesting	because	the	different	
tribunals	 took	 cognizance	 of	 other	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 seized	 of	 similar	 and	 related	
matters.	They	often,	but	not	always	agreed	with	each	other’s	conclusions”.	For	an	analysis	of	the	Yukos	
decision	issued	by	the	ECtHr	see	McCarthy,	Journal	of	World	Investment	&	Trade	(2016),	140	and	ss.	
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	 A	 similar	 coordination	 may	 be	 found	 in	 the	 abovementioned	 Sempra	 and	
Camuzzi	 decisions,	 where	 –	 even	 if	 the	 two	 minority	 shareholders	 brought	 two	
separate	claims	–	the	claimants,	in	accordance	with	Argentina,	decided	that	the	same	
Tribunal	 would	 have	 heard	 both	 disputes.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 in	 the	 similar	
circumstances	 (i.e.	 two	 autonomous	 claims	 started	 by	 minority	 shareholders)	
regarding	 the	 already	mentioned	CMS	 and	Total	 claims,	 such	 coordination	was	 not	
present.	The	Total	Tribunal	–	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	claim	before	 it	arose	
from	a	participation	of	 the	claimant	 in	 the	Argentinian	company	TGN	(i.e.	 the	same	
circumstance	that	give	rise	to	the	CMS	claim)	–	made	reference	to	the	CMS	decision	
but	 reached	 opposite	 conclusions	 on	 the	 alleged	 violation	 of	 fair	 and	 equitable	
treatment.139	
In	 light	of	 the	above,	due	 to	 the	 lack	of	a	general	 rule	 for	 the	solution	of	 the	
problem,	the	potential	for	conflicting	outcomes,	as	well	as	the	rise	of	costs,	the	lack	of	
efficiency	 and,	 last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 lack	 of	 legal	 certainty	makes	 the	 existence	 of	
parallel	proceedings	a	very	high	barrier	to	the	survival	of	international	investment	law	
and	arbitration.140	
	 It	 is	 not	 casual,	 indeed,	 that	 the	 risk	 of	 conflicting	 outcomes	 has	 led	
commentators	 to	 strongly	 criticize	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 to	 talk	 about	 its	
legitimacy	 crisis. 141 	Carver	 has	 stated	 that	 conflicting	 outcomes	 are	 a	 “totally	
unacceptable	 result	 (…)	 You	 cannot	 have	 any	 working	 system	 of	 arbitration	 which	
produces	two	diametrically	opposite	results	at	any	time	on	exactly	the	same	subject	
matter	 (…)	 It	 may	 undermine	 the	 whole	 future	 of	 bilateral	 investment	 dispute	
settlement.	 It	may	undermine	 the	whole	 future	of	 investment	 arbitration	unless	we	
can	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 this”. 142 	Similarly,	 Susan	 Franck	 stated	 that	 “prominent	
practitioners	have	noted	that	‘any	system	where	diametrically	opposed	decisions	can	
legally	coexist	 cannot	 last	 long.	 It	 shocks	 the	sense	of	 rule	of	 law	or	 fairness’.	Given	
that	 issues	of	 legitimacy	cut	to	the	heart	of	utility	of	using	arbitration,	 the	 literature	
must	 address	 the	 concerns	 underlying	 the	 legitimacy	 crisis	 in	 a	 meaningful	 way.	
Otherwise,	 conflicting	 awards	 based	 upon	 identical	 facts	 and/or	 identically	 worded	
investment	 treaty	 provisions	will	 be	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 international	 legal	 order	 and	 the	
continued	 existence	 of	 investment	 treaties”	 (footnotes	 and	 citation	 omitted,	
emphasis	 added).143	Finally,	 and	more	 generally,	 Charney	 has	 stated	 that	 “not	 only	
																																																													
139	See	Gaukrodger	(2013)	(n.	46),	43.	
140	The	dramatic	effects	of	parallel	proceedings	are	 in	fact	even	more	visible	 in	cases	 involving	several	
systems	 of	 adjudication,	 such	 as	 the	 Chevron	 disputes,	 involving	 disputes	 in	 US	 national	 Courts,	
Ecuador	national	Courts,	Permanent	Court	of	Arbitration	in	the	Hague,	the	District	Court	in	the	Hague	
(as	setting	aside	authority)	and	the	International	Criminal	Court.	Cases	such	as	this	are	out	of	the	scope	
of	the	present	book	and	will	only	be	briefly	analysed	in	Chapter	3.	See	Giorgetti,	Journal	of	International	
Law	(2013),	787	and	ss.,	Donziger,	Garr,	Page,	Human	Rights	Brief	(2010),	8	and	ss.	
141	Sornarajah,	 (2008)	 (n.	 111),	41	and	ss.	For	a	 contrary	opinion	and	direct	answer	 to	Sornarajah,	 see	
Juillard	Appeals	Mechanism	in	International	Investment	Disputes	(2008),	81	and	ss.	
142	Carver,	 Journal	of	World	 Investment	and	Trade	 (2004),	23.	 	For	an	analysis	of	 the	possible	 reasons	
behind	conflicting	outcomes	see	Schneiderman	(2010),	1	and	ss.	
143	Franck	(2005)	(n.	136),	1583.	
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may	 a	 cacophony	 of	 views	 on	 the	 norms	 of	 international	 law	 undermine	 the	
perception	that	an	 international	 legal	 system	exists,	but	 if	 like	cases	are	not	 treated	
alike,	the	very	essence	of	a	normative	system	of	law	will	be	lost”.144	
	 Given	the	above,	one	shall	consider	that,	due	to	the	its	public	nature,	in	order	
to	 be	 considered	 reliable	 (and	 therefore	 to	 increase	 its	 legitimacy)	 investment	
arbitration	shall	meet	and	reflect	the	wishes	and	needs	of	the	community	on	which	it	
has	 influence145.	 Hence,	 it	 is	 worth	 considering	 what	 States	 (and	 investors)	 expect	
from	investment	arbitration.146	It	is	our	contention	that,	when	giving	their	consent	to	
investment	 arbitration,	 the	 normal	 expectation	 of	 the	 parties	 –	 and	 in	 particular	
States	(and	the	national	public	opinion)	–		is,	inter	alia,	that	“an	issue	will	be	tried	only	
once”.147	This	 is	 in	 particular	 true	 if	 one	 considers	 that	 the	 costs	 of	 investment	
arbitration	sustained	by	States	are	finally	paid	by	citizens	and,	therefore,	the	fact	that	
a	dispute	is	heard	twice	may	be	considered	as	a	waste	of	public	money.	As	stated	by	
Susan	 Franck,	 indeed,	 “legitimacy	 depends	 in	 large	 part	 upon	 factors	 such	 as	
determinacy	and	coherence,	which	can	in	turn	beget	predictability	and	reliability	(…)	
Coherence	is	a	key	element	of	legitimacy;	it	requires	consistency	of	interpretation	and	
application	of	rules	in	order	to	promote	perceptions	of	fairness	and	justice”.148	
In	conclusion,	in	a	network	such	as	investment	law	and	arbitration,	where	very	
broad	 standards	 are	 contextualized	 and	 given	 concrete	 significance	 by	 the	work	 of	
arbitrators,149 	the	 issue	 of	 legitimacy,	 which	 involves	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 power	
exercised	by	 arbitrators,150	is	 crucial,	 due	 to	 the	 facts	 that	public	 interest	 is	 at	 stake	
and,	now	more	than	ever,	public	opinion	is	vigilant.	Indeed,	such	reasoning	has	been	
fostered	also	with	regard	to	the	ICJ	framework,	by	saying	that	“it	is	imperative	for	the	
Court	 to	 maintain	 judicial	 consistency	 (…)	 because	 intellectual	 coherence	 and	
consistency	 is	 the	 cornerstone	 of	 continuing	 respect	 for	 the	 jurisprudence	 of	 the	
Court.	Furthermore,	the	success	of	the	Court	is	dependent	to	a	large	degree	upon	its	
																																																													
144	Charney,	New	York	University	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Politics	(1999),	699.	
145	Gribnau,	Electronic	Journal	of	Comparative	Law	(2002),	28	and	ss.	
146	Bekker,	Harvard	International	Law	Journal	Online	(2013),	8,	and	Salacuse,	Making	Transnational	Law	
Work	 in	 the	 Global	 Economy	 –	 Essays	 in	 Honour	 of	 Detlev	 Vagts	 (2010),	 428,	 give	 a	 central	 role	 to	
“parties’	expectations”	in	the	context	of	the	challenges	facing	the	international	investment	regime.	
147	Vestal,	Saint	Louis	University	Law	Journal	(1964-1965),	31.	Generally	speaking,	every	time	one	refers	
to	finality	of	disputes,	the	public	interest	is	at	stake.	In	this	regard	see	Harnon	(1966)	(n.	129),	546.		
148	Franck	(2005)	(n.	136),	1584-1585.	
149	Bekker	 (2013)	 (n.	 146),	 13-14,	has	 indeed	 talked	about	 investment	arbitration	as	a	 form	of	 “judge-
made	 law”	 and	 about	 arbitrators	 as	 “agents	 of	 diffusion”	 of	 such	 law.	 Similarly	 Schill,	
www.ssrn.com/link/SIEL-Inaugural-Conference.html	 (2008),	 18	 and	 ss.,	 has	 talked	 about	 the	 “norm	
generative	 function”	 of	 international	 investment	 tribunals.	 In	 light	 of	 these	 considerations	 one	 could	
assert	that	arbitrators	 in	the	investment	network	do	not	only	resolve	disputes,	but	respond	to	the	so-
called	 “law	expounding	model”,	where	 “the	 role	 of	 judges	 in	 the	 system	 is	 to	derive	 the	 appropriate	
legal	 rule	 from	 the	 values	 articulated	 in	 the	 constitutions	 and	 statutes”	 (i.e.	 in,	 our	 case,	 Bilateral	
Investment	Treaties).	 For	 a	 description	of	 such	model	 see	Purcell,	 California	 Law	Review	 (1997),	 898	
and	ss.	
150	Gribnau	(2002)	(n.	145),	29.	
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reputation	 for	 impartial	 adjudication	 and	 judicial	 consistency	 is	 the	 most	 obvious	
means	of	avoiding	accusation	of	bias”.151	
In	the	opinion	of	the	present	author	the	only	way	to	ensure	the	legitimacy	and	
reliability	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 to	 apply	 the	 legal	 principles	 that	 are	 felt	 as	
necessary	by	 the	operators,	 such	as	 consistency,	 coherence,	 predictability,	 equality,	
justice	 and	objectivity;	 in	 other	words,	 ensuring	 legal	 certainty.152	In	 investment	 law	
and	arbitration	this	means	that	parallel	proceedings	shall	be	avoided	and	–	if	they	are	
not	avoidable	–	there	shall	be	a	general	rule	aimed	at	managing	the	problem	that	may	
arise	 from	 the	 existence	 of	 two	 proceedings	 between	 the	 same	 substantial	 parties,	
arising	from	the	same	facts	and	the	claimants	of	which	have	the	same	 interests	and	
purposes.	
Only	 when	 operators	 will	 found	 a	 way	 to	manage	 this	 problem,	 investment	
arbitration	tribunals	will	get	their	full	legitimacy	as	adjudicators.153	
	
1.3.2 Judicial	 economy	 and	 the	 need	 for	 efficiency	 in	 the	 decision	 making	
process	
	
Judicial	 economy	 is	 one	 of	 the	 most	 mentioned	 standards	 regarding	 the	
management	 of	 processes	 by	 judges,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 canon	 that	 should	 inspire	 the	
drafting	of	procedural	laws.154	Generally	speaking,	it	can	be	said	that	judicial	economy	
is	 seen	 in	 national	 systems	 as	 implying	 two	 main	 aspects:	 saving	 time	 and	 saving	
money.	
From	an	international	perspective,	judicial	economy	is	very	often	mentioned	in	
WTO	litigation,	where	panels	exercise	such	a	“practice	by	which	they	rule	not	to	rule	
on	certain	of	the	litigants’	legal	arguments,	deeming	these	unnecessary	to	solving	the	
dispute	 at	 hand”.155	In	 the	 US	 –	 Wool	 Shirts	 and	 Blouses	 case,	 the	 Appellate	 Body	
stated	that	“panels	may	not	address	any	issues	that	need	not	to	be	addressed	in	order	
to	 resolve	 the	dispute	between	the	parties”.156	In	 this	 regard	 it	 should	be	noted	that	
																																																													
151	Ovchar,	Bond	Law	Review	(2009),	25.	The	Author	has	in	particular	referred	to	what	has	been	written	
by	Higgins	in	Problems	and	Process:	International	Law	and	How	We	Use	It	(1994),	202.		
152	Ibid.,	 42	 and	 ss.	 The	prominent	 role	of	 consistency	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 also	 recognized	by	
Article	2	of	the	International	Law	Institute	Resolution	of	13	September	2013	(Tokyo	Session)	on	Legal	
Aspects	of	Recourse	to	Arbitration	by	an	Investor	Against	the	Authorities	of	the	Host	State	under	Inter-
State	 Treaties,	 stating	 that	 “Consistency	 of	 solutions	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 contributes	 to	 legal	
certainty	for	all	actors	involved.	The	quest	for	consistency	does	not	require	the	mechanical	application	
of	 prior	 practice	 without	 regard	 to	 the	 particular	 circumstances	 of	 the	 case	 or	 the	 need	 for	 the	
interpretation	 and	 development	 of	 the	 law”.	 The	 last	 sentence	 gives	 a	 central	 role	 to	 arbitrators	 in	
ensuring	consistency	in	investment	arbitration.	Such	role	will	be	deeper	analysed	below.	
153	See	Vestal	(1964-1965)	(n.	147),	33-34,	and	Pinos	(1988)	(n.	130),	718.	
154	With	 regard	 to	 the	 duty	 of	 legislators	 to	 ensure	 a	 fair	 process	 see	Nigro,	 Prosperi,	 L’irragionevole	
durata	dei	processi	(2009),	35-37.	
155	Busch,	Pelc,	 International	Organization	 (2010),	257.	The	Authors	 further	 state	 that	 “this	practice	 is	
important	not	only	for	the	litigants,	who	frequently	appeal	its	use,	but	for	the	membership	as	a	whole,	
since	judicial	economy	limits	the	scope	of	the	case	law	that	results”.	
156	WTO	Document	WT/DS138/AB/R,	25-26.	Concerning	judicial	economy	at	the	Appellate	Body	stage,	
see	Alvarez-Jimenez,	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	(2009)	393	and	ss.	
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WTO	 rules	 (as	 interpreted	 by	 the	 Appellate	 Body)	 give	 a	 very	 broad	 discretion	 to	
panels	 in	 applying	 judicial	 economy;	 therefore,	 as	 stated	by	Busch	 and	Pelc,	 panels	
“need	to	strike	a	balance	between	greater	 legalism	(that	 is,	 ‘rigidity’),	which	aims	at	
furthering	compliance,	and	more	flexibility	(that	is,	‘stability’),	which	helps	attract	and	
retain	members”.157	
	 Prof.	 Palombino	 has	 stated	 that	 “the	 principle	 of	 judicial	 economy	 from	
guiding	 and	 affecting	 the	 international	 judge’s	 activity	 (…)	 belongs,	 in	 fact,	 to	 the	
general	 canons	 of	 adjudication	 –	 that	 is,	 those	 canons	 which	 are	 inherent	 in	 the	
judicial	 function	 and	 that	 the	 judge	 takes	 into	 account	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 his	 duties,	
regardless	of	what	the	written	procedural	law	establishes.	Accordingly	the	judge	is	in	
any	case	expected	to	operate	in	conformity	with	the	principle	of	judicial	economy	and	
to	 use	 it	 in	 a	 proper	 way,	 namely	 one	 that	 does	 not	 compromise	 the	 dispute’s	
resolution	 and/or	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 true	 state	 of	 the	 world.	 Such	 a	
circumstance	is	particularly	evident	where,	for	reasons	of	judicial	economy,	the	judge	
limits	the	scope	of	the	decision,	and	this	even	though	no	provision	requires	it”.158	
	 Notwithstanding	the	above,	it	 is	worth	noting	that	in	international	arbitration	
law	there	is	no	reference	to	the	principle	of	judicial	economy.	This	does	not	mean	that	
this	 principle	 shall	 not	 influence	 the	 arbitrators’	 work	 and	 that	 the	 parties	 do	 not	
expect	that	arbitration	is	conducted	efficiently.	Indeed,	time	and	costs	are	key	issues	
in	order	to	evaluate	the	efficiency	of	the	arbitration	process	and	efficiency	is,	in	turn,	
one	 of	 the	 most	 debated	 issues	 by	 international	 arbitration	 scholars.159	Indeed,	 as	
confirmed	 by	 the	 2015	 Queen	 Mary	 Arbitration	 Survey,	 expenses	 and	 longevity	 of	
arbitration	 are	 the	 less	 attractive	 characteristics	 of	 this	 method	 of	 dispute	
settlement.160	
	 However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	“there	is	no	a	priori	answer	to	the	question	of	
how	 to	 make	 arbitration	 fair	 and	 efficient.	 Each	 case	 depends	 on	 its	 facts”.161	This	
consideration	shifts	the	analysis	on	the	role	of	arbitrators	in	ensuring	–	on	the	basis	of	
the	 concrete	 needs	 of	 each	 case	 –	 efficiency	 and	 respect	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 judicial	
economy.	This	is	particularly	true	in	case	of	investment	arbitration,	where	–	as	it	has	
been	already	said	–	the	very	high	costs	are	sustained	by	public	money.		
																																																													
157	Busch,	Pelc	 (2010)	 (n.155),	259.	Bhala,	 Journal	of	Transnational	Law	and	Politics	 (1999),	48,	 stated	
that	the	recourse	to	judicial	economy	is	a	proof	of	the	existence	of	a	system	of	de	facto	stare	decisis	in	
WTO.	He	stated	that	judicial	economy	is	a	principle	of	“self	restraint”	by	panels.	
158	Palombino,	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	(2010),	910.	The	Author,	at	912,	underlines	that	“the	
presence	of	the	principle	among	the	fundamental	canons	of	 litigation	has	always	been	highlighted	by	
scholars	of	domestic	procedural	law”.	In	this	regard,	in	particular	concerning	the	jurisdiction	of	the	US	
Supreme	Court,	see	Hill,	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	(2008),	1195	and	ss.	
159 	See	 Welser,	 Austrian	 Yearbook	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2014),	 149,	 Kirby,	 Journal	 of	
International	Arbitration	(2015),	689	and	ss.	
160	The	 2015	 School	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 Survey,	 entitled	 Improvements	 and	 Innovations	 in	
International	Arbitration	is	available	at	http://www.arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2015/.	
161	See	Fellas,	PLI’s	Course	Handbook	(2007),	16.	
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	 The	task	of	arbitrators	is	therefore	to	make	a	balance	between	due	process	and	
efficiency;162	they	have	 to	ensure	 that,	 in	 concrete,	 each	party	has	once	 the	 right	 to	
present	its	case	but	–	at	the	same	time	–	they	have	a	duty	to	avoid	wastes	of	money	
and	 time.163	As	 a	 confirmation	 of	 such	 a	 general	 duty	 it	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 the	
provision	of	Section	33	of	 the	English	Arbitration	Act	1996,	 stating	 that	 the	 tribunal	
shall,	 on	one	 side,	give	each	party	a	 reasonable	opportunity	 to	putting	his	 case	and	
dealing	with	that	of	his	opponent,	and,	on	the	other	side,	adopt	procedures	suitable	to	
the	 circumstances	 of	 the	 particular	 case,	 avoiding	 unnecessary	 delay	 of	 expense.164	
UNCITRAL	 Rules,	 at	 Article	 17,	 similarly	 provide	 that	 “[t]he	 arbitral	 tribunal	 may	
conduct	the	arbitration	in	such	manner	as	it	considers	appropriate,	provided	that	the	
parties	 are	 treated	 with	 equality	 and	 that	 an	 appropriate	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	
each	party	is	given	a	reasonable	opportunity	to	present	its	case.	The	arbitral	tribunal,	
in	exercising	its	discretion,	shall	conduct	the	proceedings	so	as	to	avoid	unnecessary	
delay	and	expense	and	to	provide	a	fair	and	efficient	process	for	resolving	the	parties’	
dispute”.		
	 In	the	context	of	parallel	proceedings	this	means	that	arbitrators	have	a	duty	to	
ensure	 that	 a	 dispute	 is	 tried	 only	 once,	 therefore	 avoiding	 conflicting	 outcomes,	
useless	 duplication	 of	 proceedings	 and	 exaggerated	 costs,	 and	 ensuring	 good	
administration	of	 justice	in	the	arbitral	proceedings.	Hence,	 it	 is	a	duty	of	arbitrators	
to	make	efforts	in	order	to	grant	finality	of	awards	and	to	avoid	re-judging	a	dispute	
that	has	been	already	judged	or	that	is	being	judged.	
	 This	would	also	ensure	that	the	defendant	State	is	not	vexed	and	harassed	by	
the	multiplication	of	proceedings.	 In	the	 lack	of	the	application	of	the	finality	rule,	a	
company	 would	 be	 able	 to	 structure	 its	 business	 so	 as	 to	 be	 able	 to	 sue	 a	 State	 a	
number	of	different	claims	on	exactly	(or	at	least	substantially)	the	same	claim.165	It	is	
in	 fact	 arguable	 that,	 when	 accepting	 to	 submit	 jurisdiction	 of	 arbitrators	 for	
investment	disputes,	States	did	not	expect	 to	have	 to	participate	 to	more	 than	one	
proceeding	concerning	the	same	dispute.	Therefore,	 if	 it	 is	true	that	arbitrators	shall	
keep	 the	 legitimate	 expectations	 and	 the	 rights	 of	both	 parties	 into	 account,166	it	 is	
also	true	that	they	cannot	allow	a	claimant	to	multiply	a	dispute	in	order	to	get	more	
chances	 of	 success.	 As	 stated	 by	 Zachary	 Douglas	 “an	 appeal	 to	 basic	 notions	 of	
justice	 would	 surely	 suffice	 to	 refute	 any	 suggestion	 that	 such	 a	 state	 of	 affairs	 is	
acceptable	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 principle.	 A	 host	 state	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 defend	 a	
barrage	of	concurrent	or	consecutive	claims	relating	to	precisely	the	same	prejudice	to	
a	single	investment.	Nor	can	it	be	right	for	a	host	state	to	defend	consecutive	claims	in	
																																																													
162	With	 regard	 to	 the	 duty	 of	 arbitrators	 in	 the	 case	 management	 see	 Waincymer,	 Procedure	 and	
Evidence	in	International	Arbitration	(2012),	78	and	ss.	
163	Fortier,	ICCA	Congress	Series	no.	9	(1999),	395-399.	
164	Similarly,	article	19	of	the	UNCITRAL	Model	Law	gives	to	the	Tribunal	the	possibility	to	conduct	the	
arbitration	in	such	manner	as	it	considers	appropriate.		
165	See	Vestal	(1964-1965)	(n.	147),	34.	
166	See	Bekker	 (2013)	 (n.	 146),	8.	For	a	general	analysis	of	 the	concept	of	 legitimate	expectations	 see	
Merusi,	 Buona	 fede	 ed	 affidamento	 nel	 diritto	 pubblico	 (2001),	 21	 and	 ss.	 and	 Carbone,	 Promessa	 e	
affidamento	nel	diritto	internazionale	(1967).	
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relation	 to	 the	 same	 investment	 by	 different	 members	 of	 the	 group	 of	 claimant	
companies	until	an	award	favourable	to	that	group	is	procured”.167		
	
	 1.3.3	 Fairness	and	finality	
	 	
A	possible	defence	of	 the	existence	of	parallel	proceedings	could	be	 that	 the	
celebration	 of	more	 than	one	process	 related	 to	 the	 same	 facts	 is	 functional	 to	 the	
achievement	of	truth	and	justice	with	regard	to	the	dispute	at	hand.168	
	 This	 consideration	 calls	 into	 play	 general	 considerations	 regarding	 the	 scope	
and	 the	 aim	 of	 a	 process	 (and	 of	 an	 arbitration).	 An	 adjudication	 proceeding	 is	 not	
aimed,	in	fact,	at	achieving	the	objective	truth,	but	only	to	ascertain	a	probable	truth.	
Such	 a	 probable	 truth	 is	 related	 to	 the	 knowledge	 and	 information	 available	 to	 the	
judges/arbitrators	 and	 has	 –	 by	 definition	 –	 a	 dialectical	 and	 uncertain	 character,	
involving,	 for	 its	 same	 nature	 of	 ex	 post	 ascertainment	 of	 facts	 a	 certain	 degree	 of	
subjectivity	by	the	adjudicative	body.169	Any	litigation	process	is	therefore	fallible	and	
the	goal	of	complete	certainty	in	a	process	is	not	reachable.170	
	 It	 is	 not	 a	 case	 that	 systems	of	 civil	 procedure	 are	 “not	 designed	 to	 produce	
absolute	certainty	of	the	truth	 in	any	given	 litigation	or	 in	a	series	of	 litigations.	The	
usual	 burden	 of	 proof	 standard	 in	 civil	 cases	 is	 the	 preponderance	 of	 the	 evidence	
test”.171	The	kind	of	analysis	that	judges	and	arbitrators	carry	out	is	a	form	of	historical	
investigation	 aimed	 at	 ascertaining	with	 the	 highest	 degree	 of	 probability	 the	 facts	
that	 happened	 and	 to	 integrate	 them	 into	 legal	 categories;	 this	 process	 involves	 a	
certain	 degree	 of	 subjectivity	 and	 is	 not	 free	 from	 being	 conditioned	 by	 the	
arbitrators’	 personal	 and	 juridical	 backgrounds.	 Hence,	 the	 question	 is,	 once	 an	
arbitration	 panel	 has	 conducted	 a	 proceedings	 respecting	 all	 the	 mandatory	
procedural	 rules	 (ensuring	 fairness	 and	 equality	 of	 the	 parties),	 why	 should	 the	
proceedings	be	 repeated	 “when	no	 subsequent	 litigation	either	will	or	 is	 intended	 to	
determine	the	absolute	truth?”	(emphasis	in	original).172	
	 In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 we	 can	 therefore	 assume	 that,	 if	 the	 scope	 of	 an	
adjudication	process	is	to	achieve	the	highest	possible	degree	of	certainty,	the	duty	of	
arbitrators	 is	 to	 ensure,	 before	 deciding	 a	 dispute,	 that	 each	 party	 has	 the	 full	
possibility	to	present	its	case	(and	to	give	evidence	of	its	assertions).	This	means	that	
arbitrators	have	to	ensure	that	during	the	proceedings	due	process	is	respected.173	In	
this	regard	it	should	be	noted	that	due	process	and	the	right	to	be	heard	are	ensured	
																																																													
167	Douglas	(2009)	(n.	64),	309.	
168	See	Harnon	(1966)	(n.	129),	542	(who	–	anyway	–	criticizes	such	a	conclusion).	
169	Pastore,	http://m.docente.unife.it/orsetta.giolo/Percorsi%20di%20Genere%20-
%20Testi%20seminario%20I%20dicembre.doc	(2012-2013),	4.	
170	Callen,	Kadue,	Hastings	Law	Journal	(1979-1980),	765;	Greenebaum,	Indiana	Law	Journal	(1969),	2.	
171	Callen	Kadue	(1979-1980)	(n.	170),	766.	
172	Id.,	767.	
173	See	Fortier	(1999)	(n.	163),	398.	
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if,	 in	 relation	to	a	dispute,	a	party	has	 the	 right	 to	present	 its	case	one	 time	and	not	
several	times.	
	 If	 due	 process	 and	 fairness	 are	 respected	 during	 a	 proceeding	 between	 two	
parties,	 a	duplication	of	 such	proceeding	 is	not	 required	and	may	well	be	precluded	
due	to	the	existence	of	a	final	award/judgement	on	the	dispute.174	
	 On	the	contrary	a	problem	of	fairness	may	exist	when	two	conflicting	awards	
relating	 to	 the	 same	dispute	 coexist,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 goes	 against	 both	 legal	
certainty	 and	 the	 same	 concept	 of	 rule	 of	 law	 if	 something	 is	 deemed	 lawful	 and	
unlawful	 at	 the	 same	 time.	 175 	This	 circumstance	 renders	 necessary	 a	 rule	 of	
coordination	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 no	 more	 than	 one	 award	 regulates	 a	 certain	
controversy	between	two	parties.		
	 In	 conclusion,	 using	 the	 words	 of	 Professor	 Scott,	 the	 Reporter	 of	 the	 First	
Restatement	of	Judgments,	we	could	ask	ourselves	“[w]hy	should	not	[the	search	for]	
the	truth	prevail?	The	answer	is	based	upon	public	policy.	The	interests	of	[justice]	and	
of	the	parties	require	the	putting	of	an	end	to	controversies”.176	
	
1.4 Necessity	of	a	general	 remedy	 for	ensuring	consistency	and	 finality.	The	
impossibility	to	find	a	solution	at	the	jurisdictional	stage:	the	central	role	
of	arbitrators	and	the	necessity	to	go	beyond	party	autonomy.	Plan	of	the	
next	chapters	
	
Several	 national	 law	 systems	 have	 given	 different	 answers	 to	 the	 issue	 of	
conflicting	judgments.	If	there	are	two	parallel	national	proceedings	and	none	of	them	
is	concluded,	while	civil	law	systems	mechanically	apply	the	lis	pendens	rule,	according	
to	which	the	judge	second	seized	shall	stay	his	proceedings	until	the	first	seized	judge	
rules	on	his	 jurisdiction,177	common	 law	systems	use	 to	make	 reference	 to	 the	more	
discretional	 remedies	 of	 forum	non	 conveniens	 and	 anti-suit	 injunctions.	 This	means	
that	if	an	English	judge	finds	that	there	is	a	clearly	more	appropriate	forum	that	may	
serve	better	than	him	the	 interest	of	 justice,	he	will	stay	 its	proceedings	and	ask	the	
plaintiff	 to	 refer	 to	 that	 judge.	On	 the	 contrary,	 if	 the	English	 judge	 finds	 to	be	 the	
most	 appropriate	 forum,	 he	 will	 issue	 an	 anti-suit	 injunction,	 an	 order	 aimed	 at	
restraining	a	party	from	commencing	or	continuing	a	judgement.	
In	case	one	of	the	two	parallel	proceedings	is	concluded,	almost	all	the	national	
law	systems	apply	the	rule	of	res	judicata,	according	to	which,	once	a	dispute	between	
two	 parties	 is	 decided	 by	 a	 determination	 that	 is	 considered	 final	 as	 to	 the	 rights,	
																																																													
174	It	 is	 not	 a	 case	 that	 the	 very	 authoritative	 Italian	 scholar	 Piero	 Calamadrei	 (Istituzioni	 di	 diritto	
processuale	civile	secondo	il	nuovo	codice	(1941),	125)	has	stated	that	any	decision/award	may	not	be	re-
judged	once	it	has	become	res	judicata,	due	to	the	fact	that	it,	by	definition,	facit	ius	(made	law).	Once	
the	award	is	issued,	it	is	valid	notwithstanding	it	could	be	considered	as	not	reflecting	the	truth.	In	this	
regard	see	Palombino,	Gli	effetti	della	sentenza	internazionale	nei	giudizi	interni	(2008),	89	and	ss.	
175	Palombino	(2008)	(n.	174),	90	and	ss.	
176	Scott,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1942),	1.	
177	See,	e.g.,	art.	29	of	the	EU	Regulation	1215/2012.	
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question	 and	 facts	 involved	 in	 the	 dispute,	 a	 re-litigation	 of	 the	 same	 matter	 is	
barred.178	
In	 the	 very	 unlikely	 hypothesis	 that	 two	 judgements	 concerning	 the	 same	
dispute	and	between	the	same	parties	are	issued,	all	national	law	systems	have	found	
solutions	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	 the	 coexistence	 of	 conflicting	 outcomes.	 Anyway,	 the	
different	 systems	 have	 applied	 different	 solutions.	 As	 it	 has	 been	 demonstrated,179	
often	these	solutions	disregard	any	evaluation	on	the	substance	of	a	decision	and	give	
precedence	 to	 the	 first	 or	 second	 issued	 decision	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 fact.	 In	 Italy,	 for	
example,	the	second	decision	always	prevails,	while	in	common	law	countries,	on	the	
contrary,	the	valid	decision	is	the	first	one.180	In	other	systems,	like	France,	the	Cour	de	
Cassation	 will	 decide	 which	 decision	 to	 render	 invalid.181	Furthermore,	 it	 should	 be	
added	that	in	some	particular	cases,	such	as	(in	Italy)	the	fragmentation	of	a	dispute	
concerning	damages	arising	 from	a	car	accident,182	national	 judges	have	applied	 the	
doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	in	order	to	bar	the	second	claim	from	going	ahead	at	the	
admissibility	stage,	even	if	–	in	principle	–	jurisdiction	was	present.	All	the	above	legal	
instruments	will	be	deeply	examined	in	Chapters	2	and	3	below.	
With	 regard	 to	 international	 arbitration,	 as	 a	matter	 of	 principle	 one	 should	
note	 that	 there	 are	 no	 explicit	 rules	 aimed	 at	 solving	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings.	For	logical	reasons,	the	first	phase	of	the	proceedings	where	it	is	possible	
to	 try	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 is	 the	 jurisdictional	
stage.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 that,	 if	 a	 case	 has	 been	 already	 judged	 or	 is	 being	
judged,	 other	 arbitral	 tribunals	 refuse	 to	 hear	 the	 same	 claim	 as	 a	 matter	 of	
jurisdiction.		
Nevertheless,	as	it	will	be	explained	in	this	paragraph,	a	closer	look	to	the	rules	
regulating	 jurisdiction	 in	 international	 arbitration	 reveals	 that	 at	 the	 jurisdictional	
stage	arbitrators	have	nothing	(or,	at	least,	less)	to	do	in	order	to	avoid	the	occurrence	
of	two	parallel	proceedings.		
First	 of	 all	 it	 should	 be	 reminded	 that	 arbitrator’s	 jurisdiction	 is	 determined,	
according	to	the	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz,	by	the	same	arbitrators.183	This	
is	clearly	stated,	for	instance,	by	art.	41,	paragraph	1,	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	stating	
that	 “[t]he	 Tribunal	 shall	 be	 the	 judge	 of	 its	 own	 competence”.	 Similarly	 art.	 23,	
paragraph	 1,	 of	 the	 2010	 UNCITRAL	 Arbitration	 Rules	 states	 that	 “[t]he	 arbitral	
																																																													
178	Gallagher,	in	Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006),	335.	
179	Palombino	(2008)	(n.	174),	90.	
180	Ibid.,	 90-91.	 The	 Author	 mentions	 some	 contrary	 opinion	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	
Italian	courts	that	let	prevail	the	second	issued	decision.	
181	In	criminal	justice	systems,	on	the	contrary,	often	the	most	favourable	decision	for	the	guilty	person	
prevails,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 principle	 in	 dubio	 pro	 reo.	 See,	 e.g.,	 art.	 669	 of	 the	 Italian	 criminal	
procedural	code.	
182 	See	 Castaldo,	
http://www.consiglionazionaleforense.it/site/home/agenda/documento5237.html	 (2011),	 1	and	
ss.,	Scarselli,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2012),	1450	and	ss.	
183	On	 the	determination	of	 arbitral	 jurisdiction	 see	Gotanda,	Columbia	 Journal	 of	 Transnational	 Law	
(2001)	 11	 and	 ss.	 On	 the	 principle	 of	 kompetenz-kompetenz	 see	 Bachand,	 Arbitration	 International	
(2009),	431	and	ss.,	Chillakaru,	Contemporary	Asian	Arbitration	Journal	(2013),	133	and	ss.	
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tribunal	shall	have	the	power	to	rule	on	its	own	jurisdiction,	 including	any	objections	
with	respect	to	the	existence	or	validity	of	the	arbitration	agreement”.	The	rationale	
behind	the	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz	is	that	arbitrators	are	appointed	by	the	
parties	 and	 their	 task	 is	 to	 interpret	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 paying	 only	
consideration	to	party	autonomy	as	expressed	in	the	arbitration	clause	in	light	of	the	
relevant	applicable	law.	
Considering	that	BITs	are	international	treaties,	arbitrators	shall	interpret	their	
jurisdictional	 clauses	according	 to	 the	provisions	of	art.	 31-32-33	of	 the	1969	Vienna	
Convention	 of	 the	 Law	of	 Treaties	 (“VCLT”)	 (which	 fully	 reflect	 customary	 law	with	
regard	 to	 treaty	 interpretation).184	Due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 article	 32	 and	 33	 VCLT	 only	
come	 into	 play,	 as	 supplementary	 means	 of	 interpretation,	 in	 cases	 of	 particularly	
obscure	 treaty	 provisions,	we	will	 primarily	 deal	with	 the	 provision	 of	 art.	 31	 VCLT.	
According	to	such	rule:	
1.		 A	 treaty	 shall	 be	 interpreted	 in	 good	 faith	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	
ordinary	meaning	to	be	given	to	the	terms	of	the	treaty	in	their	context	
and	in	the	light	of	its	object	and	purpose.		
2.		 The	 context	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 interpretation	 of	 a	 treaty	 shall	
comprise,	in	addition	to	the	text,	including	its	preamble	and	annexes:		
(a)	 	Any	agreement	relating	to	the	treaty	which	was	made	between	all	
the	parties	in	connexion	with	the	conclusion	of	the	treaty;		
(b)	 	Any	 instrument	 which	 was	 made	 by	 one	 or	 more	 parties	 in	
connexion	with	the	conclusion	of	the	treaty	and	accepted	by	the	other	
parties	as	an	instrument	related	to	the	treaty.		
3.		 There	shall	be	taken	into	account,	together	with	the	context:		
(a)	 	Any	 subsequent	 agreement	 between	 the	 parties	 regarding	 the	
interpretation	of	the	treaty	or	the	application	of	its	provisions;		
(b)	 	Any	 subsequent	 practice	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 treaty	 which	
establishes	the	agreement	of	the	parties	regarding	its	interpretation;		
(c)	 	Any	 relevant	 rules	 of	 international	 law	 applicable	 in	 the	 relations	
between	the	parties.		
4.		 A	special	meaning	shall	be	given	 to	a	 term	 if	 it	 is	established	 that	 the	
parties	so	intended.		
																																																													
184	Weininger,	Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006),	235	and	ss.,	and	Kaufmann-	Kohler,	
Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006)	257	and	ss.	See	also	Conforti	(2013),	(n.	7),	112	and	
ss.,	and	Gardiner,	Treaty	Interpretation	(2008),	142.	
	 64	
	 From	the	above	provision	three	main	elements	emerge:	(i)	interpretation	shall	
be	carried	out	 in	good	faith	according	to	the	ordinary	meaning	to	be	given	to	treaty	
provisions;	(ii)	interpretation	shall	be	performed	according	to	the	object	and	purpose	
of	the	treaty;	and	(iii)	 interpretation	shall	keep	into	account	the	context	in	which	the	
treaty	has	been	signed.185	
We	will	now	try	to	understand	how	the	requirements	for	the	interpretation	of	
treaties	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 VCLT	 have	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 order	 to	 interpret	 jurisdictional	
clauses	 contained	 in	BITs.	As	 a	preliminary	 remark	 it	 is	worth	noting	 that	 the	VCLT	
does	not	privilege	any	of	 the	above	 three	criteria.	They	are	all	equal	 for	 the	 sake	of	
interpreting	an	international	treaty.186	Furthermore	any	of	such	elements	shall	be	kept	
into	considerations	jointly	with	the	others.187	Concerning	the	ordinary	meaning	to	be	
given	 to	 treaty	 provisions,	 it	 should	 refer	 to	 the	 “regular,	 normal	 or	 customary”188	
meaning	 that	 is	 attributed	 to	 a	 term	or	 to	 a	 sequence	 of	 terms.	However,	 as	 it	 has	
been	stated	by	the	 ICJ,	 the	ordinary	meaning	“is	not	an	absolute	one.	Where	such	a	
method	of	 interpretation	 results	 in	 a	meaning	 incompatible	with	 the	 spirit,	 purpose	
and	context	of	the	clause	or	instrument	in	which	the	words	are	contained,	no	reliance	
can	be	validly	placed	on	it”.189		
This	 lets	 the	 context	 (i.e.	 the	 relevant	 constraints	 of	 the	 communicative	
situation	that	influence	the	language	use,	language	variation	and	discourse	summary)	
come	into	play.	In	fact	“context	is	as	an	immediate	qualifier	of	the	ordinary	meaning	
of	 terms	used	 in	 the	 treaty	 and	hence	 context	 is	 an	 aid	 to	 selection	of	 the	ordinary	
meaning	and	a	modifier	of	any	over-literal	approach	to	interpretation”.190		
Finally,	in	regard	to	the	object	and	purpose	of	the	treaty,	it	should	be	said	that	
even	if	it	is	not	easy	to	understand	if	such	terms	have	a	different	meaning,	a	study	has	
clarified	that	“the	term	‘object’	indicates	thus	the	substantial	content	of	the	norm,	the	
provisions,	 rights	and	obligations	created	by	 the	norm.	The	object	of	a	 treaty	 is	 the	
instrument	 for	 the	achievement	of	 the	treaty’s	purpose,	and	this	purpose	 is,	 in	 turn,	
the	general	result	which	the	parties	want	to	achieve	by	the	treaty”.191	
Given	 the	 above,	 it	 is	worth	 understanding	what	 are	 the	 context,	 the	 object	
and	the	purpose	of	a	BIT.	In	regard	to	the	context,	as	stated	in	paragraph	1.2	above,	it	
is	arguable	that	BITs	(particularly	the	ones	concluded	in	the	late	20th	century)	should	
																																																													
185	A	partially	different	 approach	 to	 interpretation	of	BITs	 is	 proposed	by	Ciurtin,	Revista	Română	de	
Arbitraj	(2015),	65	and	ss.	
186	See	Gardiner,	(2008)	(n.	184),	142.	
187	Ibid.,	161.		
188	Gardiner,	(2008)	(n.	184),	164.	
189 	South	 West	 Africa	 (Liberia	 v.	 South	 Africa,	 jointly	 with	 Ethiopia	 v.	 West	 Africa),	 Preliminary	
Objections,	Judgement,	20	May	1961,	 ICJ	Reports	1962,	336.	 In	this	 regard	Gardiner,	at	161-162,	says	
“Grotius	had	stated:	 ’If	 there	 is	no	 implication	which	suggests	a	different	conclusion,	words	are	 to	be	
understood	in	their	natural	sense,	not	according	to	the	grammatical	sense	which	comes	from	derivation	
but	according	to	current	usage’.	Thus	Grotius’	opening	words	effectively	support	the	approach	taken	in	
the	 Vienna	 rules	 in	 that	 they	 start	 with	 the	 ordinary	 meaning	 but	 allow	 for	 different	 implications”.	
Gardiner’s	quote	refers	to	Grotius,	De	Jure	Belli	ac	Pacis,	Oceana	(1964),	Book	II,	409.	
190	Gardiner	(2008)	(n.	184),	177.	
191	Buffard,	Zemanek,	Austrian	Review	of	International	&	European	Law	(1998),	326.	
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be	 contextualized	 in	 an	 economy	 that	 is	 trying	 to	 become	 even	 more	 global	 and	
where	a	movement	of	 capital	 from	 the	north	 to	 the	 south	of	 the	world	 is	 essential.	
Therefore	States	are	willing	to	incentivize	investments	(i.e.	the	purpose	of	the	treaty)	
trough	norms	which	create	very	favourable	conditions	for	investors	in	the	host	States	
(i.e.	the	object	of	the	treaty).192	
Hence,	it	is	not	surprising	that,	for	example,	the	Tokios	Tokeles	Tribunal,	facing	
a	BIT	provision	 (i.e.	 art.	 1(2)(b)	of	 the	Ukraine-Lithuania	BIT)	 stating	 that	 investor	 is	
“any	 entity	 established	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 Lithuania	 in	 conformity	with	 its	 laws	 and	
regulations”,	has	stated	that	“[t]he	object	and	purpose	of	the	Treaty	likewise	confirm	
that	 the	control-test	should	not	be	used	to	 restrict	 the	scope	of	 ‘investors’	 in	Article	
1(2)(b).	The	preamble	expresses	the	Contracting	Parties’	intent	to	‘intensify	economic	
cooperation	to	the	mutual	benefit	of	both	States’	and	‘create	and	maintain	favourable	
conditions	for	investment	of	investors	of	one	State	in	the	territory	of	the	other	State’.	
The	Tribunal	 in	SGS	v.	Philippines	 interpreted	nearly	 identical	preambulary	 language	
in	 the	 Philippines-Switzerland	 BIT	 as	 indicative	 of	 the	 treaty’s	 broad	 scope	 of	
investment	protection.	We	concur	in	that	interpretation	and	find	that	the	object	and	
purpose	of	the	Ukraine-Lithuania	BIT	 is	to	provide	broad	protection	of	 investors	and	
their	investments”.193	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 criticize	 the	 Tribunals’	 approach	 in	
cases	where	Tribunals	have	refused	to	read	the	BIT	 jurisdictional	provisions	 in	a	way	
that	 is	different	 from	the	one	 resulting	 from	the	ordinary	meaning,	 the	context,	 the	
object	and	the	purpose	of	the	treaty,	 i.e.	the	promotion	of	 investments.	The	raise	of	
parallel	proceedings	seems	justified	by	the	rules	on	interpretation	of	treaty	provisions	
conferring	jurisdiction.	
Indeed,	if	BITs	provide	that	the	mere	ownership	of	shares	is	an	investment,	it	is	
not	 surprising	 that	 we	 can	 have	 several	 autonomous	 claims	 from	 the	 various	
shareholders	of	a	same	company.	 In	this	regard,	 it	 is	worth	highlighting	what	stated	
by	the	CMS	Tribunal:	“The	Tribunal	notes	in	respect	that	the	Centre	[ICSID]	has	made	
every	effort	possible	to	avoid	a	multiplicity	of	tribunals	and	jurisdictions,	but	that	it	is	
not	 possible	 to	 foreclose	 rights	 that	 different	 investors	might	 have	 under	 different	
arrangements”.194	
																																																													
192	See	Di	Benedetto,	International	Investment	Law	and	the	Environment	(2013),	150,	according	to	whom	
“[t]he	 fundamental	 objectives	 of	 investment	 treaties	 are	 the	 protection	 and	 promotion	 of	 foreign	
investments.	 These	 are	 embedded	 into	 their	 overall	 structure	 and	 are	 confirmed	 in	 their	 preambles	
(and	often	by	their	titles)”.	
193	Tokios	Tokeles	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/18,	Award	on	Jurisdiction,	29	April	2004,	para.	31.	
Similarly,	 in	SGS	v.	Philippines,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/11,	Decision	on	 Jurisdiction,	29	 January	2004,	
para.	116,	the	Tribunal	stated	“the	object	and	purpose	of	the	BIT	supports	an	effective	interpretation	of	
art.	X(2).	The	BIT	is	a	treaty	for	the	promotion	and	reciprocal	protection	of	investments.	According	to	
the	preamble	it	is	intended	‘to	create	and	maintain	favourable	conditions	for	investments	by	investors	
of	 one	 Contracting	 Party	 in	 the	 territory	 of	 the	 other”.	 It	 is	 legitimate	 to	 resolve	 uncertainties	 in	 its	
interpretation	so	as	to	favour	the	protection	of	covered	investments”	Many	other	decisions	have	taken	
similar	approaches.	
194	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Company	v.	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	17	
July	2003,	para.	86.	
	 66	
It	 is	 also	 fully	 justifiable	 that,	 even	 in	 cases	 of	 claims	 brought	 by	 shell	
companies,	 tribunals	have	 consented	 to	disputes	 to	go	ahead,	because	 the	 relevant	
BITs	allowed	to	structure	investments	in	a	manner	aimed	at	taking	advantage	of	more	
than	one	investment	treaty.	With	this	regard	it	is	worth	reminding	the	decisions	of	the	
Saluka	 and	 Yukos	 Tribunals	 mentioned	 in	 paragraph	 1.1.3	 above,	 where	 –	 even	 if	
showing	some	sympathy	for	the	possibility	of	precluding	jurisdiction	to	claims	brought	
by	shell	companies	–Tribunals	stated	that	the	relevant	BIT	wording	precluded	them	to	
do	so.	
However,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 Tribunals	 could	 have	 also	 given	 a	 different	
reading	of	the	relevant	BITs’	provisions	and	give	prevalence	to	“policy	considerations	
rather	than	to	canons	of	interpretation”.195	For	example,	in	Vacuum	Salt	v.	Ghana	the	
Tribunal	 refused	 to	 hear	 a	 claim	by	 a	minority	 shareholder,196	and,	 in	 his	 dissenting	
opinion	in	the	Tokios	Tokeles	decision,	Prof.	Weil	explained	why	the	abovementioned	
interpretation	 of	 the	 majority	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 should	 be	 considered	 wrong.197	It	 is,	
anyway,	arguable	that	these	opinions	do	not	represent	the	majoritarian	position	and	
that	Tribunals	still	prefer	to	rigidly	apply	VCLT	provision	and	assume	jurisdiction	every	
time	the	interpretation	of	the	relevant	BIT	provision	so	dictates,	without	caring	of	the	
risk	of	multiple	and	conflicting	proceedings	(and	awards).198	Tribunals	have	therefore	
																																																													
195	Weiniger	(2006)	(n.	184),	235	and	ss.	and	in	particular	247.	
196	In	Vacuum	Salt	v.	Ghana,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/92/1,	Award,	16	February	1994,	the	Tribunal	refused	to	
hear	 a	 claim	 by	 a	 company	 incorporated	 in	 Ghana,	 a	 minority	 shareholder	 (Mr.	 Panagiotopulos)	 of	
which,	 owning	 20%	 of	 the	 company’s	 shares,	 was	 Greek.	 Provided	 that	 the	words	 “foreign	 control”	
contained	in	article	25(2)(b)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	are	not	defined,	and	that	the	concept	of	control	is	
not	intended	by	ICSID	Tribunals	(and	by	several	scholars)	as	necessarily	corresponding	to	the	majority	
of	 the	 shares,	 the	 Tribunal	 could	 have	 concluded	 that	 it	 had	 jurisdiction	 (due,	 inter	 alia,	 to	 the	 very	
important	 technical	contribution	that	Mr.	Panagiotopulos	gave	 in	 the	management	of	 the	company).	
On	 the	 contrary	 it	 reached	an	opposite	 conclusion	and	did	not	 assume	 jurisdiction	on	Vacuum	Salt’s	
claim	stating	that	there	was	not	foreign	control	over	the	company.	Probably,	if	a	BIT	between	Greece	
and	Ghana	would	have	existed	and	if	Mr	Panagiotopulos	had	brought	his	claim	under	this	BIT,	in	light	of	
the	approaches	mentioned	in	the	text	on	the	direct	claims	by	shareholders,	the	result	could	have	been	
different.	
197	In	 his	 dissenting	 opinion	 Prof.	 Weil	 explained	 that	 ICSID	 has	 been	 created	 for	 the	 settlement	 of	
investment	disputes	and	it	would	be	a	misuse	of	the	system	to	allow	a	claim	by	a	shell	company	owned	
by	 nationals	 of	 the	 host	 State.	 With	 the	 same	 aim,	 in	 the	 abovementioned	 Aguas	 del	 Tunari	 case,	
Alberro-Semerena	issued	a	dissenting	declaration	where	he	stated	that	it	should	not	be	allowed	to	an	
investor	to	change	the	nationality	of	a	shell	company	in	order	to	take	advantage	of	a	BIT.	This	form	of	
treaty	shopping	is,	in	the	opinion	of	the	dissenting	arbitrator,	an	abuse	of	the	system.	
198	This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 Tribunals	 are	 pro-investors	 biased.	 In	 case	 of	 ICSID	 claims	 brought	 by	 a	
company	 incorporated	 in	the	host	State,	Tribunals	have	 indeed	sometimes	pierced	the	corporate	veil	
and	refused	to	assume	jurisdiction	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	the	final	beneficiary	of	the	investment	
was	a	national	of	the	host	State.	This	happened	in	the	abovementioned	cases	TSA	v.	Argentina	and	in	
National	Gas	v.	Egypt.	A	closer	 look	 to	 the	awards	 reveals	 that	 tribunals	have	accepted	 to	pierce	 the	
corporate	veil	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	the	claim	was	brought	by	the	company	incorporated	in	the	
host	State:	 in	this	case	the	provision	of	Article	25(2)(b)	of	the	 ICSID	Convention	applies.	According	to	
the	TSA	(not	unanimous)	and	National	Gas	Tribunals,	such	provision	expressly	requires	the	existence	of	
a	 foreign	 control	 and	 therefore	 authorizes	 the	 Tribunal	 to	 pierce	 the	 corporate	 veil	 and	 look	 at	 the	
effective	foreign	control	and	therefore	at	the	effective	beneficiary	of	the	investment.	It	is	anyway	worth	
noting	 that	 this	 approach	 has	 not	 been	 always	 followed.	 In	 the	 already	mentioned	 cases	Amco	 and	
others	v.	Indonesia,	Autopista	Concesionada	de	Venezuela	C.A.	v.	the	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela	and	
Aguas	 del	 Tunari	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Bolivia	 the	 Tribunals	 refused	 to	 lift	 the	 veil	 beyond	 the	 first	 level	 of	
	 67	
preferred	to	respect	the	principle	of	party	autonomy	as	expressed	in	BITs	rather	than	
ensuring	the	reliability	and	legitimacy	of	investment	law	and	arbitration.	
It	 is	 therefore	 clear	 that,	 unless	 the	wording	 of	 BITs	 is	 amended199	(and	 this	
seems	not	very	likely	to	happen)200,	a	solution	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	
at	 the	 stage	 of	 jurisdiction	 is	 not	 likely,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 VCLT	 and	 the	
necessary	 respect	 the	 principle	 of	 party	 autonomy	 do	 not	 allow	 arbitrators	 to	 go	
against	 what	 has	 been	 expressed	 by	 the	 parties	 when	 giving	 their	 consent	 to	
arbitration.201	
Does	 this	 mean	 that	 we	 are	 at	 a	 deadlock	 and	 there	 is	 no	 solution	 to	 the	
problem	of	parallel	proceedings?	It	is	the	opinion	of	the	present	author	that	there	are	
still	tools	to	be	used	in	order	to	avoid	parallel	proceedings.	Such	tools	may	be:	(i)	an	
exercise	of	party	autonomy	aimed	at	avoiding	parallel	proceedings;	(ii)	an	exercise	of	
discretion	 by	 arbitrators	 at	 the	 jurisdictional	 stage;	 and	 (iii)	 a	 requirement	 of	 the	
applicable	 substantive	 law	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	 the	 result	 of	 conflicting	 outcomes,	
regardless	of	party	autonomy.		
In	the	next	Chapter	the	solutions	under	(i)	and	(ii)	and	will	be	examined.	It	will	
be	demonstrated	that	such	remedies	(i.e.	consolidation,	joinder,	intervention,	waiver	
clauses,	forum	non	conveniens,	anti-suit	injunctions	and	comity),	based	on	an	exercise	
of	 discretion	 either	 by	 the	 parties	 or	 by	 the	 arbitrators,	 may	 not	 be	 assumed	 as	 a	
general	remedy	to	the	issues	of	parallel	proceedings	and	conflicting	awards.	Indeed,	it	
is	not	possible	to	base	the	solution	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	only	on	a	
possible	 and	 discretionary	 remedy.	What	 investment	 arbitration	 needs,	 in	 order	 to	
pass	 the	 critics	 and	 increase	 its	 legitimacy,	 is	 a	 general	 remedy	 that	 is	 applicable	
regardless	of	an	exercise	of	discretion	by	the	parties	(or	by	the	arbitrators).	We	shall	
therefore	try	to	go	beyond	party	autonomy	and	see	whether	–	at	a	certain	stage	of	the	
arbitral	procedure	–	a	solution	of	this	kind	is	available.	
Chapter	3	will	be	aimed	at	examining	the	remedies	offered	at	the	admissibility	
phase	 of	 international	 investment	 disputes.	 The	 objective	 of	 the	 Chapter	will	 be	 to	
understand	if	such	remedies	(i.e.	abuse	of	process,	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel)	
can	 be	 considered	 as	 generally	 and	 autonomously	 applicable	 solutions	 aimed	 at	
precluding	the	prosecution	of	parallel	proceedings	(being	such	proceedings	concurring	
or	subsequent).	As	we	will	see,	a	central	role	in	the	application	of	these	remedies	shall	
be	assumed	by	arbitrators,	who	are	 the	 final	managers	of	 the	dispute	and	have	 the	
inherent	 powers	 to	 ensure	 that	 their	 process	 is	 respectful	 of	 the	 canons	 of	 a	 good	
administration	 of	 justice.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 only	 if	 arbitrators	 are	 aware	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
control	over	the	claimant	company.	They	argued	that:	(i)	the	Convention	talks	about	“foreign	control”	
and	 not	 about	 “effective	 control”	 and	 therefore	 a	 research	 beyond	 the	 first	 level	 of	 control	 is	 not	
justified;	 (ii)	 the	 scope	 of	 art.	 25(2)(b)	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention,	 as	 explained	 by	Mr.	 Broches	 in	 the	
Report	of	the	Executive	Directors,	is	to	expand	(and	not	reduce)	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Centre.	With	this	
regard	see	also	the	abovementioned	Tokios	Tokeles	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	at	para.	46.		
199	As	it	has	happened	for	the	CETA.	Please	refer	to	footnote	90	above.	
200	Boddiker,	American	University	International	Law	Review	(2010),	1070.	
201	Zoppo	(2013),	239	and	ss.	has	talked	about	a	“legalization”	of	forum	shopping.	
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their	duty	to	ensure	the	consistency	of	 international	 investment	 law	(and	arbitration	
awards)	the	issue	of	inconsistency	and	incoherence	will	be	resolved.	
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Chapter	2	
The	inappropriateness	of	traditional	remedies	based	on	party	autonomy	or	on	the	
discretion	of	arbitrators	and	the	Inadequacy	of	the	solutions	set	forth	in	institutional	
commercial	arbitration	rules	
	
	 Chapter	1	has	been	aimed	at	demonstrating	why	parallel	proceedings	shall	be	
avoided	and	the	reasons	behind	the	necessity	of	a	general	remedy	to	this	problem.	
	 Chapter	 2	 will	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 legal	 instruments	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	
parallel	 proceedings	 that	 are	 applicable	 at	 the	 jurisdictional	 phase	 of	 investment	
arbitration	 proceedings	 are	 not	 well	 fitted	 to	 offer	 such	 a	 remedy	 in	 international	
arbitration.	 As	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 below,	 the	 main	 reason	 for	 which	 such	 tools	 are	
unsuitable	for	the	aim	of	our	research	is	that	they	are	always	based	on	consent,1	i.e.	on	
an	 expression	 of	 autonomy	 of	 the	 same	 parties	 that	 commenced	 the	 parallel	
proceedings.		
	 It	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 that	 there	 exist	 a	 strong	 contrast	 between	 the	
consensual	paradigm	of	 international	arbitration,	which	 is	sometimes	also	called	the	
“grundnorm”	of	 international	arbitration,2	and	the	necessity	that	arbitration	–	having	
de	facto	become	the	natural	judge	for	disputes	related	to	international	commerce	and	
in	particular	to	international	investments3	–	adapts	to	the	substantial	needs	of	modern	
transactions. 4 	The	 formalism	 related	 to	 consent,	 indeed,	 often	 does	 not	 allow	
arbitration	to	adapt	to	the	substantive	reality	of	complex	disputes,	thus	generating	an	
“artificial	discrepancy	between	the	substantive	and	the	procedural	aspect	of	the	same	
multiparty	 relationship”.5	This	 situation	 generates	 a	 paradox,	 perfectly	 described	 by	
Prof.	Stipanowich	in	a	1987	paper:	“[e]conomy	and	efficiency	may	be	frustrated	by	a	
number	of	dilatory	factors	before,	during	and	after	the	arbitration.	Ironically,	many	of	
these	potential	causes	of	delay	are	rooted	 in	those	characteristics	of	arbitration	that	
distinguish	 it	 from	traditional	adjudication	processes.	Nowhere	 is	 this	paradox	more	
evident	that	in	disputes	involving	multiple	parties”.6	In	light	of	the	above,	as	perfectly	
expressed	 by	 Leboulanger,	 “strangely	 enough,	 in	 some	 aspects,	 domestic	 litigation	
seems	better	adapted	to	certain	situations	than	international	commercial	arbitration,	
																																																													
1	Even	in	the	cases	where	Authors	try	to	avoid	an	analysis	of	consent,	focusing	on	different	elements	of	
the	 proceedings,	 such	 as	 the	 meaning	 and	 extent	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 “dispute”.	 Reference	 goes	 in	
particular	to	Brekoulakis,	Third	Parties	in	International	Commercial	Arbitration	(2010),	210	and	ss.	
2	Hosking,	Pepperdine	Dispute	Resolution	Law	Journal	(2004),	565.	Craig,	Multiple	Party	in	International	
Arbitration	 (2009),	 lvii,	 has	 talked	 about	 the	 “pierre	 anguilaire	 of	 arbitration”.	See	 also	Park,	Multiple	
Party	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	4.	For	a	broad	analysis	of	the	issue	of	consent	see	Rau,	Multiple	
Party	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	69	and	ss.	
3	Youssef,	Multiparty	Arbitration	 (2010),	99,	stating	that	“The	decline	of	the	requirement	of	consent	as	
may	 be	 rationalized	 by	 reference	 to	 the	 emergence	 of	 arbitration	 as	 the	 judge	 naturel	 of	 disputes	
arising	under	international	contracts”.	
4	Strong,	Vanderbilt	Journal	of	Transnational	Law	(1998),	917.	Similarly,	see	Bamforth,	Maidment	
(2009),	3.	
5	Brekoulakis,	Penn	State	Law	Review	(2009),	1182.	
6	Stipanowich,	Iowa	Law	Review	(1987),	475.	
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namely	those	 involving	related	proceedings”.7	It	 is	 therefore	questionable	whether	 it	
would	 be	 worth	 to	 develop	 a	 more	 flexible	 approach	 to	 jurisdiction	 in	 arbitration,	
keeping	 into	 consideration	 concerns	 of	 equity	 and	 substantial	 justice.8	At	 the	 same	
time,	 however,	 it	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 that	 an	 analysis	 of	 consent	 is	 unavoidable	
when	 assessing	 arbitrators’	 jurisdiction	 and	 that	 a	 solution	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	
cannot	be	found	at	this	stage	of	arbitral	proceedings.9	
	 The	analysis	made	in	the	present	Chapter	will	start	with	forum	selection,	fork-
in-the-road	 and	waiver	 clauses	 (Paragraph	 2.1.1)	 and	 then	will	 focus	 on	 the	 various	
doctrines	 developed	 in	 international	 commercial	 arbitration,	 i.e.	 joinder	 (Paragraph	
2.1.2.1),	consolidation	(Paragraph	2.1.2.2)	and	quasi	consolidation	(Paragraph	2.1.2.3).	
Such	remedies,	based	on	party	autonomy,	are	not	able	to	provide	a	general	solution	
to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings,	because	they	necessarily	 involve	a	choice	by	
the	parties,	which	–	for	several	reasons	–	could	be	not	 interested	in	avoiding	parallel	
proceedings.	 With	 particular	 reference	 to	 joinder	 and	 consolidation,	 paradoxically,	
such	remedies	are	not	set	forth	in	ICSID	Convention	and	Rules	and	therefore	in	ICSID	
arbitration	(i.e.	the	most	common	form	of	investment	arbitration)	it	is	not	possible	to	
have	any	form	of	coordination	between	two	ICSID	proceedings,	or	any	form	of	joinder	
of	third	parties	without	an	express	manifestation	of	consent	by	all	the	parties	involved	
in	 the	 claim(s).	Hence,	 at	 present,	without	 consent	by	 all	 the	parties,	we	are	 –	with	
particular	 regard	 to	 ICSID	arbitration	–	stuck	 in	a	 situation	 in	which	 there	cannot	be	
any	 form	 of	 real	 coordination	 between	 parallel	 proceedings	 or	 any	 kind	 of	
involvement	 of	 third	 parties	 other	 than	 the	 already	 analysed	 amicus	 curiae,	 which	
cannot	be	considered	even	similar	to	joinder	or	intervention.	A	brief	reference	will	also	
be	made	to	collective	proceedings	started	by	investors.	
	 Similar	 conclusions	 will	 be	 reached	 with	 regard	 to	 other	 remedies	 which	
involve	a	discretionary	choice	by	arbitrators,	such	as	forum	non	conveniens	and	comity	
(Paragraph	 2.2.1):	 the	 applicability	 of	 the	 kompetenz-kompetenz	 principle	 at	 the	
jurisdictional	 stage	 of	 proceedings	 necessarily	 involve	 choices	 to	 be	 taken	 by	
arbitrators,	 that	 not	 necessarily	 are	 sensitive	 to	 the	 policy	 considerations	 against	
parallel	proceedings	outlined	in	the	first	Chapter.		
	 Finally	 it	 will	 be	 demonstrated	 (Paragraph	 2.2.2)	 that	 arbitral	 anti-suit	
injunctions	are	not	a	useful	tool	to	solve	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings,	because	
the	 issuance	of	such	orders	–	other	than	being	based	on	an	exercise	of	discretion	by	
arbitrators	–	is	not	advisable	(due	to	the	undue	interference	that	anti-suit	injunctions	
have	on	the	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz)	and	has	a	very	limited	efficacy	to	limit	
jurisdiction	of	other	arbitrators.	
																																																													
7	Leboulanger,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(1996),	43.	
8	Youssef,	ICCA	Congress	Series	(2012),	107	and	ss.	
9	Park	 (2009)	 (n.	 2),	 5,	 stated	 that	 “for	 arbitrators,	 motions	 to	 join	 non-signatories	 create	 a	 tension	
between	 two	 principles:	 maintaining	 arbitration’s	 consensual	 nature,	 and	 maximizing	 an	 award’s	
practical	effectiveness	by	binding	 related	persons”.	The	 issue	of	 the	diminution	of	 the	 importance	of	
the	role	of	consent	in	general	international	law	is	deeply	examined	by	Romano,	International	Law	and	
Politics	(2007),	791	and	ss.	
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2.1 Remedies	 based	 on	 party	 autonomy	 (and	 secondarily	 on	 arbitrators’	
discretion)	
	
2.1.1	 Forum	selection	options,	fork-in-the-road	and	waiver	clauses	
	
	 This	 paragraph	 is	 aimed	 at	 demonstrating	 that	 the	 remedies	 to	 the	 issue	 of	
parallel	proceedings	based	on	an	agreement	(express	or	implied)	between	the	parties	
prior	to	the	commencement	of	a	dispute	may	be	easily	circumvented	and,	therefore,	
are	not	an	effective	tool	to	deal	with	the	issue	at	stake.	We	will	first	of	all	analyse	the	
case	of	many	jurisdictional	options	contained	in	the	same	legal	instruments,	and	then	
move	to	some	more	complex	and	debated	provisions,	i.e.	fork-in-the-road	and	waiver	
clauses.	
	
Forum	selection	clauses	
With	regard	to	 forum	selection	clauses,	as	already	showed	 in	paragraph	1.1.4	
above,	 several	 BITs,	 multilateral	 treaties	 and	 national	 laws	 (as	 well	 as	 contracts	
entered	into	by	States	and	foreign	investors)	contain	various	jurisdictional	options	in	
their	 dispute	 settlement	 clauses,	 giving	 a	 choice	 to	 the	 investor,	 that	 can	 therefore	
decide	before	which	 (court	or)	 tribunal	 to	bring	a	dispute.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	has	been	
already	stated	that	–	in	principle	–	nothing	could	prevent	an	investor	in	bad	faith	from	
pursuing	all	 the	 remedies	 contained	 in	a	 legal	 instrument.	Moreover,	nothing	might	
impede	that,	on	the	basis	of	 the	kompetenz-kompetenz	principle,	all	 tribunals	before	
which	the	same	dispute	has	been	brought	assume	jurisdiction	on	the	matter.	In	light	
of	the	current	wording	of	dispute	settlement	provisions	in	contracts,	treaties	and	laws,	
there	is	no	remedy	to	this	phenomenon.	Prof.	Pierre	Mayer	has	therefore	proposed	to	
insert	in	investment	treaties	a	clarifying	provision	to	this	effect	(i.e.	a	provision	saying	
that	once	a	dispute	settlement	mechanism	under	a	forum	selection	clause	is	chosen,	
the	others	shall	be	expressly	waived).10	
Wehland,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 stated	 that	 “forum	 selection	 options	 must,	 in	
principle,	be	[considered	impliedly]	 limited	to	claims	that	have	not	yet	been	asserted	
elsewhere”	and	seems	to	consider	useless	Mayer’s	proposed	provision.11	He	motivates	
such	 an	 assertion	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 “it	 seems	 inconceivable	 that	 the	
signatories	to	an	IIA	(or	a	domestic	legislator	for	the	matter)	could	have	intended	such	
a	deeply	 flowed	outcome”	and	on	the	basis	of	“a	good	faith	 interpretation	aimed	at	
avoiding	situations	in	which	the	exercise	of	a	forum	selection	option	would	have	to	be	
considered	as	an	abuse	of	process”.12	These	Wehland’s	statement	seems	flawed.	First	
of	 all,	 the	 intentions	 of	who	wrote	 a	 legal	 text	 are	 not	 necessarily	 prevailing	 in	 the	
																																																													
10	Mayer,	Le	contentieux	arbitral	transnational	(2006),	200.	
11	Wehland,	The	 coordination	 of	multiple	 proceedings	 in	 Investment	 Treaty	Arbitration	 (2013),	 101.	 This	
Author,	 at	 103,	 further	 states	 that	 “these	 limitation	must	 be	 seen	 as	 inherent	 to	 the	mechanism	 of	
forum	selection	options.	
12	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	103.	
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interpretation	 of	 such	 legal	 text.13	Secondly,	 in	 absence	 of	 a	 provision	 that	 clearly	
limits	the	power	of	an	investor	to	start	several	claims	in	different	fora	in	relation	to	the	
same	 dispute,	 we	 could	 assume	 that	 what	 is	 not	 forbidden	 is	 to	 be	 considered	
allowed.	Finally,	and	more	 importantly,	 it	 is	 today	extremely	easy	 for	an	 investor	 to	
use	(or	to	modify	ad	hoc)	its	corporate	structure	in	order	to	start	a	claim	with	another	
company	of	the	group	under	a	different	BIT,	thus	avoiding	the	alleged	(implied)	limit	
that,	in	Wehland’s	opinion,	is	contained	in	the	forum	selection	clause.	Similarly,	forum	
selection	clauses	are	completely	useless	in	case	of	several	claims	initiated	by	majority	
and	minority	shareholders,	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	various	claims	are	started	under	
different	investment	treaties.	
Indeed,	 the	 same	use	of	 the	word	 “inconceivable”	by	Wehland	demonstrates	
that	he	did	not	found	a	legal	basis	for	his	opinion	and	that	forum	selection	options	are	
not,	 contrary	 to	what	Wehland	 said,	 a	 useful	 device	 in	 order	 to	 coordinate	multiple	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
	
Fork-in-the-road	clauses	
Fork-in-the-road	clauses	“offer	the	investor	a	choice	between	the	host	State’s	
domestic	courts	and	 international	arbitration.	The	choice,	once	made,	 is	 final.	 If	 the	
investor	resorts	to	the	host	State’s	domestic	courts	to	have	the	dispute	settled,	it	loses	
the	right	to	international	arbitration”.14	Such	clauses	are	today	not	only	limited	to	give	
an	 alternative	 among	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 national	 courts	 litigation,	 but	 are	
aimed	at	excluding	any	previously	agreed	form	of	 litigation	when	the	parties	choose	
to	refer	to	investment	arbitration.15	In	this	regard	it	is	often	said	that	electa	una	via	non	
datur	 recursus	 ad	 alteram.	 An	 example	 of	 fork-in-the-road	 clause	 is	 Article	 8(2)	 of	
Argentina-France	 BIT,	 providing	 that	 “[u]ne	 fois	 qu’un	 investisseur	 a	 soumis	 le	
différend	 soit	 aux	 juridictions	 de	 la	 Partie	 contractante	 concernée,	 soit	 à	 l’arbitrage	
international,	le	choix	de	l’une	ou	de	l’autre	de	ces	procédures	reste	définitif”.	
The	 usefulness	 of	 fork-in-the-road	 provisions	 is,	 however,	 very	 limited.	 Their	
main	 limit	 is	 that	 “they	 only	 apply	 where	 the	 dispute	 in	 the	 previous	 and	 the	 later	
proceedings	 is	 the	 same”.16	For	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 applicability	 of	 fork-in-the	 road	
clauses,	 two	 disputes	 are	 “same”	 if	 the	 so-called	 triple	 identity	 test	 is	 met.	 17	
Accordingly,	 the	parties,	 the	petitum	 (i.e.	 the	 request	 to	 the	Tribunal)	and	the	causa	
petendi	 (i.e.	 the	 legal	 basis	 for	 the	 request	 to	 the	 tribunal)	 must	 be	 identical.	 In	
particular,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 relevant	 treaty	 provisions,	 the	
																																																													
13	In	this	regard,	please	refer	to	the	rules	on	treaty	interpretation	examined	in	the	first	Chapter.	
14	Schreuer,	The	ICSID	Convention:	A	Commentary	(2009),	365.	
15	See	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	86.	See	also	Article	VI	of	the	Estonia-US	BIT.	
16	See	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	88.	
17	See	Schreuer,	The	 Journal	of	World	 Investment	and	Trade	 (2004),	245	and	 ss.	See	also	Alex	Genin,	
Eastern	Credit	Limited,	Inc.	and	A.S.	Baltoil	v.	The	Republic	of	Estonia,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/99/2,	Award,	
25	 June	 2001.	 This	 opinion	 has	 been	 strongly	 criticized	 by	 Lowenfeld,	
www.transnationaldisputemanagement.com	(2006),	in	particular	with	regard	to	the	necessity	of	strict	
identity	between	the	parties.	According	to	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	91,	footnote	296,	an	opinion	similar	
to	Lowenfeld’s	has	been	sustained	by	the	ad	hoc	committee	in	the	Vivendi	case.	
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requirements	of	the	same	parties	and	the	same	causa	petendi	have	been	applied	very	
strictly.	Hence,	even	in	presence	of	parties	which	substantially	represented	the	same	
interests	but	that	were	formally	different,	Tribunals	did	not	find	that	the	triple	identity	
test	was	met	and	did	not	apply	 fork-in-the-road	provisions.	Similarly,	 tribunals	have	
said	that	that	“the	dispute	in	two	sets	of	proceedings	is	identical	only	where	the	claims	
asserted	 in	 both	 of	 them	 have	 the	 same	 legal	 basis”.18	This	 position	 is	 perfectly	
showed	 by	 the	 approach	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 in	 Lauder	 v.	 Czech	 Republic,19	where	 the	
Respondent	State	tried	to	argue	that	the	fork-in-the-road	provision	contained	in	the	
US-Czech	 Republic	 BIT 20 	precluded	 a	 claim	 which,	 as	 already	 explained,	 was	
substantially	 identical	 to	 the	 claim	 in	 another	 dispute	 arisen	 from	 the	 same	 State’s	
measures	 (CME	 v.	 Czech	 Republic).21	The	 tribunal,	 at	 para.	 162	 stated	 that	 “the	
resolution	of	 the	 investment	dispute	 under	 the	Treaty	between	Mr.	 Lauder	 and	 the	
Czech	 Republic	 was	 not	 brought	 before	 any	 other	 arbitral	 tribunal	 or	 Czech	 court	
before	–	or	after	–	the	present	proceedings	were	initiated.	All	other	arbitration	or	court	
proceedings	 referred	 to	 by	 the	 Respondent	 involve	 different	 parties,	 and	 deal	 with	
different	disputes”.	The	dramatic	outcomes	of	the	Tribunal’s	decision,	which	reached	
opposite	 conclusions	 to	 the	 CME	 Tribunal,	 are	 well-known	 and	 have	 been	 already	
described	in	Chapter	1.	
Moreover,	 fork-in-the-road	 provisions	 do	 not	 preclude	 separate	 claims	 by	
majority	 and	 minority	 shareholders,	 thus	 allowing	 several	 arbitration	 proceedings	
under	different	BITs	and	in	relation	to	the	same	State	measure.	
As	 an	 example	 of	 fork-in-the-road	 provisions	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 it	 is	
often	cited	Article	26	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	stating	that	“Consent	of	the	parties	to	
arbitration	under	this	Convention	shall,	unless	otherwise	stated,	be	deemed	consent	
to	 such	 arbitration	 to	 the	 exclusion	 of	 any	 other	 remedy.	 A	 Contracting	 State	may	
require	the	exhaustion	of	local	administrative	or	judicial	remedies	as	a	condition	of	its	
consent	to	arbitration	under	this	Convention”.	With	concern	to	this	clause	it	should	be	
noted,	 anyway,	 that	 the	 words	 “unless	 otherwise	 stated”	 seem	 to	 envisage	 the	
possibility	that	the	parties	may	give	their	consent	to	more	than	one	dispute	resolution	
mechanism.		Furthermore	the	mechanism	provided	for	in	this	Article	operates	at	the	
moment	of	consent22	and	not	at	the	moment	of	the	commencement	of	the	dispute.	
For	 this	 reason	 it	 is	arguable	 that	Article	26	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 is	not	a	proper	
fork-in-the-road	mechanism	but	 a	device	aimed	at	 avoiding	 that	 –	unless	otherwise	
stated	 –consent	 is	 given	 to	 several	 forms	 of	 dispute	 resolution.	 This	means	 that,	 in	
principle,	it	can	happen	that	several	proceedings	are	initiated	in	different	fora.	This	is	
exactly	what	happened	 in	 the	SPP	v.	 Egypt23	case,	where	 the	Tribunal	had	 to	admit	
																																																													
18	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	93.	
19	Ronald	 S.	 Lauder	 v.	 The	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	 Final	Award,	 3	 September	 2001.	 Several	 other	
authorities	which	reached	the	same	conclusions	are	mentioned	in	Schreuer	(2004)	(n.	17),	246	and	ss.	
20	See	article	VI(3)	of	US-Czech	Republic	BIT	and	Schreuer	(2004)	(n.	17),	245.	
21	CME	Czech	Republic	B.V.	v.	The	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Award,	14	March	2003.	
22	Schreuer	et	al.	(2009)	(n.	14),	352.	
23	Southern	Pacific	Properties	 (Middle	East)	Limited	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/84/3,	
	 74	
that	“when	the	jurisdictions	of	two	unrelated	and	independent	tribunals	extend	to	the	
same	dispute,	there	is	no	rule	of	international	law	which	prevents	either	tribunal	from	
exercising	 its	 jurisdiction”.24	This	 statement	 goes	 against	 who	 said	 that	 “Article	 26	
seems	 to	 achieve	 consolidation	 at	 least	 temporarily	 as	 it	 provides	 that	 only	 one	
procedure	may	be	pending	in	relation	to	a	certain	dispute”.25	
Another	 limit	of	Article	26	of	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 is	 that	 it	operates	only	 in	
case	the	requirements	of	the	triple	identity	test	are	met.	This	means	that	all	the	limits	
that	we	have	already	examined	for	fork-in-the-road	clauses	in	BITs	(i.e.	the	possibility	
of	several	claims	under	different	BITs	by	various	shareholders	or	by	various	companies	
of	the	same	group)	are	present	also	under	the	ICSID	Convention.	
For	 all	 the	 above	 reasons,	 even	 if	 “it	 makes	 more	 sense	 to	 have	 the	 entire	
dispute	 heard	 by	 one	 tribunal,	 preferably	 the	 one	 with	 the	 most	 comprehensive	
jurisdiction”,26	it	is	strongly	arguable	that	fork-in-the-road	provisions	are	not	helpful	in	
reaching	this	objective,	due	to	the	several	drawbacks	that	 the	current	application	of	
such	 clauses	 involves.	 While,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 argued	 in	 Chapter	 3	 below,	 the	 strict	
application	 of	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 is	 not	 sustainable	 in	 presence	 of	 non-written	
general	 principles	 of	 law	 (such	 as	 res	 judicata,	 collateral	 estoppel	 and	 abuse	 of	
process),	 it	 is	 very	 difficult	 to	 demonstrate	 that,	 in	 presence	 of	 a	 very	 strict	 treaty	
provision,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 fork-in-the-road	 clauses,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 waive	 the	
requirements	 of	 the	 triple	 identity	 test.	 “Even	where	 a	 treaty	 contains	 a	 fork	 in	 the	
road	provision,	the	 latter	simply	will	not	cover	all	 the	situations	 in	which	an	 investor	
might	try	to	relitigate	a	dispute”.27		
	
Waiver	clauses	
The	last	mechanism	of	prevention	of	parallel	proceedings	possibly	contained	in	
arbitration	clauses	are	the	so-called	waiver	clauses.	Such	clauses	set	forth	that	once	a	
dispute	under	a	certain	treaty,	contract	or	law	is	commenced,	the	claimant	waives	all	
other	possible	proceedings	that	he	may	commence.		
As	 a	 preliminary	 remark,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 in	 practice,	 the	 effects	 of	
waiver	clauses	are	different	depending	on	the	kind	of	legal	instruments	in	which	they	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Decision	on	Jurisdiction.	
24	SPP	v.	Egypt,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	14	April	1988,	para.	53-56.	A	similar	statement	can	be	found	in	
Champion	Trading	Company	and	Others	v.	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	n.	ARB/02/09,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	21	
October	2003,	para.	19,	where	 it	 is	 stated	 that	 “the	Convention	does	not	contain	any	 rules	 regarding	
possible	parallel	proceedings”.	Anyway,	in	the	SPP	decision,	the	Tribunal	further	stated	that	“however,	
in	the	interest	of	international	judicial	order,	either	of	the	tribunals	may,	in	its	discretion	and	as	a	matter	
of	comity,	decide	to	stay	the	exercise	of	 its	 jurisdiction	pending	a	decision	by	the	other	 tribunal”	 (we	
will	come	back	on	the	topic	of	comity	 later	 in	this	Chapter).	 In	this	case	a	 ICC	and	a	 ICSID	arbitration	
proceedings	were	concurrently	pending.	
25	This	possibility	is	envisaged	by	Crivellaro,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	
(2005),	385,	who	–	anyway	–	denies	its	applicability	at	388.	This	opinion	is	proved	wrong	also	by	what	
has	been	stated	in	SGS	Société	Générale	de	Surveillance	S.A.	v.	Republic	of	the	Philippines,	ICSID	Case	n.	
ARB/02/6,	Decision	of	the	Tribunal	on	Objections	to	Jurisdiction,	29	January	2004,	para.	144-148.	
26	Crivellaro	(2005)	(n.	25),	389.	
27	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	98.	
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are	 contained.	 If	 waiver	 clauses	 are	 contained	 in	 an	 investment	 contract	 or	 in	 a	
national	 law,	 usually	 they	 consist	 in	 an	 advanced	 waiver	 of	 all	 the	 mechanisms	 of	
dispute	 settlement	not	 contained	 in	 the	 contract	or	 law	which	 sets	 forth	 the	waiver	
clause	 (i.e.	 such	 clauses	 usually	 consist	 in	 an	 advanced	 waiver	 to	 investment	
arbitration).	 On	 the	 contrary,	 when	 waiver	 clauses	 are	 contained	 in	 a	 treaty,	 they	
“prevent	 an	 investor	 from	 submitting	 the	 dispute	 to	 any	 other	 forum	 once	 he	 has	
opted	for	arbitration	under	the	treaty”.28	
With	 regard	 to	waiver	 clauses	 contained	 in	 contracts	 and/or	 national	 laws,	 it	
should	be	noted	that	there	is	still	much	debate	regarding	their	validity,	due	to	the	fact	
that	several	authorities	do	not	consider	possible	for	an	investor	to	waive	in	a	contract	
the	right	to	commence	investment	provided	in	a	BIT.29	Furthermore,	considering	that	
such	 clauses	 are	 usually	 aimed	 at	 focalizing	 the	 investment	 dispute	 before	 national	
courts,	 they	 do	 not	 usually	 involve	 parallel	 proceedings	 between	 investment	
arbitration	tribunals	and	are	therefore	out	of	the	scope	of	the	present	book.30	For	the	
sake	 of	 completeness,	 anyway,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 such	 clauses	 –	 if	 they	 are	
considered	 valid	 –	 set	 forth	 a	 hierarchy	 between	 contract	 claims	 (or	 claims	 arising	
from	 the	 provisions	 of	 a	 national	 law)	 and	 treaty	 claims	 and	 operate	 only	 if	 the	
requirements	 of	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 are	met.	 This	means	 that	 also	 these	 clauses	
have	 a	 very	 limited	 applicability	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 parallel	 proceedings.	 It	 will	 be	
sufficient	 for	an	 investor	 to	modify	 its	corporate	structure	 in	order	 to	 formally	claim	
damages	 through	 another	 entity	 of	 its	 corporate	 chain,	 taking	 benefit	 of	 the	
provisions	 of	 another	 BIT	 and	 therefore	 bypassing	 the	 limits	 of	 the	 waiver	 clause.	
Furthermore,	 these	 clauses	 cannot	 in	 any	way	 preclude	multiple	 claims	 by	majority	
and	minority	shareholders.	
Concerning	 the	 waiver	 clauses	 contained	 in	 investment	 treaties,31	which	 are	
more	 interesting	 for	 the	 sake	 of	 the	 present	 work,	 it	 is	 worth	 mentioning	 the	
provisions	 of	 Article	 1121	 of	 the	NAFTA,	Article	 II.20(2)	 of	 the	 TPP,	Article	 26(2)	 of	
2012	US	Model	BIT	and	Article	26(1)(e)	of	2004	Canada	Model	BIT,	all	providing	that	a	
claim	 under	 the	 dispute	 settlement	 mechanisms	 provided	 in	 such	 treaties	 may	 be	
commenced	 only	 if	 the	 investor	 expressly	 “waives	 any	 right	 to	 initiate	 or	 continue	
before	 any	 administrative	 tribunal	 or	 court	 under	 the	 law	 of	 any	 Party,	 or	 other	
																																																													
28	Id.,	98-99.	
29	See	SGS	 v.	 Philippines,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 para.	 154,	where	 it	 is	 stated	 that	 “it	 is,	 to	 say	 the	
least,	doubtful	 that	a	private	party	can	by	contract	waive	 rights	or	dispense	with	 the	performance	of	
obligations	 imposed	 on	 the	 States	 parties	 to	 those	 treaties	 under	 international	 law.	 (…)	 Thus	 the	
question	 is	not	whether	 the	Tribunal	has	 jurisdiction:	unless	otherwise	provided,	 treaty	 jurisdiction	 is	
not	abrogated	by	contract”.	An	opposite	approach	has	been	taken	by	the	Tribunal	in	Aguas	del	Tunari	
SA	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Bolivia,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/3,	 Decision	 on	 the	 Respondent’s	 Objection	 to	
Jurisdiction,	21	October	2005.	In	this	regard	see	Blyschak,	works.bepress.com	(2008),	49	and	ss.	
30	We	 shall	 therefore	 refer	 to	 the	 work	 of	 other	 Authors.	 See	 Romanetti,	 Stockholm	 International	
Arbitration	 Review	 (2009),	 75	 and	 ss.,	 Spiermann,	 Arbitration	 International	 (2004),	 179	 and	 ss.,	
Hoffmann,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2007)	69	and	ss.	See	also	Strong,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2014),	1	and	ss.,	who	
analyses	the	proposed	provision	of	a	waiver	clause	in	a	Colombian	national	law	which	generated	several	
disappointments	in	the	international	community	and	was	therefore	deleted.	
31	See	McLachlan,	Shore,	Weininger,	International	Investment	Arbitration	(2007),	107	and	ss.	
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dispute	 settlement	procedures,	 any	proceedings	with	 respect	 to	 the	measure	 of	 the	
disputing	Party”.32	Wehland	argues	that,	in	light	of	the	reference	to	the	same	State’s	
“measure”	(and	not	to	the	same	dispute,	as	in	the	case	of	fork-in-the-road	provisions),	
waiver	clauses	have	“the	advantage	of	obviating	the	need	to	determine	whether	the	
dispute	 in	 a	 subsequent	 action	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 one	 brought	 before	 the	 treaty	
forum”.33	Furthermore,	he	argues	that	waiver	clauses	have	the	advantage	to	refer	to	
any	future	request	for	relief	and	to	“go	beyond	the	‘same	parties’	criterion	in	that	they	
typically	also	require	the	waiver	of	claims	by	enterprises	owned	or	controlled	by	the	
investor	relying	on	the	treaty	mechanism”.34		
With	 regard	 to	 the	 alleged	 lack	 of	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 same	 dispute,	 it	
should	 be	 noted	 that	 there	 is	 no	 agreement	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 shall	 not	 be	met	 in	
presence	of	waiver	clauses.	Indeed,	Cremades	and	Madalena	state	that	“application	of	
the	waiver	 usually	 requires	 identity	 between	 the	different	 claims”.35	In	 this	 regard	 it	
should	be	noted	that,	 in	 lack	of	previous	case	law	on	the	matter,	 it	 is	not	possible	to	
say	that	the	mere	reference	to	the	same	State’s	measures	(which	is,	anyway,	a	good	
point	in	favour	of	a	broad	reading	of	waiver	clauses)	will	be	considered	as	a	sufficient	
argument	 by	 future	 Tribunals.	 If	 Wehland’s	 opinion	 should	 be	 considered	 correct,	
waiver	 clauses	 contained	 in	 a	 treaty	 could	 be	 considered	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 prevent	
multiple	contract	and	treaty	claims	by	the	same	investor.		
The	 lack	 of	 the	 same	 parties	 requirement	 is	 argued	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
provisions	of	Article	1121	Nafta	and	26(2)(b)(ii)	of	the	2012	US	Model	BIT	which	refer	
to	 “the	 investor,	 and	 where	 the	 claim	 is	 for	 loss	 or	 damage	 to	 an	 interest	 in	 an	
enterprise	of	another	Party	that	is	a	juridical	person	that	the	investor	owns	or	controls	
directly	or	indirectly”.	In	this	regard	it	should	be	considered	that	a	similar	provision	is	
not	contained	 in	other	treaties	 (and	 in	particular	 in	the	new	TPP,	which	has	de	facto	
replaced	the	NAFTA)	and	this	undermine	the	applicability	of	the	rule	on	a	large	scale.	
Moreover	it	is	arguable	that	it	could	be	easy	for	an	investor	in	bad	faith	to	bypass	the	
obstacle	 generated	 by	 the	 waiver	 clause:	 again,	 by	 simply	 amending	 its	 corporate	
structure	he	will	gain	 the	benefits	of	one	or	more	others	BITs	 in	order	 to	start	more	
claims	in	relation	to	the	same	dispute	or	measure	(a	simple	reference	Aguas	del	Tunari	
case	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 1	 is	 sufficient	 to	 describe	 this	 scenario).	 Furthermore,	
investor’s	 shareholders	 (majority	 or	minority)	 are	 completely	 entitled	 to	 commence	
separate	arbitration	proceedings	in	relation	to	the	same	measure.	As	a	consequence,	
unless	a	waiver	clause	such	as	the	one	set	forth	 in	Article	1121	NAFTA	is	provided	in	
almost	all	BITs,	such	clauses	cannot	be	considered	as	a	general	remedy	to	the	problem	
of	 parallel	 proceedings	 (in	 particular	 in	 cases	 of	 claims	 by	 companies	 of	 the	 same	
																																																													
32	For	 an	 application	 of	 such	 clauses	 see	Waste	 Management	 Inc.	 v.	 United	 Mexican	 States	 (Waste	
Management	I),	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/98/2,	Award,	2	June	2000.	
33	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	99.	
34	Ibid.	
35	Cremades,	Madalena,	Arbitration	International	(2004),	531.	
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group	and	in	cases	of	multiple	claims	by	majority	and	minority	shareholders)	and	are	
not	helpful	for	the	sake	of	the	present	book.36	
	
2.1.2		 Introduction	 to	 multiparty	 and	 multicontract	 situations	 in	 international	
commercial	arbitration	and	possible	applications	in	investment	arbitration	
	
International	 commercial	 arbitration	 scholars	 usually	 distinguish	 between	
multiparty	 and	 multicontract	 arbitration.37	We	 refer	 to	 multiparty	 arbitration	 when	
there	 are	 more	 than	 two	 parties	 involved	 in	 the	 proceedings,	 opposite	 to	 the	
traditional	 bi-party	 arbitration	 where	 there	 are	 only	 two	 parties.	 The	 phrase	
multicontract	arbitration,	on	 the	other	hand,	 is	 referred	 to	 those	situations	 in	which	
the	 sources	of	 obligations	 are	more	 than	one,	 irrespective	of	 the	number	of	 parties	
(and	 substantial	 interests)	 involved	 in	 the	 proceedings;	 hence,	 multicontract	
arbitrations	may	be	both	bi-party	and	multiparty.	
Furthermore,	 in	 case	 of	 multiparty	 arbitrations	 we	 can	 distinguish	 between	
cases	 in	which	there	are	more	than	two	substantive	 interests	represented	within	the	
proceedings,	that	we	will	call	multi-polar	arbitrations,	opposite	to	the	cases	in	which	–	
even	in	presence	of	more	than	two	parties	–	there	are	only	two	substantive	interests	
involved	in	the	proceedings,	which	can	be	classified	as	bi-polar	arbitrations.38	
In	light	of	the	above	we	can	distinguish	the	following	three	situations:	
a) a	multiparty	 arbitration	 in	which	only	 two	 substantive	 interests	 are	
represented	(bi-polar,	multiparty	arbitration);	
b) a	multiparty	arbitration	in	which	more	than	two	substantive	interests	
are	represented	(multi-polar,	multiparty	arbitration);	
c) a	 bi-party	 arbitration	 in	 which	 there	 are	 more	 than	 one	 source	 of	
obligations	 between	 the	 same	 parties	 (bi-polar,	 multicontract	
arbitration).	
The	three	situations	described	above	may	be	related	to	the	sources	of	parallel	
proceedings	pinpointed	in	Chapter	1:	
1) the	case	of	a	chain	of	companies	of	the	same	group	(paragraph	1.1.3)	
starting	several	proceedings	against	the	same	State	(under	different	
BITs)	may	be	equalized	to	a	bi-polar,	multiparty	arbitration.	 Indeed,	
the	various	companies	of	the	same	group	represent	the	same	interest	
against	the	host	State;	
																																																													
36	Even	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	99	at	footnote	356	admit	what	has	been	stated	in	the	text,	saying	that	“it	
should	be	noted	 that	 this	 inclusion	of	 certain	 related	parties	 represents	only	a	partial	 solution	 to	 the	
problems	associated	with	multiple	potential	 claimants.	 (..)	 In	particular,	a	waiver	provision	would	not	
appear	 to	 prevent	 an	 investor’s	 controlling	 shareholder	 from	 subsequently	 initiating	 another	 set	 of	
proceedings”.	
37 	See	 Mantilla	 Serrano,	 Multiparty	 Arbitration	 (2010),	 11	 and	 ss.,	 Hanotiau,	 Multiple	 Party	 in	
International	 Arbitration	 (2009),	 35	 and	 ss.,	 Polinari,	 Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2006),	 537	 and	 ss.	 For	 a	
complete	analysis	of	these	 issues	see	Hanotiau,	Complex	Arbitrations:	Multiparty,	Multicontract,	Multi-
Issue	and	Class	Actions	(2006),	1	and	ss.	
38	For	an	embryonic	analysis	of	such	situations	see	Laitinen	(2013),	10	and	ss.	
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2) the	 case	 of	majority	 and	minority	 shareholders	 (paragraph	 1.1.2)	 of	
the	same	investor	starting	several	claims	against	the	host	state	may	
be	equalized	to	a	multi-polar,	multiparty	arbitration.	In	fact,	even	if	in	
principle	majority	 and	minority	 shareholders	 claim	 damages	 arising	
from	 the	 same	 State	 measure,	 they	 still	 could	 represent	 different	
substantial	interests;	
3) the	 case	 of	 contract	 and	 treaty	 claims	 between	 the	 same	 parties	
(paragraph	 1.1.1)	 may	 be	 equalized	 to	 a	 bi-polar,	 multicontract	
arbitration,	 in	 which	 there	 are	 two	 parties	 starting	 more	 claims	
(arising	from	the	same	State	measure)	under	different	legal	sources.	
Given	 the	above	classification,	we	will	now	try	 to	analyse	 the	mechanisms	of	
joinder,	 consolidation	 and	 quasi	 consolidation,	 mainly	 developed	 in	 the	 field	 of	
international	 commercial	 arbitration,	 and	 their	 suitability,	 in	 investment	 arbitration,	
to	limit	the	effects	of	parallel	proceedings	in	the	various	scenarios	described	above.		
The	main	issues	that	we	will	face	in	the	discussion	are	related,	in	particular:	(i)	
to	the	consensual	nature	of	these	remedies;	(ii)	to	the	regulation	(if	any)	of	the	above	
mechanisms	 in	arbitration	rules	and	 laws;	and	(iii)	 to	the	fact	that	–	 in	many	cases	–	
these	mechanisms	are	scarcely	compatible	with	the	strict	requirements	of	nationality	
involved	in	investment	arbitration	(i.e.	an	arbitration	against	a	State	under	a	BIT	can	
be	 start	 only	 by	 a	 national	 of	 the	 other	 contracting	 State	 of	 the	 same	 BIT),	 which	
preclude	 in	 principle	 the	 recourse	 to	 arbitration	 by	 persons	 which	 do	 not	 have	 the	
required	nationality.	
The	 discussion	 will	 always	 be	 conducted	 keeping	 into	 consideration	 the	
(already	 analysed)	 several	 policy	 considerations	 against	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	
investment	 arbitration39 	which	 run	 against	 the	 formalities	 related	 to	 consent	 in	
multiparty/multicontract	mechanisms	in	international	commercial	arbitration	and	call	
for	a	more	 flexible	 (and	 justice	oriented)	approach,	based	on	 the	necessity	 to	adapt	
procedural	aspects	to	substantial	reality.40	
	
2.1.2.1	 	Joinder	 (and	 intervention):	 Looking	 for	 an	 implied	 consent?	 The	
methodologies	applied	in	international	commercial	arbitration	and	
their	fallacy	if	applied	in	investment	arbitration	
	
	According	to	Natalie	Voser	“a	request	for	 joinder	exists	when	the	respondent	
wants	 to	 file	 a	 counterclaim	 either	 against	 the	 claimant	 and	 a	 third	 party,	 or	 solely	
																																																													
39	Namely	 good	 administration	 of	 justice,	 procedural	 efficiency	 (save	 time	 and	 costs)	 and,	 mainly,	
avoiding	duplication	of	proceedings	and	contradictory	awards.	See	also	Leboulanger	(1996)	(n.	7),	53-
54.	
40	See	Platte,	Arbitration	International	(2002),	69,	stating	that	an	‘economic	reality’	analysis	should	be	
applied.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 Hanotiau,	 International	 Arbitration	 2006:	 Back	 to	 Basics	 (2007),	 357,	 has	
stated	 that	 “the	 issue	 of	 ‘extension’	 of	 the	 arbitration	 clause	 to	 non-signatories	 would	 be	 easier	 to	
decide	if	it	were	approached	by	courts	and	commentators	in	a	more	rigorous	way”.	
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against	 the	 third	 party”.41	The	 third	 party,	 which	 can	 be	 or	 not	 a	 signatory	 to	 the	
arbitration	 agreement, 42 	is	 therefore	 dragged	 into	 an	 arbitration	 which	 initially	
involved	two	other	parties.		
In	case	of	intervention,	on	the	contrary,	it	is	the	third	party	–	whether	signatory	
or	not43	–	that	asks	to	be	involved	in	the	proceedings	in	order	to	bring	its	own	claim	or	
to	support	the	claim	of	one	of	the	parties.44	In	this	regard	it	shall	be	pointed	out	that,	
in	cases	of	parallel	proceedings	in	international	arbitration	arising	from	the	situations	
outlined	in	Chapter	1	above,	it	is	very	unlikely	that	one	of	the	several	claimants	will	ask	
to	the	tribunal	to	intervene	in	the	proceedings	due	to	the	fact	that	such	claimants	are	
usually	willing	to	keep	the	advantages	of	several	separate	proceedings	which	increase	
their	possibility	to	be	successful	in	the	dispute.	
As	the	same	Voser	points	out,	“sometimes	the	wording	used	in	the	context	of	
joinder	is	not	‘third	party’	but	third	person.	On	the	one	hand,	in	a	technical	sense,	this	
wording	 is	more	correct,	since	the	third	person	to	be	 joined	 is	not	yet	a	party	to	the	
arbitral	proceedings.	On	the	other	hand,	if	a	third	person	has	implicitly	consented	to	
the	 arbitration	 agreement,	 it	 should	 automatically	 be	 a	 party	 to	 the	 arbitration	
proceedings”.45	Accordingly,	 we	 will	 therefore	 refer	 to	 third	 persons	 to	 be	 joined	 in	
arbitration	proceedings	in	order	to	become	a	party	of	the	same	proceedings.46	
When	evaluating	 if	 a	 joinder	 is	 appropriate	 in	 a	 certain	 case,	we	 shall	 always	
keep	into	consideration	the	due	process	(and,	more	generally,	policy)	concerns	related	
to	such	mechanism.	In	particular,	first	of	all,	when	operating	a	joinder,	arbitrators	shall	
ensure	 that	 every	 party	 is	 granted	 the	 full	 opportunity	 to	 present	 its	 case.47	This	
analysis	 can	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 on	 a	 case	 by	 case	 basis.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 usually	
emphasized	that	–	in	international	commercial	arbitration	–	in	case	of	joinder	after	the	
proceedings	 have	 been	 commenced,	 the	 joined	 party	 loses	 its	 right	 to	 appoint	 its	
arbitrator.48	Moreover,	 it	 could	be	argued	 that	 the	confidentiality	of	proceedings	 (at	
																																																													
41	Voser,	50	Years	of	the	New	York	Convention	(2009),	346.	
42	It	 is	 obviously	 easier,	 for	 the	 reasons	 that	 will	 be	 set	 out	 below,	 to	 operate	 a	 joinder	 in	 case	 the	
persons	are	all	signatories	of	the	arbitration	agreement.	With	this	regard	see	art.	816	quater	of	 Italian	
Code	of	Civil	Procedure.	See	Gradi,	Commentario	al	Codice	di	procedura	civile	(2014),	366	and	ss.		
43	Also	in	this	case	there	should	not	be	problems	for	intervention	of	signatory	parties.	For	a	comment	to	
a	contrary	arbitral	decision	see	Gradi,	Giustizia	Civile	(2012),	2863	and	ss.,	in	which	it	is	described	a	case	
where	arbitrators	required	a	second	consent	by	the	parties	of	an	already	initiated	arbitration	in	order	to	
allow	the	intervention	of	a	third	party	signatory.	
44	The	possibility	of	intervention	in	commercial	arbitration	has	been	strongly	criticized	by	Bove,	Rivista	
dell’arbitrato	(1995),	791.	
45	Ibid.	
46	Park	(2009)	(n.	2)	has	talked	about	“less	than	obvious	parties”.	Problems	related	to	third	parties	can	
arise	also	in	case	of	assignment	(out	of	the	scope	of	the	present	book);	for	these	cases	refer	to	Jagush,	
Sinclair,	Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006),	291	and	ss.	
47	See	Strong	(1998)	(n.	4),	982-	984.	
48	See	Ten	Cate,	The	American	Review	of	International	Arbitration	(2004),	143	and	ss.,	stating	that	this	
situation	should	not	be	dramatized.	See	also	Platte,	(2002),	(n.	40),	80,	Leboulanger,	(1996)	(n.	7),	66,	
McIlwrath,	 Moolan,	 Joinder	 –	 Current	 Practice	 in	 International	 Arbitration,	
www.transnationaldisputemanagement.com	 (2005),	 5,	 Nicklisch,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	
(1994),	61	and	ss.,	Schwartz,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(1993),	5	and	ss.,	Voser	(2009)	(n.	41),	
350,	Devolvé,	 Arbitration	 International	 (1993)	 197	 and	 ss.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Authors	 usually	 refer	 to	 the	
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least	 partially)	 will	 be	 lost.49	In	 this	 regard	 it	 should	 be	 first	 of	 all	 noted	 that,	 in	
investment	arbitration,	confidentiality	concerns	have	a	limited	role	to	play	due	to	the	
public	nature	of	this	kind	of	disputes.50	Concerning	the	right	of	every	involved	party	to	
nominate	 its	 arbitrators,	 it	 has	 been	 argued	 that	 “the	 significance	 of	 party	
appointment	may	be	psychological”,51	and	that,	in	any	case,	arbitrators	have	a	duty	of	
impartiality	 which	 should	 not	 prejudice	 the	 joined	 party.	 However,	 as	 investment	
arbitration	 is	 today	 conceived,	 it	might	 be	 difficult	 to	 deprive	 a	 party	 of	 its	 right	 to	
appoint	its	arbitrator	(or	at	least	participate	in	the	appointment	of	the	sole	arbitrator).	
Keeping	 into	 consideration	 the	 scenarios	 1),	 2)	 and	 3)	 outlined	 in	 paragraph	
2.1.2	above,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	 joinder	could	be	useful	 in	scenario	1),	due	to	 the	
fact	 that	 only	 in	 case	 of	 a	 bi-polar	 and	multiparty	 situation	 (i.e.	 in	 which	 there	 are	
more	than	two	parties	but	the	represented	interests	are	only	two),	such	as	the	one	of	
several	claims	started	by	various	entities	of	the	same	group,	it	will	be	possible	to	join	
the	multiple	claimants	 in	the	same	proceedings.	 In	this	case,	 indeed,	due	to	the	fact	
that	 the	 several	 joined	 claimants	 represent	 the	 same	 centre	 of	 interest,	 it	 is	 not	
arguable	 that	 such	 “centre	 of	 interest”	 did	 not	 have	 the	 possibility	 to	 appoint	 its	
arbitrator.	 All	 the	 companies	 of	 the	 same	 group	will	 have	 the	 right	 to	 appoint	 one	
arbitrator	and	their	right	of	appointment	will	not	be	violated	due	to	the	fact	that	these	
companies	 are	 substantially	 representing	 only	 one	 party.	 Indeed,	 as	 stated	 by	
Leboulanger,	“there	is	no	major	incompatibility	between	the	rule	of	joinder	and	multi-
contract	 situations	 between	 two	 parties”;52	the	 same	 conclusion	 could	 be	 drawn	 in	
several	claims	arising	not	only	by	contracts	but	also	by	international	treaties.	
On	the	contrary,	if	one	argues	that	each	of	the	parties	should	always	have	the	
right	 to	 appoint	 its	 arbitrator,	 the	 possibility	 of	 joinder	 does	 not	 seem	 possible	 in	
scenario	2).	
In	 scenario	 3),	 in	 consideration	of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	parties	 are	 only	 two,	 it	 is	
useless	to	speak	about	joinder,	because	in	order	to	avoid	parallel	proceedings	it	will	be	
necessary	to	consolidate	the	two	separate	claims.	
Given	the	above,	it	 is	first	of	all	worth	analysing	the	various	institutional	rules	
and	national	 laws	regarding	 joinder	 in	 international	commercial	arbitration	and	their	
suitability	 to	 regulate	 the	 matter	 also	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	 As	 a	 preliminary	
remark,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 the	 ICSID	Convention	 does	 not	 provide	 any	 form	of	
joinder/intervention	 of	 third	 parties	 and	 ICSID	 Rules	 are	 limited	 to	 accepting	 amici	
curiae’s	submissions	(which	cannot	be	compared	either	to	joinder	or	to	intervention	of	
third	parties).		
																																																																																																																																																																																		
decision	of	the	French	Cour	de	Cassation	1e	Civ.	In	BKMI	v.	Dutco,	7	January	1992,	1992	Bull.	Civ.,	No.	2.,	
where	the	Cour	de	Cassation	stated	that	the	right	of	every	party	to	appoint	its	arbitrator	is	a	matter	of	
public	policy	and	can	only	be	waived	by	any	party	after	the	dispute	has	arisen.	In	this	regard	it	should	be	
noted	 that	 the	 various	 parties	 in	 the	Dutco	 case	 represented	 more	 centres	 of	 interests	 and	 so	 the	
dispute	could	be	classified	as	multi-polar,	multiparty.	
49	Voser	(2009)	(n.	41),	350-351,	NIcklisch	(1994)	(n.	48),	68,	Platte	(2002)	(n.	40),	75.	
50	For	a	different	conclusion,	see	the	Cord	Syrup	cases	mentioned	in	Paragraph	2.1.2.2	below.		
51	Chiu,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(1990),	58.	
52	Leboulanger	(1996)	(n.	7),	68.	
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Moving	 to	 a	 reading	 of	 commercial	 arbitration	 rules	 it	 emerges	 immediately	
that	either	such	rules	are	still	strongly	anchored	to	the	requirement	of	consent	or,	as	
demonstrated	by	the	case	law,	tribunals	have	anyway	avoided	to	join	third	persons	in	
cases	where	one	of	the	parties	did	not	agree	with	the	joinder.53	In	this	regard	it	should	
be	 highlighted	 that	 only	 recently	 the	majority	 of	 institutional	 rules	 have	 started	 to	
provide	a	specific	rule	on	joinder.	Some	of	these	rules	provide	for	joinder	only	if	also	
the	party	to	be	 joined	has	signed	the	arbitration	agreement,	giving	the	discretion	to	
arbitrators	to	join	such	signatory	party.54	In	other	cases	it	is	only	requested	a	consent	
to	joinder	by	the	requesting	party	and	the	third	person,	but	not	by	the	non	requesting	
party.55	In	 these	 last	 cases,	 even	 if	 the	 rules	 are	 silent	 on	 the	 necessity	 of	 original	
consent	to	the	arbitration	agreement	of	all	 the	parties,	 it	 is	 reasonable	to	think	that	
the	tribunal	will	never	operate	a	joinder	without	the	consent	of	all	the	involved	parties,	
due	to	the	fact	that	it	will	otherwise	incur	in	the	risk	of	refusal	of	enforcement	of	the	
award.56	Finally,	there	 is	the	broadest	provision:	Article	4(2)	of	the	2004	Swiss	Rules.	
Such	 rule	 states	 that:	 “Where	 one	 or	 more	 third	 persons	 request	 to	 participate	 in	
arbitral	 proceedings	 already	 pending	 under	 these	Rules	 or	where	 a	 party	 to	 arbitral	
proceedings	 under	 these	 Rules	 intends	 to	 cause	 one	 or	 more	 third	 persons	 to	
participate	 in	 the	arbitration,	 the	arbitral	 tribunal	shall	decide	on	such	request,	after	
consulting	with	all	 parties,	 including	 the	person	or	persons	 to	be	 joined,	 taking	 into	
account	all	 relevant	 circumstances”	 (emphasis	 added).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 reference	 to	
third	persons	(instead	of	third	parties)	has	been	interpreted	by	some	Authors	as	giving	
freedom	 to	 the	 tribunal	 to	 join	 third	persons	 that	 have	never	 signed	 the	 arbitration	
agreement.57	Also	in	this	last	case,	however,	there	is	the	risk	that	an	arbitration	award	
arising	 from	 proceedings	 in	 which	 one	 or	 more	 persons	 have	 been	 joined	 without	
consent	of	all	parties	involved	is	not	enforced	and	therefore	arbitrators	could	anyway	
keep	into	account	the	position	of	all	the	parties	involved	in	the	proceedings.	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above	 it	 can	be	 said	 that	 it	 is	 a	 fact	 that	 consent	 is	 today	 still	
essential	to	join	third	parties	in	international	commercial	arbitration.	Several	Authors,	
who	understandably	assert	that	consent	is	still	the	cornerstone	and	the	grundnorm	of	
																																																													
53	For	a	general	analysis	of	such	rules,	see	Gomez	Carriòn,	Arbitration	International	(2015)	479	and	ss.,	
Pitkowitz,	Austrian	Yearbook	on	International	Arbitration	(2015),	301	and	ss.	
54	See	Article	17.5	of	UNCITRAL	Rules	and	Article	7(1)	of	2012	ICC	Rules,	Art.	14	of	2013	Vienna	Rules,	
Art.	27	of	2013	HKIAC	Rules.	S.	35	of	the	English	Arbitration	Act	1996	(regarding	consolidation)	seems	
to	have	adopted	a	similar	approach.		
55	See	Article	22.1(viii)	of	the	2014	LCIA	Rules,	which	anyway	still	 request	arbitrators	to	give	to	all	the	
parties	the	reasonable	opportunity	to	state	their	view,	Art.	24(b)	SIAC	Rules,	Art.	19.2	of	 the	Spanish	
Rules.	The	provision	of	Article	22.1(viii)	of	the	LCIA	Rules	has	generated	a	lot	of	debate.	See,	inter	alia,	
Voser	(2009)	(n.	41),	398,	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	104	and	ss.,	Gomez	Carriòn	(2015)	(n.	53),	486-488.	
On	LCIA	Rules	see	Winstanley,	Multiple	Party	Action	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	213	and	ss.	
56	See	Mayer,	Multiparty	Arbitration	(2010),	223	and	ss.	
57	See	 Brekoulakis	 (2010)	 (n.	 1),	 Conejero	 Roos,	 50	 Years	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 (2009),	 423,	
Gomez	 Carriòn	 (2015)	 (n.	 53),	 497.	 For	 a	 contrary	 opinion	 see	 Voser	 (2009)	 (n.	 41),	 394-396.	 Some	
National	Laws	seem	to	take	an	approach	similar	to	the	one	of	the	Swiss	Rules,	such	as	Art.	24	of	the	
Australian	Arbitration	Act,	Art.	1045	of	the	Netherlands	Code	of	Civil	Proceedings	and	Art,	1696	bis	of	
Belgian	Judicial	Code.	
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international	 arbitration,	 have	 shared	 this	 view.58	In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 it	 is	 self-
evident	 that,	 with	 regard	 to	 investment	 arbitration,	 where	 in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	
cases	 (i.e.,	 in	 all	 BIT	 claims)	 there	 is	 no	 consent	 at	 all	 until	 the	 proceedings	 are	
commenced,	there	is	no	possibility	to	consider	joinder	as	a	valuable	tool	to	solve	the	
issues	generated	by	parallel	proceedings.	This	should	be	added	to	the	circumstances	
that,	as	already	stated:	(i)	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	are	generated	
by	 a	 choice	 of	 the	 claimant(s)	 to	multiply	 the	 fora	 before	 which	 a	 same	 dispute	 is	
presented;	and	(ii)	BITs	contain	very	strict	nationality	requirements,	which	preclude	to	
parties	of	all	nationalities	to	be	joined	to	an	already	pending	BIT	arbitration	in	lack	of	
an	explicit	agreement	of	all	the	parties	involved	(in	this	last	case,	after	the	consent	is	
given,	the	basis	for	 jurisdiction	of	the	arbitral	tribunal	 is	not	BIT	but	the	new	parties’	
agreement).	
Anyway,	it	should	be	taken	into	account	also	that,	in	order	to	extend59	arbitral	
jurisdiction	to	third	persons	in	lack	of	an	express	consent,	Authors	have	tried	to	look	at	
certain	situations	which	could	be	considered	as	subrogates	of	consent,	i.e.	to:	(i)	forms	
of	implicit	consent,	(ii)	factual	situations	in	which	consent	cannot	be	considered	as	not	
existent,	and	(iii)	behaviours	that	can	be	interpreted	as	substitutes	for	consent.		
Among	the	techniques	used	to	look	for	a	non-expressed	consent	to	arbitration	
we	can	mainly	identify:	(i)	the	group	of	companies	doctrine;	(ii)	the	theories	based	on	
contract	 law;	 and	 (iii)	 a	 theory	 based	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 “dispute”.	 It	 will	 be	
demonstrated	 that	 all	 these	 theories	 present	 several	 problems	 that	 impede	 us	 to	
accept	 them	 as	 a	 feasible	 solution	 to	 allow	 joinder	 and	 therefore	 to	 avoid	 parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	In	fact	these	theories	are	only	aimed	at	finding	
a	 substitute	 for	 consent	 in	 a	 single	 arbitration	without	 effectively	 offering	 a	 tool	 to	
prevent	 the	 multiplication	 of	 proceedings.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 highly	 probable	 that,	 in	 a	
situation	of	parallel	proceedings	started	with	the	aim	of	multiplying	the	fora	that	can	
hear	a	dispute	(such	as	the	one	we	are	analysing),	consent	of	all	the	involved	parties	to	
a	single	 forum	does	not	actually	exist.	Supporting	these	theories	to	allow	a	 joinder	 in	
investment	 arbitration,	 therefore,	would	mean	 falling	 into	 a	 loop:	 it	would	mean	 to	
extend	jurisdiction	to	a	non	signatory	person	on	the	basis	of	a	consent	that	does	not	
exist,	while	jurisdiction	in	arbitration	is	by	nature	based	on	consent.	Indeed	the	truth	is	
that	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 cannot	 be	 found	 at	 the	
jurisdictional	stage	without	avoiding	falling	into	a	research	for	consent.	Furthermore,	
																																																													
58	Townsend,	 International	 Arbitration	 2006:	 Back	 to	 Basics?	 (2007),	 359	 and	 ss.,	 Barin,	 International	
Arbitration	2006:	Back	to	Basics?	(2007),	375	and	ss.,	Voser	(2009)	(n.	41),	347,	Mantilla	Serrano	(2010)	
(n.	37),	24,	Bond,	Multiparty	Arbitration	(2010),	35	and	ss.,	Cox,	Multiparty	Arbitration	(2010),	49,	Bove	
(1995)	(n.	44),	786	and	ss.,	Voser,	Meier,	Austrian	Yearbook	on	International	Arbitration	(2008),	115	and	
ss.,	 Swoboda,	 Journal	 of	 Dispute	 Resolution	 (2011),	 465	 and	 ss.,	 Polinari	 (2006)	 (n.	 37),	 537,	 Byrnes,	
Pollman,	 Harvard	 Negotiation	 Law	 Review	 (2003),	 289	 and	 ss.,	 Lamm,	 Aqua,	 George	 Washington	
International	Law	Review	(2003),	714	and	ss.	
59	The	word	“extension”	has	been	criticized	by	Hanotiau	(2006)	(n.	37),	4	and	ss.,	who	stated	that	it	“is	
misleading,	and,	moreover,	is	probably	wrong	to	a	large	extent	since,	in	most	cases,	courts	and	arbitral	
tribunals	still	base	their	determination	of	the	issue	on	the	existence	of	a	common	intent	of	the	parties	
and,	therefore,	on	consent”.	
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the	 lack	 of	 a	 real	 consent	 by	 the	 party	 to	 be	 joined	 would	 also	 mean	 that	 the	
nationality	 requirement	of	BITs	 is	 not	 satisfied	 and	 therefore	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 legal	
obstacle	to	join	a	person	that	does	not	have	the	nationality	of	one	of	the	two	States	
which	signed	a	BIT	in	proceedings	started	under	such	BIT.	
According	to	the	group	of	companies	doctrine	“arbitration	agreements	may	be	
extended	 to	other	affiliate	 company	of	a	 contractual	party	provided	 that	 such	 ‘non-
signatory’	was	 somehow	 involved	 in	 the	 conclusion,	 performance	 or	 termination	 of	
the	contract	in	dispute”.60	The	doctrine	has	been	applied	in	the	very	well	known	case	
Dow	Chemical	v.	Isover	Saint	Gobain,61	in	which	the	arbitral	tribunal	“considered	it	was	
not	bound	to	apply	any	national	law,	but	free	to	apply	instead	what	is	considered	to	be	
international	trade	usages	relating	to	group	of	companies”.62	The	tribunal	stated	that	
previous	 ICC	 decisions	 “progressively	 create	 case	 law	 which	 should	 be	 taken	 into	
account,	 because	 it	 draws	 conclusions	 from	 economic	 reality	 and	 conforms	 to	 the	
needs	of	 international	commerce,	to	which	rules	specific	to	 international	arbitration,	
themselves	 successively	 elaborated,	 should	 respond”.63	Having	 therefore	 found	 that	
all	 the	 claimants	 were	 part	 of	 the	 same	 group	 of	 companies	 and	 that	 they	 had	
participated	 in	 the	 conclusion,	 performance	 and	 termination	 of	 the	 contract	 (such	
involvement	being	known	by	all	the	other	parties),	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	not	
all	these	claimants	were	signatories	to	the	arbitration	agreement,	the	tribunal	stated	
that	“irrespective	of	the	distinct	 juridical	 identity	of	each	of	 its	members,	a	group	of	
companies	 constitutes	 one	 and	 the	 same	 economic	 reality	 (une	 réalité	 économique	
unique)	 of	which	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 should	 take	 account	when	 it	 rules	 on	 its	 own	
jurisdiction” 64 	and	 therefore	 accepted	 jurisdiction	 on	 all	 the	 abovementioned	
claimants.	
Anyway,	 “it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 tribunal	 did	 not	 abandon	 the	
requirement	for	consent,	but	merely	considered	that,	 in	the	particular	circumstances	
of	 the	 case,	 consent	 of	 all	 the	 parties	 was	 implied”:65	“in	 the	 present	 case,	 the	
circumstances	and	the	documents	analysed	(…)	show	that	such	application	conforms	
to	the	mutual	intent	of	the	parties”.66	
																																																													
60	Wilske,	Shore,	Ahrens,	The	American	Review	of	 International	Arbitration	(2006),	74.	With	regard	to	
the	autonomous	standing	and	the	raison	d’étre	of	this	doctrine	see	the	analysis	conducted	by	Ferrario,	
Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2009),	 647	 and	 ss.	 For	 an	 in	 depth	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 law	 and	
scholarship	related	to	the	doctrine	refer	to	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	150	and	ss.	See	also	Park	(2009)	(n.	
2),	22	and	ss.	See	also	Mayer,	Multiple	Party	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	189	and	ss.,	Hanotiau,	
Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006),	279	and	ss.	
61	ICC	Case	No.	 4131,	 23	 September	 1982,	 9	Y.B.	Comm.	Arb.	 131	 (1984).	 The	premises	 are	 perfectly	
described	by	Wilske,	Shore,	Ahrens	(2006)	(n.	60),	75:	“Various	companies	of	the	Dow	Chemical	group	
had	 brought	 arbitration	 proceedings	 against	 Isover	 Saint	 Gobain	 even	 though	 not	 all	 of	 them	 had	
entered	into	the	relevant	distribution	contracts,	which	contained	arbitration	clauses”.	
62	Wilske,	Shore,	Ahrens	(2006)	(n.	60),	75	
63	Dow	Chemical	v.	Isover	Saint	Gobain,	136.	
64	Ibid.		
65	Wilske,	Shore,	Ahrens	(2006)	(n.	60),	76.	Similar	conclusions	have	been	reached	by	Hanotiau,	Journal	
of	International	Arbitration	(2001),	271-272.	
66	Dow	Chemical	v.	Isover	Saint	Gobain,	136-137.	
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While	this	doctrine	has	found	 large	application	 in	France,67	it	“has	never	been	
universally	accepted	and	 it	might	have	experienced	more	criticism	than	sympathy	 in	
the	arbitration	community.	The	doctrine	has	consequently	been	rejected	by	numerous	
arbitral	tribunals.		Arbitral	tribunals	in	any	event	stressed	that	the	existence	of	a	group	
was	 not	 per	 se	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 the	 extension	 of	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 and	
proceeded	to	a	thorough	evaluation	of	the	facts	confirming	or	disproving	the	parties’	
intention	to	be	bound”.68	
In	light	of	the	above,	and	considering	the	already	mentioned	lack	of	consent	to	
joinder	in	cases	of	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	arising	from	several	
claims	 brought	 by	 entities	 of	 the	 same	 group,	 it	 does	 not	 seem	 possible	 to	 make	
recourse	to	the	group	of	companies	doctrine,	due	to	the	circumstance	that	it	does	not	
seem	possible	to	disregard	the	common	intention	of	the	parties	to	arbitrate.69		
Furthermore,	and	most	 importantly,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	the	application	of	
the	group	of	companies	doctrine	could	risk	to	not	satisfy	the	nationality	requirements	
of	 the	 relevant	 BIT	 in	 case	 the	 third	 person	 to	 be	 joined	 in	 the	 arbitration	 (i.e.	 the	
company	of	 the	group	which	did	not	 sign	 the	arbitration	agreement)	does	not	have	
the	same	nationality	of	the	claimant.	
In	the	context	of	international	commercial	arbitration	some	alternatives	to	the	
group	 of	 companies	 doctrine	 have	 been	 developed	 by	 US	 Courts	 and	 scholarship.	
Such	possible	 remedies	 to	 the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	have	been	borrowed	
by	contract	law	and	are	therefore	strictly	related	to	the	existence	of	a	contract.70	The	
reference	 goes	 to	 the	 following	 doctrines:	 (i)	 incorporation	 by	 reference; 71 	(ii)	
assumption; 72 	(iii)	 piercing	 the	 corporate	 veil; 73 	(iv)	 agency; 74 	and	 (v)	 estoppel.	
																																																													
67	Hanotiau	(2006)	(n.	37),	48	and	ss.	
68	Wilske,	Shore,	Ahrens,	(2006)	(n.	60),	77-78;	the	Authors	refer	to	ICC	Case	No.	5721,	Collection	of	ICC	
Arbitral	Awards	 II,	400	(1994);	 ICC	Case	No.	9517,	16(2)	 ICC	Bull.	80	(2005);	 ICC	Case	No.	10818,	16(2)	
ICC	 Bull.	 94	 (2005).	 The	 doctrine	 has	 been	 strongly	 rejected	 by	 Sandrock,	 The	 International	 Lawyer	
(1993),	 941	 and	 ss.	 For	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	development	of	 the	doctrine	 in	Switzerland	 see	Habegger,	
European	Business	Organization	Law	Review	(2002),	517	and	ss.,	and	Zuberbuhler,	ASA	Bulletin	(2008),	
24	and	ss.,	while	 for	 the	analysis	of	 the	English	case	 law	 in	 reference	to	the	doctrine	see	Woolhouse,	
Arbitration	International	(2004),	435	and	ss.	It	is	worth	emphasizing	that	England	has	always	been	the	
strongest	 opposer	 of	 the	 doctrine.	With	 regard	 to	 USA,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 shown	 below	 they	 have	made	
recourse	to	other	tools	to	extend	arbitral	jurisdiction	to	third	persons.	
69	See	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	192-198.	
70	See	Hosking	(2004)	(n.	2),	490	and	ss.,	Hanotiau,	(2001)	(n.	65),	255	and	ss.,	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	
28	and	ss.	
71 	“Incorporation	 by	 reference	 applies	 when	 a	 party	 signs	 an	 agreement	 that	 incorporates,	 or	
references,	a	second	agreement	which	includes	an	arbitration	clause.	Even	if	the	party	did	not	sign	the	
contract	 including	 the	 arbitration	 agreement,	 it	 will	 be	 compelled	 to	 arbitrate	 because	 it	 signed	 the	
contract	referencing	the	contract	requiring	arbitration”.	Courtney,	Richmond	Journal	of	Global	Law	&	
Business	(2009),	586.	
72	“A	non-signatory	may	be	bound	under	the	theory	of	assumption	if	he	manifested	intent	to	arbitrate	
through	his	conduct	and	another	party	relied	on	that	conduct.	The	idea	behind	this	theory	 is	that	the	
non-signatory	 should	 be	 allowed	 to	 express	 intent	 to	 arbitrate	 and	 then	 later	 assert	 that	 an	 arbitral	
award	is	invalid.	The	non	signatory	will	be	considered	to	have	‘impliedly	agreed	to	arbitrate’”.	Courtney	
(2009)	(n.	71),	586.	
73	“Veil	piercing	 is	a	term	well-known	in	corporate	 law.	 It	can	bind	a	non-signatory	to	an	agreement	 if	
the	agreement	was	signed	by	the	parent,	subsidiary,	or	affiliate	of	a	corporation.	Courts	have	justified	
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Considering	 that,	 as	 stated	 above,	 joinder	 can	 be	 a	 useful	 tool	 only	 in	 parallel	
proceedings	arising	from	multiple	claims	by	entities	of	the	same	group	under	different	
BITs,	the	vast	majority	of	such	theories	are	not	useful	to	justify	a	joinder	in	investment	
arbitration,	due	to	the	fact	that	in	case	of	BIT	claims	there	is	no	contract	at	all	(indeed,	
we	talk	about	arbitration	without	privity).	Theories	based	on	contract	law	are	useless	
if	there	is	no	contract!		
The	only	theory	that	can	offer	a	solution	in	the	case	at	hand	is	the	doctrine	of	
arbitral	estoppel.	Few	Authors	have	given	attention	to	the	application	of	this	doctrine	
in	 international	 arbitration. 75 	According	 to	 Prof.	 Brekoulakis	 “[t]he	 doctrine	 of	
equitable	 estoppel	 reflects	 the	 general	 legal	 principle	 of	 ‘non	 venire	 contra	 factum	
proprium’	 (…):	a	party	 is	prevented	from	asserting	rights	against	another	party	when	
the	 latter	 justifiably	relied	on	the	conduct	of	the	former	and	changed	his	position	to	
his	detriment	as	a	result	of	such	reliance.	The	principle,	as	its	name	indicates,	is	based	
on	fair	and	equity	considerations,	which	makes	 it	difficult	to	delineate.	 In	arbitration	
the	 theory	 has	 developed	 a	 specific	meaning	 (…).	 The	 term	arbitral	 estoppel	 better	
reflects	 the	 specific	meaning	 of	 the	 doctrine	 in	 the	 context	 of	 arbitration	 and	 non-
signatory	 parties.	 The	 doctrine	 has	 been	 relied	 upon	 by	 the	 US	 courts	 to	 estop	 a	
signatory	 party	 from	 avoiding	 arbitration	with	 a	 non-signatory,	 but	 also	 to	 estop	 a	
non-signatory	party	from	avoiding	arbitration	with	the	signatory	party”.76	As	pointed	
out	 by	 Brekoulakis,77	two	 versions	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 arbitral	 estoppel	 have	 been	
developed	by	US	Courts:	equitable	arbitral	estoppel	and	intertwined	arbitral	estoppel.	
“The	equitable	version	 is	based	on	 the	suggestion	 that	 if	a	party	attempts	 to	
exercise	rights	under	a	contract,	which	contains	an	arbitration	clause,	then	this	party	
will	be	normally	bound	by	the	arbitration	clause	too.	Here	the	crucial	factor	is	whether	
the	party	seeking	to	avoid	arbitration	has	gained	any	substantial	direct	benefit	 from	
the	 contract	 including	 an	 arbitration	 agreement”. 78 	This	 version	 of	 estoppel	 is	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
piercing	the	corporate	veil	in	situations	to	prevent	fraud	or	other	wrong,	or	where	a	parent	dominates	
and	controls	a	subsidiary.	It	is	a	very	fact	intensive	analysis	and	courts	tend	to	only	apply	this	theory	in	
egregious	circumstances”.	Courtney	(2009)	(n.	71),	587.	
74	Agency	“is	rooted	in	traditional	 laws	of	agency.	Agency	is:	the	relationship	that	exists	between	two	
persons	when	one,	called	the	agent,	is	considered	in	law	to	represent	the	other,	called	principal,	in	such	
a	way	as	to	be	able	to	affect	the	principal’s	legal	position	in	respect	of	strangers	to	the	relationship	by	
making	 of	 contracts.	 A	 principal	 may	 be	 bound	 to	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 signed	 by	 the	 agent.	
However	 there	must	have	been	an	 agency	 relationship	 and	when	 the	 contract	was	 signed	 the	 agent	
must	have	been	acting	‘within	the	scope	of	the	agency	relationship’.	Problems	arise	when	the	principal	
does	 not	 want	 to	 arbitrate	 and	 where	 there	 is	 no	 contract	 between	 the	 principal	 and	 the	 agent”.	
Courtney	 (2009)	 (n.	 71),	 586-587.	On	 the	 issue	of	 veil	 piercing	 see	Tyler,	Kovarsky,	 Stewart,	Multiple	
Party	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	149	and	ss.,	referring	in	particular	to	the	very	well	known	cases	
Bridas	S.A.P.I.C.	v.	Government	of	Turkmenistan,	345	F.3d	347	(5th	Cir.	2003),	cert.	denied,	543	U.S.	937	
(2004)	 and	 447	 F.3d	 411	 (5th	 Cir.	 2006),	 cert.	 denied,	 127	 S.	 Ct.	 664	 (2006).	 See	 also	 Koutoglidou,	
Multiple	Party	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	255	and	ss.,	Stoehr,	Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	
(2009),	1409	and	ss.	
75	See,	 inter	 alia,	 Brekoulakis	 (2010)	 (n.	 1),	 131	 and	 ss.,	 Hanotiau	 (2001)	 (n.	 65),	 263	 and	 ss.,	 Hosking	
(2004)	(n.	2),	529	and	ss.,	LaForge,	Texas	Law	Review	(2005-2006),	225	and	ss.	
76	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	131-132.	
77	Id.	133	and	ss.	
78	Id.,	133.	
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conceptually	inappropriate	to	justify	a	joinder	to	avoid	cases	of	parallel	proceedings	in	
investment	 arbitration.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	 cases	 analysed	 in	 this	 paragraph,	 first	 of	 all,	
there	 is	 no	 contract	 at	 all,	 and,	 secondly,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	 draw	 up	 an	 analogy	
between	the	case	of	a	party	which	takes	the	advantages	of	a	contract	and	the	case	of	
a	party	that	gets	the	advantages	of	a	BIT,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	only	persons	which	
can	take	the	advantages	of	a	BIT	in	a	State	are	the	persons	who	have	the	nationality	of	
the	other	contracting	State.79	
In	 the	 intertwined	 version	 of	 arbitral	 estoppel	 “the	 courts	 attach	 less	
importance	 to	 whether	 the	 party	 avoiding	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 has	 gained	 a	
substantive	 and	 direct	 benefit	 from	 a	 contract	 containing	 the	 arbitration	 clause.	
Instead,	 courts	will	 enjoin	 a	 signatory	 to	 arbitrate	 its	 claim	 against	 a	 non-signatory	
(and	vice	versa)	if	they	are	satisfied	that	a	‘tight	relatedness	of	the	parties,	contracts	
and	controversies’	exist.	(…)	courts	will	usually	focus	on	the	following	two	conditions	
which	must	apply	concurrently:	
- first,	 the	dispute	between	 the	 signatory	 and	 the	non-signatory	must	
be	intertwined	with	the	contract	containing	an	arbitration	clause,	and	
- second,	 the	 non-signatory	must	 have	 contractual	 or	 close	 corporate	
links	with	one	of	the	signatories”.80	
This	version	of	the	doctrine	of	arbitral	estoppel	seems	more	suitable	to	justify	a	
joinder	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	 Indeed,	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 not	 focused	 on	 the	
existence	of	 a	 contract	 but	 on	 the	 relationship	 existing	between	 the	 various	 parties	
and	disputes	plays	 in	 favour	of	 such	suitability.	 It	 could	be	 therefore	 said	 that	when	
two	 closely	 interrelated	 entities	 of	 a	 group	 get	 the	 advantages	 of	 the	 same	 treaty	
provision,	they	will	be	estopped	to	arbitrate	the	same	dispute	several	times	and	they	
shall	mandatorily	bring	all	claims	against	the	host	State	in	the	same	dispute.	However,	
this	 very	 suggestive	 idea	 does	 not	 keep	 into	 consideration	 the	 nationality	
requirement:	usually	 the	various	entities	of	a	 corporate	chain	do	not	have	 the	 same	
nationality	and	therefore	they	will	not	be	entitled	to	arbitrate	the	same	claim	under	
only	 one	 BIT.	 Hence,	 again,	 to	 have	 all	 the	 claims	 heard	 before	 only	 one	 arbitral	
tribunal	 there	would	be	 the	need	of	a	new	consent	of	all	 the	parties	 involved	 in	 the	
transaction	 (in	order	 to	 let	 the	arbitration	arise	 from	the	new	arbitration	agreement	
and	 not	 from	 the	 BIT).	 In	 conclusion,	 if	 the	 theory	 of	 intertwined	 estoppel	 has	 the	
advantage	of	thwart	the	importance	of	the	requirement	of	consent	(even	if,	according	
to	 Brekoulakis,	 such	 requirement	 is	 still	 requested	 in	 practice	 by	 the	 courts),81	such	
																																																													
79	Finally,	 this	 doctrine	 seems	 to	 completely	 ignore	 the	 doctrine	 of	 separability	 of	 arbitration	 clauses	
within	 a	 contract	 in	 international	 commercial	 arbitration.	 See	 Lew,	 Mistelis,	 Kroll,	 Comparative	 and	
International	Commercial	Arbitration	(2003),	101	and	ss.	On	separability	in	BITs	see	Zarra,	The	American	
Review	of	International	Arbitration	(2014),	593	and	ss.	
80	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	135.	
81	Brekoulakis	(2010)	(n.	1),	178-179,	states	that	“the	fact	that	the	dispute	between	the	signatory	and	the	
non-signatory	 is	 intertwined	 with	 the	 contract	 containing	 the	 arbitration	 clause”	 is	 a	 fact	 pattern	
analysis	which	“arguably	demonstrate	assent	to	arbitrate”.	“Thus	neither	the	arbitral	estoppel	nor	the	
group	of	companies	doctrine	ever	developed	as	a	separate	and	autonomous	basis	of	 jurisdiction.	The	
true	essence	of	these	doctrines	has	been	to	presume	or	at	least	facilitate	the	deduction	of	consent.	(…)	
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theory	 cannot	 be	 considered	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 justify	 a	 joinder	 in	 international	
investment	arbitration.82		
The	 final	 theory	 that	 has	 been	 developed	 in	 order	 to	 bind	 third	 persons	 to	
arbitrate	requires	“us	to	focus	not	on	putative	consent	of	non-signatories,	but	on	the	
scope	of	the	dispute	submitted	for	arbitration	and	the	scope	of	the	original	arbitration	
clause.	 If	 a	 dispute	 strongly	 implicates	 a	 non-signatory	 and	 is	 covered	 by	 a	 broad	
arbitration	clause,	a	 tribunal	will	have	 jurisdiction	to	decide	the	dispute,	even	 if	 that	
means	 that	 it	 has	 to	 assume	 jurisdiction	 over	 a	 party	 that	 has	 not	 signed	 the	
arbitration	 clause”	 (emphasis	 in	 original).83 	This	 theory,	 which	 has	 been	 already	
criticized	when	it	has	been	proposed,	84	presents	various	gaps	and	is	finally	fallacious	
to	 constitute	 the	 base	 for	 binding	 non-signatories	 avoiding	 a	 consent	 based	
reasoning.	Furthermore,	as	we	will	see,	it	could	never	be	the	basis	to	justify	a	joinder	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
It	follows	that	non-signatory	theories	fail	to	look	outside	the	consensual	context,	and	arguably	miss	the	
opportunity	to	look	into	the	interests	of	third	parties	stricto	sensu	and	examine	whether	and	under	what	
conditions	any	such	party	may	have	a	role	in	arbitration.	Naturally	thus,	all	third	parties	stricto	sensu	are	
still	altogether	excluded	from	the	arbitration	process”.	This	assertion	seems	unfounded	in	two	regards.	
First	of	all,	it	does	not	seem	true	that	the	intertwined	version	of	arbitral	estoppel	is	based	on	consent.	
On	 the	 contrary	 it	 seems	 based	 on	 equity	 and	 justice	 consideration	 according	 to	which	 if	 there	 is	 a	
strong	interrelation	between	two	entities	(to	be	analysed	on	a	case	by	case	basis),	such	entities	cannot	
avoid	 to	 consider	 themselves	 bound	 by	 the	 acts	 of	 another.	 This	 is	 demonstrated	 also	 by	 Fellas,	
Conference	 Materials	 of	 the	 School	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 30th	 Anniversary	 Conference:	 “The	
Evolution	and	Future	of	International	Arbitration:	The	Next	30	Years”	(2015),	13,	according	to	whom	“the	
‘intertwined	estoppel’	theory	is	one	developed	specifically	for	the	arbitration	context	and	appears	to	be	
based	on	some	intuitive	sense	of	fairness	more	than	some	robust	notion	of	reliance:	it	does	not	seem	
unfair	to	require	a	party	that	has	already	agreed	to	arbitrate	one	dispute	with	one	party	to	arbitrate	an	
intimately	intertwined	dispute	with	another	party”.	Secondly,	interest	of	third	parties	stricto	sensu	are	
by	nature	excluded	from	an	arbitration	and	this	cannot	be	seen	as	a	surprise!	At	most,	the	presence	of	
third	persons	in	arbitration	can	be	justified	by	the	interest	of	the	two	parties	originally	involved	(i.e.	the	
party	which	has	signed	an	arbitration	agreement	only	with	one	of	the	strictly	interrelated	entities)	and	
not	 to	 safeguard	 the	 interest	 of	 a	 third	 person	which	 is	 excluded	 from	 the	 arbitration	 from	 the	 very	
beginning	of	it.	
Brekoulakis’s	 critics	 to	 intertwined	estoppel	goes	on	 stating,	at	 179,	 that:	 “it	 is	questionable	whether	
the	fact	patterns	developed	in	the	context	of	non-signatory	theories	may	safely	warrant	the	deduction	
of	 intent	 to	arbitrate”.	This	assertion	seems	wrong	because,	as	we	have	 tried	 to	demonstrate	above,	
intertwined	estoppel	is	not	based	on	consent	and	is	not	a	substitution	for	it.	It	is	for	this	reason	(i.e.	the	
fact	that	 it	 is	not	based	on	consent)	 that	estoppel	has	attracted	some	critics.	See	Hanotiau	 (2001)	 (n.	
65),	 265	 and	United	 States	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 for	 the	 Second	Circuit	 in	Thomson-CSF	 S.A.	 v.	 American	
Arbitration	Association,	64	F.3d	773	(2nd	Cir.	1995).	
82	In	Chapter	3	we	will	consider	the	doctrine	of	intertwined	estoppel	once	again	in	order	to	see	whether	
it	can	play	a	role	in	the	extension	of	res	judicata	to	third	parties.	
83 	Brekoulakis,	 Conference	 Materials	 of	 the	 School	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 30th	 Anniversary	
Conference:	 “The	 Evolution	 and	 Future	 of	 International	 Arbitration:	 The	Next	 30	 Years”	 (2015),	 38.	 The	
Author,	at	39,	goes	no	stating	“whether	a	certain	dispute	can	(“kiss”	and)	awaken	the	jurisdiction	of	an	
arbitral	tribunal	depends	on	the	scope	of	the	arbitration	agreement”.	For	the	reasons	we	will	see	below,	
this	approach	is	completely	fallacious.	
84	Fellas	(2015)	(n.	81),	criticized	Brekoulakis’s	approach	because	 it	 ignores	theories	based	on	contract	
law.	Voser,	Conference	Materials	of	the	School	of	International	Arbitration	30th	Anniversary	Conference:	
“The	 Evolution	 and	 Future	 of	 International	 Arbitration:	 The	 Next	 30	 Years”	 (2015),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 strongly	
criticizes	 Brekoulakis	 because	 he	 fails	 to	 give	 importance	 to	 the	 requirement	 of	 consent,	 on	 which	
arbitration	 is	naturally	based.	 In	the	opinion	of	the	present	author,	as	 it	will	be	seen	below,	problems	
are	not	related	to	the	lack	of	consent,	but	on	the	inconsistency	of	the	proposed	approach.	
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in	 investment	 arbitration,	 due	 to	 the	 already	 analysed	 problems	 related	 to	 the	
nationality	requirement.	
In	 fact,	 focusing	 on	 the	 scope	 of	 arbitration	 clause,	 means	 to	 focus	 on	 the	
boarders	 that	 the	parties	have	drawn	 for	 their	dispute	 through	an	arbitration	clause	
that	 they	negotiated	and	on	which	 they	have	given	 their	 consent	 (sic!).	Hence,	when	
Brekoulakis	 says	 that	 his	 theory	 avoids	 falling	 into	 a	 consent	 based	 reasoning	 he	 is	
inconsistent	with	 the	 reality	of	 the	 fact:	everything	arises	 from	arbitration	clauses	 is	
consensual	by	nature!85	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 we	 cannot	 ignore	 that	 the	 parties	 have	 given	 their	
consent	 to	arbitrate	a	certain	dispute	through	an	arbitration	clause	only	 to	 the	other	
signatory	party	of	that	arbitration	clause.	Therefore	not	only	this	approach	misses	the	
point	of	the	consensual	nature	of	arbitration	agreement,	but	erroneously	also	tries	to	
surreptitiously	extend	a	clearly	expressed	consent	to	persons	which	are	not	bound	by	
such	consent.		
Given	the	above	considerations,	it	is	easy	to	say	that	if	a	State	in	a	BIT	gives	its	
consent	 to	 arbitrate	 disputes	 related	 to	 such	 BIT	 against	 nationals	 of	 the	 other	
contracting	 State	 of	 the	 BIT,	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 to	 extend	
jurisdiction	of	arbitral	tribunals	to	nationals	of	States	other	than	the	two	contracting	
States	by	keeping	into	consideration	the	broadness	of	the	word	“dispute”	contained	in	
the	arbitration	clause	of	the	BIT.	
On	 the	 basis	 of	 all	 the	 above,	 joinder	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 useful	
instrument	to	avoid	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
	
2.1.2.2		 Consolidation	
	
Consolidation	 is	 “the	 act	 or	 process	 of	 initiating	 into	 one	 single	 case	 several	
independent	 proceedings	 which	 are	 pending	 or	 initiated”.86	This	 remedy	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	 has	 emerged	 in	 the	 context	 of	 commercial	 arbitration	 but	 has	 been	
widely	discussed	 (and	sometimes	applied)	also	 in	parallel	proceedings	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	 Consolidation	 is	 generally	 referred	 to	 as	 a	 mechanism	 to	 avoid	
contradictory	judgments	and	to	ensure	efficiency	and	fairness.87	With	reference	to	the	
																																																													
85	As	 it	 will	 be	 shown	 in	 Chapter	 3	 below,	 focusing	 on	 the	 concept	 of	 dispute	 and	 on	 the	 legal	
relationship	 underlying	 the	 claim	 that	 is	 brought	 before	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 is	 essential	 in	 order	 to	
understand	the	scope	of	the	award.	However,	these	concepts	are	not	relevant	 in	order	to	expand	the	
jurisdiction	of	the	tribunal.	
86	Pair,	Consolidation	in	international	commercial	arbitration	(2012),	10.	Various	Authors	have	examined	
consolidation.	See,	 inter	alia,	Cremades,	Madalena	(2008)	 (n.	35),	532	and	ss.,	Hackman	(2009),	1	and	
ss.,	 Hoellering,	 Dispute	 Resolution	 Law	 Journal	 (1997),	 41	 and	 ss.,	 DeCamp,	 Journal	 of	 Dispute	
Resolution	 (1994),	 113	 and	 ss.,	 Gillies,	 Hymel,	 Asia	 Pacific	 Law	Review	 (2009),	 169	 and	 ss.,	 Hascher,	
Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (1984),	 127	 and	 ss.,	 Barron,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	
(1987),	81	and	ss.,	Aiken	(2009),	1	and	ss.,	Kazutake,	Annual	Survey	of	 International	and	Comparative	
Law	(2003),	189	and	ss.	
87	Ibid.	 See	 also	 Chiu	 (1990)	 (n.	 51),	 53	 and	 ss.,	 Stipanowich	 (1986-1987)	 (n.	 6),	 488	 and	 ss.,	 Pryles,	
Waincymer,	 www.arbitration.icca.org	 (2009),	 41	 and	 ss.,	 Crivellaro	 (2005)	 (n.	 25),	 400	 and	 ss.,	
Kaufmann	 Kohler,	 Boisson	 de	 Chazournes,	 Bonnin,	 Mbengue	 (hereinafter	 Kaufmann	 Kohler	 et	 al.),	
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scenarios	 outlined	 in	 Paragraph	 2.1.2	 above,	 consolidation	 might	 be,	 in	 principle,	
useful	 in	 all	 of	 them:88	consolidation	 does	 not	 require	 strict	 identities	 of	 the	 parties	
involved	in	the	two	proceedings	and	could	have,	in	principle	(as	will	be	demonstrated	
below	when	referring	to	the	Softwood	Lumber	disputes),	a	quite	broad	application.		
However,	it	should	be	first	of	all	noted	that	it	is	not	possible	to	consolidate	two	
proceedings	 that	 are	 not	 concurrently	 pending.89	Finally,	 in	 scenario	 2)	 (i.e.	 several	
claims	started	by	shareholders	of	the	investor	company)	there	are	serious	due	process	
concerns90	related	to	the	appointment	of	the	arbitral	tribunal	in	case	of	consolidation	
of	two	or	more	claims91	and	to	the	confidentiality	of	proceedings.92	
Various	 BITs,93	multilateral	 treaties,94	institutional	 rules95	and	 national	 laws96	
make	reference	to	consolidation,	but	–	interestingly	–	the	ICSID	Convention	and	Rules	
do	 not	 set	 forth	 for	 this	 method	 of	 coordination	 of	 proceedings,	 with	 an	 evident	
lacuna	 in	the	 ICSID	procedural	system.	From	an	analysis	of	such	 legal	sources,	some	
Authors	 have	 identified	 the	 following	 essential	 requirements	 in	 order	 to	 have	
consolidation:97	98	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2006),	 81	 and	 ss.	 Hascher	 (1984),	 132,	 stated	 that	 consolidation	 involves	 certain	
teleological	 goals:	 (i)	 avoiding	 conflicting	 awards;	 (ii)	 avoiding	 expenses	 and	 costs;	 (iii)	 ensure	
efficiency.	In	the	end,	according	to	this	Author,	consolidation	serves	the	interest	of	justice.	
88	With	particular	 regard	 to	 scenario	 3)	 (i.e.	 contract	and	 treaty	 claims),	Wehland	has	highlighted	 the	
possibility	 for	 a	 claimant	 to	 start	 together	 a	 single	 claim	 under	 various	 legal	 sources.	 See	Wehland	
(2013)	(n.	11),	115	and	ss.	This	optimistic	scenario,	however,	is	not	suitable	in	the	context	of	the	present	
book:	indeed,	the	assumption	of	the	present	research	is	that	an	entity	commences	parallel	contract	and	
treaty	 claims	with	 the	 aim	 of	 taking	 benefit	 of	more	 than	 one	 forum	 for	 the	 resolution	 of	 a	 certain	
dispute.	The	possibility	of	starting	one	claim	under	different	sources	has	been	accepted	also	by	Luiso,	
Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(2007),	604	and	ss.	
89	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	109-110	and	119.			
90	See	 Yannaca-Small,	 OECD	 International	 Investment	 Perspectives	 (2006),	 237	 and	 ss.	 The	 Author	
states	 that,	 increasing	 the	 complexity	of	 the	proceedings,	 consolidation	 increases	also	 the	margin	of	
errors	by	arbitrators.	Arbitrators,	moreover,	 shall	 give	 to	 the	parties	 full	 opportunity	 to	present	 their	
casel		
91	Please	refer	to	Paragraph	2.1.2.1	above.	See	Yannaca-Small,	(2006)	(n.	90),	236.	
92	This	issue	will	be	better	examined	below.	
93	E.g.,	Art.	33	of	the	US	Model	BIT,	Art.	32	of	the	Canada	Model	BIT,	Art.	10.26	of	the	Australia-Chile	
Free	Trade	Agreement.	
94	See	art.	1126	NAFTA	and	II.27	of	the	TPP.	
95	See	Art.	10	of	2012	ICC	Rules,	Art.	4(1)	of	the	Swiss	Rules.	See	also	Pair	(2012)	(n.	86),	15	and	ss.	For	a	
detailed	analysis	of	Art.	 10	of	 the	 ICC	Rules,	 see	Pair,	Frankenstein,	Emory	 International	Law	Review	
(2011),	1061	and	ss.	See	also,	for	an	analysis	of	the	1998	ICC	Rule	on	consolidation,	Whitesell,	Multiple	
Party	Action	in	International	Arbitration	(2009)	203	and	ss.	
96	E.g.	 Article	 1046	 of	 The	 Netherlands	 Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedure	 and	 Section	 6B	 f	 the	 Hong	 Kong	
Ordinance,	which	make	reference	to	a	form	of	court	ordered	consolidation	of	claims.	Section	35	of	the	
English	 Arbitration	 Act	 and	many	 others,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 require	 express	 consent	 to	 consolidation.	
See,	 for	 other	 references,	 Yannaca-Small,	 (2006)	 (n.	 90)	 229.	 For	 an	 analysis	 of	 a	 US	 approach	 see	
Kerner,	Washington	University	Law	Quarterly	(1991),	349	and	ss.	
97	See	Kaufmann	Kohler	et	al.	(2006)	(n.	87),	85	and	ss.	
98	With	regard	to	the	entity	that	has	to	take	the	decision	to	consolidate,	various	modalities	have	been	
used	in	international	investment	law.	The	reference	can	go,	inter	alia,	to	a	consolidation	tribunal	(such	
as	in	the	case	of	art.	1126	NAFTA),	to	the	arbitral	tribunal	itself	(such	as	in	S.	35	of	the	EAA),	to	national	
Courts	(such	as	in	art.	1046	of	The	Netherlands	Code	of	Civil	Procedure).	In	investment	arbitration,	the	
initial	 request	 to	 consolidate	 is	 usually	made	 to	 a	 third	person;	 this	 can	be,	e.g.,	 the	 ICSID	Secretary	
General	(see	Art.	1126.3	NAFTA).	This	person	will	then	establish	a	consolidation	tribunal	that	will	take	
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- consent	of	all	 the	parties	 to	 consolidate:	parties	 shall	 express,	directly	
(through	an	express	agreement)	or	indirectly	(by	referring	to	treaties,	
rules	or	national	laws	which	contain	an	express	consolidation	provision	
in	their	agreement)	their	acceptance	for	consolidation.	 In	 investment	
arbitration,	 when	 two	 arbitrations	 are	 pending	 under	 two	 different	
BITs,	 if	 the	parties	do	not	expressly	agree	on	consolidation,	 the	only	
way	 to	 have	 consolidation	 on	 request	 of	 only	 one	 party	 is	 the	 case	
when	both	BITs	involved	provide	for	consolidation,	due	to	the	fact	that	
in	 this	 case	all	 the	parties	previously	agreed	on	consolidation.	 In	 this	
regard	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 –	 if	 the	 sources	 of	 consent	 do	 not	
already	 provide	 for	 consolidation	 –	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 parties	will	
give	their	consent	after	the	dispute	has	arisen,	in	light	of	the	fact	that	
they	 have	 taken	 “a	 deliberate	 decision	 to	 commence	 a	 second	
arbitration”;99	when	 there	 is	 an	 arbitration	 under	 the	 NAFTA	 (and	
today	the	TPP)	it	 is	provided	that,	according	to	Art.	1126	NAFTA	and	
Art.	II.27	TPP	a	party	can	ask	for	consolidation	in	case	there	are	two	or	
more	 disputes	 arising	 from	 the	 same	 State	 measure	 (i.e.	 having	 a	
question	 of	 law	 or	 fact	 in	 common).	 Considering	 that	 starting	 an	
arbitration	under	these	treaties	the	investor	implicitly	accepted	these	
rules	(and	this	constitutes,	 in	principle,	a	sufficient	basis	for	consent),	
once	 the	 request	 for	 consolidation	 is	 made	 during	 the	 proceedings	
“party	 autonomy	 is	 not	 relevant	 for	 considering	 a	 consolidation	
request	under	Article	1126”.100		
- connexity	 of	 the	 cases	 to	 be	 consolidated:	 some	 treaties	 require	
“questions	 of	 law	 or	 fact	 in	 common”,101	others	 refer	 to	 disputes	
“arising	from	the	same	circumstances”.102	
- identity	 of	 dispute	 settlement	 mechanisms:	 if	 the	 mechanisms	 of	
dispute	 resolution	 are	 very	 different,	 it	 is	 almost	 impossible	 to	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
the	decision	to	consolidate.	It	has	been	questioned	whether	this	last	decision	is	an	order	that	is	subject	
or	not	to	challenge.	According	to	Kaufmann	Kohler	et	al.	(2006)	(n.	87),	102,	the	order	of	consolidation	
is	not	an	award	and	is	not	subject	to	challenge,	due	to	the	fact	that	it	has	only	procedural	effects.	In	the	
opinion	 of	 the	 present	 author	 this	 position	 is	 questionable,	 due	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that	 the	
consolidation	order	has	several	substantive	repercussion	on	the	parties’	rights	during	the	proceedings.	
99	Pryles,	Waincyer	(2009)	(n.	87),	28.	This	is	why	it	seems	that	only	in	case	there	is	previous	acceptance	
of	 consolidation	 this	 mechanism	 seems	 able	 to	 work	 well.	 In	 this	 last	 case,	 in	 fact,	 arbitrators	 (or	
institutional	 administrators)	 would	 be	 entitled	 to	 order	 a	 compulsory	 consolidation	 upon	 request	 of	
only	a	party	and	without	the	necessity	of	 looking	for	 the	consent	of	all	 the	parties	 involved.	Anyway,	
there	have	been	 critics	 to	 compulsory	 consolidation.	See	Chi,	 ssrn.com	 (2008),	 1	 and	 ss.	Compulsory	
consolidation	has	been	operated	also	in	other	fields	of	international	law.	See	the	ICJ	South	West	Africa	
cases,	 ICJ	Reports	1961,	14	and	ss.	See	also	 the	South-Eastern	Greenland	case,	PCIJ	Ser.	A/B,	No.	48	
(1932),	270.	For	a	more	detailed	analysis	of	the	case	law	in	international	law	(regarding	also	the	ITLOS	
and	WTO)	see	Kaufmann	Kohler	et	al.	(2006)	(n.	87),	104	and	ss.	
100	Yannaca-Small	(2006)	(n.	90),	236.	
101	E.g.	Art.	1126	NAFTA.	
102	E.g.	Art.	10.25	CAFTA-DR,	Art.	33	of	US-Uruguay	BIT,	Art.	15.24	of	US-Singapore	FTA.	
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coordinate	 the	 two	 pending	 proceedings	 and	 join	 them	 into	 one	
proceeding;103	
- fair	 and	 efficient	 dispute	 resolution:	 consolidation	 shall	 serve	 the	
efficient	resolution	of	the	dispute	and	the	interest	of	justice.	
From	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 case	 law,	 however,	 it	 appears	 that,	 even	 in	 case	 of	
parallel	arbitrations	initiated	under	the	same	treaty,	Tribunals	did	not	apply	uniformly	
the	requirements	for	consolidation.		
As	perfectly	expressed	by	Shany,	indeed,	when	considering	consolidation,	“the	
dilemma	before	us	is	thus	predominantly	ideological:	which	of	the	conflicting	values	–	
respect	for	private	autonomy	or	the	need	to	promote	public	order	–	should	prevail.	Of	
course,	 the	 dilemma	 has	 institutional	 implications.	 In	 particular,	 it	 raises	 questions	
concerning	the	proper	role	of	supervising	institutions	(…).	Are	they	merely	designed	to	
facilitate	 and	 execute	 the	 common	 will	 of	 the	 parties	 to	 arbitrate,	 or,	 in	 the	
alternative,	 to	 ensure	 the	 objective	 attainment	 of	 public	 policy	 (or	 systemic)	 goals?	
(…)	This	myriad	of	 considerations	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 it	would	be	difficult,	 if	 not	
indeed	 impossible,	 to	 lay	 out	 a	 general	 formulation	 regulating	 the	 conditions	 for	
consolidation,	 which	 would	 suit	 the	 concerns	 and	 capabilities	 of	 each	 legal	 regime	
that	governs	investment	or	commercial	disputes”.104	
This	lack	of	uniformity	has	been	strictly	related	to	the	requirement	of	consent:	
what	 if	 one	 of	 the	 parties,	 after	 having	 expressed	 its	 consent	 to	 rules	 providing	 for	
consolidation,	 clearly	 shows	 its	 unwillingness	 to	 consolidate	 the	 two	 parallel	
proceedings?		
This	situation	of	uncertainty	and	inconsistency	is	perfectly	demonstrated	by	a	
comparison	 of	 certain	 disputes	 arisen	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 NAFTA	 investment	
Chapter:	the	Corn	Products	(Cord	Syrup)105	and	Canfor	(Softwood	Lumber)106	cases.	
In	 the	 Cord	 Syrup	 cases,	 Mexico	 asked	 to	 consolidate	 two	 cases,	 which,	
according	 to	 the	 consolidation	 tribunal,	 had	 certain	 questions	 of	 law	 or	 fact	 in	
common	for	the	purposes	of	art.	1126	NAFTA	(i.e.	they	all	arose	from	State	measures	
pertaining	to	the	sugar	market).	Anyway,	the	Tribunal	noted	that	the	two	companies	
were	 “direct	 and	 fierce	 competitors”	 and	 this	 circumstance	 would	 have	 rendered	
necessary	complex	confidentiality	measures	during	the	proceedings	that	would	have	
rendered	 consolidation	 extremely	 difficult.	 Consolidation,	 the	 Tribunal	 said,	 would	
have	run	against	due	process:	“the	parties	should	not	have	to	calculate	which	items	of	
information,	 evidence,	 documents	 and	 arguments	 they	 can	 share	 with	 their	
competitors	and	which	ones	they	cannot	share”.	Therefore,	notwithstanding	the	fact	
																																																													
103	Kaufmann	Kohler	et	al.	(2006)	(n.	87),	88-89.	
104	Shany,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2006),	136.	
105	Corn	Products	 International	 Inc.	v.	United	Mexican	States,	 ICSID	Case	N°.	ARB(AF)/04/1,	and	Archer	
Daniels	Midland	 Company	 and	 Tate	 &	 Lyle	 Ingredients	 Americas,	 Inc.	 v.	 United	Mexican	 States,	 ICSID	
Case	N°	ARB(AF)/04/5,	Order	of	the	Consolidation	Tribunal,	7	September	2005.	See	also	Etteh	(2010),	
11	and	ss.	
106	Canfor	 Corporation	 v.	 United	 States	 of	 America	 (UNCITRAL),	and	 Tembec	 et	 al.	 v.	 United	 States	 of	
America	(UNCITRAL),	and	Terminal	Forest	Products	Ltd.	v.	United	States	of	America	(UNCITRAL),	Order	
of	the	Consolidation	Tribunal,	20	May	2005.	
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that	arbitrating	under	NAFTA	the	claimants	should	have	already	accepted	Art.	1126	of	
such	Treaty,	“largely	because	of	their	strong	competition,	the	claimants	do	not	wish	
to	have	their	claims	consolidated”	and	the	Tribunal	refused	the	consolidation	request	
by	 Mexico.	 “The	 Tribunal	 is	 persuaded	 that	 notwithstanding	 certain	 common	
questions	 of	 fact	 and	 law,	 the	 numerous	 distinct	 issues	 of	 state	 responsibility	 and	
quantum	 further	 confirm	 the	 need	 for	 separate	 proceedings”.	 This	 means,	 in	
conclusion,	 that	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 the	 requirements	 set	 forth	 above	 is	 not	 per	 se	
sufficient	to	give	the	certainty	that	consolidation	would	be	operated.	
Opposite	conclusion	have	been	reached	by	the	Softwood	Lumber	Consolidation	
Tribunal.	The	three	claimants	were	Canadian	producers	of	softwood	lumber	allegedly	
affected	 by	 certain	measures	 of	 the	United	 States.	 The	 respondent	 State	 asked	 for	
consolidation	 of	 the	 three	 claims	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 same	 NAFTA	
provisions	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 three	 proceedings.	 These	 had	 factual	 and	 legal	
circumstances	 in	 common.	 The	 claimants	 objected	 consolidation	 stating	 that	 there	
was	only	 similarity	between	 the	 circumstances,	 that	 there	was	no	 risk	of	 conflicting	
judgments	(as	there	was	instead	in	the	CME	and	Lauder	cases)	due	to	the	fact	that	the	
companies	 were	 not	 affiliated	 and	 that	 consolidation	 would	 have	 involved	 severe	
delays.	In	conclusion,	claimants	stated	that	consolidation	would	have	been	against	the	
consensual	 nature	 of	 arbitration.	 The	 Tribunal,	 after	 having	 recalled	 in	 detail	 the	
legislative	history	and	the	rationale	(i.e.	the	policy	considerations	set	out	above	and	in	
particular	 the	efficient	 resolution	of	claims	 -	 in	 the	sense	of	procedural	economy)	of	
art.	1126	NAFTA,	cited	Henri	Alvarez107	and	stated	that	“Chapter	11	of	NAFTA	(…)	 is	
not	 the	 usual	 private,	 consensual	 context	 of	 international	 commercial	 arbitration.	
Rather,	 Chapter	 11	 creates	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 claims	 which	 may	 be	 brought	 by	 an	
equally	broad	range	of	claimants	who	have	mandatory	access	to	a	binding	arbitration	
process	 without	 the	 requirement	 of	 an	 arbitration	 agreement	 in	 the	 conventional	
sense	nor	even	the	need	for	a	contract	between	the	disputing	parties.	In	view	of	this,	
some	 compromise	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 private	 arbitration	 may	 be	 justified”	 (emphasis	
added).	 Hence,	 after	 having	 recalled	 its	 discretionary	 power	 to	 order	 consolidation,	
the	 Tribunal	 did	 so.	 Arbitrators	 specified	 that	 the	 desirability	 to	 avoid	 conflicting	
awards	 is	not	 limited	to	cases	where	the	parties	are	the	same,	but	also	in	cases	with	
the	same	legal	 issues	arising	out	of	the	same	event	or	related	to	the	same	measure.	
Finally,	 contrary	 to	 the	Cord	Syrup	Tribunal,	 the	Tribunal	 stated	 that	 “concerns	over	
confidentiality	 are,	 in	 the	 view	 of	 the	 Consolidation	 Tribunal,	 not	 relevant	 when	
considering	a	request	of	consolidation,	save	for	exceptional	cases	where	consolidation	
would	defeat	efficiency	of	process	or	would	infringe	the	principle	of	due	process.	(…)	
The	general	trend	 in	 investor-State	arbitration	 is	transparency	of	process,	a	trend	to	
which	the	Consolidation	Tribunal	subscribes.	Within	the	perspective	of	that	trend,	the	
issue	of	confidentiality	must	be	approached	with	caution.	(…)	the	fact	that	parties	to	
proceedings	 are	 competitors	 is	 not	 unique	 to	 consolidation	 proceedings.	 (…)	 It	 has	
																																																													
107	Alvarez,	Arbitration	International	(2000),	404.	
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never	been	seriously	suggested	that	arbitration	cannot	proceed	in	those	cases	for	the	
mere	 reason	 that	 the	 parties	 are	 competitors	 and	 that	 disclosure	 of	 confidential	
information	is	purportedly	bound	to	occur”.108	
In	 light	of	all	 the	above,	even	 if	 the	approach	 taken	by	 the	Softwood	Lumber	
Consolidation	Tribunal	is	fully	shared	by	the	present	author,	it	is	possible	to	draw	the	
following	 conclusions.	 First	 of	 all,	 consolidation	 is	 applicable	 only	 in	 very	 limited	
situations,	 i.e.	 proceedings	 that	 are	 concurrently	 pending,	 under	 the	 same	
institutional	 rules	 and	 in	 presence	 of	 consent	 by	 all	 the	 parties	 to	 consolidation.109	
Secondly,	even	when	the	above	requirements	are	satisfied,	some	other	considerations	
(e.g.	 the	 confidentiality	 of	 proceedings)	 may	 lead	 arbitrators	 to	 not	 operate	
consolidation	and	maintain	two	(or	more)	separate	proceedings.	
The	picture	that	emerges	is	therefore	extremely	uncertain	and	cannot	lead	us	
to	 see	 consolidation	 as	 a	 general	 and	 reliable	 remedy	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.		
	
2.1.2.3		 Quasi	consolidation	
	
Quasi	 consolidation	 mechanisms	 are	 the	 ones	 “whereby	 formally	 separate	
arbitrations	 are	heard	by	 the	 same	panel	 of	 arbitrators	 and	 awards	 are	 coordinated	
both	in	terms	of	substance	and	timing”.110	This	mechanism,	which	is	not	provided	by	
any	institutional	rule	or	national	 law,	could	be	useful	 in	all	the	scenarios	1),	2)	and	3)	
outlined	 in	 paragraph	 2.1.2	 above,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 two	 proceedings	 still	
proceed	 in	 parallel,	 even	 if	 they	 are	 heard	 by	 the	 same	 arbitral	 tribunal.	 This	 has	
happened	several	times	in	the	framework	of	ICSID.	It	is	worth	noting	the	several	cases	
regarding	aluminium	and	bauxite	producers	against	Jamaica,	which	were	heard	by	the	
same	 Tribunal	 and	 produced	 identical	 results.111	The	 same	 happened	 in	 two	 cases	
brought	 by	 Italian	 investors	 against	Morocco112	and	 in	 several	 of	 the	 cases	 brought	
against	 Argentina	 after	 the	 economical	 crisis.113	The	 same	 happened	 in	 the	 already	
																																																													
108 	Softwood	 Lumber	 cases,	 consolidation	 order,	 52-55.	 On	 this	 matter	 see	 Guglya,	 Journal	 of	
International	Dispute	Settlement	(2011),	186	and	ss.	
109	With	regard	to	the	issue	of	consent,	it	is	worth	considering	what	happened	in	the	already	cited	CME	
and	 Lauder	 cases.	 In	 these	 cases,	 willing	 to	 rely	 only	 on	 res	 judicata,	 Czech	 Republic	 refused	 the	
consolidation	of	claims	and	two	completely	different	awards	were	issued.	Due	to	the	formalities	related	
to	consent,	 therefore,	consolidation	was	precluded	and	a	very	bad	 result	 from	the	perspective	of	 the	
good	administration	of	justice	came	out.	
110	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	110.	
111	Alcoa	 Minerals	 of	 Jamaica	 Inc.	 v.	 Jamaica,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/74/2,	 Kaiser	 Bauxite	 Company	 v.	
Jamaica,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/74/3,	Reynolds	 Jamaica	Mines	 Limited	 and	Reynolds	Metals	 Company	 v.	
Jamaica,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/74/4.	
112	Salini	 Costruttori	 S.p.A.	 and	 Italstrade	 S.p.A.	 v.	 Kingdom	of	Morocco,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/00/4	and	
Consortium	RFCC	v.	Royaume	du	Maroc,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/00/6.	
113	See,	e.g.,	the	already	cited	cases	Sempra	v.	Argentina	and	Camuzzi	v.	Argentina.	See	also	Electricidad	
Argentina	 S.A.	 and	 EDF	 International	 S.A.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/03/22;	 EDF	
International	 S.A.,	 SAUR	 International	 S.A.	 and	 Leòn	 Participationes	 Argentinas	 S.A.	 v.	 Argentine	
Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/23.	Other	cases	are	reported	by	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	111-112.	
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cited	(see	Chapter	1)	cases	related	to	the	Yukos	saga	(Yukos	Universal	v.	Russia,	Hulley	
Enterprises	v.	Russia	and	Veteran	Petroleum	v.	Russia).114	
Quasi	 consolidation	 of	 proceedings	 obviously	 increases	 the	 coordination	
between	them	and	lowers	the	possibility	that	inconsistent	awards	are	issued.		
However,	 this	 form	 of	 coordination	 has	 still	 several	 drawbacks.	 First	 of	 all	 it	
does	not	reduces	the	expenses	for	the	host	State,	which	still	have	to	sustain	the	costs	
of	 two	 arbitration	 proceedings.	 Indeed,	 quasi	 consolidation	 “does	 not	 necessarily	
permit	 rationalizing	 the	 use	 of	 resources,	 as	 submissions,	 hearings	 and	 decisions”	
which	 “are	 often	 separate	 for	 each	 proceedings.	 Moreover,	 this	 method	may	 raise	
issues	of	due	process	if	a	Tribunal	relies	on	knowledge	acquired	in	one	case	to	resolve	
another”.115	As	it	has	been	stated	by	Nicklisch	“it	is,	however,	by	no	means	always	the	
case	in	arbitrations	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	two-party	proceedings	
that	 an	 identical	 panel	 of	 arbitrators	 will	 automatically	 guarantee	 the	 avoidance	 of	
inconsistencies.	There	is	no	certainty	that	the	statement	of	undisputed	facts	may	not	
differ	in	the	two	proceedings	and,	above	all,	that	the	taking	of	evidence	may	not	lead	
to	different	results.	Such	discrepancies	between	statements	of	fact	and	results	of	the	
taking	 of	 evidence	 cannot	 always	 be	 prevented	 even	 by	 an	 identical	 panel	 of	
arbitrators	and	can	only	be	avoided	by	conceding	to	the	third	(and	fourth)	party	-	even	
if	only	to	a	restricted	degree	–	the	right	to	participate	in	the	initial	proceeding,	and	by	
ensuring	 that	 in	 the	 second	 proceeding,	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 first	 proceeding	 can	 no	
longer	be	contested	in	their	substance	by	the	parties”.116	Finally,	quasi	consolidation	is	
still	based	on	the	consent	of	the	parties	that	–	for	whatsoever	reason	–	may	decide	to	
not	give	it.	
In	 light	of	the	above	–	as	stated	 in	Chapter	1	–	 it	 is	possible	to	say	that	some	
examples	 of	 quasi	 consolidation	 (such	 as	 the	Yukos	 cases)	 deserve	 approval,	 having	
lead	to	one	single	award	and	to	a	total	coordination	of	proceedings.	However,	the	sole	
fact	 that	 quasi	 consolidation	 is	 based	 on	 consent	 brings	 a	 very	 high	 level	 of	
uncertainty	 on	 the	 reliability	 of	 such	mechanism	 and	 exclude	 it	 from	 the	 list	 of	 the	
general	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	 proceedings;	 it	 is,	 indeed,	 uncertain	
whether	and	when	quasi	consolidation	will	be	applied.	Moreover,	it	is	not	possible	to	
exclude	a	priori	 that,	even	 in	presence	of	quasi	 consolidation,	divergent	 results	arise	
from	the	proceedings.	For	these	reason,	quasi	consolidation	is	not	a	valid	solution	for	
the	aim	of	the	present	book.	
	
2.1.3	 	 Collective	proceedings	started	by	investors	(in	a	nutshell)	
	
																																																													
114	See	also	Gemplus	and	Talsud	v.	Mexico	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/04/4,	Award,	16	June	2010.	
115	Kaufmann	Kohler	et	al.	(2006)	(n.	87),	75.	
116	Nicklisch	(1994)	(n.	48),	65.	The	risk	of	inconsistent	decisions	even	in	cases	of	quasi	consolidation	was	
outlined	by	the	High	Court	of	Hong	Kong	in	the	Shui	On	case,	Re	Shui	On	Construction	Ltd.	and	Schindler	
Lifts	(HK)	Ltd,	HKLR	117	(1986),	in	van	den	Berg	(ed.),	14Yearbook	Commercial	Arbitration	215	(1989).	
See	Miller,	Arbitration	International	(1987),	88.	
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When	 several	 investors,	 which	 are	 in	 the	 same	 substantial	 situation,	 having	
suffered	the	same	(or	sufficiently	similar)	losses	within	the	same	period	of	time	due	to	
the	same	wrongful	acts	of	a	host	State,	start	together	a	set	of	proceedings	against	the	
host	 State,	 we	 are	 in	 front	 of	 collective	 proceedings	 started	 by	 investors.	 These	
proceedings	have	been	sometimes	admitted	in	investment	arbitration117	and	have	also	
been	referred	to	as	“mass	claims”.		
This	 definition	 has	 generated	 a	 widespread	 debate,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that,	
usually,	in	international	law	it	has	been	used	with	a	technical	meaning,	referring	to	“a	
process	 designed	 to	 deal	 with	 a	 high	 number	 of	 claims	 that	 arise	 out	 of	 the	 same	
extraordinary	situation	or	event	and	are	filed	with	the	decision	making	body	within	a	
limited	period	of	time”.118	In	international	law,	therefore,	mass-claims	are	necessarily	
decided	 on	 an	 individual	 basis	 by	 judicial	 bodies	 that	 are	 judicial	 or	 quasi-judicial	 in	
nature.119	Other	Authors,	however,	have	stated	that	in	investment	arbitration	there	is	
no	difference	between	 collective	proceedings	 started	by	 investors	 and	mass-claims,	
due	to	the	circumstance	that	this	last	definition	shall	be	used	in	an	a-technical	sense.	
The	majority	of	the	Tribunal	in	Abaclat,	indeed,	stated	that	“for	the	sake	of	simplicity	
and	 clarity,	 the	 Tribunal	 will	 refer	 to	 mass	 proceedings	 as	 a	 qualification	 for	 the	
present	proceedings,	whereby	this	term	should	be	understood	as	referring	simply	to	
the	 high	 number	 of	 Claimants	 appearing	 together	 as	 one	 mass,	 and	 without	 any	
prejudgment	on	the	procedural	classification	of	the	present	proceedings	as	a	specific	
kind	 of	 collective	 proceedings	 recognized	 under	 any	 specific	 legal	 order”.120	The	
Tribunal,	 at	 para	 482,	 expressly	 stated	 that	mass	 proceedings	 “fall	 under	 the	more	
general	 concept	of	 collective	proceedings”.	A	 similar	 conclusion	was	 reached	by	 the	
majority	of	the	Tribunal	in	Ambiente	Ufficio.121	
Collective	 proceedings	 in	 investment	 arbitration,	 therefore,	 are	 inspired	 by	
class	actions	developed	in	US	law	and	are	conceptually	different	from	mass-claims	as	
developed	in	 international	 law.	 In	US	law	the	class	action	 is	a	procedural	device	that	
“allows	a	small	number	of	individual	plaintiffs	to	represent	a	larger	group	of	plaintiffs	
in	one	litigation	proceeding	against	a	single	defendant	who	caused	a	similar	injury	to	
all	 of	 the	 plaintiffs”.122	In	 order	 to	 have	 a	 class	 action	 in	 US	 law,123	the	 following	
																																																													
117	See,	 inter	alia,	Abaclat	and	Others	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/5,	where	the	claims	
have	been	brought	by	60.000	Italian	bondholders,	and	Ambiente	Ufficio	S.p.A.	and	Others	v.	Argentine	
Republic,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/08/9.	 See	Kabra,	Arbitration	 International	 (2015),	 425	 and	 ss.	A	 recent	
decision	 involving	this	kind	of	proceedings	 is	Giovanni	Alemanni	and	Others	v.	The	Argentine	Republic,	
ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/8,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility,	17	November	2014	
118	Kosovo	Housing	and	Property	Claims	Commission,	Res.	No.	7,	11	April	2013,	HPCC/RES/7/2003,	para.	
1.4	
119	Van	 Houtte,	 McAsey,	 ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2012),	 232.	 See	 also	 Abaclat	 and	 Others	 v.	 Argentine	
Republic,	Dissenting	Opinion,	George	Abi-Saab,	28	October	2011,	para.	180,	and	Ambiente	Ufficio	S.p.A.	
and	Others	v.	Argentine	Republic,	Dissenting	Opinion,	Santiago	Torres	Bermudez,	2	May	2013,	para.	99.	
See	also	Heiskanen,	Multiple	Party	Actions	in	International	Arbitration	(2009),	297	and	ss.	
120	Abaclat	and	Others	v.	Argentine	Republic,	para.	180	
121	Paras.	119-120	
122	Daly,	University	of	Miami	Law	Review	(2007),	105	
123	Federal	class-action	suits	are	governed	by	Federal	Rule	of	Civil	Procedure	23.	
	 96	
requirements	 (which	have	been	used	also	 in	 international	 commercial	 arbitration)124	
are	necessary:125	
1) numerosity	 requirement:	 the	 class	 shall	 be	 so	 large	 that	 a	 joinder	
would	be	impracticable;126		
2) commonality	 requirement:	 there	 are	 questions	 of	 law	 and	 of	 fact	
common	to	the	claimants;	
3) typicality	 requirement:	 the	 representative	 plaintiffs’	 claims	 and	
defences	are	typical	of	those	of	the	entire	class;	
4) representativeness	 requirement:	 the	 representative	 plaintiffs	 will	
fairly	and	adequately	protect	the	interests	of	the	entire	class.	
Furthermore,	 in	 arbitration	 it	 is	 necessary	 the	 consent	 of	 all	 the	 parties	
involved:	there	can	be	no	class	actions	in	arbitration	if	all	the	parties	involved	have	not	
given	their	consent.127	This	requirement	is	less	controversial	in	investment	arbitration	
than	 in	 commercial	 arbitration.	 Indeed,	 the	 “system	 of	 arbitration	 without	 privity	
assumes	 that	 the	 offer	 is	 made	 to	 more	 than	 one	 potential	 investor”128	and	 thus	
nothing	 in	 BITs’	 wording	 seems	 to	 preclude	 collective	 proceedings	 by	 investors,	
considering	that	States’	consent	has	already	been	provided.129	Once	all	the	 investors	
will	decide	to	start	an	investment	claim,	they	are	entitled	to	do	so.		
The	debate	regarding	collective	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	is	still	in	
course	and	it	is	not	clear	what	will	be	the	role	and	the	utility	of	this	procedural	device	
in	 the	 “fight”	 against	 parallel	 proceedings. 130 	In	 particular,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
numerosity	 requirement,	 it	 shall	 be	 highlighted	 that	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 it	 is	
required	 and	 what	 is	 an	 adequate	 number	 of	 claimants	 in	 order	 to	 have	 collective	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	As	of	today,	no	case	in	investment	arbitration	
considered	 the	 numerosity	 requirement	 as	 essential	 in	 order	 to	 have	 collective	
proceedings	 started	 by	 investors.	 In	 Funnekotter	 v.	 Zimbabwe131	an	 ICSID	 Tribunal	
heard	 the	 merits	 of	 a	 case	 involving	 13	 Dutch	 Investors,	 without	 any	 objection	 to	
																																																													
124	Daly,	 (2007)	 (n.	 122),	 105	and	 ss.,	Hanotiau,	Arbitration	 International	 (2004),	 39	and	 ss.,	 Lacovara,	
Arbitration	International	(2008),	541	and	ss.,	Jeydel,	Dispute	Resolution	Journal	(2002),	3	and	ss.	
125	Daly	(2007)	(n.	122),	106.	
126	Id.,	 114,	 notes	 that	 in	 this	 case	 consolidation	 would	 not	 be	 feasible	 and	 would	 be	 against	 the	
interests	of	all	the	parties.	It	would	lengthen	and	complicate	proceedings.	
127	See	American	Arbitration	Association,	 Supplementary	 Rules	 for	 Class	 Arbitration	 (2003).	 See	 also	
Deiulemar	Compagnia	di	Navigazione	S.p.A.	v.	M/V	Allegra,	198	F.3d	473,	482	(4th	Cir.	1999,	and	Champ	
v.	Siegel	Trading	Co.,	Inc.,	55	F.3d	269,	275	(7th	Cir.	1995).	According	to	the	US	Supreme	Court,	whether	
an	 arbitration	 clause	 prohibits	 or	 allows	 class	 actions	 is	 for	 the	 arbitrators	 and	 not	 for	 the	 courts	 to	
decide.	See	Green	Tree	Financial	Corp.	v.	Bazzle,	123	S.	Ct.	2402	(2003),	and	351	S.C.	244,	569	S.E.2d	349	
(S.C.	2002).	
128	Kabra	 (2015)	 (n.	 117),	 436.	 See	 also	 Steingruber,	 ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2012),	 241	 and	 Strong,	 YB	
International	Arbitration	(2013),	288.	
129	Concerning	 the	 requirement	 of	 consent	 in	 collective	 proceedings	 under	 Article	 25	 of	 the	 ICSID	
Convention,	see	Kabra	(2015)	(n.	117),	432	and	ss.	Some	Authors	have	questioned	is	one	of	admissibility	
and	 not	 one	 of	 jurisdiction.	 See	Kabra,	 438	 and	 ss.,	 De	Brabandere,	 Journal	 of	 International	Dispute	
Settlement	(2012),	614	and	ss.	
130	Pharaon,	Arbitration	International	(2015),	589	and	ss.	
131	Bernardus	 Henricus	 Funnekotter	 and	 others	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Zimbabwe,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/05/6,	
Award,	22	April	2009.	
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jurisdiction	by	the	respondent	State.	If	the	approach	taken	in	this	decision	should	find	
confirmations	 in	 the	 future	 (and	 the	present	author	does	not	see	 reasons	 to	say	 the	
contrary,	 even	 in	 light	 of	 previous	 case	 law),132	collective	 proceedings	 by	 investors	
could	 become	 a	 very	 useful	 form	of	 coordination	 of	 proceedings	 in	 cases	 regarding	
scenario	 2)	 outlined	 in	 paragraph	 2.1.2	 above	 (multiple	 claims	 by	 the	 various	
shareholders	 of	 a	 company),	 provided	 that	 all	 the	 shareholders	 have	 the	 same	
nationality	 (this	 last	 circumstance	 seems	 not	 to	 be	 very	 common	 in	 today’s	
multinational	commerce).133	Instead,	 if	 it	should	be	ascertained	that	a	far	more	 large	
number	 of	 claimants	 is	 required	 to	 start	 collective	 proceedings	 in	 investment	
arbitration	 (such	 as	 in	 the	Abaclat	 case),	 this	 procedural	 device	would	not	 have	 any	
utility	 against	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 (as	 the	 ones	we	 are	 dealing	
with	in	this	book)	and	could	be	useful	only	in	very	large-scale	arbitrations.	
However,	 as	 in	 the	 case	 of	 quasi	 consolidation,	 collective	 proceedings	 are	
based	on	a	discretional	choice	of	the	claimants	(which,	it	is	worth	to	repeat,	shall	have	
the	 same	 nationality)	 to	 start	 collective	 proceedings.	 Such	 procedural	 device	 is	
therefore	a	good	form	of	coordination	when	it	 is	used	and	when	it	 is	possible	to	make	
recourse	 to	 it,	 but	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 general	 tool	 to	 which	 arbitrators	 can	
make	 recourse	 to	 prevent	 parallel	 proceedings.	 Collective	 proceedings	 are	 not,	
therefore,	a	valuable	solution	for	the	purposes	of	the	present	book.	
	
2.2 Remedies	based	on	arbitrators’	discretion	only	
	
																																																													
132	Antoine	 Goetz	 &	 Others	 and	 S.A.	 Affinage	 des	 Metaux	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Burundi,	ICSID	 Case	 No.	
ARB/01/2,	 and	 The	 Canadian	 Cattlemen	 for	 Fair	 Trade	 v.	 United	 States	 of	 America,	 UNCITRAL	
(formerly	Consolidated	Canadian	Claims	v.	United	States	of	America),	Award	on	Jurisdiction,	28	January	
2008.	
133	It	is	worth	noting	that	there	could	be	various	due	process	and	confidentiality	concerns	in	relation	to	
collective	 proceedings	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	 Concerns	 related	 to	 the	 confidentiality	 requirement	
have	in	particular	been	expressed	by	Justice	Scalia	in	AT&T	Mobility	LLC	v.	Concepcion	et	ux.,	Certiorari	
to	 the	United	States	Court	 of	Appeals	 for	 the	Ninth	Circuit,	 27	April	 2011.	Due	process	 concerns	 are	
related	 to:	 (a)	 the	 efficient	 conduct	 of	 proceedings;	 (b)	 fairness	 to	 all	 disputing	 parties,	 which	 shall	
maintain	 their	 right	 to	be	heard	and	to	present	 their	case.	There	can	be	also	problems	related	to	 the	
modalities	of	appointment	of	arbitrators.	According	to	Kabra	(2015)	(n.	117),	444	and	ss.,	the	“methods	
adopted	 to	 manage	 ‘mass	 claims’	 do	 not	 impinge	 upon	 parties’	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 hearing,	 as	 long	 as	
tribunals	undertake	individual	assessment	of	facts.	(…)	due	process	is	not	an	end	in	itself,	but	merely	a	
means	to	achieve	a	just	and	fair	settlement	of	a	dispute.	(…)	making	‘mass	claims’	inadmissible	results	
in	a	 frustrating	situation	 for	both	 investors	and	states	since	the	 former	 is	denied	an	effective	 remedy	
and	the	latter	becomes	susceptible	to	potentially	conflicting	decisions”.	Concerning	confidentiality,	as	
it	has	been	done	by	the	Softwood	Lumber	Consolidation	Tribunal	(mentioned	above),	it	should	be	noted	
that	confidentiality	has	a	limited	applicability	in	investment	arbitration,	due	to	the	public	nature	of	this	
form	of	dispute	resolution.	Therefore,	as	stated	by	Daly	(2015)	(n.	122),	125	“confidentiality	(…)	is	not	an	
absolute	notion”	and	therefore	confidentiality	should	deprive	arbitration	of	the	tool	given	by	collective	
proceedings.	 Finally,	 with	 regard	 to	 possible	 concerns	 of	 efficiency,	 see	 Daly,	 126	 and	 ss.,	 who	
highlights	the	positive	and	negative	repercussions	of	class	arbitrations	on	the	efficiency	of	proceedings.		
The	major	problem	related	to	collective	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	seems	to	be	the	
lack	of	expertise	by	arbitrators	 in	 the	case	management	 in	scenarios	 involving	a	very	high	number	of	
claimants	and	therefore	the	manageability	of	the	case.	Another	issue	could	be	the	costs	and	the	fees	to	
be	sustained	by	the	parties	 in	cases	which,	due	to	the	very	high	number	od	claimants,	present	a	very	
high	level	of	complexity.	
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2.2.1 Forum	non	conveniens,	comity	and	the	suspension	of	proceedings	
	
It	is	disputed,	in	cases	of	parallel	proceedings	in	international	law,	whether	an	
arbitrator,	after	having	ascertained	to	have	jurisdiction,	has	discretion	to	decline	such	
jurisdiction	(or	to	suspend	the	proceedings	pending	before	it,	waiting	for	the	decision	
of	 the	other	court)	on	 the	basis	of	considerations	 related	 to	efficiency,	deference	 to	
the	work	 of	 other	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 and	 the	 fair	 administration	 of	 justice.	 Some	
Authors	 have	 expressed	 the	 view	 that	 arbitrators	 cannot	decline	 a	 validly	 conferred	
jurisdiction,134	others	 have	 said	 that	 this	 could	 be	 done	 only	 if	 there	 is	 a	 clear	
contestation	 by	 a	 party,135	and	 still	 others	 have	 stated	 that	 it	 is	 possible	 for	 an	
arbitrator	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 keeping	 into	 consideration	 purposes	 of	 justice	 and	
efficiency.	Among	this	 last	category	of	Authors,	 some	have	expressed	 the	view	that	
the	possibility	to	decline	jurisdiction	(or	to	suspend	proceedings)	is	only	exceptional,136	
while	others	have	advocated	“a	more	generous	use	of	the	possibility	to	stay	where	the	
other	 forum	 is	 overall	 a	 more	 appropriate	 forum	 to	 try	 the	 dispute”.137 	In	 this	
patchwork	of	 ideas,	the	number	of	opinions	and	decisions138	that	consider	possible	a	
form	of	suspension	of	proceedings	seems	however	higher	than	the	number	of	Authors	
who	 do	 not	 consider	 possible	 this	 exercise	 of	 discretion.	 For	 this	 reason,	 we	 will	
assume	 (for	 the	purpose	of	 this	paragraph)	 that	 in	 international	 law	 it	 is	possible	 to	
suspend	 proceedings	 or,	 as	 we	 will	 better	 see	 in	 Chapter	 3	 below,	 to	 decline	
jurisdiction	when	the	good	administration	of	justice	so	require.	
Two	are	the	main	tools	that	have	been	used	by	judges	in	national	law	systems	
in	order	to	exercise	the	discretion	to	suspend	proceedings:	forum	non	conveniens	and	
international	comity.	
	According	 to	 the	 forum	 non	 conveniens	 doctrine,	 a	 court	 may	 decline	
jurisdiction	on	a	dispute	whenever	there	is	a	clearly	more	appropriate	forum	which	can	
better	 related	to	the	dispute	 (we	could	say:	 the	natural	 forum	of	 that	dispute),139	i.e.	
																																																													
134	Soderlund,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2005),	 314,	 Lew,	 Parallel	 State	 and	 Arbitration	
Proceedings	(2005),	310,	Yannaca-Small,	The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Investment	Law	(2010),	
1021.	
135	Gaja,	The	Statute	of	the	International	Court	of	Justice:	A	Commentary	(2012),	579.	
136	Schneider,	Arbitration	International	(1990),	111-112.	See	also	Bayindir	Insaat	Turizm	Ticaret	Ve	Sanayi	
A.S.	v.	Islamic	Republic	of	Pakistan,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/29,	para.	271.	
137	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11).	See	also	Cuniberti,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2006),	412,	Douglas,	British	Yearbook	
of	 International	Law	(2003),	264.	Lowe,	Australian	Yearbook	of	 International	Law	(1999),	191	and	ss.,	
seems	to	admit	this	possibility	in	several	situation.	
138	See	Administration	of	the	Prince	von	Pless	(Germany	v.	Poland),	PCIJ	No.	52	Ser.	A/B,	16	(1933),	Battus	
v.	Bulgaria,	 French-Bulgarian	Mixed	Arbitral	 Tribunal,11	 February	 1922,	 1	R.D.T.A.M.,	 794,	Mox	Plant	
Arbitration	 (Ireland	v.	UK),	Order	of	24	June	2003,	42	 I.L.M.	 (2003),	para.	28.	This	possibility	seems	to	
have	been	admitted	also	by	the	ICJ	in	the	TimorLeste	v.	Australia	case,	Order	of	28	January	2014;	on	this	
decision	 see	 Bonafè,	 Ordine	 Internazionale	 e	 diritti	 umani	 (2014),	 331.	 With	 reference	 to	 ICSID	
arbitration,	see	SGS	Société	Générale	de	Surveillance	S.A.	v.	Republic	of	the	Philippines,	ICSID	Case	No.	
ARB/02/6,	Decision	of	the	Tribunal	on	Objections	to	Jurisdiction,	29	January	2004,	paras.	92,	128.	
139	Pauwelyn,	Salles,	Cornell	International	Law	Journal	(2009),	113.	
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better	satisfying	the	interest	of	the	parties	and	the	interest	of	justice.140	In	investment	
arbitration,	forum	non	conveniens	could	be	interpreted	as	follows:	an	arbitral	tribunal	
does	not	exercise	its	(already	ascertained)	jurisdiction	on	a	dispute	when	it	deems	that	
there	 is	 another	 international	 tribunal	 that,	 for	 its	 particular	 competences,	 is	 more	
appropriate	to	hear	the	dispute.141		
International	comity	has	been	defined	in	the	well-known	Hilton	v.	Guyot142	case	
of	1895.	Comity	has	been	intended	as	“the	recognition	which	one	nation	allows	within	
its	territory	to	the	legislative,	executive,	or	judicial	acts	of	another	nation,	having	due	
regard	 both	 to	 international	 duty	 and	 convenience,	 and	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 its	 own	
citizens,	or	of	other	persons	who	are	under	the	protection	of	 its	 laws”.143	Comity	has	
been	 seen	 as	 a	 “protean	 concept	 of	 jurisdictional	 respect”144	and	 in	 international	
litigation	has	very	often	been	applied	–	 in	 its	meaning	of	adjudicatory	comity	–	as	a	
form	 of	 deference	 towards	 the	 work	 of	 other	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 i.e.	 recognizing	
decisions	 issued	by	 other	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 refraining	 from	 judging	on	 a	 dispute	
that	is	being	already	judged	in	another	forum	(in	this	regard	comity	is	very	similar	to	
forum	non	conveniens)	and	refraining	from	issuing	order	which	can	interfere	with	the	
jurisdiction	of	another	forum	(i.e.	anti-suit	 injunctions,	on	which	see	Paragraph	2.2.2	
below).	 In	 international	 arbitration,	 comity	 could	 be	 a	 form	 of	 deference	 that	 one	
tribunal	 recognizes	 to	 other	 tribunals,	 refraining	 from	 exercising	 its	 jurisdiction145	
(and/or,	as	it	will	be	seen	below,	from	issuing	anti-suit	injunctions).		
Some	Authors146	believe	that	these	techniques	share	the	same	rationale,	i.e.	to	
respect	jurisdiction	of	other	arbitrators	in	parallel	cases,	while	others147	have	stressed	
that	forum	non	conveniens	is	devoted	more	to	the	interests	of	the	parties	(i.e.	there	is	a	
more	 appropriate	 forum	 for	 both	 of	 them	 to	 celebrate	 the	 proceedings),	 while	
international	comity	would	be	exercised	in	view	of	the	good	relationship	between	two	
national	 legal	 systems.	Considering	 that	 they	have	different	origins148	and	 that	 they	
are	 applied	 in	 different	 national	 systems, 149 	we	 will	 deal	 separately	 with	 their	
																																																													
140	Hartley,	International	Commercial	Litigation	(2015),	205	and	ss.	See	also	Childress,	Virginia	Journal	of	
International	Law	(2012),	157	and	ss.	
141	This	approach	seems	the	one	taken	by	Lowe	(1999)	(n.	137),	191	and	ss.	
142	159	U.S.	113,	164	(1895).	
143	On	the	concept	of	comity,	see	Watson,	Joseph	Story	and	the	Comity	of	Errors	(1991),	1	and	ss.,	Paul,	
Harvard	International	Law	Journal	(1991),	1	and	ss.,	Paul,	Law	and	Contemporary	Problems	(2008),	19	
and	 ss.,	 Childress,	 University	 of	 California	 Davis	 (20109,	 11	 and	 ss.,	 Dodge,	 Columbia	 Law	 Review	
(2015),	1	and	ss.,	Bleimaier,	The	Catholic	Lawyer	(1979),	327	and	ss.	
144	Quaak	v.	Klynveld	Peat	Marwick	Goerdeler	Bedrijfservisoren,	361	F.3d	11,	at	19	(1st.	Cir.	2004)	
145	Shany,	 Regulating	 Jurisdictional	 Relations	 (2007),	 166	 has	 said	 that	 exercising	 comity	 means	 “to	
defer,	when	appropriate,	to	other	courts	and	to	treat	their	procedures	and	decisions	with	courtesy	and	
respect”.	
146	Jansen	Calamita,	U.	Pa.	Journal	of	International	Economic	Law	(2006),	606.		
147	Pauwelyn,	Salles,	(2009),	(n.	139)	112.	
148	Forum	non	conveniens	developed	first	of	all	in	Scottish	courts	and	has	then	been	applied	in	England	
pursuant	 to	 the	 1987	House	of	Lords’	decision	 in	Spiliada	Maritime	Corporation	 v.	Cansulex	 [1987]	AC	
460.	See,	for	a	detailed	analysis	of	this	evolution,	Hartley	(2015)	(n.	140),	205	and	ss.	For	the	origins	of	
the	concept	of	comity,	it	is	necessary	to	refer	to	Authors	cited	in	footnote	143	above.	
149	Comity	 is	mainly	 applied	 by	 US	 Courts.	 In	 other	 jurisdictions	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 find	 the	 concept	 of	
“reciprocal	respect”.	
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suitability	to	offer	a	valuable	remedy	to	the	problems	raised	by	parallel	proceedings	in	
international	law.			
With	 regard	 to	 forum	 non	 conveniens,	 it	 immediately	 emerged	 that	 this	
doctrine	is	“almost	exclusively	known	in	common	law	systems	and	it	could	be	difficult	
to	sell	it	as	a	general	principle	of	law”.150	As	a	consequence,	it	is	questionable	whether	
and	 according	 to	which	 law	 (or	 powers)	 arbitrators	 should	 be	 entitled	 to	 apply	 this	
doctrine.	This	question	could	be	answered	making	reference	to	the	inherent	powers	of	
arbitral	tribunals,	but	–	due	to	the	lack	of	case	law	regarding	the	application	of	forum	
non	 conveniens	 by	 international	 tribunals	 –	 there	 is	 not	 still	 a	 clear	 answer	 to	 it.151	
Secondly,	and	most	 importantly,	forum	non	conveniens	 is	by	nature	a	doctrine	which	
involves	 a	 very	 high	 amount	 of	 discretion	 by	 decision	 makers. 152 	Therefore,	
sometimes	 forum	 non	 conveniens	 could	 be	 wisely	 used	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 parallel	
proceedings,	 but	 in	 other	 cases	 the	 result	 could	 be	 opposite.	 This	means	 that	 such	
discretion	results	in	the	non	reliability	of	the	doctrine	to	solve	the	problems	related	to	
parallel	 proceedings,	 due	 to	 the	 non	 predictability	 of	 what	 the	 judge	 will	 deem	
appropriate	to	do	(“to	stay	or	not	to	stay?”,	we	could	say!)	in	the	interest	of	justice.	For	
the	 above	 considerations,	 we	 cannot,	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 present	 author,	 look	 at	
forum	 non	 conveniens	 as	 a	 possible	 general	 remedy	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	
international	arbitration.153	
With	 regard	 to	 international	 comity,	 the	 discourse	 is	 similar.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	
doubtful	whether,	being	mainly	applied	in	the	US	national	law	system,	comity	is	also	
part	 of	 international	 law	 and	 can	 therefore	 be	 freely	 applied	 by	 arbitrators.	
Furthermore,	 it	cannot	be	 ignored	that,	even	 in	national	 legal	systems,	 international	
comity	has	sometimes	been	strongly	criticized154	as	a	very	vague	principle	 that	does	
not	constitute	any	guidance	for	judges.	According	to	these	critics,	as	a	consequence,	
international	 comity	 could	 not	 offer	 any	 form	 of	 regulation	 in	 case	 of	 parallel	
proceedings.	Even	though	the	present	author	has	already	expressed	the	opinion	that	
national	judges	should	use	the	concept	of	comity	in	order	to	limit	the	issuance	of	anti-
suit	 injunctions,155	it	 is	 extremely	 doubtful	 whether	 the	 concept	 of	 comity	 can	 be	 a	
valid	tool	 in	order	to	prohibit	an	international	arbitrator	by	exercising	its	 jurisdiction.	
																																																													
150	Pauwelyn,	Salles	(2009)	(n.	139),	110.	For	the	application	of	forum	non	conveniens	around	the	world	
see	Fawcett	(ed.),	Declining	Jurisdiction	in	Private	International	Law	(1995),	1	and	ss.	
151	The	 question	 is	 partially	 answered	 (it	 seems	 in	 the	 negative)	 by	 Linton,	 Tiba,	 Chicago	 Journal	 of	
International	Law	(2009),	423-424.	
152	The	doctrine	(and	the	discretion	that	it	involves)	has	been	analyzed	by	a	moltitude	of	Authors.	See,	
inter	alia,	Zenjie,	Netherlands	International	Law	Review	(2009),	143	and	ss.,	Heiser,	Kansas	Law	Review	
(2008),	 609	 and	 ss.,	Hicks,	 Review	of	 Litigation	 (2009),	 659,	Hill,	 Vanderbilt	 Journal	 of	 Transnational	
Law	(2008),	1177	and	ss.,	Juratowich,	International	and	Comparative	Law	Quarterly	(2014),	477	and	ss..	
153	This	opinion	is	shared	by	Zoppo	(2013),	224-226	and	Virzo,	Il	regolamento	delle	controversie	nel	diritto	
del	mare:	rapporti	tra	procedimenti	(2008),	269	and	ss.	
154	See	Mann,	 Foreign	 Affairs	 in	 English	 Courts	 (1986),	 136,	 Tan,	 Virginia	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	
(2005),	303	and	ss.	This	last	Author	has	defined	comity	as	“amorphous”	and	has	stated	that	it	shall	be	
regarded	“simply	as	a	cautionary	 reminder”.	 Judge	Cardozo	called	comity	“a	misleading	word”	which	
“has	been	fertile	in	suggesting	a	discretion	unregulated	by	general	principles”.	See	Loucks	v.	Standard	
Oil	Co.	of	New	York,	120	N.E.	198,	201	(N.Y.	1918).	
155	Zarra,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	privato	e	processuale	(2014),	561	and	ss.	
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Indeed,	as	in	the	case	of	forum	non	conveniens,	suspending	proceedings	on	the	basis	of	
comity	 is	a	mere	exercise	of	discretion	of	the	arbitrator,	based	on	his	sensibility	as	a	
lawyer,	 and	 not	 the	 consequence	 of	 the	 application	 of	 a	 precise	 rule.156	Hence,	 it	 is	
possible	 to	 conclude	 that	 there	 is	 no	 rule	 of	 international	 law	 that	 imposes	 the	
suspension	of	proceedings	to	an	arbitrator.157	This	is	confirmed	by	the	very	incoherent	
case	law	of	investment	Tribunals	with	regard	to	the	issue	of	suspension.	While	in	the	
SPP	v.	Egypt158	and	SGS	v.	Philippines159	cases	the	Tribunals,	even	if	recognizing	that	
there	is	no	international	 law	rule	which	compelled	them	to	do	so,	operated	a	stay	of	
proceedings	pending	 a	 prior	 dispute	 in	 another	 forum,	 in	 other	 cases	 tribunals	 have	
“either	 explicitly	 or	 implicitly	 refused	 to	 stay	 proceedings	 in	 favour	 of	 a	 contractual	
forum”.160	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above	 (and	 of	 the	 still	 doubtful	 question	 of	 the	 discretion	 of	
arbitrators	of	staying	arbitral	proceedings),	even	if	when	applied	comity	can	be	a	valid	
form	 of	 coordination	 among	 tribunals,	 it	 is	 highly	 questionable	 that	 international	
comity	may	be	proposed	as	a	solution	for	the	issues	related	to	parallel	proceedings	in	
investment	arbitration.161	
	
2.2.2 Arbitral	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 and	 the	 infringement	 of	 kompetenz-
kompetenz	
																																																													
156	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	211-212,	seems	to	treat	comity	as	a	rule	that	in	some	cases	could	impose	to	
arbitrators	to	stay	proceedings.	According	to	his	opinion,	there	are	certain	situations	in	which	there	is	a	
presumption	in	favor	of	a	stay	and	in	which	arbitrators	should	not	hesitate	to	do	so.		
157	This	critic	 is	shared	by	Cannizzaro,	European	Journal	of	Legal	Studies	 (2007),	stating	that	the	 legal	
basis	of	comity	and	judicial	discretion	are	“uncertain”	and	their	content	“indeterminate”.	
158	Southern	Pacific	Properties	(Middle	East)	Limited	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/84/3,	
Decision	on	Jurisdiction	 I,	27	November	1985,	paras.	53-56.	This	 is	a	 real	case	of	comity	between	two	
international	Tribunals,	due	to	the	fact	that	the	ICSID	Tribunal	staid	the	proceedings	pending	before	it	
waiting	for	the	termination	of	an	already	pending	 ICC	arbitration,	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	“when	
the	 jurisdictions	of	 two	unrelated	and	 independent	 tribunals	 extend	 to	 the	 same	dispute,	 there	 is	no	
rule	of	international	law	which	prevents	either	tribunal	from	exercising	its	jurisdiction.	However,	in	the	
interest	of	 international	 judicial	order,	either	of	the	tribunals	may,	 in	 its	discretion	and	as	a	matter	of	
comity,	decide	to	stay	the	exercise	of	its	jurisdiction	pending	a	decision	by	the	other	tribunal.	
159	See	n.	25	above.	According	to	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	11),	213,	“The	majority	of	the	tribunal,	while	finding	
that	it	had	jurisdiction	with	regard	to	the	investor’s	claims	under	the	treaty’s	umbrella	clause,	took	the	
view	that	the	contractual	dispute	resolution	provision	should	nevertheless	be	given	effect,	and	decided	
to	 stay	 the	 proceedings	 so	 that	 the	 Philippine	 courts	 could	 render	 a	 decision	 on	 the	 underlying	
contractual	issues,	In	doing	so,	the	tribunal	seemed	to	base	itself	both	on	the	principle	of	comity	and	on	
consideration	of	estoppel	and	the	prohibition	of	venire	contra	factum	proprium”.	
160	Wehland	 (2013)	 (n.	 11),	 213.	 This	 situation	 has	 very	 often	 arisen	 in	 case	 of	 treaty	 claims	 before	
investment	 tribunals	 and	 contract	 claims	before	national	 courts	 (which	are	not	part	of	our	 research).	
See	Holiday	Inns	v.	Morocco,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/72/1,	unpublished	decision	mentioned	by	Schreuer	et	
al.	(2009)	(n.	14),	364.	In	this	case	the	Tribunals,	while	refusing	to	stay	its	proceedings,	emphasized	the	
supremacy	 of	 international	 proceedings	 over	 purely	 internal	 proceedings.	 See	 also	 CMS	 Gas	
Transmission	Company	v.	The	Republic	of	Argentina,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	Decision	on	Objections	to	
Jurisdiction,	17	July	2003,	para.	76,	Azurix	Corp.	v.	The	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/12,	
Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	8	December	2003,	para.	95,	Eureko	v.	Poland	(UNCITRAL),	Partial	Award	of	19	
August	2005,	para.	114,	BG	Group	v.	Argentina	(UNCITRAL)	Award	of	24	December	2007,	para.	183.	See	
also	several	other	similar	precedents	mentioned	by	Wehland,	213,	footnote	42.	
161	The	above	concerns	are	shared	by	Virzo	(2008)	(n.	153),	265-268.	
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An	 anti-suit	 injunction	 is	 an	 order,	 generally	 issued	 by	 common	 law	 courts,	
which	forbids	a	party	from	commencing	or	continuing	an	action	in	another	jurisdiction	
or	arbitral	tribunal,	before	a	final	determination	of	the	dispute	is	reached	by	the	court	
that	 issued	 the	 injunction.162	In	 case	 a	 party	 does	 not	 comply	 with	 an	 anti-suit	
injunction	issued	by	a	national	court,	such	party	will	be	liable	of	contempt	of	court.163	
Case	 law	 has	 showed	 a	 general	 tendency	 to	 accept	 also	 the	 possibility	 that	
arbitrators	issue	anti-suit	injunctions	to	restrain	a	party	from	going	on	with	a	dispute	
in	a	court	or	in	another	arbitral	tribunal.	For	the	sake	of	the	present	book,	we	will	only	
deal	 with	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 issued	 by	 an	 arbitral	 tribunal	 in	 order	 to	 restrain	
proceedings	pending	in	another	arbitral	tribunal.164	
In	 this	 regard,	 in	 the	 past	 it	 has	 been	 several	 times	 questioned	 whether	
arbitrators	have	the	power	to	issue	anti-suit	injunctions.165	This	criticism	seems	today	
outdated,	due	to	the	fact	that	several	tribunals,	in	particular	within	the	framework	of	
ICSID,	have	issued	anti-suit	 injunctions	to	protect	their	 jurisdictions.166	This	has	been	
considered	as	part	of	the	power	of	arbitral	tribunals	to	 issue	interim	measures.167	On	
																																																													
162	Raphael,	 The	 Anti-suit	 Injunction	 (2008),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Zarra	 (2014)	 (n.	 155),	 561	 and	 ss.,	 Bermann,	
Columbia	 Journal	 of	 Transnational	 Law	 (1990),	 589	 and	 ss.,	 Hartley,	 The	 American	 Journal	 of	
Comparative	Law	(1987),	487	and	ss.,	Atteritano,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(2010),	441	and	ss.,	Gaja,	Rivista	
di	 diritto	 internazionale	 (2009),	 503	 and	 ss.,	 Benedettelli,	 Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2014),	 701	 and	 ss.,	
Goldhaber,	 Stanford	 Journal	 of	 Complex	 Litigation	 (2013),	 376	 and	 ss.,	 Barcelò,	 Cornell	 Law	 Faculty	
Publication	 (2007),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Fisher,	 Bond	 Law	 Review	 (2010),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 Fernandez	 Rozas,	 Anti-suit	
Injunctions	 in	 International	Arbitration	 (2005),	 73	 and	 ss.,	 Fumagalli,	 Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2005),	 583	
and	ss.,	Phull,	 Journal	of	 International	Arbitration	 (2011),	21	and	ss.,	Tan	 (2005)	 (n.	 154),	286	and	ss.,	
Ortolani,	MPILux	Working	Paper	(2015),	1	and	ss.,	Seriki,	 International	Arbitration	Law	Review	(2011),	
19	and	ss.,	Ali,	Nesbitt,	Wessel,	International	Arbitration	Law	Review	(2008),	12	and	ss.,	Chavier,	Suffolk	
Transnational	Law	Journal	(1990-1991),	257	and	ss.	
163	See	Section	37	of	the	English	Supreme	Court	Act	of	1981.	
164	Levy,	IAI	Arbitration	Series	(2005),	Gaillard,	ICCA	Congress	Series	(2007),	235	and	ss.,	Leandro,	Rivista	
di	diritto	internazionale	(2015),	815	and	ss.,	Gaillard,	Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration,	203	
and	ss.	(2006)	
165	Gaillard	 (2007)	 (n.	 164),	 240	 and	 ss.	 The	 reasons	 for	 such	 critics	 are,	 according	 to	Gaillard,	mainly	
three:	(i)	that	it	is	improper	for	arbitral	tribunals	to	address	injunctions	to	State	courts;	(ii)	that	anti-suit	
injunctions	 violate	 the	 kompetenz-kompetenz	 of	 the	 other	 court/tribunal	 involved;	 and	 (iii)	 that	 an	
arbitral	tribunal	 issuing	anti-suit	 injunctions	would	be	a	judge	in	its	own	case.	To	this	circumstances	it	
could	 be	 also	 added	 that,	 as	 noted	 by	 Benedettelli	 (2014)	 (n.	 162),	 706	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 can	 be	
considered	lato	sensu	as	orders	with	a	criminal	sanction	and	therefore	would	be	out	of	the	competence	
of	arbitral	tribunals.	
166	See	 Gaillard	 (2007)	 (n.	 164),	 244	 and	 ss.,	 Goldhaber	 (2013)	 376	 and	 ss.	 The	 reference	 goes	 in	
particular	 to	 Holiday	 Inns	 v.	 Morocco,	 decision	 reported	 by	 Pierre	 Lalive,	 British	 Yearbook	 of	
International	 Law	 (1980),	 134,	Maritime	 International	 Nominees	 Establishment	 (MINE)	 v.	 Republic	 of	
Guinea,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/84/4,	Award	of	6	January	1988,	Ceskoslovaska	Obchodni	Banka	(CSOB)	v.	
Slovak	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/97/4,	 Procedural	 Order	 n.	 2	 of	 9	 September	 1988,	 Procedural	
Order	 n.	 3	 of	 5	 November	 1998	 and	 Procedural	 Order	 n.	 4	 of	 11	 January	 1999,	 Société	 Générale	 de	
Surveillance	S.A.	(SGS)	v.	Islamic	Republic	of	Pakistan,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/13,	Procedural	Order	n.	2	
of	16	October	2002,	Tokios	Tokeles	v.	Ukraine,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/18,	Procedural	Order	n.	1	of	1	July	
2003.	
167	With	 regard	 to	 interim	measures	 in	 ICSID	arbitration,	 see	Luttrell,	Arbitration	 International	 (2015),	
394	and	ss.,	while	concerning	international	commercial	arbitration	see	Drahozal,	 International	Council	
for	Commercial	Arbitration,	International	Commercial	Arbitration:	Important	Contemporary	Questions	
(2003),	 179	 and	 ss.,	 and	 Carlevaris,	 La	 tutela	 cautelare	 nell’arbitrato	 internazionale	 (2006),	 1	 and	 ss.,	
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this	 point,	 it	 seems	 therefore	worth	 to	 borrow	 the	words	 of	who	 said	 that	 “arbitral	
anti-suit	 injunctions	 are	 admissible	 and	 legitimate	 if	 they	 are	mentioned	within	 the	
arbitration	rules	of	the	arbitral	seat	or	within	the	selected	institutional	rules.	Anyway,	
the	 possible	 unfulfilment	 of	 arbitral	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 does	 not	 involve	 criminal	
sanctions	 both	 because	 arbitral	 tribunals	 do	 not	 have	 this	 power	 and	 because	
‘contempt’	 is	a	 form	of	non	compliance	with	orders	 issued	by	public	authorities	and	
not	 by	 arbitral	 tribunals.	 The	 remedy	 against	 unfulfilment	 of	 arbitral	 anti-suit	
injunctions	can	therefore	only	be	damages”.168	
Hence,	assuming	that	anti-suit	injunctions	can	be	issued	by	arbitral	tribunals,	it	
is	now	worth	considering	the	advisability	of	the	issuance	of	such	orders.	In	this	regard,	
it	is	worth	noting	that	anti-suit	injunctions	are	in	personam	orders,	which,	in	principle,	
should	 not	 interfere	 with	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 other	 arbitral	 tribunal.	 On	 the	
contrary,	 however,	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 strongly	de	 facto	 interfere	
with	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 second	 tribunal,	 due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 –	 in	 case	 the	
compelled	 party	 decides	 to	 stop	 the	 proceedings	 before	 it	 –	 its	 jurisdiction	 will	 be	
affected	 by	 an	 order	 of	 another	 tribunal.169	This	 is,	 in	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 present	
Author,	a	clear	and	undue	interference	with	the	kompetenz-kompetenz	of	the	second	
arbitral	tribunal.	As	stated	by	Levy,	“it	is	a	fundamental	principle	that	each	[Court	or]	
arbitral	tribunal	has	 jurisdiction	to	rule	on	its	own	jurisdiction	or,	 in	other	words,	has	
kompetenz-kompetenz”.170	In	a	previous	paper,	the	present	Author	has	already	stated	
that	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 should	 be	 only	 issued	 by	 national	 courts	 in	 extreme	
circumstance	and	 that	 judges	 should	exercise	a	 very	 strong	 restraint	 in	 issuing	 such	
orders	(against	other	national	proceedings)	due	to	reasons	of	adjudicatory	comity.171	
Transposing	 this	 idea	 in	 the	 field	 of	 international	 arbitration,	 the	 present	 Author	
argues	that	international	arbitrators	cannot	issue	anti-suit	injunctions	without	unduly	
interfering	with	 the	kompetenz-kompetenz	 of	 another	 arbitral	 tribunal	 and	 therefore	
should	absolutely	refrain	from	doing	so.172	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Kaufmann	 Kohler,	 Antonietti,	Arbitration	 Under	 International	 Investment	 Agreements:	 A	Guide	 to	 Key	
Issues	(2010),	507	and	ss.,	DeBattista	(2008).	
168	Leandro,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(2015),	818.		
169	See	Atteritano	(2010)	(n.	162),	450-451	who	says:	“I	do	not	feel	comfortable	with	the	theory	of	the	in	
personam	nature	 of	 anti-suit	 injunctions.	 (…)	 I	 think	 that	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 (…)	 generate	 a	 certain	
disequilibrium	between	the	 two	 judges	which	 is	not	 justified	by	 the	New	York	Convention	and	which	
generates	also	a	strong	disequilibrium	between	the	parties	involved	in	the	arbitrations”.	
170	Levy	(2005)	(n.	164),	117.	The	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz	is	unanimously	considered	as	the	
fundamental	 basis	 of	 arbitral	 jurisdiction	 and	 is	worldwide	 recognized	 as	 such.	 See,	 on	 this	 principle	
Lew,	Mistelis,	Kroll,	(2003)	(n.	79),	129	and	ss.	
171	Zarra	(2014)	(n.	155),	571	and	ss.	
172	Benedettelli	 (2014)	 (n.	 162),	 732.	 See	 also	 Atteritano	 (2010)	 (n.	 162),	 seems	 to	 share	 this	 opinion	
when	 he	 says:	 “We	 can	 say	 that	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 are	 in	 personam	 and	 not	 directed	 to	 the	 other	
judge;	we	 can	 say	 that	 they	are	based	on	 considerations	of	 convenience	due	 to	 the	 relationship	of	 a	
certain	forum	with	the	dispute;	we	can	say	that	anti-suit	injunctions	could	be	helpful	for	the	prosecution	
of	the	arbitration,	but	the	final	result	is	always	the	same:	a	judge	imposes	his	opinion	to	another	judge!”	
and	 this	 is	 against	 the	principle	 of	 kompetenz-kompetenz.	According	 to	Gaillard	 (2007)	 (n.	 164),	 261	
and	ss.,	the	opportunity	to	issue	an	anti-suit	injunction	should	be	evaluated	on	a	case	by	case	basis.	
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Moreover,	 even	 if	 we	 would	 admit	 that	 anti-suit	 injunctions	 could	 be	 easily	
issued	 in	 international	 arbitration,	 case	 law	 shows	 that	 the	 arbitral	 tribunals	 (the	
proceedings	of	which	should	be,	as	already	stated,	de	facto	affected	by	the	order)	can	
simply	ignore	an	anti-suit	injunction	and	go	on	with	the	proceedings.173	It	is	therefore	
strongly	arguable	that	the	efficacy	of	anti-suit	injunctions	is	very	limited,	because	the	
same	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz	has	the	consequence	that	arbitrators	are	free	
to	 determine	 their	 jurisdiction	 and	 to	 ignore	 any	 order	 aimed	 at	 influencing	 such	
jurisdiction.	This	 is	 perfectly	demonstrated	by	 the	Salini	 v.	 Ethiopia174	case,	 in	which	
the	arbitral	tribunal	completely	ignored	an	anti-suit	injunction	issued	by	the	Court	of	
Addis	Abeba,	 stating	 that	an	arbitral	 tribunal	 is	only	 subject	 to	party	autonomy	and	
cannot	be	influenced	by	the	decisions	of	other	courts	or	tribunals.	A	similar	conclusion	
was	 reached	 in	 several	 other	 cases, 175 	including	 the	 already	 mentioned	 SGS	 v.	
Pakistan,	where	the	 ICSID	Tribunal	completely	 ignored	an	anti-suit	 injunction	 issued	
by	 the	 Court	 of	 Islamabad.176	This	 position	 has	 also	 been	 confirmed	 by	 the	 English	
House	of	Lords	in	Donohue	v.	Armco,177	when	it	said	that	“the	risk	inherent	in	an	anti-
suit	 injunction,	 if	 it	 is	unwisely	granted,	 is	that	 it	will	not	succeed	in	stopping	a	party	
(…)	nor	dissuade	the	courts	of	other	countries	from	entertaining	the	litigation”.	
Finally,	even	if	we	would	be	inclined	to	admit	that	anti-suit	injunctions	could	be	
a	useful	 tool	 to	avoid	parallel	 proceedings	 in	 investment	arbitration,	we	 should	also	
consider	that	such	orders	are	completely	based	on	a	discretionary	exercise	of	power	
by	the	arbitrators	and	it	 is	not	possible	to	rely	in	advance	on	the	issuance	of	an	anti-
suit	 injunction	 (indeed,	 they	 could	 be	 considered	 the	 reverse	 side	 of	 the	 coin	 with	
regard	to	forum	non	conveniens).	
For	 all	 the	 above	 reasons,	 in	 conclusion,	 it	 is	 strongly	 arguable	 that	 anti-suit	
injunctions	 are	 not	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 manage	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	
	
2.3 Conclusions	
	
The	 present	 Chapter	 has	 highlighted	 the	 unsuitability	 to	 solve	 the	 issue	 of	
parallel	proceedings	of	all	the	remedies	that	are	applicable	at	the	jurisdictional	phase	
of	 investment	 arbitration.	 As	 we	 have	 tried	 to	 demonstrate,	 in	 the	 current	 legal	
framework,	 jurisdiction	 is	 necessarily	 based	 on	 consent	 and	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 to	
																																																													
173	Tan	 (2006)	 (n.	 154),	 305,	 Gaja	 (2009)	 (n.	 162),	 506,	 Hill,	 Chong,	 International	 Commercial	 Disputes	
(2010),	375.	Another	possibility	is	that	a	battle	of	anti-suit	injunctions,	anti-anti-suit	injunctions	and	so	
on	begins.	With	this	regard	see	Schimek,	Baylor	Law	Review	(1993),	499	and	ss.	
174	ICC	Case	No.	10623/AER/ACS.	
175	See	Companhia	Paranaense	de	Energia-COPEL	v.	UEG	Araucaria	Ltda,	ICC	Case	No.	12656/KGA/CCO,	
reported	in	Quass	Duarte,	Antitrust	and	Unfair	Competition	Law	(2010),	21.	The	Tribunal	stated:	“as	the	
parties	 have	 agreed	 that	 this	 Tribunal	 has	 its	 judicial	 seat	 in	Paris	 and	 therefore	 is	 subject	 to	 French	
arbitration	law,	any	decision	of	a	Brazilian	court	or	any	other	court	as	to	the	validity	of	the	arbitration	
agreement	is	not	binding	on	the	Tribunal”.	
176	For	other	cases,	see	Zarra	(2014)	(n.	155),	579	and	ss.	
177	I.L.Pr.	21	(2000).	
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imagine	a	situation	in	which	arbitrators	extend	consent	beyond	the	boarders	set	forth	
by	the	parties.	All	the	theories	based	on	a	research	of	implicit	consent	(e.g.	the	group	
of	 companies	 doctrine)	 have	 been	 strongly	 criticized	 and	 the	 theories	 which	 try	 to	
bypass	 at	 all	 the	 research	 of	 consent	 (such	 as	 Brekoulakis’s	 theory)	 miss	 the	 real	
framework	of	arbitral	jurisdiction.		
As	 a	 consequence,	 remedies	 such	 as	 consolidation	 and	 joinder	 cannot	 be	
considered	as	general	solutions	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings,	due	to	the	fact	
that,	as	we	have	tried	to	demonstrate,	it	is	highly	probable	that	one	of	the	parties	will	
not	 give	 its	 consent	 to	 these	 form	 of	 coordination.	 Furthermore	 –	 and	 most	
importantly	–	 ICSID	Convention	and	Rules	are	completely	silent	on	the	possibility	to	
coordinate	parallel/multiple	proceedings	or	 to	 join	 third	parties	 and	 this	means	 that	
the	 only	 plausible	 solution	 is	 quasi-consolidation	 (that,	 indeed,	 seems	 the	 only	 one	
that	has	been	applied	in	a	certain	number	of	cases).	Such	remedy,	as	we	have	tried	to	
demonstrate	above,	does	not	give	any	certainty	on	the	effective	coordination	of	the	
solutions	 of	 the	 two	 parallel	 cases.	 On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 majority	 of	
investment	 arbitrations	 are	 held	 in	 the	 ICSID	 framework,	 we	 are	 today	 stuck	 in	 a	
situation	 of	 total	 lack	 of	 rules	 providing	 for	 coordination	 of	 proceedings	 and/or	
possible	involvement	of	third	parties.	
The	current	situation	in	investment	arbitration	is	therefore	one	in	which	ICSID	
arbitration	does	not	provide	for	any	form	of	solution	to	parallel	proceedings,	while	ad	
hoc	 arbitration	 is	 by	 nature	more	 consensual	 (i.e.	 similar	 to	 commercial	 arbitration)	
and	therefore	still	strictly	anchored	to	the	impossibility	to	extend	the	proceedings	to	
third	parties	without	consent	by	all	of	them.	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 having	 examined	 the	 unsuitability	 of	 existing	 rules	 to	
solve	the	issue	at	stake,	it	is	necessary	to	try	to	find	a	solution	to	parallel	proceedings	
in	 the	 framework	 of	 general	 international	 law,	 which,	 as	 it	 will	 be	 demonstrate,	 is	
always	to	be	considered	applicable	in	investment	arbitration.	This	will	be	the	task	that	
will	be	carried	out	in	Chapter	3.	
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SECTION	2	
Remedies	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings	
	
Chapter	3	
Abuse	of	process,	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel:	the	available	tools	against	parallel	
proceedings	
	
Chapter	1	and	2	have	tried	to	demonstrate	that	there	is	no	general	remedy	to	
parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration	to	be	applied	at	the	jurisdictional	phase	
of	 arbitral	 proceedings.	 As	 we	 have	 seen,	 this	 is	 not	 surprising.	 Jurisdiction	 in	
arbitration	 is	 mainly	 regulated	 by	 party	 autonomy	 and	 there	 is	 no	 chance	 for	
arbitrators	 to	 decline	 a	 validly	 conferred	 jurisdiction	 in	 case	 of	 parallel	 proceedings.	
Similarly,	we	have	demonstrated	that	it	is	not	possible	to	rely	on	tools,	such	as	forum	
non	 conveniens	 and	 comity,	which	 are	 solely	 based	 on	 the	 discretion	 of	 arbitrators.	
Anti-suit	injunctions,	in	turn,	seem	to	run	against	the	basis	of	the	whole	international	
arbitration	law,	the	principle	of	kompetenz-kompetenz.	
However,	 this	 cannot	 be	 the	 end	 of	 the	 story.	 We	 have	 demonstrated	 that	
several	 policy	 considerations	 (i.e.	 reliability	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 arbitration	 as	 an	
adjudication	 process,	 judicial	 economy,	 efficiency	 and	 finality)	 impose	 to	 avoid	 and	
limit	 parallel	 proceedings.	 If	 such	 policy	 considerations	 cannot	 find	 a	 place	 when	
arbitrators	 consider	 their	 jurisdiction,	 this	 does	 not	mean	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 kept	
into	account	at	a	later	stage	in	the	proceedings,	i.e.	the	admissibility	phase.	
Indeed,	it	is	strongly	arguable	that,	if	at	the	admissibility	stage	arbitrators	have	
–	 as	 recognized	 by	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 authors	 and	 tribunals	 –	 inherent	 powers	 in	
order	 to	 safeguard	 the	 good	 administration	 of	 justice	 and	 to	 ensure	 the	 proper	
exercise	of	 the	 judicial	 function,	 such	 inherent	powers	 shall	be	exercised	by	 them	 in	
order	 to	 prevent	 and	 preclude	 the	 continuation	 of	 parallel	 proceedings.	 The	 good	
administration	 of	 justice	 would	 be	 indeed	 not	 ensured	 if	 general	 principles	 of	
international	 law	 and	 fundamental	 canons	 of	 judicial	 proceedings	 (such	 as	 judicial	
economy)	are	violated	by	the	continuation	of	duplicative	proceedings.	
	 Chapter	3	 is	therefore	aimed	at	finding	a	legal	basis	for	the	application	of	the	
above	 powers	 by	 arbitrators.	 It	 will	 start	 (Paragraph	 3.1)	 with	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	
distinction	between	jurisdiction	and	admissibility	in	investment	arbitration	and	of	the	
possible	sources	of	such	distinction.	 In	order	to	understand	the	law	applicable	at	the	
admissibility	stage,	the	discussion	will	then	move	to	the	analysis	of	the	law	applicable	
in	investment	arbitration	and,	in	particular,	to	the	applicability	of	general	principles	of	
international	law.	It	will	be	demonstrated	that,	at	the	admissibility	phase,	arbitrators	
have	the	inherent	power	to	preclude	the	continuation	of	proceedings	that	are	against	
general	principles	of	international	law	(Paragraph	3.2).	
	 After	having	excluded	the	applicability	of	lis	pendens	in	investment	arbitration	
(Paragraph	 3.3),	 the	 analysis	 will	 then	 turn	 on	 the	 specific	 general	 principles	 of	
international	 law	 whose	 violation	 may	 be	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 declaration	 of	
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inadmissibility,	 namely	good	 faith	 and	ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 (Paragraph	 3.4).	Both	of	 these	
principles	 may	 be	 applied	 differently	 and	 may	 be	 specified	 in	 other	 more	 specific	
principles	or	rules.	In	particular,	the	principle	of	good	faith	can	give	rise	to	the	doctrine	
of	abuse	of	process	(analysed	in	Paragraph	3.5),	while	the	ne	bis	in	idem	principle	has	
generated	 the	 principles	 of	 claim	 preclusion	 (analysed	 in	 Paragraph	 3.6)	 and	 issue	
preclusion	 (analysed	 in	Paragraph	3.7).	 In	 fact	 it	will	 be	demonstrated	 that	 abuse	of	
process,	 issue	 estoppel	 and,	 if	 interpreted	broadly,	 res	 judicata	 are	 valuable	 tools	 in	
order	to	avoid,	or	at	least	limit,	the	effects	of	parallel	proceedings.	However,	prior	to	
apply	such	doctrines,	it	is	essential	to	make,	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	a	coordination	of	
any	 of	 them	with	 the	 principle	 of	 due	 process.	 In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 we	will	 firstly	
provide	 the	 abstract	 framework	 of	 any	 of	 these	 doctrines	 and	 then	 make	 an	
assessment	of	the	concrete	ways	in	which	they	can	operate	in	investment	arbitration	
(Paragraph	3.8).	Finally,	and	keeping	into	account	all	the	above	discussion,	a	proposal	
to	 amend	 investment	 arbitration	 rules	 in	 order	 to	 render	 them	more	 effective	 and	
policy	oriented	will	be	made	(Paragraph	3.9).	
	
3.1	 Jurisdiction	and	admissibility.	The	legal	basis	for	the	distinction	and	its	role	in	the	
fight	against	parallel	proceedings	
	
The	 distinction	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 is	 a	 simple	 one:	
“[j]urisdiction	refers	to	the	power	of	a	court	or	judge	to	entertain	an	action,	petition	or	
other	proceeding.	 (…)	By	contrast,	 admissibility	 concerns	 the	power	of	a	 tribunal	 to	
decide	a	case	at	a	particular	point	in	time	in	view	of	possible	temporary	or	permanent	
defects	 of	 the	 claim”.1	Therefore,	 “if	 jurisdiction	 reflects	 legal	 power	 –	 that	 is,	 the	
power	 to	 adjudicate	 a	 dispute”	 –	 rules	 of	 admissibility	 should	 be	 considered	 “as	
pertaining	 to	 the	 terms	 permitting	 an	 international	 court	 to	 decline	 to	 exercise	 its	
legal	 powers.	 In	 other	 words,	 international	 courts	 may	 be	 authorized	 not	 only	 to	
decide	a	 legal	 case,	but	also	 to	decide	not	 to	decide	 it”.2	Hence,	at	 the	admissibility	
stage,	 arbitrators	 keep	 into	 consideration	 “alleged	 impediments	 to	 consideration	of	
the	merits	of	the	dispute	which	do	not	put	into	question	the	investiture	of	the	tribunal	
as	such”.3		
																																																													
1	Waibel,	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	Series,	University	of	Cambridge	(2014),	2.	
2	Shany,	Questions	of	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility	before	International	Courts	(2015),	47.	
3	Paulsson,	Global	Reflections	on	 International	Law,	Commerce	and	Dispute	Resolution	 (2005),	617.	See	
also	Rosenfeld,	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	(2016),	137	and	ss.,	Williams,	The	Oxford	Handbook	
of	 International	 Investment	 Law	 (2008),	 868	 and	 ss.	 It	 is	 worth	 highlighting	 that,	 when	 referring	 to	
inadmissibility	 of	 a	 claim,	 we	 refer	 to	 a	 legal	 of	 preclusion	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 validly	 conferred	
jurisdiction.	This	 is	 the	main	difference	with	comity:	when	a	claim	 is	declared	 inadmissible,	 it	 is	 so	 in	
light	of	the	existence	of	a	legal	reason	(i.e.	a	preclusion)	which	imposes	to	do	so.	On	the	contrary,	when	
jurisdiction	is	declined	for	reasons	of	comity,	the	only	reasoning	at	the	basis	of	the	arbitrators’	choice	is	
their	 sensibility,	 i.e.	 their	 alleged	 respect	 for	 other	 tribunals.	 When	 we	 talk	 about	 comity	 there	 is,	
therefore,	no	legal	 impediment	to	the	exercise	of	 jurisdiction;	 instead,	such	an	impediment	is	present	
when	a	claim	is	declared	inadmissible.	
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A	claim	may	be	declared	inadmissible	when	it	 is	 in	concreto	precluded,	due	to	
legal	impediments	to	hear	that	claim	at	that	time.	On	the	contrary,	a	tribunal	does	not	
have	 jurisdiction	 if,	 in	 abstracto,	 the	 tribunal	 cannot	 hear	 the	 dispute	 at	 hand,	
regardless	 of	 timing	 and	 preclusions.	 Therefore,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 suggested,	 “an	
accurate	approach	is	as	follows:	if	the	objection	concerns	the	power	or	faculty	of	the	
court	or	tribunal	to	deal	with	the	case	as	a	whole	[i.e.	when	the	objection	regards	the	
existence	of	consent	or	the	arbitrability	of	the	dispute],	the	objection	is	jurisdictional;	
if	the	objection	concerns	the	suitability	of	a	particular	claim	to	be	dealt	on	its	merits	at	
a	relevant	procedural	time,	the	objection	regards	the	admissibility	of	a	claim”.4	
It	 should	 be	 noted	 that,	 sometimes,	 in	 investment	 cases,	 the	 distinction	
between	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 has	 been	 denied	 by	 arbitral	 tribunals,	 in	
particular	due	to	the	fact	that	it	does	not	find	support	in	any	relevant	legal	source.5	In	
other	 cases,	 Tribunals	 have	 avoided	 to	make	 such	 a	 distinction,	 stating	 that	 it	 is	 “a	
distinction	without	 difference”,	 i.e.,	 according	 to	 this	 view,	 the	 two	 concepts	would	
allegedly	 coincide.6	These	 criticisms	 seem	 to	 fall	 short.	 As	 confirmed	 by	 several	
sources,7	Tribunals8	and	Authors,9	indeed,	the	two	concepts	are	“as	different	as	night	
and	day”.10		
																																																													
4	Hugues	Arthur,	Anuario	Mexicano	de	Derecho	 International	 (2015),	458.	A	similar	 concept	has	been	
expressed	by	Heiskanen,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2013),	7,	where	he	says	that	“while	jurisdiction	is	about	the	
scope	of	the	State’s	consent	to	arbitrate,	admissibility	is	about	whether	the	claim,	as	presented,	can	or	
should	be	resolved	by	an	international	tribunal,	which	otherwise	has	found	jurisdiction”.	The	dichotomy	
between	jurisdiction	and	admissibility	is	also	accepted	by	Douglas,	The	International	Law	of	Investment	
Claims	 (2009),	135,	according	to	whom	“[f]or	an	 investment	treaty	tribunal	to	proceed	to	adjudge	the	
merits	of	claims	arising	out	of	an	investment,	it	must	have	jurisdiction	over	the	parties	and	the	claims,	
and	the	claims	submitted	to	the	tribunal	must	be	admissible”.	
5	Salini	 Costruttori	 S.p.A.	 and	 Italstrade	 S.p.A.	 v.	 Jordan,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/13,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction,	9	November	2004,	para.	131	and	ss.,	Methanex	Corporation	v.	USA,	UNCITRAL	 (NAFTA),	
Partial	 Award	 on	 Jurisdiction	 and	 Admissibility,	 7	 August	 2002,	 CMS	 Gas	 Transmission	 Company	 v.	
Argentina,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/8,	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 17	 July	 2003,	 para.	 41,	 Bayindir	 v.	
Pakistan,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/29,	Decision	on	Jurisdiciton,	14	November	2005,	paras.	85-87,	Enron	
Corporation	 and	 Ponderosa	 Assets	 L.P.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/3,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction,	14	January	2004,	para.	33,	Consorzio	Groupement	L.E.S.I.	–	Dipenta	v.	Republique	Algerienne	
Democratique	 et	 Populaire,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/03/8,	 Award,	 10	 January	 2005,	 para.	 40.	 For	 other	
references	see	Heiskanen	(2013)	(n.	4),	2,	footnote	2.	
6	Renée	Rose	Levy	and	Gremcitel	S.A.	v.	Republic	of	Perù,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/17,	Award,	9	January	
2015;	 Pac	 Rym	 Cayman	 LLC	 v.	 Republic	 of	 El	 Salvador,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/09/12,	 Decision	 on	 the	
Respondent’s	Jurisdictional	Objections,	1	June	2012.	
7	See	Art.	79	of	the	ICJ	Rules	of	Court,	Art.	44	of	the	Articles	on	State	Responsibility	promulgated	by	the	
International	Law	Commission	and	Art.	35(3)	of	the	ECHR.	
8	Ioan	 Micula,	 Viorel	 Micula,	 S.C.	 European	 Food	 S.A.,	 S.C.	 Starmill	 s.r.l.,	 and	 S.C.	 Multipack	 s.r.l.	 v.	
Romania,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/20,	Decision	on	 Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility,	 24	September	2008,	
para.	63,	Abaclat	and	Others	v.	Argentine	Republic,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/5,	Decision	on	 Jurisdiction	
and	Admissibility,	4	August	2011,	Hochtief	AG	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/31,	Decision	
on	 Jurisdiction,	24	October	2011,	Antoine	Goetz	&	Others	and	S.A.	Affinage	des	Métaux	v.	Republic	of	
Burundi,	ICSID	Case	ARB/01/2,	Award,	21	June	2012,	SGS	Société	Générale	de	Surveillance	v.	Republic	of	
the	 Philippines,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/6,	 Decision	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 on	 Objections	 to	 Jurisdiction,	 29	
January	2004,	Pantechniki	SA	Contractors	&	Engineers	v.	Republic	of	Albania,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/07/21,	
Award,	 30	 July	 2009,	 paras.	 50-68.	 See	 also	Waste	Management	 Inc.	 v.	 United	Mexican	 States,	 ICSID	
Case	 No.	 ARB(AF)/00/3,	 Dissenting	 Opinion	 of	 Keith	 Highet,	 26	 September	 2001,	 para.	 58.	 Several	
other	authorities	are	mentioned	by	Heiskanen	(2015)	(n.	4),	9,	footnote	32.	
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The	legal	foundation	of	the	distinction	between	jurisdiction	and	admissibility	in	
investment	arbitration	may	be	twofold.		
In	 ICSID	arbitration	such	foundation	has	been	found	in	Art.	41(2)	of	the	ICSID	
Convention,	stating	that	“[a]ny	objection	by	a	party	to	the	dispute	that	that	dispute	is	
not	 within	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 Centre,	 or	 for	 other	 reasons	 is	 not	 within	 the	
competence	of	the	Tribunal,	shall	be	considered	by	the	Tribunal	which	shall	determine	
whether	 to	 deal	 with	 it	 as	 a	 preliminary	 question	 or	 to	 join	 it	 to	 the	merits	 of	 the	
dispute”	(emphasis	added).	According	to	Heiskanen	the	word	competence	used	in	Art.	
41	has	to	be	understood	as	a	synonym	of	admissibility.	Indeed,	in	Heiskanen’s	opinion,	
admissibility	 and	 competence	 are	 one	 and	 the	 same	 concept,	 only	 viewed	 from	 a	
different	viewpoint:	one	from	the	perspective	of	the	tribunal	(competence),	the	other	
from	the	perspective	of	a	claim	(admissibility).	
However,	 the	 distinction	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 may	 be	 also	
explained,	in	general	terms,	by	reference	to	the	inherent	powers	of	arbitral	tribunals,11	
i.e.	 the	 powers	 which	 are	 not	 expressly	 provided	 in	 the	 international	 instruments	
regulating	 the	 tribunals’	 jurisdiction	 and	 are	 used	 to	 fill	 in	 the	 lacunae	 of	 such	
instruments.12	The	existence	of	 inherent	powers	has	found	broad	acceptance	both	in	
the	 case	 law13 	and	 in	 scholarship,14 	so	 that	 it	 has	 been	 said	 that	 “the	 general	
application	by	courts	and	tribunals	of	the	notion	of	inherent	powers	may	warrant	the	
conclusion	 that	 a	 general	 principle	 has	 gradually	 taken	 shape	 in	 international	 law,	
whereby	international	judicial	bodies	may	exercise	those	powers	that	prove	necessary	
for	guaranteeing	the	sound	administration	of	justice	and	protecting	their	legal	nature”	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
9	See,	 inter	 alia,	 Fitzmaurice,	The	 Law	 and	 Procedure	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 vol.	 2,	 439	
(1986),	 Gouiffés,	 Ordonez,	 Arbitration	 International	 (2015),	 107	 and	 ss.,	 Salles,	 Forum	 Shopping	 in	
International	Adjudication	 (2014),	141	and	ss.,	Shany	 (2015)	 (n.	2),	47	and	ss.,	Newcombe,	Evolution	 in	
Investment	Treaty	Law	and	Arbitration	(2011),	187	and	ss.,	Briggs,	The	American	Journal	of	International	
Law	(1985),	373	and	ss.,	Waibel	(2014)	(n.	1),	2	and	ss.,	Heiskanen	(2013)	(n.	4),	1	and	ss.	(the	Author,	at	
3,	 footnote	11	 indicates	several	other	references),	Walters,	Journal	of	 International	Arbitration	(2012),	
651	 and	 ss.,	 Potestà,	 Sobat,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Dispute	 Settlement	 (2012),	 137	 and	 ss.	 Zeiler,	
International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century,	77	and	ss.,	at	91	seems	to	recognize	the	distinction	
in	general	terms,	but	expresses	doubts	on	its	applicability	in	investment	arbitration.	
10	Paulsson	 (2005)	 (n.	 3),	 603.	 See	 also	 De	 Brabandere,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Dispute	 Settlement	
(2012),	616.	
11	The	 foundation	 of	 the	 distinction	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 has	 been	 found	 in	 the	
tribunals’	inherent	powers	by	Newcombe	(2011)	(n.	9),	194,	and	by	Shany	(2015)	(n.	2),	50.	
12 	For	 a	 detailed	 history	 of	 the	 development	 of	 this	 concept	 see	 Brown,	 British	 Yearbook	 of	
International	Law	(2006),	205	and	ss.	
13	See,	inter	alia,	PCIJ,	Mavrommatis	Palestine	Concessions	(Greece	v.	UK),	PCIJ	Rep	Series	A	No.	2	(1924)	
I,	16;	ICJ,	Legality	of	the	Use	of	Force	(Serbia	and	Montenegro	v.	Belgium)	(Preliminary	Objections)	(2005),	
44	ILM	299;	ICJ,	Nuclear	Tests	(Australia	v.	France)	(1974)	ICJ	Rep	253,	259-260;	ICJ,	Nuclear	Tests	(New	
Zealand	v.	France)	(1974)	ICJ	Rep	457,	463;	ad	hoc	arbitration,	Rio	Grande	Irrigation	and	Land	Company,	
6	RIAA	131,	135-6	(UK-US,	1923).	
14	See,	inter	alia,	Palombino,	La	Comunità	Internazionale	(2004),	708	and	ss.,	Brown	(2006)	(n.	12),	195	
and	ss.,	Mitchell,	Heaton,	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	(2010),	561	and	ss.,	Pierini,	University	
of	Catania	–	Online	Working	Legal	Paper	(2015),	1	and	ss.,	Weiss,	International	Investment	Law	for	the	
21st	Century	(2009),	185	and	ss.,	Orakhelashvili,	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	(2007),	36.	
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(emphasis	 in	 original).15	Indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 necessity	 to	 ensure	 that	 judicial	
bodies	properly	exercise	their	 function	fully	 justifies	the	possibility	that	 international	
courts	and	tribunals	have	powers	that	are	not	explicitly	conferred	to	them,	in	order	to	
grant	the	good	administration	of	justice.16		
This	 idea	 has	 found	 support	 also	 in	 international	 investment	 arbitration.17	In	
this	regard,	it	is	worth	noting	that	there	is	explicit	legal	foundation	for	the	existence	of	
inherent	 powers	 in	 ICSID	 arbitration	 (i.e.	 Article	 44	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Convention18	and	
Article	 19	 of	 the	 ICSID	 Arbitration	 Rules).19	The	 same	 can	 be	 said	 with	 regard	 to	
UNCITRAL	Rules20	and	other	 institutional	 rules.21	Several	policy	considerations	 (such	
																																																													
15	Gaeta,	Man’s	 Inhumanity	 to	Man	 (2003),	 367.	There	 is	no	 such	broad	commonality	of	opinions	with	
regard	 to	 the	 sources	 of	 such	 inherent	 powers.	 The	 following	 opinions	 have	 emerged:	 (i)	 inherent	
powers	can	be	derived	from	general	principles	of	rules	of	international	law.	See	Inter-American	Court	of	
Human	 Rights,	Genie	 Lacayo	 (Request	 for	 Review	 of	 the	 Judgment	 of	 29	 January	 1997),	 Order	 of	 13	
September	1997;	(ii)	 inherent	powers	are	to	be	considered	as	a	category	of	implied	powers.	Such	idea	
has	been	strongly	criticized	due	to	the	fact	that	 implied	powers	pertain	to	international	organizations	
and	 not	 to	 international	 courts	 (see	 Gaeta,	 at	 362);	 (iii)	 inherent	 powers	 are	 to	 be	 considered	 as	
functional	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 the	 judicial	 function	 and	 are	 aimed	 at	 guaranteeing	 the	 proper	
administration	of	justice	and	the	effectiveness	of	the	courts’	jurisdiction.	The	last	opinion	is	the	one	that	
has	gained	the	biggest	support.	See	Palombino	(2004)	(n.	14),	714-715.	The	same	definition	of	the	word	
“inherent”	(i.e.,	according	to	the	Oxford	English	Dictionary),	 i.e.	“something	belonging	to	the	intrinsic	
nature	of	that	which	is	spoken	of”,	seems	to	support	this	idea.	
16 	The	 concept	 of	 “la	 bonne	 administration	 de	 la	 justice”	 has	 been	 deeply	 studied	 by	 Kolb,	
L’Observateur	des	Nations	Unies	(2009),	5	and	ss.	and	Sakai,	Japanese	Yearbook	of	International	Law	
(2012),	 110	 and	 ss.	 Kolb	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 international	 courts	 and	 tribunals	 have	 not	 only	 a	
private	 function	 (i.e.	 to	 do	 justice	 between	 the	 parties),	 but	 also	 a	 public	 function	 (i.e.	 to	 grant	 that	
justice	 is	 administrated	 in	 the	 proper	 way).	 This	 public	 function	 is	 the	 main	 foundation	 of	 inherent	
powers	and	can	be	also	found	in	international	investment	tribunals,	which	involve	States	and	therefore	
involve	also	 the	public	 interest.	See	also	Kolb,	The	Statute	of	 the	 International	Court	of	 Justice	 (2012),	
806	and	ss.	
17	See,	 inter	 alia,	 International	 Company	 for	 Railway	 Systems	 (ICRS)	 v.	 Hashemite	 Kingdom	 of	 Jordan,	
ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/09/13,	 Procedural	 Order	 No.	 2,	 9	 July	 2010,	 ConocoPhillips	 Petrozuata	 B.V.,	
ConocoPhillips	Hamaca	B.V.,	ConocoPhillips	Gulf	of	Paria	B.V.,	v.	Bolivarian	Republic	of	Venezuela,	ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/07/30,	Decision	on	Respondent’s	Request	for	Reconsideration,	10	March	2014.	See	also	
McDougall,	Markbaoui,	The	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2014),	1062	and	ss.	Several	other	
authorities	are	mentioned	in	Paparinskis	ssrn.com	(2012),	18	and	ss.,	Topcan,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2014),	
633	and	ss.	The	existence	of	 inherent	powers	 is	also	confirmed	by	the	fact	that	the	 International	Law	
Association	has	dedicated	 to	 the	 study	of	 such	powers	a	biennial	 conference.	See	 ILA,	Report	 for	 the	
Biennial	 Conference	 in	 Washington	 D.C.	 in	 April	 2014	 (2014),	 1	 and	 ss.	 Paparinskis,	 8	 and	 ss.	 has	
explained	 the	 various	 legal	 reasons	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 inherent	 powers	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	
18	“Any	arbitration	proceeding	shall	be	conducted	in	accordance	with	the	provisions	of	this	Section	and,	
except	as	the	parties	otherwise	agree,	in	accordance	with	the	Arbitration	Rules	in	effect	on	the	date	on	
which	the	parties	consented	to	arbitration.	If	any	question	of	procedure	arises	which	is	not	covered	by	this	
Section	or	the	Arbitration	Rules	or	any	rules	agreed	by	the	parties,	the	Tribunal	shall	decide	the	question”	
(emphasis	added).		
19	“The	Tribunal	shall	make	the	orders	required	for	the	conduct	of	the	proceeding”.		
20	Art.	17(1)	states	that	“Subject	to	these	Rules,	the	arbitral	tribunal	may	conduct	the	arbitration	in	such	
manner	 as	 it	 considers	 appropriate,	 provided	 that	 the	parties	 are	 treated	with	equality	 and	 that	 at	 an	
appropriate	 stage	 of	 the	 proceedings	 each	 party	 is	 given	 a	 reasonable	 opportunity	 of	 presenting	 its	
case.	 The	 arbitral	 tribunal,	 in	 exercising	 its	 discretion,	 shall	 conduct	 the	 proceedings	 so	 as	 to	 avoid	
unnecessary	 delay	 and	 expense	 and	 to	 provide	 a	 fair	 and	 efficient	 process	 for	 resolving	 the	 parties’	
dispute”	(emphasis	added).		
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as	the	necessity	to	ensure	the	integrity	of	process,	the	promotion	of	fair	and	efficient	
dispute	resolution,	the	interest	of	justice	and	the	interest	of	the	parties)	also	militate	
in	this	sense.	It	seems	therefore	possible	to	say	that	international	arbitration	tribunals	
have	the	power	to	manage	their	proceedings	as	they	deem	appropriate	(provided	that	
they	respect	the	rules	and	regulations	under	which	they	have	been	constituted)	and,	
in	 particular,	 have	 the	 power	 to	 distinguish	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	
phases.22	
At	 the	 admissibility	 stage	 arbitrators	 usually	 consider	 preliminary	 objections,	
i.e.	 the	 questions	 related	 (also)	 to	 the	 merit	 that	 refer	 “to	 prerequisites	 to	 the	
existence	and	development	of	adjudicatory	process”.23	Such	questions	have	a	material	
character	 (i.e.	 they	have	 to	be	 logically	 assessed	before	 the	merits,	 e.g.	 a	 time	bar)	
and	material	effects	 (i.e.	 they	can	potentially	prevent	or	postpone	a	decision	on	 the	
merits,	e.g.	a	claim	whose	discussion	violates	a	general	principle	of	international	law).	
From	 the	 decision	 of	 preliminary	 questions	 related	 to	 the	merit	 it	 could,	 therefore,	
derive	that	a	tribunal	decides	that	the	discussion	of	some	issues	(or	of	the	entire	claim)	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
21	See,	inter	alia,	Art.	22(2)	of	the	ICC	Rules,	stating	that	“In	order	to	ensure	effective	case	management,	
the	 arbitral	 tribunal,	 after	 consulting	 the	 parties,	 may	 adopt	 such	 procedural	 measures	 as	 it	 considers	
appropriate,	provided	that	they	are	not	contrary	to	any	agreement	of	the	parties”	(emphasis	added)	and	
Art.	 14(5)	 of	 the	 LCIA	 Rules,	 stating	 that	 “The	 Arbitral	 Tribunal	 shall	 have	 the	 widest	 discretion	 to	
discharge	these	general	duties,	subject	to	such	mandatory	law(s)	or	rules	of	law	as	the	Arbitral	Tribunal	
may	decide	to	be	applicable;	and	at	all	times	the	parties	shall	do	everything	necessary	in	good	faith	for	
the	fair,	efficient	and	expeditious	conduct	of	the	arbitration,	including	the	Arbitral	Tribunal’s	discharge	
of	its	general	duties”	(emphasis	added).	
22	According	to	Salles	(2014)	(n.	9),	160	and	ss.,	there	are	three	possible	approaches	to	the	distinction	
between	jurisdiction	and	admissibility.	The	first	approach	does	not	distinguish	at	all	between	the	two	
concepts	and	treats	both	of	them	as	acceptability	of	the	claim	(so-called	“indifference	approach”).	The	
second	 approach	 considers	 jurisdiction	 as	 a	 tribunal-centered	 approach	 and	 admissibility	 as	 a	 claim-
centered	 approach	 (“objectivist	 approach”).	 Finally,	 the	 third	 approach	 says	 that	 all	 evaluations	
centered	 on	 consent	 pertain	 to	 jurisdiction,	 while	 the	 remaining	 reasons	 to	 decline	 a	 claim	 regard	
admissibility	 (“conventionalist-residualist	 approach”).	 In	 the	 opinion	 of	 the	 present	 author	 both	 the	
second	and	the	third	approaches	are	acceptable	and	may	find	support	in	the	case	law	and	in	scholars’	
opinions.	It	is	difficult	here	to	say	if	admissibility	pertains	to	the	merit	phase	of	proceedings	or	whether	
it	constitutes	a	separate	and	autonomous	stage	of	international	process.	In	the	opinion	of	the	present	
author,	also	in	light	of	the	circumstance	that,	as	stated	by	Salles,	at	176,	“admissibility	questions	may	
arise	 under	 general	 principles	 of	 law	 that	 regulate	 resort	 to	 international	 adjudication”	 and	 are	
therefore	governed	by	the	law	applicable	at	the	merit	stage	of	investment	arbitration	proceedings	(i.e.,	
as	we	will	see	in	paragraph	3.2	below,	public	international	law),	admissibility	seems	to	be	a	question	of	
merit.		
23	Salles	(2014)	(n.	9),	110.	On	the	contrary,	“preliminary	objections	are	actions	by	a	party,	notably	the	
respondent,	that	raise	these	prerequisites	for	the	existence	and	development	of	adjudicatory	process”.	
The	same	Author,	at	155,	explains	that	“the	category	of	admissibility	–	a	complement	to	the	category	of	
jurisdiction	 –	 is	 the	 usual	 channel	 for	 preliminary	 objections	 based	 on	 the	 broader	 set	 of	 norms	
governing	the	procedural	rights	and	obligations	of	the	parties”.	
	 112	
is	precluded.24	Such	a	judicial	limitation	of	the	scope	of	the	decision	has	been	defined	
“absorption”.25		
The	 above	 fosters	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 distinction	 between	 jurisdiction	 and	
admissibility	 finds	 support	 also	 in	 the	 canon	 of	 judicial	 economy.26	Indeed,	 the	
existence	 of	 a	 phase	 of	 the	 proceedings	 in	 which	 arbitrators	 deal	 with	 preliminary	
issues	of	merit	that	can	potentially	absorb	the	whole	discussion	on	the	merit,	leading	
to	a	declaration	of	 inadmissibility	of	 the	whole	dispute,	 seems	 to	be	a	good	way	 to	
save	time	and	costs.27	
The	admissibility	stage	has	been	recognized	as	the	policy	tool	that	can	be	used	
in	order	 to	 avoid	 forum	shopping	and	parallel	 proceedings	 “while	 the	 jurisdiction	of	
each	 international	tribunal	and	the	architecture	of	the	 international	 judiciary	are	 left	
untouched”.28	Indeed,	in	this	phase,	by	exercising	their	inherent	powers	and	dismissing	
claims	whose	 continuation	 runs	 against	 the	 good	 administration	 of	 justice,	 arbitrators	
may	 protect	 their	 judicial	 function	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 investment	 arbitration	 as	 a	
whole.	As	noted	by	Shany,	“since	 international	courts	derive	much	of	their	authority	
from	 notions	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 from	 their	 perceived	 role	 as	 guardians	 of	 the	
international	rule	of	law,	allowing	parties	to	adjudication	to	utilize	them	in	ways	that	
violate	 substantive	 procedural	 international	 law	 could	 undermine	 their	 own	
legitimacy”.29	This	 means	 that,	 whenever	 arbitrators	 realize,	 at	 the	 admissibility	
																																																													
24	The	 issue	 of	 preliminary	 questions	 has	 been	 deeply	 studied	 by	 Lamberti	 Zanardi,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	
internazionale	 (1965),	 537	 and	 ss.,	Morelli,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 internazionale	 (1971)	 5	 and	 ss.,	 Sperduti,	
Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(1974),	649	and	ss.,	Morelli,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(1975),	5	and	
ss.	
25	This	expression	is	due	to	Lauterpacht,	The	Development	of	International	Law	by	the	International	Court	
(1958),	77.	As	explained	by	Palombino,	Leiden	Journal	of	International	Law	(2010),	913,	it	is	possible	to	
distinguish	 between	 absorption	 stricto	 sensu	 and	 lato	 sensu.	 The	 first	 “postulates	 a	 certain	 order	
between	the	issues	to	be	decided	–	that	is	the	presence	of	an	issue	which,	as	a	matter	of	logic,	should	
be	analysed	before	the	others;	if	the	decision	as	to	the	former	issue	is	able	to	settle	the	dispute	by	itself	
(absorbing	 issue),	 it	 either	 precludes	 or	 implies	 a	 solution	 to	 the	 latter	 (absorbed	 issue).	 The	 second	
type	 of	 absorption,	 instead,	 takes	 place	 where	 the	 judge	 does	 not	 wish	 to	 enter	 into	 a	 particular	
question	 raised	 in	 the	proceeding	 and	 to	 this	 end	decides	 the	 issue	which	 is	 logically	 anterior	 to	 the	
others	 but	 in	 any	 case	 enables	 the	 dispute	 to	 be	 settled	 and	 the	 resolution	 of	 that	 question	 to	 be	
precluded	or	implied”.	In	the	present	book,	we	will	deal	only	with	absorption	stricto	sensu.	
26	The	concept	has	been	fully	analysed	by	Palombino	(2010)	(n.	25),	910	and	ss.	
27	It	 is	 still	 doubtful	 whether	 issues	 pertaining	 to	 the	 admissibility	 phase	 can	 be	 raised	 ex	 officio	 by	
arbitrators	 or	 shall	 be	 necessarily	 introduced	 in	 the	 proceedings	 by	 the	 parties.	 Gouiffés,	 Ordonez	
(2015)	(n.	9),	121-122,	seems	to	support	the	second	idea.	However,	Article	19(1)	of	the	Rome	Statute	of	
the	International	Criminal	Court	seems	to	support	a	different	opinion.	Such	rule	states	that	“The	Court	
shall	satisfy	itself	that	it	has	jurisdiction	in	any	case	brought	before	it.	The	Court	may,	on	its	own	motion,	
determine	 the	 admissibility	 of	 a	 case	 in	 accordance	 with	 article	 17”	 (emphasis	 added).	 Following	 (by	
analogy)	this	idea,	that	seems	more	compliant	with	the	aim	of	the	present	book	and	which	is	supported	
by	the	finding	that	admissibility	 is	a	policy	tool	aimed	at	safeguarding	the	 legitimacy	of	 international	
investment	arbitration	tribunals	(in	particular	against	forum	shopping	techniques),	we	could	state	that	
arbitrators	 could	 raise	 concerns	 related	 to	 abuse	 of	 process,	 res	 judicata	 and	 collateral	 estoppel	 by	
themselves.	This	approach	is	the	preferable	one	according	to	the	opinion	of	the	present	author.  
28	Salles	(2014)	(n.	9),	158.	The	Author	further	says	that	“focusing	on	admissibility	puts	all	tribunals	on	
an	 equal	 footing,	 but	 it	 also	 underscores	 the	 need	 for	 a	 case	 by	 case	 assessment	 of	 the	 conditions	
underlying	adjudication”.	This	is	precisely	the	aim	of	the	present	book.	Similarly,	see	Douglas	(2009)	(n.	
4),	141.	
29	Shany	(2015)	(n.	2),	154.	
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stage,	 that	 the	 continuation	 of	 (duplicative)	 proceedings	 runs	 against	 the	 proper	
administration	 of	 justice	 and	 risks	 to	 undermine	 the	 judicial	 function	 that	 they	
administrate,	 both	 because	 such	 continuation	 runs	 against	 the	 canon	 of	 judicial	
economy	and	because	it	runs	against	general	principles	of	international	law,	they	have	
to	exercise	their	inherent	powers	in	order	to	preclude	these	proceedings	to	go	on.	
The	 next	 paragraphs	 will	 be	 aimed	 at	 individuating	 the	 legal	 tools	 to	 which	
arbitrators	 may	 refer	 at	 the	 admissibility	 stage	 in	 order	 to	 prevent	 parallel	
proceedings	and	preclude	their	continuation.	It	is	here	submitted	that	such	tools	may	
be	individuated	in	certain	principles	of	international	law,	such	as	good	faith	and	ne	bis	
in	 idem.	 However,	 prior	 to	move	 to	 examine	 the	 various	 principles	 that	might	 limit	
parallel	 proceedings,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	 explain	 why	 and	 how	 general	 principles	 of	
international	law	are	applicable	in	investment	arbitration.	
	
3.2	 The	applicability	 of	 general	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 in	 investment	
arbitration		
	
The	 applicability	 of	 general	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 in	 investment	
arbitration,	 that	today	 is	quite	unanimously	accepted,	has	been	the	object	of	severe	
debates.	 Hence,	 in	 this	 paragraph,	 we	 will	 briefly	 examine	 the	 issue	 of	 the	 law	
applicable	in	international	investment	arbitration.30	
In	the	determination	of	applicable	law,	the	first	task	of	a	tribunal	is	to	ascertain	
whether	 the	 parties	 have	 expressed	 any	 choice	 in	 this	 regard; 31 	indeed,	 party	
autonomy	 is	always	the	first	source	of	 regulation	 in	arbitration.	This	 is	confirmed	by	
several	arbitration	rules,	such	as	art.	42(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention,	which,	at	its	first	
sentence,	says	that	“[t]he	Tribunal	shall	decide	a	dispute	in	accordance	with	such	rules	
of	 law	as	may	be	agreed	by	 the	parties”.	Similarly,	Art.	 35	of	UNCITRAL	Arbitration	
Rules	 states:	 “[t]he	 arbitral	 tribunal	 shall	 apply	 the	 rules	 of	 law	 designated	 by	 the	
parties	as	applicable	to	the	substance	of	the	dispute”.32	
In	modern	investment	disputes,	sometimes	(but	not	very	often)33	the	choice	of	
the	applicable	law	is	made	by	the	parties.	Such	choice	is	usually	made	by	reference	to	
the	applicable	BIT	or	 in	 the	 investment	contract	existing	between	the	State	and	the	
investor.	
																																																													
30	The	 subject	 has	 been	 extensively	 dealt	 with	 by	 Begic,	 Applicable	 Law	 in	 International	 Investment	
Disputes	(2005),	1	and	ss.,	and	Kjos,	Applicable	Law	in	Investor	State	Arbitration	(2013),	1	and	ss.	See	also	
Belohlavek,	Cerny,	International	Journal	of	Law	and	Management	(2012),	443	and	ss.	
31	Kahn,	Indiana	Law	Journal	(1968),	6	and	ss.,	Feuerle,	Yale	Studies	on	World	Public	Order	(1977),	103	
and	 ss.,	 Shihata,	 Parra,	 ICCA	 Congress	 Series	 No.	 7	 (1996),	 294	 and	 ss.,	 Gaillard,	 Banifatemi,	 ICSID	
Review	FILJ	(2003),	375	and	ss.,	Schreuer,	www.univie.ac.at	(2007),	9	and	ss.,	Tawil,	UNCTAD	Course	on	
Dispute	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Trade,	 Investment	 and	 Intellectual	 Property,	 11	 and	 ss.,	 Crespi	
Reghizzi,	Rivista	di	diritto	 internazionale	privato	e	processuale	 (2009),	28	and	ss.,	Giardina,	Rivista	di	
diritto	 internazionale	 privato	 e	 processuale	 (1982),	 679	 and	 ss.,	 Beniassadi,	 International	 Tax	 and	
Business	Lawyer	(1992),	61	and	ss.	
32	In	the	same	vein,	Art.	21	of	the	ICC	Rules	of	Arbitration	says	that	“The	parties	shall	be	free	to	agree	
upon	the	rules	of	law	to	be	applied	by	the	arbitral	tribunal	to	the	merits	of	the	dispute”.	
33	Gaillard,	Banifatemi	(2003)	(n.	31),	379.	
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When	BITs	make	reference	to	the	applicable	 law,	they	usually	mainly	refer	to	
the	 same	 BIT,	 public	 international	 law	 and,	 sometimes,	 also	 to	 the	 law	 of	 the	 host	
State.34	Very	few	BIT	do	not	refer	to	international	law,35	while	the	present	author	has	
not	been	able	to	find	a	BIT	referring	only	to	the	law	of	the	host	State.	
The	situation	can	be	different	in	investment	contracts:	in	these	sources	usually	
the	 reference	goes	mainly	 to	 the	 law	of	 the	host	State,	 even	 if	 it	 is	 not	 rare	 to	 find	
investment	agreements	referring	also	to	international	law.36	
With	regard	to	the	cases	in	which	the	parties	have	made	a	choice	of	applicable	
law	different	from	international	 law,	the	 issue	 is	whether	arbitrators	have	the	power	
to	integrate	such	parties’	choice	and	apply	also	principles	and/or	rules	of	international	
law	that	they	consider	essential	for	the	case	at	hand.	In	this	regard,	it	should	be	noted,	
first	 of	 all,	 that	 “international	 law	 is	 frequently	 incorporated	 into	 domestic	 law	
through	 a	 variety	 of	 techniques.	 To	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 thereby	 becomes	 applicable	
internally,	 it	may	be	seen	as	part	of	a	system	of	domestic	 law	chosen	by	the	parties	
and	may	be	relied	upon	before	an	ICSID	tribunal”.37	However,	even	if	one	should	find	
that	 international	 law	 is	not	 (directly	or	 indirectly)	applicable,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	
the	modern	trend	is	to	consider	that	investment	arbitrators	have	the	freedom	to	apply	
the	principles	of	international	law	that	they	consider	essential	for	the	good	resolution	
of	the	case.38	This	idea	is	clearly	put	forward	by	Tawil,	who	stated	that	“there	are	good	
																																																													
34	An	example	of	BIT	referring	to	all	these	systems	of	law	is	Art.	10	of	the	1992	Argentina/Netherlands	
BIT,	 stating	 that	 “The	Arbitration	Tribunal	addressed	 in	accordance	with	paragraph	 (5)	of	 this	Article	
shall	decide	on	the	basis	of	the	law	of	the	Contracting	Party	which	is	a	party	to	the	dispute	(including	its	
rules	on	the	conflict	of	law),	the	provisions	of	the	present	Agreement,	special	Agreements	concluded	in	
relation	to	the	investment	concerned	as	well	as	such	rules	of	international	law	as	may	be	applicable”.	
35	See	 the	 exhaustive	 list	 made	 by	 Gaillard,	 Banifatemi	 (2003)	 (n.	 31),	 377-378.	 See	 also	 Gaillard,	
Annulment	 of	 ICSID	 Awards,	 IAI	 Series	 on	 International	 Arbitration	 N°1	 (2004),	 226-227.	 This	 Author	
mentions	the	Australia-Egypt	BIT	ans	the	Belgium	&	Luxembourg-Mongolia	BIT,	which	do	not	mention	
international	law	but	only	refer	to	the	same	BITs,	to	the	law	of	the	host	States	and	to	other	agreements	
between	the	parties.	
36	See	Crespi	Reghizzi	(2009)	(n.	31),	28.	Some	ICSID	cases	report	choices	by	the	parties	of	national	law	
and	 international	 law.	See	AGIP	v.	République	Démocratique	du	Congo,	Award,	30	November	1979,	67	
Int.	Law	Rep.	318	(1984)	and	Kaiser	Bauxite	Company	v.	Jamaica,	Award,	6	July	1975,	114	Int.	Law	Rep	
144	(1999).	
37	Tawil	(2003)	(n.	31),	9.	
38	See	Beniassadi,	International	Tax	and	Business	Lawyer	(1992)	62	and	ss.,	Bjorklund,	Mandatory	Rules	
in	International	Arbitration	(2011),	270,	Donovan,	Mandatory	Rules	in	International	Arbitration	(2011),	282	
and	ss.	The	reference	goes	to	the	essential	principles	of	international	commerce,	which	are	considered	
by	part	 of	 the	 scholars	 as	 constituting	 the	 transnational	 or	 “truly	 international”	 public	 policy.	 Such	 a	
concept	shall	not	be	confused	with	the	concept	of	jus	cogens	(on	which	see	Orakhelashvili,	Peremptory	
Norms	 in	 International	 Law	 (2008),	 7	 and	 ss.).	 For	 a	 broader	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	
transnational	public	policy	see	Lalive,	 ICCA	Congress	Series	No.	3	(1986),	257	and	ss.,	Dolinger,	Texas	
International	 Law	 Journal	 (1982),	 167	 and	 ss.	 See	 also	Mann,	 British	 Yearbook	 of	 International	 Law	
(1957),	20	and	ss.,	Gal,	Cornell	International	Law	Journal	(1972),	55	and	ss.	The	concept	of	transnational	
public	 policy	 has	 been	 recently	 applied	 by	 two	 investment	 arbitration	 awards,	 i.e.	World	 Duty	 Free	
Company	 Ltd.	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Kenya,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/00/7,	 Award,	 4	 October	 2006,	 Inceysa	
Vallisoletana	S.L.	v.	Republic	of	El	Salvador,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/26,	Award,	2	August	2006.	The	idea	
that	“investment	law	must	be	interpreted	consistently	with	international	law”	is	put	forward	also	by	van	
Aaken,	 Finnish	 Yearbook	 of	 International	 Law	 (2006),	 91	 and	 ss.	 The	 applicability	 of	 these	 rules	 is	
supported	also	by	the	principle	 iura	novit	curia,	according	to	which	the	judge	is	not	bound	by	the	legal	
allegations	of	 the	parties;	 such	principle	has	been	 considered	a	general	 principle	of	 international	 law	
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reasons	for	the	proposition	that	there	is	at	least	some	place	for	international	law	even	
in	the	presence	of	an	agreement	on	choice	of	law	which	does	not	mention	it”.39	In	the	
opinion	of	 this	author	arbitrators	have	“a	 reluctance	to	abandon	 international	 law	 in	
favour	of	the	host	State's	domestic	 law.	The	complete	exclusion	of	 international	 law	
as	a	consequence	of	an	agreed	choice	of	law	containing	only	a	domestic	legal	system	
would	lead	to	undesirable	consequences.	It	would	mean	that	an	ICSID	tribunal	would	
have	to	uphold	discriminatory	and	arbitrary	actions	by	the	host	State,	breaches	of	its	
undertakings	which	are	evidently	in	bad	faith	or	amount	to	a	denial	of	justice	as	long	
as	they	conform	to	the	applicable	domestic	law.	It	would	mean	that	a	foreign	investor,	
by	 assenting	 to	 a	 choice	 of	 law,	 could	 sign	 away	 the	 minimum	 standards	 for	 the	
protection	of	aliens	and	their	property	developed	in	customary	international	law.	Such	
a	 solution	would	be	contrary	 to	 the	goal	of	 the	Convention	 to	 stimulate	 investment	
through	the	creation	of	a	favourable	investment	climate”.40	
	 Such	an	approach	seems	confirmed	by	Article	4	of	the	2013	Resolution	of	the	
Institut	de	Droit	International	on	Legal	Aspects	of	Recourse	to	Arbitration	by	an	Investor	
Against	 the	 Authorities	 of	 the	 Host	 State	 under	 Inter-State	 Treaties,	 stating	 that	
“Arbitral	tribunals,	when	referring	to	notions	defined	in	municipal	law	(…)	shall	at	the	
same	time	respect	the	relevant	rules	of	international	law”.	
	 Having	ascertained	that	 international	 law	 is	applicable	even	when	the	parties	
have	made	 an	 autonomous	 choice	 of	 law,	we	have	 now	 to	 turn	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 the	
applicability	of	international	law	when	the	parties	have	not	made	an	express	choice	of	
applicable	 law.	Such	a	circumstance	 is	not	unusual	 in	 investment	cases.41	In	order	to	
assess	the	issue	a	distinction	between	cases	brought	under	the	auspices	of	ICSID	and	
other	investment	cases	is	required.	
	 With	regard	to	ICSID	cases,	the	issue	of	applicable	law	in	absence	of	a	choice	is	
regulated	by	Art.	42(1),	second	sentence,	of	the	Washington	Convention,	stating	that	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
since	Sereni,	Principi	generali	di	diritto	e	processo	 internazionale	 (1955),	79;	 in	this	regard	see	also	Kolb	
(2012)	(n.	16),	820	and	ss.	With	regard	to	the	applicability	of	the	principle	in	arbitration,	see	Carlevaris,	
Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2007),	 505	 and	 ss.,	 Spagnolo,	 Towards	 Uniformity:	 the	 2nd	 Annual	 MAA	
Schlechtriem	CISG	Conference	 (2011),	 181	 and	 ss.,	 Kaufmann-Kohler,	Arbitration	 International	 (2005),	
631	 and	 ss.,	 Kurkela,	 ASA	 Bulletin	 (2003),	 486	 and	 ss.,	 Lew,	 ssrn.com	 (2010),	 1	 and	 ss.	 For	 a	 broad	
analysis	of	the	concept	of	mandatory	rules	in	arbitration	see	Mistelis,	Mandatory	Rules	in	International	
Arbitration	(2011),	292,	Zhilsov,	Netherlands	International	Law	Review	(1995),	81	and	ss.	
39	Tawil,	(2003)	(n.	31),	9.	
40	Tawil	 (2003)	(n.	31),	10In	accordance	with	this	 idea,	see	the	illuminating	opera	by	Feuerle,	(1977)	(n.	
31),	105	and	ss.,	 stating,	at	107,	 that	arbitrators	have	“generally	 interpreted	the	parties’	choice	of	 law	
clauses	 liberally	 so	 as	 to	 enable	 the	 tribunal	 to	 invoke	 rules	 not	 expressly	 designates,	 such	 as	
international	 law,	general	 law	principles,	or	 the	 law	of	 third	states,	even	where	 the	parties	had	made	
determinations	which	seemed	to	be	comprehensive”.	This	 idea	seems	compliant	with	what	stated	by	
McNair,	British	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(1957),	who	said	that	contracts	concluded	by	States	and	
foreign	investors,	even	if	not	governed	by	public	international	law,	“can	more	effectively	be	regulated	
by	general	principles	of	law	than	the	special	rules	of	any	single	territorial	system”.	Sacerdoti,	I	contratti	
tra	stati	e	stranieri	nel	diritto	 internazionale	 (1972),	262,	has	further	stated,	 in	this	regard,	that	general	
principles	of	international	law	can	be	considered	ipso	facto	applicable	to	these	contracts.	This	idea	does	
not	seem	completely	followed	by	Crespi	Reghizzi	(2009)	(n.	31),	28	and	ss.,	and	by	Giardina	(1982)	(n.	
31),	679	and	ss.	
41	Gaillard,	Banifatemi	(2003)	(n.	31),	379.	
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“[i]n	 the	absence	of	 such	agreement	 [i.e.	 the	agreement	on	 the	applicable	 law],	 the	
Tribunal	shall	apply	the	law	of	the	Contracting	State	party	to	the	dispute	(including	its	
rules	on	the	conflict	of	laws)	and	such	rules	of	international	law	as	may	be	applicable”	
(emphasis	added).	42	Art.	42	is	not	clear	in	expressing	the	relationship	between	the	law	
of	the	host	State	and	international	law.	Various	theories	have	been	put	forward	in	this	
regard.	
	 A	 first	 (and	 old)	 theory	 stated	 that,	 in	 absence	 of	 a	 choice	 by	 the	 parties,	
disputes	should	have	been	mainly	regulated	by	the	national	law	of	the	host	State.	The	
reason	 for	 this	 was	 that	 the	 reference	 to	 international	 law	 “seems	 to	 be	 precluded	
from	 the	 subsidiary	 references	 [to	 such	 law]	 established	 by	 the	 Convention	 in	 the	
absence	of	a	choice	of	law	by	the	parties”.43	This	theory	seems	completely	outdated.	
Indeed,	as	 it	has	been	explained,	 it	was	based	on	the	(today	unfounded)	assumption	
that	 international	 law	 regulating	 foreign	 investment	was	very	undeveloped	and	was	
unable	 to	 regulate	 the	 very	 complex	 relationships	 between	 States	 and	 foreign	
investors.44		
	 A	second	theory,	close	to	the	first	one,	has	been	developed	by	Prof.	Reisman.	
He	states	 that	 investment	disputes	should	be	governed	by	national	 law,	unless	such	
law	is	against	 international	 jus	cogens.45	The	justification	for	Reisman’s	theory	is	that	
the	national	 law	of	the	host	State	must	have	an	effective	role.	Anyway,	as	stated	by	
Gaillard	and	Banifatemi,46	this	 idea	seems	to	go	against	the	reading	of	art.	42	of	the	
ICSID	 Convention,	 which	 does	 not	 make	 any	 reference	 to	 jus	 cogens	 and,	 on	 the	
contrary,	seems	to	put	national	law	and	international	law	on	the	same	level.47	
	 A	 third	 theory,	developed	on	 the	basis	of	 the	decisions	of	 the	Klockner48	and	
Amco49	ad	hoc	committees,	and	supported	by	several	scholars,50	put	forward	the	idea	
that	international	law	shall	have	only	a	supplemental	and	corrective	function	vis-à-vis	
domestic	 law.	 International	 law	 should	 only	 intervene	 in	 case	 of	 lacunae	 in	 the	
applicable	national	 law	system	or	 in	case	such	system	runs	against	 international	 law	
obligations.		
																																																													
42	According	 to	 par.	 41	 of	 the	 Report	 of	 the	 Executive	 Directors	 of	 the	 International	 Bank	 for	
Reconstruction	 and	Development	 on	 the	 Convention	 on	 the	 Settlement	 of	Disputes	 between	 States	
and	National	of	other	States,	available	at	icsid.worldbank.org,	such	reference	to	international	law	shall	
be	intended	as	a	reference	to	the	sources	indicated	in	Article	38(1)	of	the	ICJ	Statute.	
43	Kahn	(1968)	(n.	31),	31.		
44	Kahn	(1968)	(n.	31),	31,	said	that	“while	the	international	law	in	this	area	is	still	very	uncertain	and	of	
limited	scope,	its	importance	will	grow	with	the	corresponding	development	of	the	law	of	investment”.	
45	Reisman,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2000),	380.	
46	(2003)	(n.	31),	400	and	ss.	
47	The	idea	that	national	and	international	law	were	on	the	same	level	within	the	framework	of	Art.	42	
was	already		put	forward	in	1982	by	Giardina	(1982)	(n.	31),	693.	
48	Klockner	v.	Cameroon,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/2,	Ad	Hoc	Committee	Decision,	3	May	1985.	
49	Amco	Asia	Corporation	and	others	v.	Republic	of	Indonesia,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/1,	Decision	on	the	
Application	for	Annulment,	16	May	1986.	The	approach	was	followed	also	in	CDSE	v.	Costa	Rica,	ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/96/1,	Award,	17	February	2000.	
50	See	Crespi	Reghizzi	(2009)	(n.	31),	32	and	ss.,	Giardina,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	International	Courts	
and	Tribunals	(2006),	29	and	ss.,	Schreuer	(2007),	12.	
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	 The	last	mentioned	approach	has	been	criticized	by	Gaillard	and	Banifatemi,51	
who	–	on	the	basis	of	the	decision	of	the	ad	hoc	Committee	in	Wena52	–	have	explained	
that	 international	 law	 is	 directly	 applicable	 in	 investment	 disputes	 in	 light	 of	 the	
interpretation	 of	 Art.	 42	 imposed	 by	 Art.	 31	 and	 followings	 of	 the	 1969	 Vienna	
Convention	 on	 the	 Law	 of	 Treaties.	 According	 Gaillard	 and	 Banifatemi,	 the	 word	
“and”	 contained	 in	 the	 second	 sentence	 of	 Art.	 42	 means	 only	 “and”.	 As	 a	
consequence,	 arbitrators,	 in	 case	 of	 lack	 of	 a	 choice	 by	 the	 parties,	 shall	 apply	 the	
national	 law	of	 the	host	State	and	 the	applicable	 rules	of	 international	 law.	The	two	
systems	 are	 on	 an	 equal	 footing.	 “[I]nternational	 law	 constitutes	 a	 legal	 order	 fully	
operating	[in	investment	arbitration]	in	both	its	public	policy	function	and	as	a	body	of	
substantive	rules”.53	
	 This	 theory,	 which	 has	 found	 support	 in	 the	 work	 of	many	 other	 scholars,54	
seems	the	most	correct	and	appropriate	for	a	form	of	arbitration	which	has	a	strong	
public	 international	 law	 component 55 	and	 that,	 usually,	 finds	 its	 foundation	 in	
international	law	treaties.	
	 Having	 ascertained	 that	 international	 law	 is	 applicable	 in	 ICSID	 cases	 where	
the	parties	did	not	make	any	choice	of	law,	we	have	now	to	turn	to	non-ICSID	cases.	A	
reference	to	some	institutional	rules	can	here	be	of	certain	support	for	the	research.	
The	 second	 sentence	 of	 Art.	 35	 of	 the	 UNCITRAL	 Rules	 says	 that	 “[f]ailing	 such	
designation	[of	applicable	law]	by	the	parties,	the	arbitral	tribunal	shall	apply	the	law	
which	it	determines	to	be	appropriate”.	Similarly,	the	second	sentence	of	Art.	21(1)	of	
the	 ICC	 Rules	 stipulates	 that	 “[i]n	 the	 absence	 of	 any	 such	 agreement	 [on	 the	
applicable	law],	the	arbitral	tribunal	shall	apply	the	rules	of	law	which	it	determines	to	
be	appropriate”.	 It	 therefore	seems	that	arbitrators	are	called	to	assume	a	proactive	
role	 in	the	determination	of	applicable	 law.56	In	this	regard,	 it	 is	obvious	that	–	given	
the	 duty	 of	 arbitrators	 to	 issue	 an	 enforceable	 award	 –	 they	 will	 keep	 into	
consideration	 and	 apply	 all	 the	 rules	 related	 to	 the	 field	 of	 law	 in	 which	 the	 legal	
relationship	 at	 hand	 finds	 its	 foundation	 (i.e.,	 in	 investment	 cases,	 mainly	
international	law).57	Given	the	above,	it	seems	quite	certain	that	arbitrators	will	apply	
international	law	also	in	non-ICSID	investment	cases	where	the	parties	have	failed	to	
make	a	choice	of	law.58	
																																																													
51	(2003)	(n.	31),	403	and	ss.	
52	Wena	Hotels	Limited	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/98/4,	Decision	on	Application	for	
Annulment,	5	Feb	2002,	paras.	38-40.	
53	Gaillard	(2004)	(n.	35),	234.	
54	See,	inter	alia,	Fenyvesi,	Adam	Antal	PhD	tanulmanyok	(2005),	57	and	ss.	The	idea	that	“national	and	
international	law	should	not	be	understood	as	mutually	exclusive	sets	of	rules”	was	already	set	forth	by	
Feuerle	in	1977.	See	Feuerle	(1977)	(n.	31),	115.	
55	See	Douglas,	Brithish	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(2003),	151	and	ss.	
56	In	 non-ICSID	 cases,	 the	 determination	 of	 applicable	 law	 seems	 to	 be	 closer	 to	 the	 one	 made	 by	
arbitrators	in	international	commercial	arbitration.	See	Lew,	Applicable	Law	in	International	Commercial	
Arbitration	(1978),	1	and	ss.	
57	Ibid.	
58	This	 is	also	confirmed	by	 the	vast	 reference	 that	 investment	 tribunals	use	 to	make	 to	 ICJ	case	 law.	
See	 Pellet,	 ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2013),	 223	 and	 ss.	 In	 this	 regard,	 see	 also	 Douglas	 (2009)	 (n.	 4),	 40,	
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	 As	 a	 conclusion,	 we	 can	 affirm	 that	 international	 law	 is	 always	 applicable	 in	
international	 investment	disputes.59	This	means	that	the	assessment	that	arbitrators	
will	 have	 to	make	 in	 order	 to	 decide	whether	 a	 certain	 claim	 is	 admissible	 shall	 be	
based,	 inter	alia,	on	public	 international	 law	and,	 in	particular,	for	what	 is	relevant	 in	
the	 present	 book,	 on	 general	 principles	 of	 international	 law,	 i.e.	 general	 principles	
developed	and	applied	 in	 international	 law.	Such	principles	are	 legal	sources,	usually	
with	 a	 very	 broad	meaning,	which	 –	 by	 themselves	 or	 by	means	 of	 a	more	 specific	
principle	or	rule	gathered	by	them	–	express	the	key	goals	and	values	of	international	
law.	 For	 this	 reason,	 they	 have	 always	 to	 be	 respected. 60 	Indeed,	 it	 is	 today	
“undisputed	that	general	principles	have	acquired	a	role	in	the	shaping	of	rules	in	the	
area	 of	 foreign	 investment	 protection	 and	 play	 a	 prominent	 role	 in	 arbitrations	
between	 States	 and	 foreign	 nationals”.61	As	 a	 consequence,	 if	 the	 continuation	 of	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
according	 to	 whom	 “[a]n	 investment	 treaty	 tribunal	 has	 the	 inherent	 authority	 to	 characterise	 the	
issues	in	dispute	and	determine	the	laws	applicable	thereto”.	
59	Such	a	conclusion	is	shared	by	Bjorklund	(2011)	(n.	38),	268.	See	also	Donovan,	(2011)	(n.	38),	276.	
60	Palombino,	Il	trattamento	giusto	ed	equo	degli	investimenti	stranieri	(2012),	47	and	55	and	ss.	General	
principles	of	international	law	are	usually	found	out	by	international	judges	on	the	basis	of	an	inductive-
deductive	 process.	 Firstly	 judges	 draw	 a	 principle	 from	 already	 existing	 norms	 (inductive	 step)	 and,	
secondly,	they	express	a	specific	rule	for	the	concrete	case	from	the	general	principles	they	have	drawn	
before	(deductive	step).	
61	Gazzini,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2009),	103.	In	this	regard,	it	is	worth	noting	that	–	in	
the	present	book	–	the	reference	to	“general	principles	of	international	law”	shall	not	be	understood	as	
a	reference	to	the	general	principles	that	are	common	to	national	law	systems	and	that	are	mentioned	
in	 Art.	 38(1)(c)	 of	 the	 ICJ	 Statute.	 The	 distinction	 (if	 any)	 between	 general	 principles	 and	 general	
principles	 of	 international	 law	 (both	 sources	 of	 general	 international	 law)	 has	 been	 one	 of	 the	most	
debated	questions	 in	 international	 law	and	is	still	an	open	issue.	See,	 in	this	regard,	Gaja,	Max	Planck	
Encyclopedia	of	Public	 Internationa	Law,	 (2008),	par.	8	and	21	and	ss.	 In	particular,	Gaja,	at	par.	8,	has	
clarified	 that	 “the	application	of	 [a]	principle	 in	 international	 law	does	not	necessarily	depend	on	 the	
fact	 that	 the	principle	 is	common	to	a	number	of	municipal	systems”.	This	means,	according	to	Prof.	
Gaja,	that	there	could	exist	general	principles	of	 international	 law	that	are	not	born	 in	the	practice	of	
municipal	 law	 but	 are	 a	 sub-specie	 of	 customary	 international	 law.	 The	 same	 idea	 is	 expressed	 by	
Gazzini	(2009),	104,	where	he	says	“general	principles	of	law	coexist	both	in	the	domestic	legal	systems	
of	 the	 generality	 of	 the	 States	and	 in	 international	 law”	 (emphasis	 in	 original).	 Strozzi,	 La	 comunità	
internazionale	 (1992),	 164	 has	 finally	 stated	 that	 “international	 judges	 apply	 always	 international	
principles,	even	if	strengthened	by	a	correspondence	with	analogous	principles	of	municipal	law.	Hence,	
general	 principles	 common	 to	 municipal	 systems	 correspond	 to	 already	 existing	 principles	 of	
international	 law	 (…)	 otherwise	 they	 cannot	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 positive	 international	 law”	
(emphasis	 in	original).	The	 issue	of	 the	nature	of	general	principles	of	 international	 law	has	been	 the	
object	of	several	studies.	On	this	matter	see	also	Carpanelli,	General	Principles	of	Law	–	The	Role	of	the	
Judiciary	(2015),	125	and	ss.	A	very	exhaustive	work	has	been	written	by	Magnani,	Nuove	prospettive	sui	
principi	generali	nel	sistema	delle	fonti	nel	diritto	internazionale	(1997),	71	and	ss.,	while	Sereni	(1955)	(n.	
38),	 1	 and	 ss.,	 has	 deeply	 studied	 the	 general	 principles	 regarding	 international	 processes.	 See	 also	
Gaillard,	World	Arbitration	&	Mediation	Review	(2011),	161	and	ss.,	Nolan,	Sourgens,	World	Arbitration	
&	Mediation	Review	(2009),	505	and	ss.,	Lammers,	Essays	on	the	Development	of	the	International	Legal	
Order	in	memory	of	Haro	F.	van	Panhuys	(1980),	53	and	ss.,	Ellis,	European	Journal	of	International	Law	
(2011),	 949	 and	 ss.,	 Di	 Benedetto,	 International	 Investment	 Law	 and	 the	 Environment	 (2013),	 73,	
Balladore	Pallieri,	I	“principi	generali	del	diritto	riconosciuti	dale	nazioni	civili	nell’art.	38	dello	statuto	della	
Corte	permanente	di	Giustizia	internazionale	(1931),	1	and	ss.,	Freeman	Jalet,	UCLA	Law	Review	(1963),	
1041	and	ss.	However,	also	in	 light	of	the	fact	that	both	these	sources	are	to	be	considered	as	part	of	
general	 international	 law	(and	therefore	are	both	applicable	 in	 investment	arbitration),	 in	the	present	
book	a	more	pragmatic	approach	will	be	followed	and	the	reference	will	only	go,	 in	general	terms,	to	
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duplicative	 proceedings	 runs	 against	 general	 principles	 of	 international	 law,	
arbitrators	 should	 exercise	 their	 inherent	 powers	 aimed	 at	 safeguarding	 the	 proper	
exercise	of	their	judicial	function	and	preclude	such	duplicative	proceedings	to	go	on.	
We	 will	 now	 turn	 on	 the	 examination	 of	 general	 principles	 of	 public	
international	 law	 that	may	 be	 helpful	 in	 avoiding	 parallel	 proceedings	 and	 ensure	 a	
good	administration	of	justice	by	investment	tribunals.	
	
3.3	 An	inadequate	solution	for	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings:	the	“first	
in	time”	rule	
	
	 The	first	in	time	rule,	or	lis	pendens,	is	one	of	the	main	doctrines	which	civil	law	
countries	 (and	 the	EU)	 use	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 parallel	 proceedings.	According	 to	 this	
doctrine	“when	two	courts	have	been	seized	of	the	same	dispute	[and	none	of	them	
has	 still	 decided	 such	a	dispute],	 the	 court	 seized	 second	 should	decline	 jurisdiction	
and	let	the	court	seized	first	decide	the	dispute”.62	The	application	of	lis	pendens	relies	
only	on	the	time	factor.	The	 judge	seized	 first	shall	go	on	with	the	proceedings,	 the	
second	 shall	 stay.	The	only	 conditions	 to	apply	 lis	 pendens,	 are	 that	 the	parties,	 the	
object	 of	 their	 claims	 (petitum)	 and	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 such	 claims	 (causa	 petendi)	
coincide	in	the	two	proceedings	(so-called	triple	identity	test).63	
	 According	to	Reinisch	“it	can	hardly	be	disputed	that	lis	pendens	is	(…)	a	rule	of	
international	 law	 applicable	 in	 international	 proceedings.	 The	 widespread	 use	 and	
similarity	of	the	concept	of	lis	pendens	in	the	national	procedural	laws	of	States	of	all	
legal	traditions	as	well	as	its	inclusion	in	a	number	of	bi-	and	multilateral	agreements	
is	evidence	that	lis	pendens	can	be	regarded	as	a	general	principle	of	law	in	the	sense	of	
Article	 38	of	 the	 ICJ	Statute.	 Further,	 the	existence	or	 application	of	 such	a	 rule	was	
generally	acknowledged	in	the	few	cases	where	lis	pendens	claims	were	made	before	
international	 courts	 or	 tribunals”	 (emphasis	 added).64	This	 would	 mean	 that	 if	 two	
international	arbitral	 tribunals	are	 seized	of	 the	same	dispute	 (i.e.	 the	 triple	 identity	
test	is	met),	the	tribunal	seized	second	should	decline	to	exercise	its	jurisdiction.	
	 However,	this	statement	is	not	convincing	for	two	main	reasons.	First	of	all,	no	
international	 tribunal	 has	 ever	 applied	 lis	 pendens;	 secondly,	 several	 national	 legal	
systems	(i.e.	all	the	systems	pertaining	to	the	common	law)	do	not	apply	lis	pendens	at	
all.	 It	 is	 therefore	questionable	that	 lis	pendens	 is	a	general	principle	of	 international	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
general	 principles	 of	 international	 law.	 This	 approach	 also	 corresponds	 to	 the	 general	 pragmatic	
attitude	of	investment	tribunals.	
62	Cuniberti,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2006),	382.	
63	The	 triple	 identity	 test	 is	 usually	 applied	 very	 strictly	 in	 national	 court	 proceedings.	 However,	 the	
Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 developed	 a	 less	 strict	 approach	 to	 such	 test,	 and	 in	
particular	to	the	requirements	of	petitum	and	causa	petendi,	in	order	to	avoid	that	the	same	judgement	
is	started	in	two	EU	member	States,	 in	one	as	a	claim	for	damages	and	in	the	second	as	a	request	for	
negative	declaration	of	lack	of	liability.	See	McLachlan,	Lis	pendens	in	International	Litigation	(2009),	117	
and	ss.	As	 it	will	be	shown	in	paragraphs	3.6	and	3.7	the	present	author	strongly	believes	that	a	strict	
application	of	the	triple	identity	test	would	lead	to	manifest	injustice	and	would	foster	abuses.		
64	Reinisch,	 The	 Law	 and	 Practice	 of	 International	 Courts	 and	 Tribunals	 (2004),	 50.	 This	 opinion	 is	
shared	by	Hober,	Res	Judicata	and	Lis	Pendens	in	International	Arbitration	(2013),	330.	
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law	and,	moreover,	it	is	arguable	that	lis	pendens	 is	not	even	a	principle	of	law,	but	a	
mere	rule.	These	lines	of	reasoning	will	be	developed	in	the	present	paragraph.	
	 With	regard	to	the	development	of	lis	pendens	 in	international	law,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	the	relevant	case	 law	 is	“too	scarce	and	non-determinative”65	to	confirm	
the	existence	of	such	a	principle.	In	all	the	cases	where	lis	pendens	has	been	invoked,	
international	 tribunals	have	avoided	to	apply	 it.	 In	Certain	German	 Interests	 in	Polish	
Upper	Silesia,66	the	PCIJ	refused	to	consider	whether	lis	pendens	is	a	general	principle	
of	international	law	due	to	the	circumstance	that	the	triple	identity	test	was	not	met.	
In	 Factory	 at	 Chorzow67	the	 same	 PCIJ	 “made	 reference	 albeit	 indirectly,	 to	 the	
principle	of	estoppel,	rather	than	the	lis	pendens	doctrine”.68	Similarly,	in	his	separate	
opinion	in	the	MOX	Plant	case,	Judge	Treves	stated	that	the	legal	status	of	lis	pendens	
is	 a	 “completely	open”	 issue.69	Finally,	 and	most	 importantly,	 in	 the	SPP	 case70,	 the	
tribunal	did	not	find	itself	bound	by	lis	pendens	and	stated	that	“when	the	jurisdictions	
of	 two	unrelated	and	 independent	 tribunals	extend	 to	 the	same	dispute,	 there	 is	no	
rule	 of	 international	 law	 which	 prevents	 either	 tribunal	 from	 exercising	 jurisdiction”	
(emphasis	 added).	 All	 these	 decisions,	 albeit	 mentioning	 lis	 pendens,	 show	 a	 clear	
reluctance	to	apply	 the	 first	 in	 time	rule	 to	parallel	proceedings	 in	 international	 law.	
Several	investment	arbitral	tribunals	have	also	dealt	with	the	issue	and	none	of	them	
has	applied	the	rule.71	
	 Moving	to	the	acceptance	of	lis	pendens	in	national	law	systems,	while	it	is	true	
that	lis	pendens	has	found	broad	acceptance	in	almost	all	civil	law	systems	(including	
EU	 law,72	due	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that	 EU	 countries	 are	 for	 the	 majority	 civil	 law	
systems),	it	is	worth	noting	that	this	rule	has	never	found	application	in	common	law	
systems.73	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that,	historically,	common	law	systems	–	which	were	
																																																													
65	Shany,	The	Competing	Jurisdictions	of	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(2003),	244.	Notwithstanding	
the	above,	Shany	has	also	stated	that	 lis	pendens	could	be	qualified	as	a	general	principle	if	one	takes	
into	account	the	single	systems	of	 justice.	The	present	author	does	not	share	this	opinion;	an	answer	
can	be	given	using	the	words	of	Gaja,	 (2008)	 (n.	61),	par.	7:	“general	principles	that	exist	 in	municipal	
systems	of	law	do	not	necessarily	form	part	of	international	law.	The	main	reason	lies	in	the	difference	
in	structure	between	international	society	and	municipal	societies”.	Moreover,	as	will	be	shown	below,	
lis	pendens	is	not	accepted	in	a	relevant	number	of	municipal	systems.	
66	Germany	v.	Poland,	Judgment	(1925)	PCIJ	(ser.	A)	No.6,	20.	
67	Germany	v.	Poland,	Jurisdiction	(1927)	PCIJ	(ser.	A)	No.	9.	
68	Nguyen,	Bond	Law	Review	(2013),	157.	
69	International	Tribunal	 for	 the	Law	of	 the	Sea,	 Ireland	v.	United	Kingdom,	Case	No.	10,	Request	 for	
Provisional	Measures,	3	December	2001.	
70	Southern	Pacific	Properties	(Middle	East)	Limited	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/84/3,	
Award,	20	May	1990.	
71	See	S.A.R.L.	Benvenuti	&	Bonfant	v.	People’s	Republic	of	the	Congo,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/77/2,	Award,	8	
August	1980,	Compania	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	S.A.	and	Vivendi	Universal	v.	Argentine	Republic,	 ICSID	
Case	No.	ARB/97/3,	Award,	21	November	2000,	Alex	Genin	and	others	v.	Republic	of	Estonia,	ICSID	Case	
No.	 ARB/99/2,	 Award,	 25	 June	 2001,	 Azurix	 Corp.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/12,	
Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,	 8	 December	 2003.	 For	 other	 references	 see	 Cuniberti	 (2006)	 (n.	 62),	 381,	
footnote	1.	
72	See	1968	Brussels	Convention	and	EU	Regulations	44/2001	and	1215/2012.	
73	The	issue	is	deeply	analysed	in	Shany,	ssrn.com	(2006),	45	and	ss.,	Cuniberti	(2006)	(n.	62),	402	and	
ss.,	McLachlan	(2009)	(n.	63),	48	and	ss.	and	143	and	ss.,	Nguyen	(2013)	(n.	68),	158-159,	Yannaca-Small,	
The	Oxford	Handbook	of	International	Investment	Law	(2008),	1021	and	ss.,	Das,	www.academia.edu,	1	
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based	on	the	coexistence	of	common	law	and	equity	courts	–	have	not	seen	parallel	
proceedings	 as	 a	 necessary	 evil.74	What	 common	 lawyers	 are	 looking	 for	 is	 the	
resolution	of	a	case	in	the	most	appropriate	forum	and	not	in	the	forum	first	seized.	If	
the	 judge	 second	 seized	believes	 that	 he	 is	 the	most	 appropriate	 judge	 to	 hear	 the	
case,	he	will	go	on	with	 the	proceedings.75	In	 the	words	of	Lord	Goff	“there	 is,	 so	 to	
speak,	 a	 jungle	 of	 separate,	 broadly	 based,	 jurisdictions	 all	 over	 the	 world	 (…)	 The	
basic	principle	is	that	each	jurisdiction	is	independent.	There	is	therefore,	as	I	have	said,	
no	embargo	on	concurrent	proceedings	in	the	same	matter	in	more	than	one	jurisdiction”	
(emphasis	added).76	Similarly,	in	the	US,	Wilkey	J	stated	that	“parallel	proceedings	on	
the	same	in	personam	claim	should	ordinarily	be	allowed	to	proceed	simultaneously,	at	
least	until	 a	 judgment	 is	 reached	 in	one	which	be	plead	as	 res	 judicata	 in	 the	other”	
(emphasis	added).77	
	 For	the	above	reasons,	common	lawyers	have	started	to	make	recourse	to	the	
Scottish	 doctrine	 of	 forum	 non	 conveniens	 and	 to	 anti-suit	 injunctions,	 two	
discretionary	tools	that	we	have	already	examined	in	Chapter	2	above.	It	is	only	worth	
repeating	here	that	forum	non	conveniens	and	anti-suit	 injunctions	are	not	related	to	
considerations	of	time,	but	only	on	a	discretionary	evaluation	of	the	appropriateness	
of	the	court	to	hear	a	certain	case.	
	 In	light	of	the	above,	it	is	evident	that	it	is	not	possible	to	rely	on	lis	pendens	as	
a	 general	 principle	 of	 international	 law.	Not	 all	 States	 rely	 on	 this	 doctrine	 and	 the	
international	case	law,	as	shown	above,	goes	against	this	idea.78	
	 In	fact	it	is	even	arguable	that	lis	pendens	is	not	a	principle	of	law.	Indeed,	if	we	
consider	 Dworkin’s	 distinction	 between	 principles	 and	 rules,79	we	 find	 out	 that	 a	
principle	expresses	a	tendency	of	a	system	of	 law	towards	certain	values	and	certain	
objectives	 to	 be	 reached	 (we	 could	 describe	 it	 as	 a	 “transformator	 of	 extra	 positive	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
and	ss.,	Soderlund,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(2005),	301	and	ss.,	Bregensjo,	Lis	Alibi	Pendens	
in	 International	Arbitration	 (2013),	39	and	ss.,	Orrego	Vicuna,	Parallel	States	and	Arbitral	Procedures	 in	
International	Arbitration	 (2005),	207	and	ss.	The	matter	has	been	also	 the	subject	of	 the	 International	
Law	 Association	 Toronto	 Conference,	 from	 which	 originated	 the	 Final	 Report	 on	 Lis	 Pendens	 and	
Arbitration,	 further	 analysed	 by	 Ma,	 Contemporary	 Asia	 Arbitration	 Journal	 (2009),	 56	 and	 ss.	 The	
concept	of	lis	pendens	in	international	litigation	with	an	EU	perspective	has	been	analysed	by	Consolo,	
Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(1997),	5	and	ss.,	Salerno,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(1999),	363	and	
ss.	
74	For	an	historical	analysis	of	lis	pendens	see	McLachlan	(2009)	(n.	63),	48	and	ss.	
75	Baumgartner,	 Zeitschrift	 für	 Zivilprozeß	 International	 (1998),	 218,	 stated	 that	 “civil	 lawyers	 should	
not	forget	that,	in	the	common	law	world,	the	search	for	the	just	and	fair	resolution	of	every	single	case	
has	 a	 long	 tradition	 in	 equity	 procedure,	 which	 developed	 in	 response	 to	 the	 rigid	 procedure	 in	 the	
common	law	courts,	and	which,	often	manned	by	clergy,	operated	on	reason	and	morality	rather	than	
on	legal	technicalities”.	
76	House	of	Lords,	Airbus	Industrie	GIE	v.	Patel,	[1999]	1	AC	119	(HL),	132-133.	
77	Laker	Airways	Ltd	v.	Sabena	Belgian	World	Airlines,	731	F.2d	909	(DC	Cir.	1984).	
78	See	Wehland,	The	Coordination	of	Multiple	Proceedings	 in	 Investment	Treaty	Arbitration	 (2013),	 194-
196,	Yannaca-Small	(2008)	(n.	73),	1015,	Shany,	Regulating	Jurisdictional	Relations	between	National	and	
International	Courts	(2007),	158,	Yang,	Tsinghua	China	Law	Review	(2011),	352.	
79	Dworkin,	 Taking	 Rights	 Seriously	 (1978),	 14-15.	 The	 subject	 has	 been	 deeply	 analized	 by	 Viola,	
Zaccaria,	Diritto	e	interpretazione	(2009),	366	and	ss.	See	also	Iovane,	Ars	Interpretandi	(2008),	124	and	
Strozzi	(1992)	(n.	61),	168.	
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(moral,	social	or	other)	needs	into	the	legal	system),80	while	a	rule	is	something	more	
concrete,	 i.e.	 a	 precise	 order	 to	 do	 something,	 not	 to	 do	 something,	 or	 to	 do	
something	in	a	certain	way.	It	is	the	opinion	of	the	present	author	that	lis	pendens	is	a	
precise	 rule	 applied	 in	 certain	 systems	 of	 law,	 which	 imposes	 to	 judges	 to	 decline	
jurisdiction	whenever	another	judge	has	previously	been	seized	of	the	same	dispute.	
Lis	 pendens	 is	 an	 answer	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 efficiency	 and	 to	 the	 canon	 of	 judicial	
economy	that	has	been	given	in	certain	 legal	systems.81	Referring	to	 lis	pendens	as	a	
general	 principle	 of	 international	 law	 is	 therefore	 erroneous.	 As	 a	 consequence,	
considering	 that	 –	 as	 stated	 by	 Bin	 Cheng	 –	 Article	 38(1)(c)	 of	 the	 ICJ	 regards	
“principles,	 not	 rules”,82	lis	 pendens	 cannot	 anyway	 be	 regarded	 as	 encompassed	 in	
Art.	38(1)(c).		
In	 conclusion,	 lis	 pendens	 cannot	be	adopted	as	a	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	
parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
	
3.4	 Sources	of	general	international	law	providing	for	solutions	to	the	problem	
of	parallel	proceedings:	the	principles	of	good	faith	and	ne	bis	in	idem	and	
their	concrete	applications	
	
	 Good	 faith	 and	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 are	 broadly	 referred	 as	 general	 principles	 of	
international	 law.83	Indeed,	 with	 regard	 to	 proceedings	 before	 international	 courts	
and	tribunals,	such	principles	–	 in	their	procedural	dimension	–	can	be	considered	as	
the	 source	 of	 other	 general	 principles	 and/or	 rules	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 the	 correct	
regulation	 of	 such	 proceedings.	 Indeed,	 as	 general	 principles,	 they	 have	 been	
considered	 to	 play	 “a	 middle	 role	 between	 the	 lex	 lata	 and	 the	 lex	 ferenda,	 being	
wholly	 neither	 one,	 nor	 the	 other.	 They	 have	 that	 just	 degree	 of	 abstraction	 and	
concreteness,	to	be	able	to	be	dynamic	and	filled	with	some	specific	legal	meaning	at	
once.	 (…)	 Their	 specific	 role	 in	 the	 formative	 stage	 of	 new	 rules	 (at	 the	 legislative	
																																																													
80	Kolb,	 Netherlands	 International	 Law	Review	 (2006),	 7.	 The	word	 “principle”	 comes	 from	 the	 Latin	
“primium	capere”	and	means	something	which	generates	something	else.	Indeed,	principles	are	used	by	
judges	 in	 order	 to	 decide	 the	most	 difficult	 cases	 in	 order	 to	 find	 out	 rules	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 cases	 of	
lacunae	of	law	and	in	order	to	avoid	a	non	liquet.	
81	Wehland	 (2013)	 (n.	 78),	 132,	has	put	 in	direct	 relationship	 lis	 pendens	 and	 judicial	 economy,	 stating	
that	such	canon	is	the	real	rationale	behind	the	first	in	time	rule.	
82	Cheng,	General	Principles	of	Law	as	Applied	by	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(1953),	24.	
83	See	Certain	Norwegian	Loans	 (France	 v.	Norway)	 (Jurisdiction)	 [1957]	 ICJ	Rep	9,	 at	 53;	Nuclear	 Tests	
(Australia	v	France)	(Merits)	[1974]	ICJ	Rep	253,	at	268;	Military	and	Paramilitary	Activities	in	and	Against	
Nicaragua	(Nicaragua	v.	United	States	of	America)	(Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility)	[1984]	ICJ	Rep	392,	at	
419;	 Border	 and	 Transborder	 Armed	 Actions	 (Nicaragua	 v.	 Honduras)	 (Jurisdiction	 and	 Admissibility)	
[1988],	ICJ	Rep.	68,	at	105-106;	Phoenix	Action	Ltd	v.	Czech	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/5,	Award,	
15	April	2009,	para.	107.	See	also	O’Connor,	Good	Faith	in	International	Law	(1991),	5	and	ss.,	Conforti,	
Il	 principio	 di	 buona	 fede	 (1987),	 89	 and	 ss.,	 Kolb	 (2006)	 (n.	 80),	 Cremades,	 American	 University	
International	Law	Review	(2012),	781,	Mitchell,	Melbourne	Journal	of	International	Law	(2006),	341,	De	
Brabandere	(2012)	(n.	10),	609,	Kotzur,	Max	Planck	Encyclopedia	of	Public	International	Law	(2012)	par.	
1	and	ss.,	Ziccardi	Capaldo,	Atti	del	 convegno	 in	memoria	di	Luigi	Sico	 (2011),	510.	Reinhold,	 ssrn.com	
(2013),	2	has	–	on	the	contrary	–	argued	that	good	faith	serves	“a	mediatory	role	between	a	rule	and	a	
principle”.	The	concept	of	good	faith	has	been	deeply	analysed	by	Litvinoff,	Tulane	Law	Review	(1997),	
1646	and	ss.	
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level)	and	their	dynamic	function	in	the	application	of	the	law	indeed	permits	to	look	
at	them	as	a	type	of	source	of	law	which	goes	far	beyond	the	idea	of	subsidiary	filling	
lacunae”.84		
In	the	present	paragraph	we	will	briefly	analyse	the	principles	of	good	faith	and	
ne	bis	 in	 idem,	 in	order	to	introduce	the	doctrines	of	abuse	of	process,	which	directly	
derives	from	the	principle	of	good	faith,	and	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel,	which	
are	specifications	of	the	principle	of	ne	bis	in	idem.	Such	doctrines	will	be	proposed,	in	
the	 remaining	part	of	 this	Chapter,	 as	 a	possible	 solution	 to	 the	problem	of	parallel	
proceedings.	
	 	
Good	faith	
The	principle	of	good	faith,	which	has	been	largely	recognized	as	a	“generally	
accepted	 principle	 of	 international	 law”,85 	“requires	 every	 right	 to	 be	 exercised	
honestly	and	loyally.	(…)	A	reasonable	and	bona	fide	exercise	of	a	right	in	such	a	case	is	
one	that	is	appropriate	and	necessary	for	the	purpose	of	the	right	(…).	It	should	at	the	
same	 time	 be	 fair	 and	 equitable	 as	 between	 the	 parties	 and	 not	 one	 which	 is	
calculated	to	procure	for	one	of	them	an	unfair	advantage	in	the	light	of	the	obligation	
assumed.	(…)	the	principle	of	good	faith	establishes	an	interdependence	between	the	
rights	 of	 a	 State	 [i.e.	 of	 a	 subject]	 and	 its	 obligations”.86	We	 talk,	 in	 this	 regard,	 of	
material	(or	substantive)	good	faith.	It	derives	that	the	principle	of	material	good	faith	
controls	the	exercise	of	substantial	rights.	The	direct	consequence	of	the	principle	of	
material	good	faith	is	that,	in	case	rights	are	exercised	in	mala	fide,	an	abuse	of	rights	
will	take	place.	
The	principle	of	good	faith	has	also	a	procedural	dimension,	i.e.	it	“requires	the	
parties	 not	 to	 undertake	 any	 action	which	 could	 frustrate	 or	 substantially	 adversely	
affect	the	proper	functioning	of	the	procedure	chosen,	the	point	being	to	protect	the	
object	and	purpose	of	the	proceedings.	(…)	it	is	perfectly	open	to	a	party	to	further	its	
own	 interests	even	at	 the	expense	of	 the	other	party.	But	 this	 selfishness	has	 some	
limits.	 It	 cannot	disregard	 requirements	of	 a	proper	 functioning	of	 the	procedure	as	
																																																													
84	Kolb	(2006)	(n.	80),	9.	
85 	Aust,	 Handbook	 of	 International	 Law	 (2010),	 8,	 has	 talked	 about	 a	 fundamental	 principle	 of	
international	law.	See	also	Tamburini,	Trattamento	degli	stranieri	e	buona	fede	nel	diritto	internazionale	
generale	(1984),	44	and	ss.	The	Author	expressly	criticizes	the	opinion	expressed	in	Zoller,	La	bonne	foi	
en	droit	 international	public	 (1977),	 1	and	ss.,	according	 to	whom	good	 faith	would	not	be	a	 source	of	
rights	and	duties	but	only	a	canon	of	ethics.	The	opinion	that	good	faith	is	a	source	of	international	law,	
essential	 in	 order	 to	 integrate	 the	 lacunae	 of	 the	 system,	 has	 been	 strongly	 already	 expressed	 by	
Sperduti,	La	comunità	internazionale	(1952),	42	and	ss.,	and	Virally,	American	Journal	of	International	
Law	 (1983),	 133.	 See	 also	Certain	German	 Interests	 in	Polish	Upper	 Silesia	 (Germany	 v.	 Poland)	 [1926]	
PCIJ	 (Ser.	A)	No.	 7,	 33.	 This	 approach	has	been	partially	 criticized	by	Curti	Gialdino,	Rivista	di	 diritto	
internazionale	(1960),	427	and	ss.	
86	Cheng	(1953)	 (n.	82),	123-126.	The	 idea	that	the	principle	of	good	faith	 is	related	to	the	principle	of	
equality	of	the	parties	in	the	proceedings	has	been	also	explored	by	Sereni	(1955)	(n.	38).	However,	this	
last	Author	 stated	 that	 the	principle	of	good	 faith	derives	 from	the	principle	of	equality	between	 the	
parties	and	is	not	on	its	same	level.	
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such”.87	The	direct	effect	of	a	violation	of	the	principle	of	procedural	good	faith	is	that,	
in	case	a	process	 is	 initiated	or	conducted	 in	bad	faith,	an	abuse	of	process	will	 take	
place.88	
	 The	 above	 distinction	 between	material	 and	 procedural	 good	 faith	 has	 been	
endorsed	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 by	 the	 Abaclat	 Tribunal.89	While	 material	 good	
faith	 regards	 the	 modalities	 with	 which	 an	 investment	 has	 been	 assumed	 (and	 in	
particular	 the	 legality	 of	 the	 investment	 in	 light	 of	 the	 applicable	 law),	 procedural	
good	faith	concerns	“the	context	and	the	way	 in	which	a	party,	usually	the	 investor,	
initiates	 the	 (…)	 claim	 seeking	 protection	 for	 its	 investment”.	 Such	 a	 distinction	
entitles	 us	 to	 talk	 about	 abuse	 of	 rights	 and	 abuse	 of	 process	 in	 investment	
arbitration.	
It	is	worth	repeating	here	that	the	principle	of	good	faith,	both	procedural	and	
substantial,	 has	 a	 common	 core,	 i.e.	 the	 necessity	 to	 exercise	 a	 right	 in	 compliance	
with	 the	 goals	 of	 this	 right	 and	without	 the	 aim	 of	 generating	 a	 prejudice	 to	 other	
parties.	 However,	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith	 requires	 to	 be	 filled	 in	 by	 judges	 on	 a	
case-by-case	 basis,	 keeping	 into	 account	 the	 concrete	 circumstances	 of	 the	 single	
case.	 For	 this	 reason	 it	 is	 essential	 to	 highlight	 the	 very	 active	 role	 of	 judges	 and	
arbitrators	 in	applying	both	the	principle	of	good	 faith	and	the	deriving	doctrines	of	
abuse	of	right/process.90	
As	already	stated,	for	the	sake	of	the	present	book,	we	will	only	focus	on	the	
doctrine	of	abuse	of	process,	which	will	be	deeply	analysed	in	paragraph	3.5	below.	
	 	
																																																													
87	Kolb	(2012)	(n.	16),	831.	The	procedural	dimension	of	good	faith	is	perfectly	explained	by	Art.	3(10)	of	
the	DSU,	stating	that	WTO	Members	will	engage	in	WTO	dispute	settlement	procedures	in	good	faith.	
See	also	art.	300	of	the	UNCLOS,	regarding	“good	faith	and	abuse	of	rights”	and	Art.	38	of	the	Peruvian	
Ley	de	Arbitraje	(D.O.	2008,	1071),	stating	that	“the	parties	are	required	to	respect	the	principle	of	good	
faith	 in	all	of	 their	acts	and	participations	 in	the	course	of	arbitral	proceedings	and	to	cooperate	with	
the	arbitral	tribunal	in	the	development	of	the	arbitration”.	
88	See	 in	 this	 regard	 Ascensio,	 Chinese	 Journal	 of	 International	 Law	 (2014),	 777,	 according	 to	 whom	
“good	faith	 is	a	general	principle	of	 international	 law	and	the	concept	of	abuse	of	process	 is	deduced	
form	this	principle	 in	all	systems	of	 law”.	dalla	Massara,	Rivista	di	diritto	civile	(2008),	has	highlighted	
that	 the	 principle	 of	 good	 faith	 and	 the	 related	 doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 process	 are	 useful	 in	 order	 to	
safeguard	the	values	which	constitute	the	heart	of	any	legal	system.	
89	Abaclat	and	others	v.	Argentina	(supra	n.	8),	paras.	647-649.		
90	Tamburini	(1984)	(n.	85),	50.	
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Ne	bis	in	idem	
	 According	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 (also	 called	 principle	 of	 finality,	
according	to	the	Latin	maxim	“interest	rei	publicae	ut	sit	finis	litium”),	something	that	
has	 been	 judicially	 decided	 once,	 cannot	 be	 decided	 again.	 Such	 a	 definition	 of	 the	
principle	of	finality	assumes	the	perspective	of	the	judge,	who	cannot	hear	a	dispute	
that	has	been	already	decided.	The	principle	can	be	also	seen	from	the	perspective	of	
the	parties:	for	them,	once	issued,	a	decision	is	final	and	binding	and	precludes	a	new	
discussion	of	the	case.91	From	the	perspective	of	a	judge,	the	principle	is	said	to	have	a	
negative	effect,	while	from	the	perspective	of	the	parties	 it	 is	said	to	have	a	positive	
effect.92	In	the	opinion	of	the	present	author	the	positive	and	the	negative	effects	are	
to	be	considered	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin:	the	 issue	cannot	be	discussed	again	
because	the	award	is	binding,	and	vice	versa.	93	
Ne	bis	 in	 idem	 is	 the	main	answer	 that	almost	all	 legal	systems	have	given	to	
the	public	necessities	of	finality,94	efficiency95	and	legal	certainty;	at	the	same	time,	ne	
																																																													
91	See	Volpino,	L’oggetto	del	giudicato	nell’esperienza	americana	(2007),	1	and	ss.	
92	As	it	has	been	noted	by	Volpino	(2007)	(n.	91),	47,	the	case	law	and	scholars	(in	particular	in	the	US)	
have	mainly	 considered	ne	bis	 in	 idem	 from	 its	negative	perspective,	which	 is	 considered	essential	 to	
ensure	finality.	
93	The	principle	has	a	 very	 long	history.	We	can	 indeed	 find	 it	 in	Greek,	Roman	and	old	Ecclesiastical	
Law.	See	Barnett,	Res	Judicata,	Estoppel	and	Foreign	Judgments	(2001),	8	and	ss.,	Van	Bockel,	The	Ne	Bis	
in	Idem	Principle	in	EU	Law	(2009),	1	and	ss.	It	should	be	noted	that	the	negative	effect	of	the	principle	
has	 been	 occasionally	 questioned.	 See	Wehland	 (2013)	 (n.	 78),	 182.	 However,	 this	 opinion	 does	 not	
seem	to	find	support	in	other	Authorities.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	same	Wehland,	at	193,	when	he	says	
that	 “one	 could	 imagine	 a	 preclusive	 effect,	 where	 forums	 in	 a	 second	 set	 of	 proceedings	 would	
altogether	be	prevented	from	rendering	a	new	decision	on	the	merits	of	the	dispute”.		
94	An	 exceptional	 plea	 against	 finality	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Sinai,	 Duke	 Journal	 of	 Comparative	 and	
International	Law	(2011),	387	and	ss.	
95	See	 Comoglio,	 Il	 principio	 di	 economia	 processuale,	 vol.	 2	 (1980),	 109.	 See	 also	 Blonder-Tongue	 v.	
University	 of	 Illinois	 Foundation,	 402	 US	 313	 (1971,	 ,	 328-329,	 where	 it	 has	 been	 stated	 that	 “in	 any	
Good	Faith	
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Abuse	of	Rights	
Procedural	
Abuse	of	Process	
	 126	
bis	in	idem	serves	the	private	interest	to	protect	individuals,	ensuring	them	that	once	a	
dispute	 is	 decided,	 it	 will	 be	 final	 and	 binding.	 It	 is	 largely	 recognized	 as	 a	 general	
principle	 of	 international	 law.96	Indeed,	 the	 principle	 of	ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 has	 found	 an	
extremely	broad	application.	It	has	been	recognized	by	civil	and	common	lawyers,	as	
well	as	 in	commercial	and	criminal	 law.97	It	has	been	considered	“essential	to	 judicial	
operation,	to	the	orderly	working	of	the	judicial	branch.	If	disputants	could	just	reopen	
their	adjudicated	disputes,	there	would	be	no	end	to	 litigation,	nor	any	beginning	of	
authority.	 Finality	 is	 not	 just	 an	 efficient	 policy,	 it	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	 the	
existence	of	the	judiciary”98	(emphasis	in	original).	Indeed	“the	doctrine	of	res	judicata	
is	 primarily	 one	 of	 public	 policy	 and	 only	 secondarily	 of	 private	 benefit	 to	 individual	
litigants”	(emphasis	added).99	
	 With	 regard	 to	 this	 principle,	 there	 is	 no	 uniformity	 in	 terminology.	 Several	
Authorities	 prefer	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 principle	 of	 res	 judicata.100	However	 the	 same	
name	 res	 judicata	 is	 also	often	used	–	 in	a	 stricter	 sense	–	 to	make	 reference	 to	 the	
doctrine	of	claim	preclusion,101	which	is	a	specification	of	the	broader	principle	that	we	
have	called	ne	bis	in	idem	and	that	will	be	analysed	later	in	this	paragraph.102	In	order	
to	avoid	confusion,	we	will	 refer	 to	ne	bis	 in	 idem	 as	 the	general	principle,	while	 the	
name	res	judicata	will	be	used	to	refer	to	the	less	broad	concept	of	claim	preclusion.	
	 It	 is,	 in	 theory,	 possible	 to	 distinguish	 between	 a	 substantive	ne	 bis	 in	 idem,	
according	 to	 which	 someone	 cannot	 pay	 more	 than	 once	 for	 the	 same	 acts	 or	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
lawsuit	where	a	defendant,	because	of	 the	mutuality	principle,	 is	 forced	 to	present	a	defense	on	 the	
merits	 to	 a	 claim	which	 the	 plaintiff	 has	 fully	 litigated	 and	 lost	 in	 a	 prior	 action,	 there	 is	 an	 arguable	
misallocation	of	resources”	(emphasis	added).	
96	See	 Cheng	 (1953)	 (n.	 82),	 153	 and	 336,	 Lowe,	 African	 Journal	 of	 International	 &	 Comparative	 Law	
(1996),	 38,	 Shany	 (2003)	 (n.	 65),	 245,	 Reinisch	 (2004)	 (n.	 64),	 44,	 Nguyen	 (2013)	 (n.	 68),	 144.	 The	
principle	 has	 been	 affirmed	 in	 several	 decisions.	 See,	 inter	 alia,	 Société	 Commerciale	 de	 Belgique	
(Belgium	v.	Greece)	1939	PCIJ	(Ser.	A/B)	No.	78,	at	174;	Polish	Postal	Service	in	Danzig,	1925	PCIJ	(Ser.	B)	
No.	 11,	 at	 30;	 Interpretation	of	 Judgments	Nos.	 7	 and	8	Concerning	 the	 case	of	 the	Factory	at	Chorzow	
(Germany	v.	Poland),	1927	PCIJ	(Ser.	A)	No.	11,	at	21;	Factory	at	Chorzow	(Germany	v.	Poland),	1927	PCIJ	
(ser.A)	No.	17	(Merits)	(Dissenting	opinion	of	Judge	Ehrlich);	Orinoco	Steamship	Co.	(US	v.	Venezuela)	11	
RIAA	227,	239	(1910);	Petrobart	v.	Kyrgyz	Republic,	SCC	Case	No.	126/2003,	Award,	29	March	2005,	64;	
Waste	Management	 Inc.	 v.	 United	Mexican	 States	 (No.	 2),	 ICSID	 Case	No.	 ARB(AF)/00/3,	 Decision	 on	
Preliminary	Objection,	26	June	2002.	The	only	dissenting	voice	has	been	Sacerdoti,	TDM	(2005),	104-
105.	However	Sacerdoti’s	position,	expressed	in	a	legal	opinion	in	the	CME	case,	goes	against	what	has	
been	unanimously	said	for	various	centuries.	
97	See	Palombino,	 Italian	Yearbook	of	 International	 Law	 (2002),123	and	 ss.,	Hober	 (2013)	 (n.	 64),	 126	
and	ss.,	Conway,	International	Criminal	Law	Review	82003),	217	and	ss.,	Varvaele,	Utrecht	Law	Review	
(2005),	100	and	ss.,	Aghenitei,	Flamanzeanu,	Challenges	of	the	Knowledge	Society	(2011),	131	and	ss.,	
Luparia,	La	litispendenza	internazionale	(2012),	34	and	ss.,	Perez	Manzano,	La	prohibicion	constitucional	
de	incurrir	en	ne	bis	in	idem	(2002),	1	and	ss.		
98	Casad,	Clermont,	Res	Judicata	(2001),	4.	
99	See	Coca	Cola	Co.	v.	Pepsi-Cola	Co.,	36	Del.	(6	W.W.	Harr.)	124,	130,	172	Atl.	260,	262	(1934).	See	also	
Vestal,	Iowa	Law	Review	(1964),	45.	
100	See,	inter	alia,	Cheng	(1953)	(n.	82),	153	and	336,	Lowe,	(1996)	(n.	96),	38,	Shany	(2003)	(n.	65),	245,	
Reinisch	(2004)	(n.	64),	44,	Nguyen	(2013)	(n.	68),	144.	
101	See,	inter	alia,	Brower,	Henin,	Kemperink,	Building	International	Investment	Law:	The	First	50	Years	of	
ICSID	(2015),	55.	
102	The	 idea	that	the	doctrine	of	res	 judicata	 is	an	expression	of	the	broader	principle	of	ne	bis	 in	 idem	
has	been	clearly	expressed	by	Leo,	Diritto	penale	e	processo	(2008),	513.	
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omissions,	 and	 a	 procedural	ne	 bis	 in	 idem,	 according	 to	which	 a	 person	 cannot	 be	
judged	more	than	once	for	the	same	offence.	However,	contrary	to	what	we	have	said	
for	good	faith,	the	distinction	between	the	substantial	and	procedural	dimensions	of	
the	 principle	 seems	 useless	 in	 this	 case;	 indeed,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 exist	 only	 one	
principle	of	ne	bis	 in	 idem,	which	have	both	substantial	and	procedural	value.103	Such	
aspects	are	 in	 fact	 the	two	sides	of	 the	same	coin,	 i.e.	 the	 fact	 that	 there	cannot	be	
more	than	one	judgment	for	the	same	dispute.	
	 The	broad	application	of	 the	ne	bis	 in	 idem	principle	all	around	the	world	has	
brought	 to	 different	 developments	 of	 the	 same	 principle.	 Such	 differences	 regard	
mainly	two	aspects.		
	 First	of	all,	it	is	commonly	said	that	the	ne	bis	in	idem	principle	is	based	on	the	
application	of	the	already	mentioned	triple	identity	test,	i.e.	identity	of	parties,	claim	
and	legal	basis	of	the	claim.	However,	as	we	will	see	in	paragraph	3.6	below,	there	is	
no	uniformity	(both	in	international	law	and	among	municipal	systems)	on	the	content	
of	these	requirements.	Just	to	make	an	example,	we	could	ask	ourselves	whether	the	
requirement	of	 the	same	parties	shall	be	 intended	as	 referring	to	parties	 in	a	 formal	
sense	(i.e.	the	nominal	parties)	or	 in	a	substantial	sense	(i.e.	the	centres	of	 interest);	
whether	the	requirement	of	the	same	claim	shall	be	intended	to	cover	only	what	has	
been	formally	claimed	by	the	parties	or	also	what	they	could	have	claimed	but	did	not	
claim;	or,	 finally,	whether	 the	 requirement	of	 identity	of	 the	 legal	basis	of	 the	claim	
shall	be	intended	in	a	formal	way	or	in	a	broader	sense.	All	these	doubts	are	still	open	
in	international	law104	and	let	Shany	talk	about	a	“somewhat	inconsistent”	application	
of	the	principle	of	finality	in	international	law.105	
	 Secondly,	 while	 civil	 law	 systems	 have	 developed	 only	 the	 concept	 of	 claim	
preclusion	(usually	referred	to	as	res	judicata),	i.e.	the	idea	that	a	judgment	on	a	claim	
precludes	another	discussion	of	such	claim,	common	lawyers	also	apply	the	doctrine	
of	 issue	 preclusion	 (usually	 referred	 to	 as	 collateral	 estoppel),	 according	 to	 which	
issues	 or	 fact	 or	 law	 actually	 litigated	 and	 determined	 within	 a	 broader	 claim,	 and	
which	were	essential	for	the	judgment	on	such	claim,	cannot	be	litigated	again.106	
	 In	 light	of	 the	above	we	can	only	 talk	about	a	 “ne	bis	 in	 idem	 family”,107	such	
family	being	composed	of	several	doctrines,	as	described	in	the	chart	below.		
																																																													
103	This	idea	has	been	already	developed	by	Palombino	(2002)	(n.	97),	132.	
104	Nguyen	(2013)	(n.	68),	146.	
105	Shany	(2003)	(n.	65),	253.	
106	See	Polasky,	Iowa	Law	Review	(1954),	217,	stating	that	“collateral	estoppel,	despite	its	development	
quite	apart	 from	the	other	aspects	of	 res	 judicata,	 seems	now	 to	be	classified	as	only	a	 facet	of	 that	
broad	generic	concept”.		
107	Van	Bockel	(2009)	(n.	92),	34.	
	 128	
	
	
	
Paragraphs	 3.6	 and	 3.7	 below	 will	 be	 aimed	 at	 deeply	 examine	 the	 various	
approaches	 and	 ideas	 underlying	 the	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 family.	 We	 will	 analyse	 their	
application	 in	 municipal	 law	 and	 their	 status	 in	 international	 law	 in	 order	 to	
understand	 which	 of	 them	 could	 be	 a	 useful	 instrument	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
	
3.5	 Abuse	of	process	in	international	investment	arbitration	
	
In	 investment	 arbitration	 an	 abuse	 of	 process	 takes	 place	when	 an	 investor,	
owning	 a	 certain	procedural	 right,	 exercise	 its	 right	 in	 a	way,	 or	 for	 a	 scope,	 that	 is	
contrary	to	the	aim	for	which	such	a	right	has	been	granted	(i.e.	in	bad	faith).108	This	
entitles	the	Tribunal	to	preclude	the	exercise	of	that	right	by	the	claimant	by	way	of	a	
declaration	of	inadmissibility,	although	such	right	is	an	actual	and	valid	one.109	
The	 following	 can	 be	 identified	 as	 the	 main	 requirements	 for	 an	 abuse	 of	
process	to	occur:	
a)	the	ownership	of	a	valid	procedural	right;	
b)	the	possibility	that,	in	abstracto,	such	procedural	right	can	be	exercised	also	
for	scopes	which	are	different	from	the	ones	for	which	the	right	has	been	granted;	
																																																													
108	Pino,	Eguaglianza,	ragionevolezza	e	logica	giuridica	(2006),	116.	
109	De	 Brabandere	 (2012)	 (n.	 10),	 619-620.	 Ascensio	 (2014)	 (n.	 88),	 784.	 See	 also,	 on	 the	 doctrine	 of	
abuse	of	rights	in	international	law,	Gestri,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(1994),	5	and	ss.	With	regard	
to	 the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	 right	 in	EU	 law	see	Losurdo,	 Il	divieto	di	abuso	del	diritto	nell’ordinamento	
europeo	 (2011),	 107	 and	 ss.,	 Gestri,	 Abuso	 del	 diritto	 e	 frode	 alla	 legge	 nell’ordinamento	 comunitario	
(2003),	1	and	ss.	
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Res	Judicata		
(Claim	Preclusion)	
Rigid	Application	
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c)	the	exercise	of	the	procedural	right	for	a	scope	that,	in	concreto,	generates	a	
prejudice	to	the	other	party	and	to	the	proper	functioning	of	the	relevant	method	of	
dispute	settlement.	
However,	 the	 same	 existence	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 process	 has	 been	
questioned	 (in	 particular	 in	 investment	 arbitration)	 due	 to:	110	(i)	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 legal	
basis	for	it;111	(ii)	an	erosion	of	the	principle	of	party	autonomy;	(iii)	a	possible	violation	
of	the	principle	of	due	process.	
In	order	to	answer	such	criticisms	it	is	necessary	to	start	from	a	brief	reference,	
in	general	terms,	to	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	rights.	
In	the	words	of	Hersch	Lauterpacht,	“[t]he	essence	of	the	doctrine	[of	abuse	of	
rights]	 is	 that,	 as	 legal	 rights	 are	 conferred	 by	 the	 community,	 the	 latter	 cannot	
countenance	 their	 antisocial	 use	 by	 individuals;	 that	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 hitherto	 legal	
right	becomes	unlawful	when	it	degenerates	into	an	abuse	of	rights;	and	that	there	is	
such	an	abuse	of	rights	each	time	the	general	interest	of	the	community	is	injuriously	
affected	as	the	result	of	the	sacrifice	of	an	important	social	or	individual	interest	to	a	
less	important,	though	hitherto	legally	recognized	individual	right”.112	The	conviction	
that	 every	 right	 shall	 be	 exercised	 fairly	 and	 in	 good	 faith,	 thus	 avoiding	 anti-social	
effects	deriving	from	the	exercise	of	such	right,	is	deeply	rooted	in	all	the	systems	of	
law113	and	has	been	considered,	even	since	the	early	 twentieth	century,	as	a	general	
principle	of	 law.114	It	derives	that	only	a	right	that	 is	exercised	 in	good	faith	deserves	
the	 protection	 of	 the	 law.	 This	 is	 today	 also	 expressly	 recognized	 by	 some	
																																																													
110	See,	with	regard	to	the	notion	of	abuse	of	process	in	general,	Scarselli,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	
(2012),	1467	and	ss.,	Picò	y	Junoy,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2013),	171	and	ss.,	Cordopatri,	Rivista	di	
diritto	 processuale	 (2012),	 883	 and	 ss.	 A	 general	 attempt	 of	 balancing	 abuse	 of	 process	 and	
fundamental	rights	has	been	tried	by	Comoglio,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2008),	319	and	ss.	
111	See,	in	general	terms,	the	criticisms	reported	by	Ascensio	(2014)	(n.	88),	764.	
112	Lauterpacht,	The	Function	of	Law	in	the	International	Community	(2010	ed.),	294.	The	history	of	the	
doctrine	of	abuse	of	rights	is	deeply	analysed	by	Lettieri,	Marini,	Merone,	L’abuso	del	diritto	nel	dialogo	
tra	corti	nazionali	ed	internazionali	(2014),	18	and	ss.	
113	See	 Byers,	 McGill	 Law	 Review	 (2002),	 391	 and	 ss.	 The	 Author	 perfectly	 demonstrates	 the	 wide	
application	of	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	rights	in	both	civil	and	common	law	systems.		
114	Lauterpacht	(2010	ed.)	(n.	112),	300	and	ss.	The	Author	explains	that,	at	his	time,	even	if	the	common	
law	world	did	not	know	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	right,	 it	had	equivalent	principles	that	supplied	to	 its	
function.	According	to	the	Author,	at	308,	“the	possibilities	of	the	application	of	the	doctrine	of	abuse	
of	 rights	 in	 relations	 among	 States	 are	 manifold”.	 See	 also	 Iluyomade,	 Harvard	 International	 Law	
Journal	(1975),	47	and	ss.	With	regard	to	the	case	law,	see	the	Lighthouse	case	(Turkey	v.	Greece),	[1934]	
PCIJ	(Ser.	A/B),	No.	62,	Certain	German	Interests	in	Polish	Upper	Silesia	(Germany	v.	Poland)	[1926]	PCIJ	
(Ser.	 A)	 No.	 7,	 Free	 Zone	 Case	 (France	 v.	 Switzerland)	 [1932],	 PCIJ	 (Ser.	 A/B)	 No.	 46,	 Nottebohm	
(Liechtenstein	 v.	Guatemala)	 [1955]	 ICJ	4,	 370,	Barcelona	Traction	 (Belgium	v.	Spain)	 [1970]	 ICJ	 1,	 324.	
Several	other	cases	are	mentioned	in	Gestri	(1994)	(n.	109),	19	and	ss.	Particularly	relevant	is	the	Award	
of	4	March	1925	rendered	in	the	Tacna-Arica	ad	hoc	arbitration	between	Chile	and	Peru,	where	the	sole	
arbitrator	expressly	endorsed	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	rights	as	basis	for	its	decision,	stating	that	Chile	
used	its	laws	with	the	sole	purpose	of	generating	damage	to	Peruvian	people.	
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international	 sources	 of	 law,115	as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 national	 legal	
systems.116	
The	 theory	 of	 abuse	 of	 rights	 has	 been	 recognized	 also	 in	 investment	
arbitration,	notwithstanding	the	fact	that	it	usually117	lacks	of	a	normative	basis.118	It	is	
here	worth	quoting	para.	646	of	the	Decision	on	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility	issued	
in	 the	Abaclat	 case:	 “(…)	 the	 theory	of	 abuse	of	 rights	 is	 an	expression	of	 the	more	
general	principle	of	good	faith	(…)	a	fundamental	principle	of	international	law,	as	well	
as	investment	law.	As	such,	the	Tribunal	hold	that	the	theory	of	abuse	of	rights	is,	in	
principle,	applicable	to	ICSID	proceedings”.	
In	 fact	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 observe	 that	 procedural	 rights	 have	 nothing	 different	
from	other	rights,	unless	the	fact	that	they	are	to	be	exercised	in	a	certain	context,	i.e.	
a	process.	As	a	consequence,	such	rights	can	be	abused.	The	right	to	initiate	a	process	
may	itself	be	abused,	in	case	the	process	is	not	initiated	for	the	scope	of	doing	justice,	
but	with	the	aim	of	 taking	an	undue	advantage	or	creating	harassment	to	the	other	
party.119	In	general	 terms,	all	procedural	 rights	 shall	be	exercised	avoiding	 to	unduly	
bypass	other	 rights	or	procedural	 fundamental	 rules.	This	 is	a	direct	consequence	of	
the	 same	 fact	 that	 procedural	 rights	 are	 rights.120	This	 is	 confirmed	by	Lauterpacht,	
when	he	says	 that	“[i]t	 is	easy	 to	see	why	the	doctrine	 thus	conceived	 [i.e.	abuse	of	
rights]	can	be	regarded	as	one	of	great	potentialities	in	the	process	of	judicial	legislation	
adjusting	the	law	to	new	conditions	and	preventing	unfair	or	anti-social	use	of	rights”.121	
The	logical	consequence	of	this	statement	is	that	a	party	cannot	use	a	process	in	order	
to	 obtain	 a	 personal	 advantage	 regardless	 of	whether	 the	 initiation	 of	 that	 process	
																																																													
115	See,	 inter	alia,	Art.	54	of	 the	European	Charter	of	Human	Rights.	For	other	 references	see	Lettieri,	
Marini,	Merone	(2014)	(n.	112),	24	and	ss.	See	also	Art.	XX	of	the	GATT,	which	has	been	seen	as	a	rule	
“setting	out	a	right	(…)	and	then	forbidding	its	abuse”	by	Di	Benedetto	(2013)	(n.	61),	126.	
116	See	 Gestri	 (2003)	 (n.	 109),	 24-52,	 who	 has	 conducted	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
application	abuse	of	rights	in	national	legal	systems	within	the	EU.	See	also	Losurdo	(2011)	(n.	109),	25-
36.	
117	There	is	a	strong	debate	among	scholars	with	regard	to	the	necessity	that	investments	are	made	in	
good	 faith	 and/or	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 law	 of	 the	 host	 State.	 See	Đajić,	 Proceedings	 of	Novi	 Sad	
Faculty	of	Law (2012),	207	and	ss.,	Carlevaris,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2008),	35	and	
ss.,	 Tirado,	 Page,	Meagher,	 ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2014),	 493	 and	 ss.,	 Lamm,	Greenwald,	 Young,	 ICSID	
Review	 FILJ	 (2014),	 328	 and	 ss.,	 Kriebaum,	 Austrian	 Arbitration	 Yearbook	 2010	 (2010),	 307	 and	 ss.,	
Obersteiner,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2014),	 265	 and	 ss.,	Maniruzzaman,	 Amicus	 Curiae:	
Journal	of	the	Society	for	Advanced	Legal	Studies	(2012),	16	and	ss.	
118	See,	 inter	 alia,	Mr.	 Franck	Charles	Arif	 v.	Republic	 of	Moldova,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/23,	Award,	8	
April	 2013,	Malicorp	 Limited	 v.	 The	 Arab	 Republic	 of	 Egypt,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/08/18,	 Award	 of	 7	
February	 2011.	 Several	 other	 references	 are	 contained	 in	 Georgilas,	 ILA	 Regional	 Conference	 2013,	
Greece	(2013),	14	and	ss.	
119	Such	an	improper	use	of	a	right	might	be	related	to	the	French	doctrine	of	détourement	de	pouvoir,	
according	to	which	a	power	cannot	be	used	for	a	goal	that	 is	different	from	the	one	for	which	such	a	
power	 has	 been	 provided.	 The	 applicability	 of	 détourement	 de	 pouvoir	 in	 international	 law	 has	 been	
criticized	by	Gestri	(1994)	(n.	109),	11.	
120	See,	in	this	regard,	Gestri	(1994)	(n.	109),	9	and	22	and	ss.	This	Author	also	cites	several	precedents	
on	the	point.	
121	Lauterpacht	(2010	ed.)	(n.	112),	294.	
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respects	 the	 (already	 mentioned)	 fundamental	 canons	 of	 justice.122	The	 process	 is	
available	for	the	parties	provided	that	they	make	recourse	to	it	according	to	its	actual	
scopes.		
It	 seems	 therefore	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 a	 judge	 has	 the	 duty	 to	 control,	 in	
concreto,	 that	 all	 procedural	 rights	 are	 exercised	 in	 good	 faith,	 notwithstanding	 the	
lack	 of	 a	 normative	 basis	 for	 such	 power.	 Such	 a	 duty,	 to	 be	 exercised	 at	 the	
admissibility	 stage,	 is	 an	 inherent	 power	 of	 every	 judge	 and	 shall	 be	 aimed	 at	
protecting	the	judicial	function,	the	proper	functioning	of	proceedings	and	the	rights	
of	the	other	party	in	the	proceedings.123	Only	rights	exercised	in	a	way	(or	for	a	scope)	
that	 does	 not	 have	 such	 undesirable	 effects	 are	 to	 be	 considered,	 let	 us	 say,	
meritorious	and	deserve	the	protection	of	the	law.124	From	the	above	it	is	possible	to	
understand	that	the	application	of	 the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	 involves	an	high	
amount	 of	 discretion	 for	 judges/arbitrators,	 who	 have	 to	 check	 if,	 in	 concrete,	 the	
exercise	of	a	procedural	right	is,	to	borrow	Lauterpacht’s	words,	anti-social.125	
According	to	Robert	Kolb,	even	 if	 the	 ICJ	“has	never	found	the	conditions	for	
an	application”126	of	abuse	of	process,	this	does	not	exclude	that	such	doctrine	cannot	
find	a	place	in	its	case	law.	However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	abuse	of	process	can	find	
its	 explicit	 recognition	 (other	 than	 in	 municipal	 laws)127 	in	 several	 international	
sources,	 such	 as	 Art.	 35(3)	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 of	 Human	 Rights,128	Art.	
294(1)129	and	300130	of	the	United	Nation	Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	and	Art.	
																																																													
122	Ghirga,	La	meritevolezza	della	tutela	richiesta	(2004),	78	and	89	and	ss.	For	a	reference	to	efficiency	
and	judicial	economy	see	also	Lettieri,	Merini,	Merone	(2014)	(n.	112),	40.	
123	Ghirga,	(2004)	(n.	122),	77.	
124	Ghirga,	 (2004)	 (n.	 122),	 89	 and	 ss.	 In	 1982,	 in	Hunter	 v.	 Chief	 Constable	 of	 the	West	Midlands,	 the	
House	of	Lords	stated	that	abuse	of	process	is	essential	to	prevent	“the	administration	of	justice	might	
be	brought	into	disrepute	among	right-thinking	people”.		
125	All	 the	 above	 is	 confirmed	 in	 the	 Interim	 Report:	 "Res	 judicata"	 and	 Arbitration	 issued	 by	 the	
International	 Law	 Association,	 Berlin	 Conference,	 in	 2004,	 8,	 par.	 E.	 Gestri	 (1994)	 (n.	 109),	 10,	 has	
criticized	the	definition	of	abuse	of	rights	on	the	basis	of	the	anti-social	exercise	of	such	a	right,	stating	
that,	used	in	this	way,	abuse	of	right	might	become	a	way	to	give	legislative	powers	to	judges	and	this	
would	undermine	the	principle	of	legal	certainty.	Due	to	the	proactive	role	of	international	judges,	such	
an	 idea	 is	not	convincing	with	 regard	to	 international	 law.	The	present	author,	 therefore,	 fully	shares	
Lauterpacht’s	approach.	
126	Kolb	(2012)	(n.	80),	831.	
127	See	Gaffney,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2010),	515	and	ss.,	recalling	applications	of	the	
doctrine	 in	Canada,	England,	Australia	 and	United	States.	 Today	 the	doctrine	 finds	 application,	 inter	
alia,	 also	 in	France,	 Italy	and	Switzerland.	For	a	detailed	analysis	of	US	practice	 see	Dondi,	Rivista	di	
diritto	processuale	(1995),	787	and	ss.	Abuse	of	process	does	not	seem	to	be	recognized	in	Sweden.	See	
Case	T	8735-01,	judgment	of	15	May	2003,	paras.	187-188.	
128	“The	 Court	 shall	 declare	 inadmissible	 any	 individual	 application	 submitted	 under	 Article	 34	 if	 it	
considers	that:		
(a)	the	application	is	incompatible	with	the	provisions	of	the	Convention	or	the	Protocols	thereto,	
manifestly	ill-founded,	or	an	abuse	of	the	right	of	individual	application;	or		
(b)	the	applicant	has	not	suffered	a	significant	disadvantage,	unless	respect	 for	human	rights	
as	 defined	 in	 the	 Convention	 and	 the	 Protocols	 thereto	 requires	 an	 examination	 of	 the	
application	on	the	merits	and	provided	that	no	case	may	be	rejected	on	this	ground	which	has	
not	been	duly	considered	by	a	domestic	tribunal”.	(Emphasis	added).	
129	“A	court	or	tribunal	provided	for	in	article	287	to	which	an	application	is	made	in	respect	of	a	dispute	
referred	 to	 in	 article	 297	 shall	 determine	 at	 the	 request	 of	 a	 party,	 or	may	 determine	 proprio	motu,	
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3(10)	of	the	WTO	Dispute	Settlement	Understanding.131	According	to	Vaughan	Lowe,	
however,	 regardless	 of	 a	 normative	 recognition,	 the	 doctrine	 is	 “well	 established,	
though	 occasions	 for	 its	 application	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 very	 rare.	 It	 indicates	 that	 a	
tribunals	 should	 decline	 jurisdiction	 in	 a	 range	of	 circumstances	where	 the	 action	 is	
rendered	 vexatious.	 These	 include	 cases	 where	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 litigation	 is	 to	
harass	the	defendant,	or	the	claim	is	frivolous	or	manifestly	groundless”.132		
It	is	difficult	(and	maybe	too	early)	to	say	here	whether	abuse	of	process	can	be	
considered	as	an	autonomous	principle	of	international	law.	It	seems	that,	if	seen	as	a	
procedural	expression	of	the	general	principle	of	abuse	of	right,	abuse	of	process	can	
find	 a	 place	 in	 international	 law.133	It	 is	 not	 debatable,	 however,	 that	 international	
courts	and	tribunals	have	the	inherent	power	to	preclude	a	claim	to	go	ahead	if	such	a	
claim,	in	concrete,	amounts	to	an	abuse	of	process.		
With	 particular	 regard	 to	 international	 investment	 arbitration,	 all	 the	 above	
debate	 is	 very	 relevant.	 Indeed,	 being	 investment	 arbitration	 a	 form	 of	 dispute	
settlement	that	involves	several	public	interests,	it	is	of	certain	importance	that	such	
form	of	justice	is	not	abused	to	the	detriment	of	State	parties.	Indeed,	several	recent	
cases	have	discussed	the	existence	and	the	requirements	of	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	
process	as	a	way	to	balance	the	over-formalistic	approach	to	jurisdiction,	on	the	one	
side,	with	the	substantial	necessity	of	a	proper	administration	of	justice,	on	the	other	
side.	 Such	 cases	 mainly	 regarded	 a	 change	 of	 the	 investors’	 corporate	 structure,	
aimed	 at	 gaining	 the	 advantages	 of	 a	 certain	 BIT.	 In	 various	 cases	 Tribunals	 have	
stated	that,	if	the	final	owner	of	the	alleged	investor	had	the	same	nationality	of	the	
host	State	(or	a	nationality	of	a	State	which	was	not	a	party	of	the	relevant	BIT)	and	
such	 final	 owner	 purposefully	 modified	 the	 corporate	 structure	 in	 order	 to	 get	 the	
advantage	 of	 a	 BIT	 after	 a	 dispute	 arose,	 such	 conduct	 amounted	 to	 an	 abuse	 of	
process.134	In	these	cases,	the	recourse	to	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	has	not	been	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
whether	the	claim	constitutes	an	abuse	of	legal	process	or	whether	prima	facie it	 is	well	founded.	If	the	
court	 or	 tribunal	 determines	 that	 the	 claim	 constitutes	 an	 abuse	 of	 legal	 process	 or	 is	 prima facie 
unfounded,	it	shall	take	no	further	action	in	the	case”.	(Emphasis	added)	
130	“States	 Parties	 shall	 fulfil	 in	 good	 faith	 the	 obligations	 assumed	 under	 this	 Convention	 and	 shall	
exercise	the	rights,	jurisdiction	and	freedoms	recognized	in	this	Convention	in	a	manner	which	would	not	
constitute	an	abuse	of	right”.	(Emphasis	added)	
131	“It	 is	 understood	 that	 requests	 for	 conciliation	 and	 the	 use	 of	 the	 dispute	 settlement	 procedures	
should	not	be	intended	or	considered	as	contentious	acts	and	that,	if	a	dispute	arises,	all	Members	will	
engage	 in	 these	 procedures	 in	 good	 faith	 in	 an	 effort	 to	 resolve	 the	 dispute.	 It	 is	 also	 understood	 that	
complaints	 and	 counter-complaints	 in	 regard	 to	 distinct	 matters	 should	 not	 be	 linked”.	 (Emphasis	
added)	
132	Lowe,	Australian	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(1999),	202.	
133	Ascensio	(2014)	(n.	88),	779.	
134	Phoenix	Action	 Ltd.	 v.	 the	 Czech	Republic,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/06/5,	Award,	 15	April	 2009;	Europe	
Cement	Investment	 Trade	v.	Republic	of	Turkey,	ICSID	Case	No,	ARB	(AF)/07/2,	Award,	13	August	2009;	
Cementownia	 "Nowa	 Huta"	 S.A.	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Turkey,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB	 (AF)/06/2,	 Award,	 17	
September	 2009;	Renée	Rose	 Levy	 and	Gremcitel	 S.A.	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Perù,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/11/17,	
Award,	 9	 January	 2015;	Pac	 Rym	Cayman	 LLC	 v.	 Republic	 of	 El	 Salvador,	 ICSID	Case	No.	 ARB/09/12,	
Decision	on	 the	Respondent’s	 Jurisdictional	Objections,	 1	 June	2012.	See,	with	general	 regard	 to	 the	
doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 process	 and	 the	 changes	 of	 corporate	 structure,	 Cerny,	 Czech	 Yearbook	 of	
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(and	 cannot	 be)	 seen	 as	 a	 limitation	 of	 party	 autonomy	 and	 due	 process:	 if	 a	 party	
unlawfully	exercises	its	procedural	rights,	and	then	this	unlawful	exercise	is	precluded	
by	 the	 tribunal,	 such	 a	 party	 cannot	 further	 claim	 that	 it	 has	 been	 deprived	 of	 its	
rights!	Modern	procedural	 law	has,	 indeed,	developed	 the	 idea	 that	all	 the	 forms	of	
protection	granted	 in	a	process	are	conditioned	to	the	circumstance	that	procedural	
rights	are	exercised	 in	good	faith.	 It	 is	not	surprising	that	such	principle	 is	applied	 in	
investment	arbitration.	
Abuse	of	process	has	been	described	as	a	perfect	way	of	attracting	attention	
on	 “systemic	 malfunctioning”135	and	 to	 preclude	 the	 continuance	 of	 proceedings	
which	 run	 against	 fundamental	 canons	 of	 procedure	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 can	 be	
extremely	onerous	for	the	other	party.	It	can	be	said	that	“the	function	of	the	concept	
is	to	correct	a	too	formalistic	approach	of	the	procedure,	taking	into	account	elements	
of	social	finality	and	fairness”.136		
It	 is	 here	 submitted	 that,	 even	 if	 there	 has	 never	 been	 a	 decision	 expressly	
applying	abuse	of	process	in	order	to	prevent	parallel	proceedings,137	abuse	of	process	
can	be	a	valuable	tool	in	order	to	avoid	that	–	bypassing	some	fundamental	canons	of	
procedure	(i.e.	the	needs	for	finality,	efficiency	and	proper	administration	of	justice)	as	
well	as	the	principle	of	ne	bis	 in	 idem	–	some	parties	 initiate	multiple	proceedings	on	
the	basis	of	the	same	identical	dispute.138	In	the	words	of	Chester	Brown,	used	in	this	
way	abuse	of	process	would	be	“a	rule	of	public	policy	based	on	the	desirability,	 in	the	
general	 interest	 as	well	 as	 that	 of	 the	 parties	 themselves,	 that	 litigation	 should	 not	
drag	 on	 forever	 and	 that	 a	 defendant	 should	 not	 be	 oppressed	 by	 successive	
proceedings	when	one	would	do”	(emphasis	added).139	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
International	 Law	 (2012),	 183	 and	 ss.,	 Voon,	 Mitchell,	 Munro,	 Journal	 of	 International	 Dispute	
Settlement	(2014),	41	and	ss.,	Topcan	(2014)	(n.	17),	627	and	ss.,	Daujotas,	ssrn.com	(2012),	1	and	ss.	
135	Ascensio	(2014)	(n.	88),	785.	The	idea	to	let	substance	prevail	on	form	is	also	confirmed	by	Prosper	
Weil’s	 dissenting	 opinion	 in	 Tokios	 Tokeles	 v.	 Ukraine,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/02/18,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction,	Dissenting	Opinion	of	Prosper	Weil,	29	April	2004,	para.	19	and	ss.,	in	which	he	focused	on	
the	goals	of	the	ICSID	regime	and	on	the	need	to	preserve	the	integrity	of	the	system	and	stated	that	
international	 courts	must	 retain	 a	minimal	 amount	 of	 both	 effectiveness	 and	 legitimacy	 in	 order	 to	
continue	 to	 operate.	 Shany	 (2003)	 (n.	 65),	 259	 has	 put	 abuse	 of	 process	 in	 relation	 to	 res	 judicata.	
According	 to	 his	 opinion	 “abuse	 of	 process	 doctrine	 can	 serve	 as	 an	 additional	 justification	 for	 the	
adoption	 of	 (…)	 res	 judicata	 (…)	 and	 perhaps	 even	 support	 a	 liberal	 construction	 of	 [its]	 scope	 of	
application,	so	to	encompass	closely	related	multiple	proceedings,	which	are	extremely	onerous	for	one	
party	and	of	relatively	little	utility	to	the	other	party.	It	might	also	operate	to	restrict	unjustified	claim-
splitting	tactics”.	See	also	Ghosh,	Arbitration	International	(2015),	665	and	ss.	
136	Ascensio	(2014)	(n.	88),	764.	
137	On	 the	 contrary,	 in	CME	 v.	 Czech	 Republic,	 UNCITRAL,	 Final	 Award	 14	March	 2003,	 par.	 412,	 the	
Tribunal	stated	that,	if	jurisdiction	is	validly	conferred,	the	commencement	of	two	parallel	proceedings	
cannot	be	seen	as	an	abuse	of	process.	The	present	author	does	not	share	this	opinion,	considering	that	
–	 as	 it	 will	 be	 seen	 better	 in	 Paragraph	 3.6	 below	 –	 	 the	CME	 Tribunal’s	 approach	 fosters	 abuses	 of	
investment	arbitration.	
138	This	idea	seems	to	be	denied	by	Gaffney	(2010)	(n.	127),	529.		
139	Brown,	Transnational	Dispute	Management	(2011),	7.	
	 134	
This	approach	is	indirectly	confirmed	by	the	RSM	and	Grynberg	case,140	where	
the	Tribunal	said	that	“the	present	case	is	no	more	than	an	attempt	to	re-litigate	and	
overturn	the	findings	of	another	ICSID	Tribunal	(…).	Claimants’	present	case	is	thus	no	
more	than	a	contractual	claim	(previously	decided	by	an	ICSID	Tribunal	which	had	the	
jurisdiction	to	deal	with	Treaty	and	contractual	issues)	dressed	up	as	a	treaty	case	(…).	
The	 tribunal	 finds	 that	 the	 initiation	 of	 the	 present	 arbitration	 is	 thus	 an	 improper	
attempt	 to	 circumvent	 the	 basic	 principles	 set	 out	 in	 [the	 ICSID]	Convention	Article	 53	
and	 the	procedures	available	 for	 revision	and	 rectification	of	 awards	provided	 for	 in	
Article	51”	(emphasis	added).	It	is	strongly	arguable	that	the	reasoning	of	the	Tribunal,	
even	 if	 not	 mentioning	 abuse	 of	 process,	 was	 referring	 to	 and	 applying	 such	 a	
doctrine.	
Thus,	 by	way	of	 a	 declaration	of	 inadmissibility,	 tribunals	 have	 the	 power	 to	
preclude	such	abusive	(and	bad	faith)	claims	to	go	ahead.141	This	approach	is	fostered	
by	the	fact	that	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	seems	applicable	also	in	case	of	two	
(or	 more)	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	 which	 the	 claimants	 are	 formally	 different	 but	
represent	the	same	substantive	interests.142	Such	an	approach	seems	to	be	confirmed	
by	the	Commercial	Court	of	London	in	Michael	Wilson	and	Partners.	In	this	judgment,	
Mr.	 Justice	 Teare	 recognized	 that	 “mutuality	 is	 not	 a	 bar	 to	 an	 abuse	 of	 process	
argument”.143	As	a	consequence,	notwithstanding	the	fact	the	parties	in	the	previous	
arbitration	were	formally	different	(but	substantially	represented	the	same	interest),	
he	expressly	stated	that	“it	would	be	an	abuse	of	the	process	of	this	court	to	permit	
MWP	to	make	the	same	factual	allegations	which	it	had	made	in	the	arbitration	and	
had	been	rejected”.	This	approach	seems	to	be	the	correct	one	also	in	order	to	avoid	
abuses	of	investment	arbitration.	
	
3.6	 Res	judicata	(claim	preclusion)	
	 	
3.6.1	 Definition	of	res	judicata	and	its	role	in	ensuring	the	goal	of	the	process	
	
																																																													
140	In	S	Grynberg,	Stephen	M	Grynberg,	Miriam	Z	Grynberg,	and	RSM	Production	Corporation	v	Grenada,	
ICSID	Case	No	ARB/10/6,	Award,	10	December	2010,	paras.	7.3.6	and	7.3.7.	
141	The	legal	foundation	of	the	possibility	to	issue	such	a	declaration,	as	stated	by	Brown	(2011)	(n.	139),	
8,	is	in	the	inherent	powers	of	the	Tribunal	and	in	the	necessity	to	ensure	the	proper	administration	of	
justice.	 See	 also	Waste	 Management	 v.	 Mexico	 (No.	 2),	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB(AF)/00/3,	 Decision	 on	
Jurisdiction	of	26	June	2002,	paras.	49-50.	Also	Gestri	(1994)	(n.	109),	44,	has	stated	that	abuse	of	rights	
and	abuse	of	process	may	be	relevant	at	the	admissibility	stage	and	that	such	doctrines	may	constitute	
a	way	of	protecting	the	judicial	function	of	international	courts	and	tribunals.	According	to	this	Author,	
such	 a	 protective	 function	may	 justify	 the	 application	of	 abuse	of	 process	 even	 in	 lack	of	 an	 express	
provision	in	written	sources	of	law.	
142	As	stated	by	Brown	(2011)	(n.	139),	6,	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	does	not	require	the	fulfilment	
of	the	triple	identity	test.	
143 	Michael	 Wilson	 &	 Partners	 v.	 Thomas	 Ian	 Sinclair,	 Sokol	 Holdings	 Incorporated,	 Eagle	 Point	
Investments	Limited,	Butterfield	Bank	 (Bahamas)	 [2012]	EWHC	2560	(Comm).	This	approach	has	been	
applied	since	1889	in	Reichel	v.	Magrath	(1889)	14	App	Cas	665	and	has	been	confirmed	in	Arthur	JS	Hall	
v.	Simons	 [2002]	1	AC	615,	701	and	 in	OMV	Petrom	SA	v.	Glencore	 International	AG	 [2014]	EWHC	242	
(Comm),	para.	16	and	ss.	See	also	Monichino,	Fawke,	Asian	DR	(2012),	123.	
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	 According	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 claim	 preclusion	 “a	 party	 generally	 may	 not	
relitigate	 a	 claim	 decided	 (…)	 by	 a	 valid	 and	 final	 judgment.	 The	 judgment	
extinguishes	 the	 whole	 claim,	 precluding	 all	 matters	 within	 the	 claim	 that	 were	 or	
could	 have	 been	 litigated	 in	 that	 initial	 action”.144	Res	 judicata	 regards	 a	 claim	 as	 a	
whole	 and	 precludes	 a	 second	 discussion	 of	 such	 a	 claim.	 The	 principle	 of	 claim	
preclusion	is	recognized	in	all	legal	systems,	as	well	as	in	international	law.	However,	
not	all	countries	have	applied	the	principle	of	claim	preclusion	in	the	same	way.145	The	
principle,	therefore,	has	a	common	core	(i.e.,	first	of	all,	the	impossibility	to	re-litigate	
an	already	decided	claim)	but	is	composed	of	several	aspects	whose	application	often	
varies	according	to	the	different	legal	cultures	and	within	international	law.146		
	 First	of	all	 it	 is	worth	focusing	on	the	aspects	of	the	principle	that	seem	to	be	
commonly	 applied.	 Firstly,	 it	 is	 commonly	 said	 (both	 in	 international	 law	 and	
municipal	 law)	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 be	 res	 judicata,	 the	 decision	 on	 a	 claim	 has	 to	 be	
final.147	Secondly,	 to	 acquire	 the	 res	 judicata	 force,	 a	 judgment	 must	 be	 valid,	 i.e.	
issued	 at	 the	 end	 of	 a	 judicial	 procedure.148	Thirdly,	 it	 seems	 undisputed	 that	 the	
extent	 of	 claim	 preclusion	 not	 only	 regards	 what	 has	 been	 pleaded	 by	 the	 parties	
during	the	proceedings,	but	also	precludes	all	the	related	pleas	that	could	have	been	
filed	before	the	judge	and	were	not.149	Finally,	with	particular	regard	to	international	
arbitration,	 it	 is	 quite	 unanimously	 accepted	 that	 arbitral	 awards	have	 the	 same	 res	
judicata	 value	 of	 court	 judgments:	 as	 a	 consequence,	 arbitral	 awards	 preclude	 a	
second	discussion	on	the	same	case.150	
																																																													
144	Casad,	 Clermont	 (2001)	 (n.	 98),	 11.	 See	 also	 Brower,	 Henin,	 Kemperink	 (2015)	 (n.	 101),	 55.	 In	
common	law	it	is	usually	distinguished	between	merger	and	bar.	We	have	a	merger	when	the	plaintiff	in	
the	 first	 action	 is	 successful	 and,	 therefore,	 is	 claim	 is	 merged	 in	 the	 judgment	 and	 cannot	 be	 re-
litigated.	 We	 have	 a	 bar	 when	 the	 first	 judgment	 is	 in	 favor	 of	 the	 defendant	 and	 the	 plaintiff	 is	
therefore	barred	to	start	again	such	a	claim.	
145	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	5-6.	
146	See	Hahn,	Austrian	Yearbook	of	International	Law	(2014),	330-331,	Scobbie,	Australian	Yearbook	of	
International	Law	(1999),	301.	
147	Hahn	(2013)	(n.	146),	331.	
148	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	49.	See	also	Carrington,	Ohio	State	Law	Journal	(1963),	381,	who	has	
explained	that	the	judgment	shall	be	valid	according	to	the	law	of	the	place	where	it	has	been	issued.	
149	See,	 inter	alia,	Art.	2909	of	the	Italian	Civil	Code,	Art.	400(2)	of	the	Spanish	Ley	de	Enjunciamiento	
Civil.	On	 this	 point	 see	De	 La	Oliva	 Santos,	Oggetto	 del	 processo	 e	 cosa	 giudicata	 (2005),	 92,	 Casad,	
Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	62	and	Polasky	(1954)	(n.	106),	218.	See	also	Barnett	(2001)	(n.	93),	183-244	and	
Henderson	 v.	Henderson	 (1843)	 3	Hare	 100.	As	 explained	by	 these	 last	Authors,	 the	 rule	 according	 to	
which	a	plaintiff	shall	relitigate	in	a	single	dispute	all	reliefs	arising	from	a	transaction	is	a	consequence	
of	 the	 need	 of	 efficiency	 of	 the	 judiciary.	 However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 the	 the	Genocide	 case,	
Application	of	 the	Convention	on	 the	Prevention	and	Punishment	of	 the	Crime	of	Genocide	 (Bosnia	and	
Herzegovina	v.	Serbia	and	Montenegro),	 Joint	Dissenting	Opinion	of	Judges	Ranjeva,	Shi	and	Koroma,	
ICj	 Rep.	 (2007),	 par.	 9,	 some	 dissenting	 Judges	 stated	 that	 “as	 a	matter	 of	 principle,	 a	 State	 is	 not	
precluded	from	legally	raising	a	distinct	claim	arising	from	the	same	facts,	where	a	separate	point	falls	
for	 decision	 within	 the	 same	 legal	 context”.	 Contra,	 see	 the	Delgado	 case	 quoted	 in	 Paragraph	 269	
below.	
150	See	Hober	 (2013)	 (n.	64),	128	and	ss.,	Gordon,	Florida	Journal	of	 International	Law	(2006),	577	and	
ss.,	Bonato,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2006),	669	and	ss.,	Menchini,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(1998),	775.	
See	also	Italian	Supreme	Court	16901/2015,	as	well	as	Art.	824-bis	of	the	Italian	Code	of	Civil	Procedure,	
Art.	1484	of	the	French	New	Code	of	Civil	Procedure,	Art.	1055	of	the	German	ZPO	and	Art.	387	of	the	
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	 Moving	 to	 the	 uncertain	 aspects	 of	 res	 judicata,	 as	 we	will	 see	 in	 Paragraph	
3.6.2	 below,	 the	main	points	 of	 disagreement	 are	 related	 to	 the	 triple	 identity	 test,	
according	 to	which	–	 in	order	 to	 res	 judicata	 apply	 –	 the	parties,	 the	object	 and	 the	
legal	grounds	shall	be	identical.	
A	second	point	of	discussion	regards	the	extension	of	claim	preclusion.	While	it	
is	commonly	accepted	that	the	findings	contained	in	the	operative	part	of	a	judgment	
are	res	judicata,	there	is	less	certainty	with	regard	to	the	reasoning	of	the	court.	In	this	
regard,	the	German	approach,	which	gives	preclusive	effect	only	to	the	operative	part,	
is	 the	 strictest,	 while	 the	 French	 approach,	 which	 looks	 at	 the	 dispositif	 and	 to	 the	
underlying	reasons	is	the	broadest.151	In	this	regard,	however,	it	is	worth	noting	that	it	
is	often	impossible	to	completely	divide	the	dispositif	from	its	underlying	reasons	and,	
even	if	one	would	accept	that	only	the	operative	part	of	the	judgment	generates	claim	
preclusion,	it	is	implied	that	such	operative	part	needs	to	be	understood	and	explained	
by	 its	 underlying	 reasons.	 Indeed,	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 has	
stated	 that	 “the	 concept	 of	 res	 judicata	 under	 European	Union	 law	 does	 not	 attach	
only	to	the	operative	part	of	the	judgment	in	question,	but	also	attaches	to	the	ratio	
decidendi	 of	 that	 judgment,	 which	 provides	 the	 necessary	 underpinning	 for	 the	
operative	 part	 and	 is	 inseparable	 from	 it”152	(emphasis	 added).	 This	 seems	also	 to	be	
the	approach	followed	by	international	courts	and	tribunals.153	
	 There	are,	finally,	some	distinctions	which	are	applied	in	some	systems	and	not	
in	 others.	 The	 main	 one	 regards	 the	 difference	 between	 formal	 res	 judicata	 and	
substantial	res	judicata	(mainly	recognized	by	the	civil	law	systems).154	The	formal	res	
judicata	 has	 to	be	 seen	 from	the	procedural	point	of	 view,	 i.e.	a	decision	 that	 is	not	
subject	 to	 any	 further	 appeal	 constitutes	 formal	 res	 judicata.	 The	 substantial	 res	
judicata,	on	the	contrary,	regards	the	relationship	underlying	the	process:	a	decision	is	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Swiss	 Code	 of	 Civil	 Procedure.	 The	 issue	 of	 the	 res	 judicata	 of	 international	 arbitration	 awards	 in	
national	legal	systems	and	vice	versa	will	be	examined	in	Paragraph	3.6.5	below.	
151	Also	common	law	systems	seem	to	accept	that	“res	judicata	affects	both	premises	and	conclusions”.	
See	Millar,	Michigan	Law	Review	(1940),	4.	
152	Decision	 of	 15	 November	 2012,	 C-456/11,	Gothaer	 Allgemeine	 Versicherung	 AG	 ed	 altri	 c.	 Samskip	
GmbH,	par.	40. 
153	See,	ex	multis,	 the	 detailed	 reasoning	 developed	 in	Apotex	Holdings	 Inc.	 and	Apotex	 Inc.	 v.	United	
States	of	America,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/12/1,	Award,	25	August	2014,	paras.	 7.23	and	ss.	See	also	
Barcelona	 Traction,	 Light	 and	 Power	 Co	 Ltd	 (Belgium	 v.	 Spain)	 (Second	 Phase)	 [1970]	 ICJ	 Rep	 3,	 267,	
separate	opinion	of	Judge	Gros,	stating	that	even	if	it	is	commonly	said	that	res	judicata	only	refers	to	
the	operative	part	of	a	 judgment,	 it	 is	 also	 commonly	accepted	 that	 international	 courts	 refer	 to	 the	
reasoning	 set	 forth	 in	 previous	 decisions.	 See	 also	Compagnie	 Generale	 de	 l’Orenoque	 Case	 (Franco-
Venezuelan	 Mixed	 Claims	 Commission	 1905),	 Pious	 Fund	 Arbitration	 (United	 States	 of	 America	 v.	
Mexico),	 and	 Channel	 Arbitration,	 mentioned	 in	 Schreuer,	 Reinisch,	 Legal	 Opinion	 in	 CME	 v.	 Czech	
Republic	 (2002),	 23.	 See	 also	 Hober	 (2013)	 (n.	 64),	 321	 and	 ss.,	 Cheng	 (1953)	 (n.	 82),	 348-349.	 This	
opinion	seems	not	shared	by	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	78),	191.	
154	See	Millar	 (1940)	 (n.	 151),	 7,	De	La	Oliva	Santos	 (2005)	 (n.	 149),	 107	and	ss.	See,	as	an	example	of	
formal	res	judicata,	Art.	324	of	the	Italian	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	and,	as	an	example	of	substantial	res	
judicata,	Art.	2909	of	the	Italian	Civil	Code.	Another,	less	important,	distinction	is	between	absolute	res	
judicata	and	relative	res	 judicata,	on	which	see	Millar,	 id.,	7.	Absolute	res	 judicata	 is	cognizable	by	the	
second	 court	 regardless	 of	 a	 plea	 by	 a	 party,	while	 substantial	 res	 judicata	 requires	 that	 a	 party	 files	
before	the	court	a	request	to	preclude	the	claim	based	on	res	judicata.	
	 137	
substantial	 res	 judicata	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 such	 a	 relationship,	 from	which	 a	 dispute	
arose,	 acquire	 stability	 (i.e.	 the	 dispute	 is	 completely	 settled)	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	
binding	force	of	a	judicial	decision.155	Even	if	this	distinction	has	been	put	in	question	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 “a	 judgment	 does	 not	 become	 res	 judicata	 in	 the	
substantial	 sense	 until	 it	 has	 achieved	 the	 quality	 of	 formal	 res	 judicata”,156	it	 is	
essential	 in	order	to	let	us	understand	the	double	function	of	any	judicial	process	and,	
therefore,	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 proper	 object	 of	 any	 process,	 including	 investment	
arbitration.		
Indeed,	 it	 has	 been	 correctly	 pointed	 out	 that	 every	 process	 has:	 (i)	 a	
procedural	 function,	 i.e.	 to	put	 in	effect	what	 the	 law	dictates;	 and	 (ii)	 a	 substantial	
function,	 i.e.	 to	 finally	 settle	 the	 underlying	 dispute.157 	The	 procedural	 function	
focuses	 on	 the	 correct	 application	 of	 the	 law	 by	 the	 judge,	 while	 the	 substantial	
function	 focuses	 on	 the	 concepts	 of	 dispute	 and	 legal	 relationship	 underlying	 the	
process.158	It	 is	not	possible	 to	assume	only	a	procedural	perspective,	on	the	basis	of	
which	 a	 judgment	 fulfils	 its	 function	 (i.e.	 to	 ensure	 finality)	 just	 if	 the	 judge	 has	
correctly	 applied	 the	 law.	 On	 the	 contrary,	 it	 is	 strongly	 arguable	 that	 a	 judgment	
reaches	 its	goal	 if	the	underlying	dispute	 is	completely	(and	forever)	settled.	 Indeed,	
as	 it	has	been	stated,	at	some	point	 it	 is	necessary	to	know	with	certainty	the	rights	
and	obligations	arising	from	a	certain	legal	relationship;	“a	party	[of	such	relationship]	
should	not	have	to	bring	or	defend	multiple	suits	to	establish	his	right	or	obligations	
arising	 out	 of	 a	 single	 incident	 [i.e.	 dispute]”.159	This	 means	 that,	 regardless	 of	 the	
formal	 elements	 of	 any	 single	 judgment	 (i.e.	 the	 parties,	 the	 object	 and	 the	 legal	
ground),	res	judicata	shall	not	permit	a	second	discussion	of	the	already	decided	facts	
regarding	 a	 certain	 legal	 relationship;	 such	 facts	 shall	 be	 intended	 to	 be	 definitely	
settled	by	the	first	decision.	 Indeed,	“[i]f	a	 judgment	[is]	not	conclusive	as	to	what	 it	
actually	determined,	the	adjudicative	process	would	fail	to	serve	its	social	function	of	
resolving	disputes”.160		
It	 is,	 in	 conclusion,	 necessary	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 public	 function	 of	 investment	
arbitration,161	i.e.	a	vision	of	litigation	“that	is	more	sensitive	to	the	need	to	ensure	a	
																																																													
155	It	follows	that	only	decisions	on	the	merit	are	able	to	become	substantial	res	judicata,	due	to	the	fact	
that	any	other	decision	does	not	have	the	effect	of	definitely	stabilize	 legal	 relationships	De	La	Oliva	
Santos	(2005)	(n.	149),	116.	
156	Millar	(1940)	(n.	151),	7.	
157	Allorio,	La	cosa	giudicata	rispetto	ai	terzi	(1935),	11	and	ss.	This	concept	has	been	also	developed	by	
Carnelutti,	Istituzioni	del	processo	civile	italiano	(1956),	79.	
158 	In	 this	 regard,	 see	 also	 Bonafè,	 La	 protezione	 degli	 interessi	 di	 Stati	 terzi	 davanti	 alla	 Corte	
internazionale	di	Giustizia,	who	proposes	–	in	order	to	justify	the	intervention	of	third	States	as	a	party	
before	 the	 ICJ	 –	 the	 acceptance	 of	 a	 larger	 concept	 of	 “dispute”,	 encompassing	 also	 the	 rights	 and	
obligations	of	third	parties.	
159	Arbour,	Louisiana	Law	Review	(1974),	763.	
160	Currie,	The	University	of	Chicago	Law	Review	(1978),	325.	
161	The	processual	nature	of	arbitration	has	been	strongly	argued	by	Vecchione,	L’arbitrato	nel	sistema	
del	processo	 civile	 (1971),	 1	and	ss.	According	 to	 this	 view,	arbitration	has	a	public	 function	as	well	 as	
national	litigation.	
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more	effective	use	of	social	resources	and	that	recognized	the	public	consequences	of	
any	procedural	regime”,162	rather	than	merely	giving	attention	on	its	private	function.	
	 Given	 the	 above,	 the	 following	 discussion	 will	 be	 aimed	 at	 analysing	 the	
requirements	that	shall	be	satisfied	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	substantial	function	of	
any	 investment	arbitration	(i.e.	to	finally	settle	 investment	disputes)	 is	satisfied.	The	
analysis	 will	 start	 from	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 res	 judicata	 in	
international	law.	It	will	further	discuss	whether	such	an	approach	is	appropriate	and	
desirable	 for	 investment	 arbitration.	 The	 focus	will	 finally	 go	 to	 on	 how	 arbitrators	
should	 approach	 the	 triple	 test	 in	 order	 to	 render	 it	 suitable	 to	 finally	 settle	
investment	disputes	and	to	ensure	the	good	administration	of	justice.	
	
3.6.2	 The	 traditional	 approach	 to	 res	 judicata:	 The	 triple	 identity	 test	 and	 the	
requirement	of	the	same	legal	order.	The	CME/Lauder	cases	and	a	critic	to	
the	 triple	 identity	 test	 as	 an	 over-formalistic	 approach,	 which	 does	 not	
take	into	account	substance	
	
	 In	 international	 law,	 the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 res	 judicata	 is	 explained	 by	
Judge	 Anzilotti’s	 dissenting	 opinion	 in	 the	Chorzow	 Factory:	 Interpretation	 Case.	 He	
stated	that	“the	decision	of	the	Court	has	no	binding	force	except	between	the	Parties	
and	 in	 respect	 of	 that	 particular	 case:	 we	 have	 here	 three	 traditional	 elements	 for	
identification,	persona,	petitum,	 causa	 petendi,	 for	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 particular	 case	
covers	 both	 the	 object	 and	 the	 grounds	 of	 the	 claim”.163	The	 parties	 are	 usually	
considered	 to	 constitute	 the	 subjective	 scope	 of	 application	 of	 res	 judicata,	 while	
petitum	 and	 causa	 petendi	 constitute	 its	 objective	 scope	 of	 application.	 Anzilotti	
construed	 its	definition	of	 the	principle,	which	has	given	origin	 to	 the	 triple	 identity	
test,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 what	 he	 thought	 to	 be	 the	 aspects	 of	 res	 judicata	 that	 were	
common	to	the	various	systems	of	law.164	Indeed,	Anzilotti	considered	res	judicata	as	a	
general	principle	common	to	civilized	nations	in	the	sense	of	Art.	38	(1)(c)	of	the	PCIJ	
Statute.	
	 Since	 Anzilotti’s	 statement,	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 (and	 in	 particular	 the	
requirement	of	the	same	parties)	has	been	very	often	rigidly	and	formally	applied,165	
																																																													
162	Watson,	Canadian	Bar	Review	(1990),	626.	The	distinction	between	the	public	and	private	functions	
is	clearly	expressed	in	Polasky	(1954)	(n.	106),	219-220.	
163	[1927]	PCIJ	(ser.	A),	No.	13,	23.	
164 	As	 we	 will	 see	 below,	 Anzilotti’s	 assumption	 is	 today	 (at	 least	 partially)	 wrong,	 due	 to	 the	
circumstance	 that	 several	 systems	 of	 law	 do	 not	 apply	 a	 rigid	 and	 formal	 triple	 identity	 test.	 This	
approach	has	also	been	followed	by	some	international	tribunals.	
165	This	 approach	 is	 shared	 by	 Wehland	 (2013)	 (n.	 78),	 127,	 185	 and	 ss.;	 Kuhn,	 Journal	 of	 World	
Investment	 and	 Trade	 (2004),	 7	 and	 ss.;	 Bernhardt,	 The	 Statute	 of	 the	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice	
(2012)	 1239	 and	 ss.,	 examining	 in	 particular	 Art.	 59	 of	 the	 ICJ	 Statute.	 See	 also	 the	 Trail	 Smelter	
Arbitration	 (US	 v.	 Canada),	 Award	 of	 11	March	 1941,	 3	 UNRIAA,	 1952;	Biloune	 v.	 Ghana,	 UNCITRAL,	
Award	on	Jurisdiction	and	Liability	of	27	October	1989,	95	ILR	222	(1994);	Guyana	Boundary	Arbitration	
(Brazil	v.	Great	Britain),	Award	of	6	June	1904,	11	UNRIAA	22;	Continental	Shelf,	Application	by	Malta	for	
Permission	 to	 Intervene	 (Tunisia	 v.	 Libya),	 ICJ	 Rep	 (1981),	 20.	 However,	 see	 Ottolenghi,	 Prows,	 Pace	
International	Law	Review	(2009),	50	and	ss.,	who	stated	that	the	ICJ	Genocide	case	represents	a	more	
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also	 in	 light	 of	 the	wording	 of	 international	 rules	 allegedly	 referring	 only	 to	 the	 res	
judicata	effect	on	the	parties	 (such	as	Art.	59	of	the	 ICJ	Statute	and	Art.	53(1)	of	the	
ICSID	Convention).166	Such	a	strict	application	has	been	mainly	 justified	on	the	basis	
of	the	principle	of	due	process,	according	to	which	all	parties	shall	have	a	full	and	fair	
opportunity	to	present	their	case	with	regard	to	every	single	legal	question	they	want	
to	discuss	before	a	 judge.167	This	means	 that,	even	 if	 the	parties,	 the	object	and	 the	
legal	ground	of	a	process	are	substantially	 identical,	 they	are	not	considered	able	to	
satisfy	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 if	 they	are	not	perfectly	 identical	also	 from	the	 formal	
point	of	view.		
	 The	formal	approach	based	on	a	strict	application	of	the	triple	 identity	test	 is	
perfectly	expressed	by	the	decisions	 in	the	Lauder168	and	CME169	cases.	 In	the	former	
case,	Ronald	S.	Lauder,	the	ultimate	controlling	shareholder	of	a	group	of	companies	
holding	 an	 investment	 in	 Czech	 Republic,	 initiated	 an	 UNCITRAL	 arbitration	 in	
London	against	the	host	State	under	the	US-Czech	BIT,	on	the	basis	of	the	violation	of	
several	 standards	 of	 protection	 contained	 in	 such	 BIT,	 namely	 fair	 and	 equitable	
treatment,	 full	 protection	 and	 security,	 the	 prohibition	 to	 impair	 investments	 by	
arbitrary	and	discriminatory	measures	and	the	prohibition	of	indirect	expropriation.170	
In	the	latter	case,	arising	from	the	exactly	same	facts	(i.e.	an	alleged	expropriation	of	
the	investment),	CME	–	a	Dutch	company	and	group	subsidiary	holding	the	shares	in	a	
Czech	 company	 which	 actually	 made	 the	 investment	 –	 started	 another	 UNCITRAL	
arbitration,	 this	 time	 in	 Stockholm,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 Dutch-Czech	 BIT,	 which	
contained	 substantially	 identical	 standards	 of	 treatment.	 Both	 the	 tribunals	 upheld	
their	 jurisdiction,	 but	 they	 reached	 contradictory	 findings	 on	 the	 existence	 of	 an	
expropriation.	 The	 London	 arbitration	 was	 concluded	 in	 favour	 of	 Czech	 Republic;	
arbitrators	 did	 not	 find	 violations	 of	 the	 relevant	 BIT.	 The	 Stockholm	 Tribunal	
concluded	that	the	Czech	Republic	violated	its	obligations	under	the	Dutch-Czech	BIT;	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
flexible	application	of	the	triple	identity	test,	to	be	welcomed	in	light	of	the	very	rigid	previous	case	law	
of	the	ICJ.	
166	Art.	59	of	the	ICJ	Statute	says	that	“[t]he	decision	of	the	Court	has	no	binding	force	except	between	
the	parties	and	in	respect	of	that	particular	case”.	Similarly,	Art.	53(1)	of	the	ICSID	Convention	says	that	
“[t]he	 award	 shall	 be	 binding	 on	 the	 parties	 and	 shall	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 any	 appeal	 or	 to	 any	 other	
remedy	except	 those	provided	 for	 in	 this	Convention.	Each	party	 shall	 abide	by	and	comply	with	 the	
terms	 of	 the	 award	 except	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 enforcement	 shall	 have	 been	 stayed	 pursuant	 to	 the	
relevant	provisions	of	 this	Convention”.	With	 regard	 to	Art.	 59	of	 the	 ICJ	Statute,	 it	 should	be	noted	
that	it	has	been	interpreted	by	some	scholars	as	an	exclusion	o	the	applicability	of	the	stare	decisis	rule,	
rather	than	a	limitation	of	the	scope	of	application	of	res	judicata.	See	Apotex	Holdings	Inc.	and	Apotex	
Inc.	v.	United	States	of	America,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/12/1,	Award,	25	August	2014,	paras.	7.6	and	
7.7,	referring,	inter	alia,	to	the	work	of	Prof.	Shabtai	Rosenne	and	Judge	Manley	O.	Hudson.		
167	See	 Brekoulakis,	 The	 American	 Review	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2005),	 9.	 Concerning	 the	
principle	 of	 due	 process,	 see	 Schwebel,	 Lahne,	 Comparative	 Arbitration	 Practice	 and	 Public	 Policy	 in	
Arbitration,	ICCA	Congress	Series	Vol.	3	(1987),	205	and	ss.,	Kurkela,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	
(2004),	221	and	ss.,	Pörnbacher,	Dolgorukow,	Annal	FLB	-	Belgrade	Law	Review	50	(2013),	50	and	ss.,	
Wirtz,	 The	 Arbitrator	 and	 the	 Parties,	 Proceedings	 of	 the	 Eleventh	 Annual	 Meeting	 of	 the	 National	
Academy	of	Arbitrators	(1958),	1	and	ss.	
168	Ronald	S.	Lauder	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award,	3	September	2001.	
169	CME	v.	Czech	Republic,	UNCITRAL,	Final	Award	14	March	2003.	
170	A	detailed	description	of	the	factual	background	may	be	found	in	Hober	(2013)	(n.	64),	345-348.	
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the	Tribunal,	at	par.	432,	expressly	stated	that	“the	parties	in	the	London	Arbitration	
differ	from	the	parties	in	this	arbitration”	and	that	“the	two	arbitrations	are	based	on	
differing	 bilateral	 investment	 treaties,	 which	 grant	 comparable	 investment	
protection,	which,	however,	 is	not	 identical”.	Furthermore,	 the	Tribunal,	at	par.	412,	
stated	 that	 “there	will	be	 two	awards	on	 the	same	subject	which	may	be	consistent	
with	 each	 other	 or	may	 differ.	 Should	 two	 different	 Treaties	 grant	 remedies	 to	 the	
respective	 claimants	 deriving	 from	 the	 same	 facts	 and	 circumstances,	 this	 does	 not	
deprive	 one	 of	 the	 claimants	 of	 jurisdiction,	 if	 jurisdiction	 is	 granted	 under	 the	
respective	 treaty”.	 This	 award	 was	 further	 challenged	 before	 the	 SVEA	 Court	 of	
Appeal	 in	 Stockholm171	(the	 competent	 court	 at	 the	 seat),	 but	 the	 court	 upheld	 the	
award	and	refused	to	accept	the	allegations	related	to	 lis	pendens	and	res	 judicata	 in	
investment	arbitration	filed	by	the	Czech	Republic	on	the	basis	of	a	rigid	application	of	
the	triple	identity	test.	
	 The	result	of	the	two	parallel	proceedings	 in	the	Lauder	and	CME	cases	 is	the	
antithesis	of	legal	certainty	and	finality,	as	well	as	the	full	negation	of	the	goals	of	an	
arbitral	 process	 (and	 of	 any	 form	 of	 dispute	 settlement)	 aimed	 at	 finally	 settling	 a	
dispute	and	stabilizing	a	legal	relationship.	Indeed,	August	Reinisch	has	talked	about	
“the	ultimate	fiasco	in	investment	arbitration”	(emphasis	added).172	
	 The	prevalence	of	formalities	on	substance	has	also	attracted	severe	criticism	
from	 scholars,173	some	 of	 them	 in	 fact	 arrived	 also	 to	 put	 in	 discussion	 the	 same	
legitimacy	of	investment	arbitration.174	
Having	said	the	above,	for	the	sake	of	completeness	it	is	worth	noting	that,	in	
addition	 to	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 it	 has	 very	 often	 been	 required	 that,	 for	 the	
application	 of	 res	 judicata,	 the	 two	 competing	 decisions	must	 arise	 from	 the	 same	
legal	 order,	 i.e.	 it	 is	 not	 possible	 for	 a	 national	 judgment	 to	 be	 res	 judicata	 in	
international	proceedings	and	vice	versa.175	
	 The	 next	 paragraphs	 will	 analyse	 cases	 and	 opinions	 related	 to	 a	 broader	
application	 of	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 and	 try	 to	 find	 a	 legal	 justification	 for	 such	 a	
broader	approach.176	We	will	start	dealing	with	the	objective	prong	of	res	judicata	(i.e.	
petitum	 and	 causa	 petendi)	 and	 then	move	 to	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 requirement	of	 the	
same	parties.	Finally,	we	will	also	briefly	analyse	whether	the	identity	of	legal	order	is	
actually	required	in	order	to	res	judicata	apply.	
	
3.6.3	 The	 requirements	 of	 petitum	 and	 causa	 petendi	 and	 the	 call	 for	 a	more	
flexible	approach.	The	Southern	Bluefin	Tuna	case	
																																																													
171	Case	T	8735-01,	judgment,	15	May	2003.	
172	Reinisch,	International	Law	Between	Universalism	and	Fragmentation:	Festschrift	in	Honour	of	Gerhard	
Hafner	(2008),	116.	
173	See,	in	particular,	Carver,	Journal	of	World	Investment	and	Trade	(2004),	23	and	ss.,	who	has	talked	
about	a	“totally	unacceptable	result”.		
174	See	Van	Harten,	Malysheuski,	Osgoode	Legal	Studies	Research	Paper	No.	14	(2016),	5	and	ss.		
175	See	Hober	(2013)	(n.	64),	311	and	ss.	
176	A	call	for	a	broader	approach	may	be	found	in	Brown,	(2011)	(n.	139),	5-6.	
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As	 we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 previous	 Paragraph,	 the	 strict	 application	 of	 the	
required	objective	identity	(i.e.	petitum	and	causa	petendi)	of	two	parallel	arbitrations	
may	 involve	 the	 risk	 of	 claim	 splitting.	 The	 claimant	 might	 want	 to	 avoid	 “the	 res	
judicata	effect	of	a	prior	award	by	seeking	a	different	sort	of	relief	or	by	raising	new	
grounds	in	support	of	the	same	claim	for	relief”.177	
However,	as	noted	by	Schreuer	and	Reinisch,178	“[i]nternational	tribunals	have	
also	been	aware	of	the	risk	that	if	they	use	too	restrictive	criteria	of	identity	of	“object”	
and	 “grounds,	 the	 doctrine	 of	 res	 judicata	 would	 rarely	 apply;	 if	 only	 an	 exactly	
identical	relief	sought	(object)	based	on	exactly	the	same	legal	arguments	(grounds)	in	
a	second	case	would	be	precluded	as	a	result	of	res	judicata,	then	litigants	could	easily	
evade	this	by	slightly	modifying	either	the	relief	requested	or	the	grounds	relied	upon.	
(…)	This	would	be	the	case,	 for	 instance,	 if	 in	a	typical	 investment	dispute,	 involving	
allegations	of	 acts	 amounting	 to	expropriation,	 the	 investor	 first	 sought	 restitutio	 in	
integrum	as	relief	from	the	host	State	and	in	a	later	litigation	changed	the	“object”	of	
his	 case	 to	 requesting	 compensation”.	 Indeed,	 the	 already	 mentioned	 policy	
arguments	 (i.e.	 finality,	 reliability	 of	 the	 system	 of	 justice	 and	 judicial	 economy)	
strongly	militate	against	claim	splitting.	
There	are	several	international	decisions	that	apply	a	less	strict	approach	to	the	
requirement	of	identity	of	petitum	and	causa	petendi.	
Starting	from	the	first	of	such	requirements,	it	is,	first	of	all,	worth	mentioning	
the	 Delgado	 and	Machado	 cases.179	In	 the	 former	 of	 them,180	a	 claim	 for	 damages	
against	Spain	for	seizure	of	property	in	Cuba	was	brought	before	a	US-Spanish	Claims	
Commission.	An	 umpire	 denied	 such	 a	 request.	 The	 same	dispute	was	 then	 re-filed	
under	 the	 label	of	 “claim	for	 the	value	of	 the	property	seized”.	The	defendant	State	
asked	to	dismiss	the	claim	on	grounds	of	res	judicata,	arguing	that	“the	test	of	identity	
[is]	not	whether	the	measure	of	relief	demanded,	but	whether	the	injury	that	formed	
the	foundation	of	the	claim	[is]	the	same	in	both	cases”.	The	umpire	stated	that	the	
identity	of	object	was	to	be	analysed	on	the	basis	of	“whether	new	tights	are	asserted	
in	[the	second]	claim	and	then	stated	that	“[e]ven	if	the	claimant	did	not	at	the	time	of	
the	 former	 case	 ask	 indemnity	 of	 the	 commission	 of	 the	 value	 of	 the	 lands,	 the	
claimant	had	the	same	power	to	do	so	as	other	claimants	in	other	cases	where	it	has	
been	done,	and	he	can	not	have	relief	by	a	new	claim	before	a	new	umpire”.	Similarly,	
in	 the	Machado	 case,181	in	 a	 first	 arbitration	 damages	 arising	 from	 the	 seizure	 of	 a	
house	were	claimed	and,	 in	a	second	arbitration,	 restoration	of	 the	house	as	well	as	
																																																													
177	Dodge,	Hastings	International	&	Comparative	Law	Review	(2000),	366.	
178	(2002)	(n.	153),	16.	
179	The	 factual	 description	 of	 these	 cases	 is	 based	 on	 what	 has	 been	 written	 by	 Schreuer,	 Reinisch	
(2002)	(n.	153),	17-18.	
180	Delgado	Case,	in	Moore,	International	Arbitrations	to	which	the	United	States	Has	Been	a	Party	2196	
(Spanish	–	US	Claims	Commission	1881).	
181	Machado	Case,	in	Moore,	International	Arbitrations	to	which	the	United	States	Has	Been	a	Party	2193	
(Spanish	–	US	Claims	Commission	1881).	
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rent	and	damages	for	 its	detention	were	claimed.	The	Umpire	dismissed	the	second	
claim	on	the	basis	of	res	judicata,	stating	that	“the	question	whether	this	claim	No.	129	
is	a	new	one,	or	the	same	as	No.	3,	does	not	depend	upon	whether	the	items	included	
be	the	same	in	both	claims,	but	that	the	test	 is	whether	both	claims	are	founded	on	
the	same	injury;	that	the	only	injury	on	which	claim	No.	129	is	founded	is	the	seizure	of	
a	certain	house;	that	this	same	injury	was	alleged	as	one	of	the	foundations	for	claim	
No.	3,	and	that	in	consequence	claim	No.	129,	as	being	part	of	an	old	claim,	can	not	be	
presented	as	a	new	claim	under	a	new	number”.	
Such	an	approach,	aimed	at	defining	the	object	of	the	claim	functionally	rather	
than	analytically,	has	been	fostered	in	common	law	legal	systems182	and,	also,	by	civil	
law	 courts,	 such	 as	 the	 Italian	 Corte	 di	 Cassazione,	 according	 to	 which	 in	 cases	 of	
international	conflicts	of	jurisdiction	the	rule	of	identity	of	petitum	shall	be	seen	from	
the	perspective	of	the	identity	of	the	practical	results	which	the	claimant	aim	to	reach	
and	 not	 from	 the	 limited	 perspective	 of	 the	 rule	 which	 is	 allegedly	 violated	 by	 the	
defendant.183		
Moving	to	the	requirement	of	the	identity	of	causa	petendi,	such	a	requirement	
could	be	used	in	order	to	split	claims,	“for	example,	when	a	party	seeks	compensation	
for	expropriation,	in	one	case,	under	customary	international	law,	in	another,	under	a	
BIT,	 or	 where	 a	 party	 bases	 its	 claim,	 in	 one	 case,	 on	 a	multilateral	 agreement,	 in	
another	on	a	bilateral	one	or	on	two	different	BITS	such	as	 in	 the	 [CME	and	Lauder]	
case[s].	 Technically	 speaking	 in	 such	 a	 situation	 the	 “cause”,	 “ground”	 or	 “causa	
petendi”	 is	non-identical	which	would	seem	to	exclude	application	of	the	res	 judicata	
principle.	 It	 is	 evident,	 however,	 that	 this	 is	 a	 highly	 artificial	 distinction	 since	 in	 all	
cases	mentioned	 the	 legal	grounds	 for	 the	 compensation	 sought	would	be	a	 rule	of	
international	 law	 calling	 for	 compensation	 for	 expropriation	 contained	 in	 custom	or	
expressed	 in	 a	 treaty.	 It	 is	 far	 more	 appropriate	 to	 look	 at	 the	 specific	 rules	 and	 to	
examine	 how	 far	 they	 are	 substantively	 identical	 or	 different.	 If	 it	 is	 the	 same	 rule	
reflected	in	different	legal	instruments	this	should	not	cast	any	doubt	on	the	identity	
of	 the	 “cause”	 and	 thus	 of	 the	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 disputes.	 Under	 modern	
international	 law,	 it	 is	 common	 that	 acts	 and	 omissions	 of	 States	 (or	 other	
international	 actors)	 may	 be	 subject	 to	 more	 than	 one	 treaty	 instrument,	 and	
therefore	more	than	one	dispute	settlement	mechanism.	(…)	Consequently,	adoption	
of	 the	 position	 that	 parallel	 sets	 of	 litigation	 based	 on	 substantially	 identical	
provisions	found	in	different	instruments	do	not	compete	with	each	other,	would	tend	
																																																													
182	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	66.	See	also	Scott,	Harvard	Law	Review	(1942),	24.	A	clear	example	
of	flexible	approach	to	identity	of	causae	petendi	 in	common	law	is	Davis	v.	US	Steel	Supply,	688	F.2d	
166,	171	(3d	Cir.	1982),	in	which	the	Court	stated	that	res	judicata	requires	“essential	similarity	[in]	the	
underlying	 events	 giving	 rise	 to	 the	 various	 legal	 claims”,	 even	 if	 the	 claims	 arise	 from	 different	
statutory	or	common	law	grounds.	
183 	See	 Italian	 Corte	 di	 Cassazione,	 Plenary	 Session,	 12208/2012.	 See	 also	 Corte	 di	 Cassazione	
11532/2009	 and	 11185/2007.	 In	 this	 last	 decision,	 the	Corte	 di	 Cassazione	has	 stated	 that	all	 disputes	
arising	from	the	same	juridical	relationship	are	to	be	considered	as	having	the	same	cause	of	action.	
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to	promote	multiplicity	of	proceedings,	and	might	also	result	 in	conflicting	decisions	
concerning	the	State’s	international	rights	and	obligations”	(emphasis	added).184	
Such	an	approach,	that	has	been	defined	as	“substantive-transactional”,185	has	
been	 applied	 by	 the	 International	 Tribunal	 for	 the	 Law	 of	 the	 Sea	 in	 the	 Southern	
Bluefin	Tuna	Case,186	in	which	the	Tribunal	had	to	determine	whether	a	dispute	on	the	
Japanese	 fishing	 practices	 was	 to	 be	 settled	 according	 to	 the	 Convention	 for	 the	
Conservation	of	Southern	Bluefin	Tune	 (CCSBT)	or	 according	 to	 the	United	Nations	
Convention	on	the	Law	of	the	Sea	(UNCLOS).	The	Tribunal	held	that	“the	Parties	to	
this	 dispute	 (…)	 are	 the	 same	Parties	 grappling	 not	with	 two	 separate	 disputes	 but	
with	what	 in	 fact	 is	a	single	dispute	arising	under	both	Conventions.	To	 find	 that,	 in	
this	case,	there	is	a	dispute	actually	arising	under	UNCLOS	which	is	distinct	from	the	
dispute	that	arose	under	the	CCHBT	would	be	artificial”.	As	a	consequence	“	a	dispute	
may	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 single	 identical	 dispute	 based	 on	 identical	 grounds	 where	
claims	are	based	on	two	fairly	different	treaties	as	long	as	they	all	relate	to	the	same	
factual	background.	Argumento	a	minore,	this	principle	applies	even	more	where	two	
separate	 treaties	 contain	 essentially	 identical	 provisions”.187	This	 approach,	which	 is	
accepted	 by	 several	 scholars,188	is	 confirmed	 also	 by	 certain	 human	 rights	 organs,	
which	have	considered	 that	 the	 same	causa	petendi	 has	 to	be	substantially	 (and	not	
formally)	analysed	on	the	basis	of	the	same	events	and	facts	and	not	on	the	basis	of	
the	 rule	 whose	 application	 is	 recalled	 by	 the	 claimant.189 	In	 all	 these	 cases	 of	
substantially	identical	claims,	the	second	action	has	been	declared	inadmissible	by	the	
second	 Court	 or	 Tribunal,	 even	 if	 such	 a	 Court	 or	 Tribunal	 had	 a	 validly	 conferred	
jurisdiction.		
All	 the	 above	 is	 very	 relevant	 in	 investment	 arbitration.	 Taking	 as	 a	 point	 of	
reference	 the	 CME	 and	 Lauder	 cases,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 in	 both	 these	 cases,	
arising	from	the	same	facts,	the	substantially	same	standards	of	protection	have	been	
invoked,	 in	 the	 latter	 case	 according	 to	 the	 Dutch-Czech	 BIT	 and	 in	 the	 former	
according	 to	 the	 US-Czech	 BIT.	 Schreuer	 and	 Reinisch	 have	 defined	 these	 BITs	 as	
virtually	identical	with	regard	to	the	standard	of	protection	that	they	involve	(such	as	
the	definition	of	investment,	the	MFN	and	national	treatment	clauses,	the	prohibition	
																																																													
184	Schreuer,	Reinisch	(2002)	(n.	153),	18-19.	
185	See	Martinez-Fraga,	Samra,	Northwestern	Journal	of	International	Law	and	Business	(2012),	438	and	
ss.	
186	(Australia	and	New	Zealand	v.	Japan),	Award	on	Jurisdiction	and	Admissibility,	4	August	2000,	39	ILM	
1359	 (2000).	 See	Virzo,	 Il	 regolamento	 delle	 controversie	 nel	 diritto	 del	mare:	 rapporti	 tra	 procedimenti	
(2008),	243-244.	
187	See	Schreuer,	Reinisch	(2002)	(n.	153),	20.	
188	See,	inter	alia,	Lowe	(1999)	(n.	132),	202.	
189 	See	 Glaziou	 v.	 France,	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 452/1991,	 Decision	 of	 18	 July	 1994,	
CCPR/C/51/D/452/1991,	 6.	 See	 also	 Trébutien	 v.	 France,	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 421/1990,	
Decision	 of	 18	 July	 1994,	 CCPR/C/51/D/421/1990,	 7.	 In	 both	 cases	 the	 UN	Human	 Rights	 Committee	
declared	the	complaints	 inadmissible	because	 it	 found	that	the	same	 issue	had	already	been	brought	
before	 the	European	Commission	of	Human	Rights.	See	also	UN	Human	Rights	Commission,	Rogl	 v.	
Germany,	 808/1998,	 Decision	 of	 25	 October	 2000,	 CCPR/C/70/D/808/1998.	 The	 same	 approach	 has	
been	assumed	by	the	European	Commission	of	Human	Rights,	Application	16717/90,	Pauger	v.	Austria,	
Decision	on	Admissibility,	9	January	1995.	
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of	 expropriations	 not	 executed	 according	 to	 international	 law	 standards,	 fair	 and	
equitable	 treatment	 and	 full	 protection	 and	 security)	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	would	
have	allowed	an	application	of	res	judicata	to	bar	the	second	claim.190		
Indeed,	 the	 argument	 of	 the	 substantial	 equivalence	 of	 the	 standards	 of	
protection	in	the	BITs	is	fostered	by	the	considerations	that	such	standards	are	usually	
drafted	 in	 a	 very	 generic	 way 191 	and	 that,	 therefore,	 they	 have	 assumed	 an	
autonomous	 standing	 in	 international	 investment	 law192	and	 are	 to	 be	 considered	
detached	 them	 from	 the	 wording	 of	 the	 single	 BIT.	 It	 is	 very	 difficult	 (i.e.	 almost	
impossible)	 to	 find	 an	 investment	 arbitration	 tribunal	 referring	 to	 “the	 fair	 and	
equitable	 treatment	 as	 set	 forth	 in	 BIT	 X”	 and	 not	 only	 to	 the	 “fair	 and	 equitable	
treatment	of	foreign	investment”.	This	is	because,	as	it	has	been	demonstrated,193	we	
have	today	a	general	principle	of	 international	 investment	 law,	namely	the	“fair	and	
equitable	 treatment	 of	 foreign	 investment”,	 which	 is	 applied	 autonomously	 and	
usually	regardless	of	the	wording	of	the	single	BIT.	The	same	could	be	said	with	regard	
to	 the	 other	 standards	 of	 treatment	 of	 foreign	 investments.	 Indeed,	 as	 stated	 by	
Schill 194 	(and	 confirmed	 by	 Pellet), 195 	“the	 core	 legal	 concepts	 of	 international	
investment	 law	 (…)	only	 assume	a	more	 concretized	meaning	over	 time	because	of	
the	interpretation	investment	treaty	tribunals	give	to	them	in	their	decisions”.	
The	above	approach	is	confirmed	by	the	approach	that	has	been	applied	by	the	
Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union,	which,	according	to	the	provision	of	Art.	29	of	
EU	 Regulation	 1215/2012,	 has	 had	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 formally	 different,	 but	
substantially	 identical,	 claims	 had	 the	 same	 cause	 of	 action	 (i.e.	 both	 petitum	 and	
causa	 petendi).	 In	 Gubisch	 Maschinenfabrik	 v.	 Palumbo,196	the	 Court	 had	 to	 state	
whether	 two	 actions,	 one	 asking	 to	 enforce	 a	 contract	 and	 the	 second	 seeking	 the	
rescission	of	the	same	contract,	were	based	on	the	same	cause	of	action.	The	Court	
stated	 that	 “it	 is	apparent	 that	 the	action	 to	enforce	 the	contract	 is	aimed	at	giving	
effect	 to	 it,	 and	 that	 the	 action	 for	 its	 rescission	 or	 discharge	 is	 aimed	 precisely	 at	
depriving	it	of	any	effect.	The	question	whether	the	contract	is	binding	therefore	lies	
at	the	heart	of	the	two	actions.	(…)	In	those	procedural	circumstances	it	must	be	held	
																																																													
190	Schreuer	and	Reinisch	(2002)	(n.	153),	31-32.	
191	Let	us	take,	as	an	example,	the	provisions	of	the	already	mentioned	US-Czech	BIT	and	Dutch-Czech	
BIT.	The	 former,	 at	Art.	 II,	 para	2(a),	 states	 that	 “[i]nvestment	 shall	 at	 all	 times	be	accorded	 fair	 and	
equitable	treatment,	shall	enjoy	full	protection	and	security	and	shall	in	no	case	be	accorder	treatment	
less	than	that	required	by	international	law”.	The	latter,	at	Art.	3,	states	that	“[e]ach	Contracting	Party	
shall	 ensure	 fair	 and	 equitable	 treatment	 to	 the	 investors	 of	 the	 other	 Contracting	 Party	 (…)	 each	
Contracting	Party	 shall	 accord	 to	 such	 investments	 full	 security	 and	protection	 (…)	 If	 (…)	 obligations	
under	international	law	existing	at	present	or	established	hereafter	(…)	contain	rules,	whether	general	
or	 specific,	 entitling	 investments	 by	 investors	 of	 the	 other	 Contracting	 Party	 to	 a	 treatment	 more	
favourable	than	is	provided	for	by	the	present	Agreement,	such	rules	shall	to	the	extent	that	they	are	
more	favourable	prevail	over	the	present	Agreement”.	
192	See	Palombino	(2012)	(n.	60),	58	and	ss.	See	also	Di	Benedetto,	(2013)	(n.61),	17	and	36-37	and	103	
and	ss.	
193	Palombino	(2012)	(n.	60),	58	and	ss.	
194	Schill,	German	Law	Journal	(2011),	1092.	
195	Pellet,	ICSID	Review	FILJ	(2013),	228.	
196	Case	C-144/86,	[1987]	ECR	4861.	
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that	 the	 two	 actions	 have	 the	 same	 subject-matter,	 for	 that	 concept	 cannot	 be	
restricted	 so	 as	 to	 mean	 two	 claims	 which	 are	 entirely	 identical”.197	This	 has	 been	
further	 confirmed	 in	 the	Overseas	 case,	 in	 which	 the	 CJEU	 stated	 that	 the	 rule	 on	
identity	 of	 subject	 matter	 shall	 be	 interpreted	 broadly,	 in	 order	 to	 encompass	 the	
broader	 possible	 spectrum	of	 situations.198	Such	 an	 approach	 has	 been	 base	 on	 the	
éffét	 utile	 doctrine,	 according	 to	which	 a	 rule	 has	 to	 be	 interpreted	 in	 a	way	which	
allows	to	reach	the	scope	for	which	such	rule	has	been	drafted.199	
Similarly,	in	the	US,	a	so-called	“pragmatic	standard”	has	been	adopted	and	it	
is	now	usually	required	an	identity	of	“transaction”	rather	than	“cause	of	action”.200	
It	 seems,	 in	 conclusion,	 completely	 unreasonable	 to	 consider	 two	 claims	 as	
having	 different	 causae	 petendi	 only	 because	 the	 sources	 under	 which	 the	 same	
standard	is	invoked	are	formally	different.201	
	
3.6.4	 The	 requirement	 of	 identical	 parties:	 the	 effects	 of	 international	 awards	
on	related	third	parties	
	
The	 traditional	 approach,	 according	 to	 which	 res	 judicata	 has	 effect	 only	
between	the	formal	parties	of	a	process,	fails	to	keep	into	account	the	circumstance	
that	a	dispute,	if	seen	in	its	integrity,	is	often	more	complex	than	how	it	is	filed	before	
a	Tribunal.	For	example,	if	we	consider	a	dispute	involving	a	company	(which	is	part	of	
a	group)	and	a	State,	 it	 is	strongly	arguable	that	such	a	dispute	actually	 involves,	on	
the	one	side,	the	whole	group	–	to	be	intended	as	a	centre	of	interests	–	(and	not	only	
the	 single	 company	 who	 filed	 the	 claim)	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 side,	 the	 State.	
Furthermore,	 the	 traditional	 approach	 fails	 to	 consider	 that	 a	 legal	 relationship	 is	
often	part	of	a	bundle	of	 legal	relationships	which	 influence	each	other;	 it	 is	actually	
impossible	 to	 say	 that	 a	 legal	 relationship	 is	 not	 conditioned	 by	 the	 other	 legal	
relationships	 with	 which	 it	 is	 inextricably	 interrelated.202	As	 stated	 by	 Rudolf	 von	
Jhering,	the	legal	world	behaves	like	the	biological	world:	when	a	certain	circumstance	
(e.g.	an	award)	modifies	a	legal	relationship,	it	(voluntarily	or	involuntarily)	has	effects	
on	 other	 legal	 relationships,	 i.e.	 on	 the	 rights	 of	 certain	 third	 parties,	 whose	 legal	
sphere	 will	 be	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 modified. 203 	This	 very	 simple	 cause-effect	
relationship,	which	 is	dictated	first	of	all	by	rules	of	 logic,	 is	essential	to	ensure	 legal	
certainty	and	coherence	in	legal	relationships.	
																																																													
197	Paras.	16-17.	
198	Overseas	Union	Insurance	Ltd	and	Deutsche	Ruck	Uk	Reinsurance	Ltd	and	Pine	Top	Insurance	Company	
Ltd	 v	 New	 Hampshire	 Insurance	 Company,	 Case	 C-351/89	 [1991]	 ECR	 I-03317.	 See	 also	 Salerno,	
Giurisdizione	ed	efficacia	delle	decisioni	straniere	nel	Regolamento	(UE)	n.	1215/2012	(rifusione)	(2015),	265	
and	ss.	
199	See	Dumbrovsky,	Effet	Utile	(2014),	93	and	ss.	
200	See	Volpino	(2007)	(n.	91),	119	and	ss.	and	173.	
201	This	approach	(only	with	regard	to	causa	petendi)	is	accepted	also	by	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	78),	192.	
202	Liebman,	Efficacia	ed	autorità	della	sentenza	(1983),	56	and	ss.	
203	von	Jhering,	Die	ReflexWirkungen	oder	die	Ruckwirkung	 rechtlicher	Tatsachen	auf	dritte	Personen,	 in	
Liebman	(1983)	(n.	202),	61.	
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These	 assumptions	 should	 lead	 us	 to	 re-think	 the	 requirement	 of	 identity	 of	
the	parties	in	investment	arbitration.	Indeed,	the	effects	of	the	strict	application	of	the	
triple	identity	test,	that	we	have	seen	in	the	CME	and	Lauder	decisions,	is	the	perfect	
antithesis	of	what	we	have	just	said.	
It	 is	 possible	 to	 identify	 two	 kind	 of	 interrelation	 between	 two	 legal	
relationships	(i.e.	a	legal	relationship	and	the	rights	of	one	or	more	third	parties):204	(i)	
one	 of	 the	 two	 relationships	 is	 subordinated	 to	 the	 other,	 i.e.	 the	 third	 party’s	 (or	
parties’)	 rights	are	subordinated	to	a	 legal	 relationship	because	 they	are	part	of	 (i.e.	
involved	 in)	 such	 relationship.	 Indeed,	 we	 could	 also	 say	 that	 the	 third	 party	 is	 an	
ostensible	third	party,	which	in	fact	is	a	party	to	the	process.205	Thus,	in	this	case,	the	
modification	 of	 the	 first	 relationship	 involves	 a	 necessary	 modification	 of	 the	
subordinated	 relationship(s);206	and	 (ii)	 the	 two	 legal	 relationships	 are	 independent	
but	 concurrent/parallel,	 i.e.	 due	 to	 the	 very	high	degree	of	 identification	of	 the	 two	
relationships	 (which	 might	 be	 indeed	 called	 analogous),	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 one	 of	
them	 is	 equalized	 to	 the	 satisfaction	 of	 all	 of	 them.	 In	 this	 last	 case,	 if	 for	 example	
there	is	an	award	involving	one	of	the	concurrent/parallel	relationships,	such	an	award	
imposes	that	all	the	concurring	legal	relationships	comply	with	it.207		
In	these	cases,	both	as	a	matter	of	logic	and	as	a	consequence	of	the	principle	
of	legal	certainty,	a	decision	of	the	first	relationship	should	absorb	a	discussion	on	the	
second	 (subordinated	 or	 concurrent)	 relationship.	 The	 logical	 and	 implied	
consequence	 of	 the	 above	 discussion	 is	 that	 a	 judicial	 decision	 (both	 issued	 by	 a	
national	judge	and	by	an	international	court	or	tribunal)	may	have	certain	effects,	that	
have	been	called	 “the	 reflected	effects	of	 res	 judicata”,208	on	 certain	 third	parties.209	
																																																													
204	Allorio	(1935)	(n.	157),	47	and	ss.	and	118	and	ss.	
205	Carnelutti,	Studi	di	diritto	processuale	(1925),	443.	
206	Allorio	(1935)	(n.	157),	68.	
207	Allorio	(1935)	(n.	157),	120.	
208	Carnelutti,	 (1956)	 (n.	 157),	 79;	 Allorio	 (1935)	 (n.	 157),	 121.	 It	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 the	 Author	 has	
distinguished	between	the	reflected	effects	of	res	judicata,	arising	when	one	of	the	two	relationships	is	
subordinated	to	the	other,	and	the	enlargement	of	res	judicata,	which	arises	when	the	two	relationships	
are	concurrent.	In	Allorio’s	opinion,	while	the	reflected	effects	are	 ipso	facto	deducible	by	the	law,	the	
same	 cannot	 be	 said	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 enlargement	 of	 res	 judicata,	 which	 should	 be	 expressly	
authorized	by	the	law.	In	the	opinion	of	the	present	Author,	such	distinction	is	extremely	technical	and	
perhaps	artificial	for	the	aim	of	the	present	book,	due	to	the	lack	of	any	legal	reference	to	both	of	such	
effects	in	international	law.	Hence,	in	order	to	avoid	any	confusion,	we	will	only	talk	about	the	reflected	
effects	of	res	judicata.	Several	decisions	of	the	Italian	Corte	di	Cassazione	have	referred	to	the	reflected	
effects	(to	be	intended	according	to	Allorio’s	definition)	of	res	judicata.	These	decisions,	which	anyway	
represent	a	minority,	have	motivated	this	approach	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	every	judicial	decision	
shall	 be	 intended	 as	 an	 objective	 affirmation	 of	 the	 truth	 and	 therefore	 the	 legal	 effects	 a	 decision	
cannot	 be	 put	 in	 discussion	 by	 a	 subsequent	 decision.	 See	 decisions	 no.	 2137/2014,	 10989/2013,	
19946/2004.	
209	The	idea	of	the	effects	of	res	judicata	on	third	parties	was	firstly	developed	by	Betti,	Trattato	dei	limiti	
soggettivi	 della	 cosa	 giudicata	 in	 diritto	 romano,	 8	 and	 ss.,	 and	has	 further	 been	 the	object	 of	 a	 huge	
discussion	between	 Italian	scholars.	See	 inter	alia,	Luiso,	Principio	del	contraddittorio	ed	efficacia	della	
sentenza	 verso	 terzi	 (1981),	 63	 and	 ss.,	 Proto	 Pisani,	Opposizione	 di	 terzo	 ordinaria	 (1965),	 35	 and	 ss.	
There	have	been	several	points	of	discussion.	In	particular,	certain	Authors	have	distinguished	between	
the	effects	of	the	decision	and	the	effects	of	the	res	judicata,	while	others	have	said	that	the	effects	on	
third	parties	are	only	de	facto	and	not	de	jure.	See,	in	general	terms,	Chizzini,	L’intervento	adesivo,	vol.	2	
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The	common	law	world	refers	to	such	third	parties	as	“privies”,	i.e.	“people	who	were	
non	parties	to	an	action	but	who	in	certain	circumstances	are	nevertheless	subject	to	
generally	 the	 same	 rules	 of	 res	 judicata	 as	 are	 the	 former	 parties,	 the	 basis	 for	 this	
treatment	being	 some	 sort	 of	 representational	 relationship	between	 a	 former	 party	
and	 the	non	party”.210	A	distinction	 is	usually	made	between	 substantive	privity	and	
procedural	privity.	 In	 the	 former	case,	 “privies	 include	persons	who	have	or	had	any	
one	 of	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 substantive	 legal	 relationships	 with	 a	 party,	 when	 that	
relationship	 in	 a	 sense	 created	 a	 representative	 role”;	211	in	 order	 to	 address	 the	
existence	 of	 substantive	 privity,	 i.e.	 an	 identity	 of	 interests,	 a	 factual	 	 and	 concrete	
determination	 is	 required.212	Procedural	 privity	 regards	 “persons	 who	 were	 actually	
represented	in	the	litigation	by	a	party,	thus	including	beneficiaries	represented	by	a	
trustee”.213	In	this	book	we	will	refer	only	to	substantive	privity.	
What	 we	 have	 just	 stated	 is	 perfectly	 compliant	 with	 the	 function	 of	 the	
process:	 if	 the	 process	 is	 the	 instrument	 to	 settle	 a	 dispute	 and	 to	 stabilize	 one	 or	
more	aspect(s)	of	a	legal	relationship	(to	be	intended	in	its	integrity),	the	effects	of	a	
judicial	decision	shall	necessarily	have	a	scope	of	application	which	is	broader	than	the	
single	 process	 and	 extend	 to	 the	 entire	 legal	 relationship,	 i.e.	 referring	 also	 to	
privies.214	Such	third	party	effects	been	already	(partially)	confirmed	with	regard	to	ICJ	
decisions,	 which	 have	 been	 considered	 by	 some	Authors	 as	 having	 effects	 on	 third	
parties.215		
It	 is	 here	 submitted	 that	 arbitral	 awards	may	 have	 effects	 on	 privies	 also	 in	
international	 investment	 arbitration,	 regardless	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 party	 autonomy:	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
(1991),	581	and	ss.,	and	Zucconi	Galli	Fonseca,	La	convenzione	arbitrale	rispetto	ai	terzi	(2004),	686	and	
ss.	 See	 contra	 the	 above	 mentioned	 approach	 Balena,	 Il	 giusto	 processo	 civile	 (2009),	 35	 and	 ss.,	
Cavallini,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 processuale	 (2007),	 1221	 and	 ss.	 The	 German	 position	 regarding	 the	
extension	of	 res	 judicata	 on	 third	parties	has	been	analysed	by	Trocker,	Rivista	di	 diritto	processuale	
(1989),	36	and	ss.	
210	Casad,	Clermont	 (2001)	 (n.	 98),	 149.	 The	 term	has	 been	 also	 defined	by	Vestal,	 Iowa	Law	Review	
(1968),	2,	saying	that	“there	is	(…)	a	long	history	of	decisions	where	a	plaintiff,	not	a	party	to	one	suit,	
has	been	held	precluded	in	an	action	against	a	party	to	the	first	suit.	Very	early	in	the	development	of	
res	 judicata	 it	was	 held	 that	 a	 plaintiff,	 under	 some	 circumstances,	would	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 recover	
because	 of	 an	 earlier	 suit	 in	 which	 another	 plaintiff	 was	 defeated.	 The	 courts,	 in	 reaching	 this	
conclusion,	 relied	 on	 a	 significant	 relationship	 between	 the	 losing	 plaintiff	 in	 Suit	 I	 and	 the	 plaintiff	
attempting	recovery	in	Suit	II.	Privity	was	the	label	attached	to	this	relationship”.	
211	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	153.	
212	See	Battle	v.	Cherry,	339	F.	Supp.	186	(N.D.	Ga.	1972),	and	Crane	Boom	Life	Guard	Co.	v.	Saf-T-Boom	
Corp.,	362	F.2d	317	(8th	Cir.	1966).	See	also	Vestal,	Southern	California	Law	Review	(1974),	361,	Morris,	
California	Law	Review	(1968),	1101.	
213	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	159.	
214	Carnelutti,	(1956)	(n.	157),	79.	
215	See	Forlati,	Rivista	di	diritto	internazionale	(2002),	105	and	ss.	The	Author	also	recalls	what	has	been	
stated	by	Nigeria	in	the	Cameroon	v.	Nigeria	Case,	ICJ	Rep	1998,	323,	par.	113:	“by	virtue	of	article	59	of	
the	Statute,	third	States	are	not	formally	bound	by	decisions	of	the	Court;	(…)	nevertheless	(…)	Article	
59	 of	 the	 Statute	 gives	 insufficient	 protection,	 since	 in	 specific	 situations,	 in	 spite	 of	 that	 Article,	
decisions	of	the	Court	may	have	clear	and	direct	 legal	and	practical	effects	on	third	States”.	 	See	also	
Forlati,	 The	 International	 Court	 of	 Justice:	 An	 Arbitral	 Tribunal	 or	 a	 Judicial	 Body	 (2014),	 200-201,	
Palchetti,	Max	Planck	UNYB	(2002),	140,	Bonafè	(2014)	(n.	158),	15	and	59-60,	and	Al-Qahtani,	The	Law	
and	Practice	of	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(2003),	273	and	ss.	
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the	 effects	 of	 an	 award	 are	de	 jure	 and	de	 facto	 extensible	 to	 all	 subordinated	 and	
concurrent	relationships.	This	idea	has	been	already	supported	in	the	case	law216	and	
by	some	Authors,	who	have	noted	that,	once	the	award	 is	 issued,	all	 the	other	 legal	
relationship	which	in	some	way	depend	from	such	award	shall	comply	with	it;217	it	has	
been	 said	 that,	 if	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 not	 followed,	 an	 arbitral	 award	 would	 be	
equalized	 to	a	 legal	opinion218	or	 to	a	 contract.219	Indeed,	 it	 is	undeniable	 that,	 from	
the	perspective	of	 its	 function,	arbitration	 is	aimed	at	settling	a	dispute	(as	a	whole)	
and	to	giving	stability	to	 legal	relationships	which	 it	decides.	Arbitration	 is	therefore	
(and	obviously)	at	 the	disposal	of	 the	parties,	but	 the	effects	of	 the	award	are	 to	be	
necessarily	 intended	 as	 going	 beyond	 the	 intention	 of	 the	 parties:	 otherwise	
arbitration	could	be	also	intentionally	used	by	the	parties	to	abuse	of	their	procedural	
rights,	as	it	happened	in	the	CME	and	Lauder	cases.	
Indeed,	such	an	approach,	that	Schreuer	and	Reinisch	have	defined	“economic	
approach”,220	has	found	several	applications	in	international	 law,	EU	law	and	(even	if	
only	indirectly)	in	investment	arbitration.221	
With	 regard	 to	 international	 law,	 it	 is	 worth	mentioning	 the	Martin	 v.	 Spain	
case,222	in	which	the	European	Commission	of	Human	Rights	has	supported	the	idea	
that	 “a	 claim	by	 23	Union	 activists,	 presented	 in	 their	 personal	 capacity,	which	was	
identical	in	its	object	and	scope	to	a	previous	claim	brought	before	the	ILO	Committee	
on	 Freedom	 of	 Association	 by	 the	 trade	 organization	 to	 which	 the	 applicants	
belonged,	was	precluded”	by	virtue	of	Art.	35(2)(b)	of	the	ECHR.	Another	statement	
providing	 for	 third	 parties	 effect	 of	 res	 judicata	 can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 ICJ	Lighthouses	
case,	 where	 –	 in	 a	 case	 regarding	 the	 interpretation	 of	 a	 multilateral	 treaty	 –	 the	
																																																													
216	See	 French	Cour	 de	Cassation,	Prodim	 v.	Distribution	 Casino	 France,	 23	 January	 2007,	 in	 Revue	 de	
l’Arbitrage	 (2007),	 135.	 Other	 cases	 are	 mentioned	 in	 Gunes,	 Transnational	 Dispute	 Management	
(2015),	18,	footnote	174.	
217	Ricci,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 processuale	 (1989),	 666.	 Id.,	 Rivista	 trimestrale	 di	 diritto	 e	 procedura	 civile	
(2003),	517-518.	Such	an	approach	has	been	also	approved	by	Ruffini,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(1995),	648.	
See	also	Fazzalari,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(1995),	619-620,	See	Zucconi	Galli	Fonseca	(2004)	(n.	209),	681	
and	 ss.	 The	 issue	 has	 been	 generally	 analysed	 by	 Lotbiniére	 McDougall,	 Transnational	 Dispute	
Management	(2012),	1	and	ss.	
218	Ricci,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(1989)	(n.	217),	669.	
219	The	equalization	of	arbitral	awards	to	contract	is	not	new	in	scholars’	opinion.	See	Schell,	UCLA	Law	
Review	(1988),	662	and	ss.,	Motomura,	Tulane	Law	Review	(1988),	80	and	ss.	See	also	Vandenberg	v.	
Superior	Court,	 982	P.2d	229	 (Cal.	 1999).	Such	a	decision	has	been	criticized	by	Cromwell,	 Journal	of	
Dispute	Resolution	(2000),	425	and	ss.	
220	Schreuer,	Reinisch	(2002)	(n.	153),	10	and	ss.	Many	of	the	cases	reported	below	have	been	read	by	
the	present	author	in	such	legal	opinion.	
221	With	regard	to	 international	commercial	arbitration,	we	have	already	mentioned,	 in	Chapter	2,	the	
so-called	 “group	 of	 companies	 doctrine”,	 according	 to	 which	 if	 a	 number	 of	 companies	 represent	 a	
single	 economic	 unit,	 they	 can	 be	 considered	 as	 all	 bound	 by	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	
even	if	only	one	of	them	has	signed	the	arbitration	clause.	According	to	Schreuer	and	Reinisch	(2002)	
(n.	153),	10,	such	a	doctrine	could	be	seen	also	from	the	perspective	of	the	arbitral	award:	in	presence	of	
a	group	of	companies,	an	award	regarding	only	one	of	them	extends	also	to	the	other	companies	of	the	
group.	
222 	European	 Commission	 of	 Human	 Rights,	 Application	 16358/90,	 Decision	 on	 Admissibility,	 12	
October	1992.	
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judges	stated	that	“[t]he	res	judicata	extends	(…)	beyond	the	strict	limits	of	the	case	
decided”.223	
In	 EU	 law,	 the	 opinion	 that	 “the	 fact	 that	 a	 subsidiary	 has	 a	 separate	 legal	
personality	 is	 not	 sufficient	 to	exclude	 the	possibility	of	 imputing	 its	 conduct	 to	 the	
parent	company”	has	firstly	been	pointed	out	in	the	Dyestuffs	Case,224	in	which	it	was	
said	 that,	 if	 the	subsidiary	“does	not	decide	 independently	upon	 its	own	conduct	on	
the	market,	but	carries	out,	in	all	material	respects,	the	instructions	given	to	it	by	the	
parent	 company”,	 such	 a	 parent	 company	 can	 be	 considered	 involved	 in	 the	
transaction	and,	therefore,	bound	by	the	subsequent	award.	The	same	approach	has	
been	assumed	in	the	Continental	Can	case.225	
Finally,	with	regard	to	investment	arbitration,	as	we	have	already	observed	in	
Chapter	 1,	 Paragraph	 [-],	 arbitral	 tribunals	 have	 several	 times	 extended	 their	
jurisdiction	to	other	companies	of	the	same	group,	by	stating	that	this	was	necessary	
in	 order	 to	 protect	 the	 investor.	 This	 is	 clearly	 represented	 by	 one	 of	 the	 very	 first	
ICSID	 decisions,	 the	 Amco	 v.	 Indonesia	 Decision	 on	 Jurisdiction,226	in	 which	 the	
Tribunal	 stated	 that	 “the	 foreign	 investor	was	Amco	Asia	 [i.e.	 the	parent	company]:	
PT	 Amco	 [i.e.	 the	 subsidiary	 through	which	 the	 investment	was	made]	 was	 but	 an	
instrumentality	through	which	Amco	Asia	[realized]	the	investment.	Now,	the	goal	of	
the	arbitration	clause	was	to	protect	the	investor.	How	could	such	protection	be	ensured,	
if	Amco	Asia	would	be	refused	the	benefit	of	the	clause?”	(emphasis	added).		
It	 is	 not	 understandable	why	 a	 similar	 approach	 has	 not	 been	 assumed	with	
regard	to	res	judicata.	Indeed,	it	could	be	said	that	the	goal	of	investment	arbitration	is	
to	 ensure	 that	 certain	 standards	 of	 protection	 are	 granted	 to	 investors.	 Such	
standards	can	be	violated	only	once	by	the	same	facts.	How	could	abuses	be	avoided	
if	 the	 principle	 of	 res	 judicata	 is	 not	 interpreted	 in	 the	 same	 broad	 way	 in	 which	
tribunals	have	interpreted	arbitration	clauses	contained	in	BITs?	
As	already	said,	 the	main	 reason	which	should	allegedly	 justify	such	a	 formal	
approach	is	the	respect	of	the	principle	of	due	process.	However,	it	is	submitted	that	
the	respect/violation	of	the	principle	of	due	process	shall	be	ascertained	on	a	case-by-
case	basis	and	it	is	not	possible	to	exclude	a	priori	the	possibility	of	an	extension	of	res	
judicata	on	third	parties.	 Indeed,	 if	 it	 is	ascertained	that	a	party,	 to	be	 intended	as	a	
single	centre	of	 interest,	has	had	the	full	and	fair	opportunity	to	present	 its	case,	we	
cannot	see	why	such	a	party	should	have	the	possibility	to	do	so	a	second	time	just	by	
changing	the	label	of	the	legal	entity	who	files	the	claim.227	This	is	the	approach	taken	
																																																													
223	Lighthouses	(France	v.	Greece),	23	ILR	(1956),	86-87.	See	Al-Qahtani,	(2003)	(n.	215),	273	and	ss.	
224	Case	C-48/69,	ICI	v.	Commission	(Dyestuffs	Case)	[1972]	ECR	619,	par.	133.	
225	Case	C-6/72,	Europemballage	and	Continental	Can	v.	Commission	[1973]	ECR	215,	par.	15.	
226	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/1,	Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	25	September	1983,	p.	400.	
227	See	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	 (n.	98),	150,	stating	that	“due	process	allows	binding	many	more	non-
parties	 than	 most	 persons	 assume.	 After	 all,	 the	 loose	 demands	 of	 due	 process	 explain	 how	 the	
legislature	 and	 administrators	 can	 bind	 people	 and	 their	 property,	when	 those	 people	 have	 received	
representation	only	in	the	loosest	sense.	Analogously,	a	court’s	judgment	could	bind,	among	others,	all	
similarly	 situated	 persons	 whose	 interests	 received	 adequate	 representation,	 binding	 them	 not	 only	
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by	the	Restatement	2nd	of	Judgments,	par.	39	of	which	states	that	“[a]	person	who	is	
not	a	party	to	an	action	but	who	controls	or	substantially	participates	in	the	control	of	
the	presentation	on	behalf	of	a	party	is	bound	by	the	determination	of	issues	decided	
as	 though	 he	 were	 a	 party”,	 provided	 that	 he	 had	 the	 full	 and	 fair	 opportunity	 to	
present	 its	 claim.228	Hence,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 it	 is	 true	 that	 each	 substantive	
party	 shall	 have	 the	 full	 and	 fair	 opportunity	 to	present	 its	 case,	but	 the	 concept	of	
“party”	 shall	be	 intended	 in	 the	substantial	 sense	and,	 therefore,	 the	 respect	of	due	
process	shall	be	ascertained	in	concreto	and	not	only	in	abstracto.229		
This	approach	has	been	also	confirmed	by	the	US	Supreme	Court,	which	stated	
that	 the	 controlling	 question	 is	whether	 it	 can	be	 said	 that	 “the	procedure	 adopted	
fairly	insures	the	protection	of	the	interests	of	absent	parties	who	are	to	be	bound	by	
it”.230	In	 conclusion,	 if	 there	 is	 a	 strict	 relationship	between	one	of	 the	parties	and	a	
third	party	so	that	such	a	third	party	(privy)	may	be	considered	represented	during	the	
process,	 the	 third	 party	 will	 be	 precluded	 to	 newly	 file	 the	 same	 claim	 and,	 in	 the	
event	 it	 should	 nevertheless	 file	 it,	 such	 a	 claim	 shall	 be	 declared	 inadmissible.231	It	
would,	 indeed,	 be	 “unjust	 to	 permit	 one	 who	 has	 had	 his	 day	 in	 court	 to	 reopen	
identical	issues	by	merely	switching	adversaries”.232	
Such	an	approach,	 supported	by	several	authoritative	scholars,233	would	have	
lead	to	consider	as	identical	parties	Mr.	Lauder	and	CME	in	the	Lauder	and	CME	cases,	
considering	 that	 all	 the	 decisions	 regarding	 CME	were	 taken	 by	 its	 controlling	 and	
ultimate	shareholder,	Mr.	Lauder.	
	
3.6.5	 The	same	legal	order	(in	brief)		
																																																																																																																																																																																		
through	the	flexible	doctrine	of	stare	decisis	as	it	does	but	also	through	the	strictures	of	res	judicata	as	it	
could”.	
228	The	 idea	 that	 the	 “community	 of	 interest”	 is	 the	 necessary	 requirement	 in	 order	 to	 extend	 res	
judicata	on	 third	parties	has	been	expressed	also	by	Brekoulakis	 (2005)	 (n.	167),	 11.	According	 to	 this	
Author,	when	the	rights	of	 third	parties	are	 inextricably	 intertwined	with	the	rights	of	one	of	the	real	
party,	 the	 third	 party	 is	 in	 fact	 a	 false	 third	 party	 which	 will	 be	 affected	 by	 the	 arbitral	 award.	
Brekoulakis	talks	about	“arbitral	effect”.	Such	an	approach	has	been	strongly	approved	by	Gunes	(2015)	
(n.	216),	18	and	ss.	
229	An	even	more	extreme	position	against	due	process	has	been	taken	by	Bone,	New	York	University	
Law	Review	(1992),	195	and	ss.,	according	to	whom	“the	day	in	the	court	is	often	invoked	in	talismanic	
fashion	to	oppose	non-party	preclusion	without	any	explanation	of	why	the	values	underlying	the	ideal	
support	the	result”.	According	to	Bone,	if	a	third	party	is	virtually	represented	in	the	process	(even	if	not	
in	 privity	with	 one	 of	 the	 parties),	 such	 a	 third	 party	 is	 precluded	 to	 start	 a	 new	 claim	 on	 the	 same	
dispute.	However,	the	theory	of	virtual	representation	has	been	rejected	in	2008	by	the	Supreme	Court	
in	Taylor	v.	Sturgell,	553	US	880.	
230	Hansberry	v.	Lee,	311	US	32,	42	(1940).	See	also	Vestal,	Michigan	Law	Review	(1963),	49-51.	
231	See	McFadden	v.	McFadden,	239	Ore.	 76,	396	P.2d	202	 (1964),	204,	where	 the	Court	 stated	 that	 it	
was	 “satisfied	 that	 the	 first	 litigation	 provided	 substantial	 protection	 of	 the	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 the	
person	sought	to	be	bound”	(emphasis	added).	
232	Bernhard	v.	Bank	of	America	Nat.Trust	&	Savings	Assn.,	122	P.	2d	892	(S.C.	Cal.	1942),	894.	See	also	
Watson	(1990)	(n.	162),	629-630.	
233	See,	 inter	alia,	Reinisch	(2004)	(n.	64),	44	and	ss.,	and	Shany,	ssrn.com	(2007),	13-14,	who	expressly	
stated	 that	 the	privity	of	 interest	 test	 is	more	 suitable	 to	 regulate	 cases	of	 jurisdictional	 competition	
between	 international	arbitration	tribunals.	See	also	Spoorenberg,	Vinuales,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	
International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(2009),	99,	Radicati	di	Brozolo,	ssrn.com	(2011),	10.	
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As	already	clarified,	this	book	does	not	deal	with	cases	of	parallel	proceedings	
between	national	courts	and	international	arbitration	tribunals,	but	only	with	parallel	
proceedings	 involving	 two	 arbitration	 panels.	 For	 this	 reason,	 the	 identity	 of	 legal	
order,	which	is	often	posed	as	a	requirement	for	the	application	of	res	judicata,	should	
not	 be	 dealt	 with	 in	 this	 book,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 assumed	 that	 two	
investment	arbitration	tribunals	are	part	of	the	same	legal	order,	namely	international	
law.	
However,	the	Award	in	the	Helnan	v.	Egypt	case234	requires	us	to	deal	with	such	
a	 question,	 even	 if	 very	 briefly.	 In	 this	 case,	 prior	 to	 refer	 to	 ICSID	 arbitration,	 the	
parties	litigated	before	an	arbitral	tribunal	sitting	in	Cairo.	After	the	Cairo	arbitration	
was	 concluded	 and	 the	 award	 enforced	 in	 Cairo	 (according	 to	 the	 1958	 New	 York	
Convention),	 Helnan	 started	 another	 claim	 before	 ICSID.	 Egypt	 objected	 the	
admissibility	of	the	claim	stating	that	the	Cairo	award	was	res	judicata	with	regard	to	
all	the	matters	that	have	been	already	decided.	The	ICSID	Tribunal	recognized	the	res	
judicata	force	of	the	Cairo	award,	but	also	stated	that	the	res	judicata	effect	could	only	
extend	within	 the	 legal	order	where	 the	award	was	enforced,	 i.e.	 the	Egyptian	 legal	
system.	Hence,	 the	Tribunal	 refused	 to	 recognize,	 in	 the	 framework	of	 international	
law,	the	res	judicata	effect	of	the	Cairo	award.	The	Tribunal	reasoning	was	not	based	
on	the	circumstance	that	“an	 international	tribunal	 is	considered	to	be	hierarchically	
superior	 to	 any	 national	 court	 or	 private	 arbitral	 tribunal”235	but	 on	 the	 fact	 that	
“although	the	subject	matter	may	be	substantially	the	same,	the	causes	of	action	are	
different”.236	Indeed,	 even	 if	 the	 Cairo	 award	 had	 res	 judicata	 within	 the	 legal	 order	
where	 it	 belongs,	 it	 cannot	 have	 such	 an	 effect	 in	 another	 legal	 order,	 namely	
international	 law.	 Hence,	 the	 ICSID	 Tribunal	 considered	 itself	 bound	 by	 the	 Cairo	
Award	with	 regard	 to	 the	matter	 concerning	Egyptian	Law,	but	not	with	 regard	 the	
issues	of	international	law.237	
																																																													
234	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/19,	Award,	3	July	2008,	paras.	121	and	ss.	
235	ILA,	 Final	 Report	 on	 Lis	 Pendens	 and	 Arbitration,	 Toronto	 Conference,	 2006,	 13.	 This	 idea	 is	 also	
fostered	by	Wehland	(2013)	(n.	78),	136-137.	
236	Helnan	Award,	par.	124.	
237	A	 similar	 approach	 has	 been	 approved	 also	 by	 Cremades	 in	 his	 dissenting	 opinion	 in	 Fraport	 AG	
Frankfurt	 Airport	 Services	 Worldwide	 v.	 Republic	 of	 the	 Philippines,	 Dissenting	 Opinion	 of	 Bernardo	
Cremades,	 16	August	2007,	 26	and	 in	GAMI	 Investments	 v.	Mexico,	UNCITRAL,	Award,	 15	November	
2004,	par.	41.	This	is	not	the	only	approach	followed	by	Tribunals	in	analysing	the	relationship	between	
national	 and	 international	 proceedings.	 As	 noted	 by	 Wehland	 (2013)	 (n.	 78),	 148	 and	 ss.,	 there	 are	
several	 international	 Tribunals	 which	 have	 considered	 national	 decisions	 as	 mere	 facts	 and	 have	
therefore	fully	reviewed	the	national	decisions,	such	as	Empresas	Lucchetti	SA	and	Lucchetti	Peru	SA	v.	
The	Republic	of	Peru,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/03/4,	Decision	on	Annulment,	5	September	2007,	par.	87,	and	
EDF	International	SA,	Saur	International	SA	and	Leòn	Participationes	Argentinas	SA	v.	Argentine	Republic,	
ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/03/23,	 Award,	 11	 June	 2012,	 par.	 1131.	 Finally,	 in	 other	 cases,	 the	 review	 of	
domestic	 decisions	 by	 international	 Tribunals	 has	 been	 considered	 to	 be	 limited	 to	 circumstance	 in	
which	 a	 denial	 of	 justice	 realized.	 See	 Robert	 Azinan,	 Kenneth	 Davitian	 &	 Ellen	 Baca	 v.	 The	 United	
Mexican	 State,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB(AF)/97/2,	 Award,	 1	 November	 1999,	 paras.	 4-24	 and	 96-97	 and	
Mondev	 International	 Ltd	 v.	 United	 States	 of	 America,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB(AF)/99/2,	 Award,	 11	
October	2002,	par.	126.	
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The	award	poses	us	two	questions,	particularly	relevant	for	the	case	of	parallel	
contract	 and	 treaty	 claims:	 (i)	 is	 it	 correct	 to	 consider	 that	 there	 is	 no	 hierarchy	
between	 national	 courts	 (and	 by	 non-ICSID	 arbitration	 panels)	 and	 international	
tribunals?	And	(ii)	is	it	correct	to	state	that	there	is	no	interrelation	between	a	national	
decision	 (or	 an	 arbitration	 award	 to	 be	 enforced	 according	 to	 the	 New	 York	
Convention)	and	an	investment	arbitration	decision?	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 first	 question,	 it	 is	 here	 submitted	 that	 the	 approach	
assumed	by	the	Helnan	Tribunal	 is	 the	correct	one.	 Indeed,	 in	 lack	of	any	normative	
reference,	 the	present	 author	 shares	 the	 view	of	who	 stated	 that	 a	 national	 and	 an	
international	 proceeding	 are,	 in	 principle,	 indifferent	 to	 each	 other.238	If	 there	 is	 a	
validly	 conferred	 jurisdiction	 they	 could	 indeed	proceed	 in	 parallel:	 their	 exercise	 of	
jurisdiction	 is	 not	 precluded.	 However,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 it	 could	 well	 happen	
that,	by	way	of	admissibility,	the	arbitral	tribunal	or	the	national	court	considers	itself	
precluded	from	hearing	a	question	that	has	been	already	decided	by,	 respectively,	a	
national	court	(or	commercial	arbitration	panel)	or	an	international	tribunal.	
Concerning	the	second	question,	i.e.	whether	a	national	decision	can(not)	have	
any	 international	 influence	 and	 vice	 versa,	 the	 present	 Author	 shares	 the	 view	
expressed	by	Yuval	Shany.	239	This	Author	starts	from	the	assumption	of	the	rejection	
of	 what	 he	 calls	 the	 disintegrationist	 approach,	 according	 to	 which	 parallel	 claims	
arising	 in	 national	 and	 international	 legal	 systems	 cannot	 overlap,	 and	 looks	 for	 an	
integrationist	approach,	which	seeks	to	harmonize	overlapping	norms	and	procedures	
and	to	effectively	regulate	related	claims.	In	light	of	this	approach,	Shany	militates	in	
favour	of	a	broad	construction	of	the	requirements	for	res	judicata	and	in	favour	of	the	
possible	 international	 res	 judicata	 effects	 of	 national	 decisions	 (or	 arbitral	 decision	
enforced	according	to	the	New	York	Convention).240	
From	 this	 perspective,	 and	 also	 in	 light	 of	 the	 hybrid	 nature	 of	 investment	
arbitration	 (which	 involves	 both	 elements	 of	 international	 and	 national	 law),241	it	 is	
arguable	that	–	prior	to	say	that	a	national	decision	(or	an	award	issued	by	a	another	
arbitration	 panel)	may	 not	 preclude	 an	 action	 before	 an	 ICSID	 tribunal	 –	 a	 tribunal	
should	be	verified	whether,	in	concreto,	the	parties,	the	petitum	and	the	causa	petendi	
substantially	coincide.	If	there	is	such	a	substantial	coincidence,	it	is	arguable	that	the	
second	 judge	 could	 consider	 the	 second	 claim	precluded	by	way	of	 a	declaration	of	
inadmissibility	of	the	same	claim.242		
																																																													
238	See	Palombino,	Gli	 effetti	 della	 sentenza	 internazionale	 nei	 giudizi	 interni	 (2008),	 20.	However,	 the	
same	 Author,	 has	 demonstrated,	 at	 151	 and	 ss.,	 that,	 in	 concreto,	 the	 international	 decision	 may	
influence	in	various	ways	the	national	proceedings.	
239	Shany	(2006)	(n.	73),	10	and	ss.,	id.	(2007)	(n.	233),	16	and	ss.	
240	See	Palombino	 (2008)	 (n.	 238),	 151	and	 ss.,	who	has	demonstrated	how	and	why	an	 international	
decision	could	influence	a	national	judge.	
241	See	Douglas	(2003)	(n.	55),	151	and	ss.	
242	See	Dodge	(2000)	(n.	177),	359.	This	Author	bases	his	opinion	that	national	decisions	(or	arbitration	
awards	 to	 be	 enforced	 according	 to	 the	 New	 York	 Convention)	 do	 not	 have	 res	 judicata	 effects	 in	
international	 proceedings	 on	 the	 circumstance	 that	 otherwise	 the	 rule	 of	 prior	 exhaustion	 of	 local	
remedies	 would	 loose	 its	 efficacy.	 It	 could	 be	 easily	 answered	 that	 the	 prior	 exhaustion	 of	 local	
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The	above	opinion	is	confirmed	by	another	circumstance.	As	already	reported,	
the	Helnan	Tribunal	did	not	 recognize	the	effects	of	 the	Cairo	award	on	the	basis	of	
the	fact	that,	having	been	such	an	award	enforced	according	to	the	provisions	of	the	
1958	 New	 York	 Convention,	 it	 was	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 the	 Egyptian	 legal	
order.	If	such	an	approach	is	confirmed,	this	would	lead	to	the	absurd	result	that	even	
a	non-ICSID	investment	decision	(for	example	an	UNCITRAL	decision),	to	be	enforced	
according	 to	 the	 New	 York	 Convention,	 could	 be	 bypassed	 by	 a	 subsequent	 ICSID	
decision	just	because,	having	been	enforced	according	to	the	New	York	Convention,	it	
has	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 a	 national	 legal	 order.	 This	 is	 what	 happened	 in	
Bywater	 Gauff	 v.	 Tanzania, 243 	where	 a	 contract	 claim	 was	 brought	 before	 an	
UNCITRAL	 Tribunal	 and,	 then,	 a	 treaty	 claim	 before	 the	 ICSID	 Tribunal.	 The	 ICSID	
Tribunal	 refused	 to	 decline	 jurisdiction	 stating	 that	 it	 was	 not	 influenced	 by	 the	
contract	 claim,	 but	 nevertheless	 stated	 that	 the	 interpretation	 and	 application	 of	 the	
investment	contract	represented	an	essential	element	in	the	perspective	of	its	finding	of	
BIT	 breaches.	 This	 position	militates	 against	 legal	 certainty	 and	 coherence	and	 shall	
therefore	be	fully	refused.	244		
The	proposed	approach	finds	support	in	the	RSM	and	Grynberg	ICSID	Award,245	
which	 will	 be	 deeply	 examined	 in	 the	 following	 Paragraph,	 where	 the	 Tribunal	
considered	that	a	previous	decision	by	another	investment	Tribunal	of	certain	contract	
claims	may	be	 evaluated	 as	 a	 collateral	 estoppel	 in	 a	 subsequent	 treaty	 arbitration,	
provided	 that	 there	 is	 substantial	 identity	 between	 the	 two	 claims.	 The	 Tribunal	
expressly	 rejected246	the	 Claimant’s	 assertion	 that	 “breach	 of	 contract	 issues	 do[es]	
not	dispose	of	BIT	issues	because	a	party	may	be	in	compliance	with	an	international	
contract	but	still	run	afoul	of	a	BIT”.247	
The	only	exception	to	what	stated	above	is	the	case	in	which	the	same	treaty	
text	provides	for	the	prior	exhaustion	of	the	local	remedies.	In	this	case,	it	is	the	same	
treaty	 that	 allows	 the	 parties	 to	 bring	 a	 claim,	 already	 discussed	 before	 national	
courts,	 before	 an	 international	 tribunal,	 therefore	 excluding	a	 priori	 the	 res	 judicata	
effect	of	the	national	decision.	
	
3.7	 Collateral	estoppel	(issue	preclusion)		
	
3.7.1	 Development	and	requirements	of	collateral	estoppel:	A	broader	concept	
of	privity	and	the	necessity	to	respect	due	process	
	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
remedies	 can	 be	 interpreted	 as	 an	 exception	 to	 the	 general	 rule	 which	 envisages	 the	 possibility	 of	
preclusion	in	case	the	parties,	the	object	and	the	legal	grounds	are	substantially	the	same.	
243	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/22,	Award,	24	July	2008.	
244	The	Bywater	Gauff	 decision	has	been,	 indeed,	 criticized	by	Savarese,	www.federalismi.it	 (2009),	8	
and	12.	
245	Rachel	 S	 Grynberg,	 Stephen	 M	 Grynberg,	 Miriam	 Z	 Grynberg,	 and	 RSM	 Production	 Corporation	 v	
Grenada,	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/10/6,	10	December	2010.	
246	See	par.	7.1.3	of	the	Award.	
247	See	par.	5.3.3	of	the	Award.	
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Collateral	 estoppel	 is	 a	 doctrine	 developed	 and	 applied	 in	 the	 common	 law	
world,248	whose	goals	are	the	same	of	res	 judicata.249	In	1897,	the	US	Supreme	Court	
described	issue	preclusion	in	this	way:	“a	right,	question,	or	fact	distinctly	put	in	issue	
and	directly	determined	by	a	court	of	competent	jurisdiction	(…)	cannot	be	disputed	in	
a	 subsequent	 suit	between	 the	 same	parties	or	 their	privies;	 and	even	 if	 the	 second	
suit	 is	 for	a	different	cause	of	action,	 the	 right,	question	or	 fact	once	so	determined	
must,	 as	 between	 the	 same	 parties	 or	 their	 privies,	 be	 taken	 as	 conclusively	
established,	so	long	as	the	judgment	in	the	first	suit	remains	unmodified.	This	general	
rule	 is	 demanded	 by	 the	 very	 object	 for	 which	 civil	 courts	 have	 been	 established,	
which	is	to	secure	the	peace	and	repose	of	society	by	settlement	of	matters	capable	of	
judicial	determination.	Its	enforcement	is	essential	to	the	maintenance	of	social	order;	
for	 the	aid	of	 judicial	 tribunals	would	not	be	 invoked	 for	 the	vindication	of	 rights	of	
person	and	property,	 if,	 as	between	parties	and	 their	privies,	 conclusiveness	did	not	
attend	the	judgments	of	such	tribunals	 in	respect	of	all	matters	properly	put	 in	 issue	
and	actually	determined	by	them”.250	
This	 very	 old	 definition	 is	 still	 very	 actual	 and	 responds	 to	 the	 already	
mentioned	public	function	of	any	process,	 i.e.	to	definitely	settle	disputes	(or,	 in	this	
case,	 issues),	 regardless	 of	 the	 formalities	 and	 labels	 of	 every	 single	 case.	 Indeed,	
regardless	of	the	cause	of	action	of	the	two	succeeding	proceedings,	“the	doctrine	of	
collateral	 estoppel	 precludes	 a	 party	 or	 its	 privy	 from	 relitigating	 any	 factual	 [and	
legal]	 issue	 that	 has	 been	 “actually	 litigated”	 in	 a	 prior	 action	 and	 that	 have	 been	
necessary	 to	 the	 resolution	 of	 that	 action.	 (…)	 The	 estopped	 party,	 however,	 may	
oppose	 preclusion	 if	 it	 was	 not	 given	 a	 “full	 and	 fair”	 opportunity	 to	 litigate	 the	
particular	issue	in	the	original	action”.251	
The	following	are	the	requirements	for	the	application	of	collateral	estoppel:	(i)	
the	 issue	whose	 discussion	 is	 precluded	 shall	 be	 the	 same	 in	 the	 two	 processes;	 (ii)	
such	an	issue	shall	have	been	actually	litigated;	(iii)	such	issue	has	been	essential	to	the	
resolution	of	the	prior	case;	(iv)	the	parties	shall	be	the	same	or,	at	least,	in	privity	with	
the	parties	of	the	prior	judgment	(even	if,	as	we	will	see	below,	this	requirement	has	
been	questioned);	and	(v)	the	precluded	party	shall	have	had	a	full	and	fair	opportunity	
to	litigate	the	precluded	issue.		
Prior	to	move	to	the	analysis	of	such	requirements,	three	preliminary	remarks	
are	necessary.		
																																																													
248	Both	in	England	and	in	the	US.	See	Gunes	(2015)	(n.	216),	4-5.	
249	For	 an	 historical	 analysis	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 see	 Millar,	 Illinois	 Law	 Review	 of	 Northwestern	
University	(1940),	41	and	ss.	With	regard	to	the	cost	saving	aspects	of	collateral	estoppel	see	also	Spurr,	
International	Review	of	Law	and	Economics	(1991),	47	and	ss.	
250	S.	Pac.	R.R.	v.	United	States,	168	U.S.	1,	48-49	(1897).	See	Nesin,	New	York	University	Law	Review	
(2001),	879.	
251	Bain,	Journal	of	Dispute	Resolution	(1990),	190.	The	applicability	of	collateral	estoppel	to	both	issues	
of	fact	and	issues	of	law	has	been	explained	by	Vestal,	Washington	University	Law	Quarterly	(1965),	171	
and	ss.	
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Firstly,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 the	 applicability	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 is	 to	 be	
based	on	a	flexible	approach	and	is	the	result	of	a	balancing	test	between,	on	the	one	
side,	 the	public	 interests	of	 finality,	 judicial	 economy,	 legal	 certainty	and	 coherence	
and,	on	the	other	side,	the	private	(and,	to	a	certain	extent,	public)	interest	to	ensure	
that	the	precluded	party	has	had	the	full	and	fair	opportunity	to	present	its	case.	As	a	
consequence,	 the	 applicability	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 is	 something	 that	 shall	 be	
ascertained	 in	concreto	and	keeping	 into	consideration	the	factual	 framework	of	any	
dispute.		
Secondly,	it	is	worth	noting	that	–	while,	initially,	collateral	estoppel	has	been	
considered	 applicable	 only	when	 the	 entire	 claim	 including	 the	 precluded	 issue	was	
finally	decided	–	in	a	second	phase	and	with	the	aim	of	saving	time	and	costs,	judges	
(in	particular	in	the	US)	have	adopted	a	more	pragmatic	approach	and	have	consented	
the	 application	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 even	 if	 the	 issue	 was	 finally	 decided	 but	 the	
entire	claim	was	still	pending.	The	only	requirement	for	such	an	application	is	that	the	
issue	 has	 been	 duly	 discussed	 in	 the	 first	 process	 and	 the	 second	 judge	 considers	
plausible	that	the	resolution	of	such	an	 issue	 is	definitive	and	will	not	be	changed	 in	
the	 final	decision.252	This	approach	has	been	endorsed	 in	 the	second	Restatement	of	
Judgments,	at	par.	13.	
Thirdly,	notwithstanding	some	contrary	voices	in	the	past,253	it	is	today	broadly	
accepted	that	 the	collateral	estoppel	effect	may	derive	also	by	 issues	decided	by	an	
arbitration	 panel.254	Therefore,	 both	 a	 second	 international	 tribunal	 and	 a	 national	
court	 should	 be	 bound	 by	 previous	 arbitral	 decisions	 on	 issues	 provided	 that	 the	
requirements	for	the	application	of	collateral	estoppel	set	forth	above	are	met.255	
Moving	to	the	analysis	of	the	first	requirement,	i.e.	identity	of	issues,	it	is	worth	
noting	that	“[w]hether	a	matter	to	be	presented	in	subsequent	action	constitutes	the	
same	issue	as	a	matter	presented	in	the	initial	action	is	a	pragmatic	question,	turning	
on	 such	 factors	 as	 the	 degree	 of	 overlap	 between	 the	 factual	 evidence	 and	 legal	
																																																													
252	Volpino	(2007)	(n.	91),	95-99.	In	this	regard	see	Lummus	Co.	v.	Commonwealth	Oil	Ref.	Co.,	297	F.2d	
(2d	Cir.	1961),	80	and	ss.	
253	Sanders,	Law	and	Policy	of	International	Business	(1992),	118-119,	Motomura	(1988)	(n.	219),	32	and	
ss.	
254	In	general	terms	see	Gunes	(2015)	(n.	216),	21	and	ss.	and	Bernal-Fandiño,	Rojas-Quiñones,	Revista	
Colombiana	de	Derecho	Internacional	(2010),	455	and	ss.	Concerning	the	US	see	Hulbert,	International	
Tax	 and	 Business	 Lawyer	 (1989),	 159	 and	 ss.,	 Cromwell	 (2000)	 (n.	 219),	 425	 and	 ss.,	 Collings,	 Los	
Angeles	Lawyer	 (2005),	20	and	ss.,	Westerlind,	Fox,	Mealey’s	Litigation	Report	 (2010),	1	and	ss.	With	
regard	 to	 the	UK	 see	Fidelitas	Shipping	Co	Ltd	 v	V/O	Exportchleb	 [1965]	 1	Lloyd's	Rep	13	 (CA),	where	
Lord	 Diplock	 said	 "[i]ssue	 estoppel	 applies	 to	 arbitration	 as	 it	 does	 to	 litigation.	 The	 parties,	 having	
chosen	 the	 tribunal	 to	 determine	 the	 disputes	 between	 them	 as	 to	 their	 legal	 rights	 and	 duties,	 are	
bound	 by	 the	 determination	 of	 that	 tribunal	 on	 any	 issue	 which	 is	 relevant	 to	 the	 decision	 of	 any	
dispute	referred	to	that	tribunal."	See	also	Associated	Electric	and	Gas	 Insurance	Services	Ltd	 (Aegis)	v	
European	Reinsurance	Co.	of	Zurich	(European	Re)	[2002]	UKPC	1129,	[2003]	1	WLR	1041	(on	appeal	from	
the	 Court	 of	 Bermuda).	 Finally	 see	 International	 Law	Association,	 Interim	 Report:	 “Res	 Judicata”	 and	
Arbitration,	Berlin	Conference,	2004,	7	and	ss.  
255	The	collateral	estoppel	effect	has	been	also	recognized	by	English	Courts	and	with	regard	to	foreign	
decisions.	 A	 recent	 decision	 applying	 such	 an	 approach	 is	 Yukos	 Capital	 S.a.r.L.	 v.	 OJSC	 Rosneft	 Oil	
Company,	[2011]	EWHC	1461	(Comm).	See	also	Casad,	Iowa	Law	Review	(1984),	53	and	ss.	
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argument	 advanced	 with	 respect	 to	 the	matter	 in	 the	 initial	 action	 and	 that	 to	 be	
advanced	with	 respect	 to	 the	matter	 in	 the	 subsequent	 action”.256	It	 is,	 therefore,	 a	
task	of	 the	 judge	 to	understand	whether	 there	 is	substantial	 identity	 of	 the	 litigated	
issues,	regardless	of	the	label	of	the	various	claims.	
With	 regard	 to	 the	 requirement	of	 the	prior	actual	 litigation	 of	 the	precluded	
issue,	 what	 is	 essential	 is	 that	 “the	 parties	 to	 be	 bound	 and	 benefited	 must	 have	
submitted	 the	 issue	 for	 decision,	 and	 the	 adjudicator	must	 have	 decided	 the	 issue.	
Thus,	 issue	 preclusion	 does	 not	 result	 from	 a	 default,	 admission,	 or	 stipulation”.257	
Furthermore,	 contrary	 to	 res	 judicata,	 collateral	 estoppel	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 “issues	
which	might	have	been	raised	in	the	prior	litigation,	but	were	not”.258	
Moving	 to	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 issue	 has	 been	 essential	 for	 the	 prior	
judgment,	 it	shall	be	determined	 in	concreto	whether	the	determination	of	that	 issue	
has	been	necessary	to	reaching	the	court	ultimate	result.	As	explained	by	Casad	and	
Clermont,	 “[t]he	 idea	 behind	 this	 requirement	 is	 that	 such	 a	 determination	 in	 the	
nature	of	dicta	may	not	have	been	unavailable	or	 unmotivated”.259	However,	 in	 this	
regard	it	 is	worth	noting	that	the	application	of	this	requirement	will	be	attenuate	in	
cases	of	application	of	 collateral	estoppel	prior	 to	 the	 issuance	of	 the	 final	decision,	
due	to	the	fact	that	sometimes	it	could	be	difficult	to	understand	whether	the	decided	
issue	will	be	essential	 for	 the	 final	decision.	 Indeed,	 the	second	 judge	will	be	only	 in	
the	possibility	 to	make	a	prognostic	evaluation	of	whether	 the	decided	 issue	will	be	
essential	for	the	final	decision	in	the	prior	judgment.	
Concerning	 the	 fourth	 requirement,	 i.e.	 identity	 of	 the	 parties,	 “collateral	
estoppel	(…)	requires	that	the	parties	to	the	second	action	be	the	same	as,	or	in	privity	
with,	the	parties	to	the	first	action.	This	requirement	is	generally	denominated	as	the	
rule	 of	 mutuality”. 260 	The	 concept	 of	 privity	 and	 the	 related	 requirement	 of	
commonality	of	interests,	to	be	ascertained	 in	concreto,	have	been	already	examined	
in	Paragraph	3.6	above.261	It	is	here	worth	noting	that,	with	regard	to	the	applicability	
of	collateral	estoppel,	“courts	have	often	manipulated	the	notion	of	privity	to	permit	
non-parties	 to	 preclude	 the	 relitigation	 of	 issues	 that	 earlier	 law	 suits	 have	
determined.	 At	 times	 the	 privity	 concept	 has	 assumed	 wondrous	 attributes	 of	
flexibility	 as	 courts	 attempt	 to	 apply	 their	 subjective	 sense	 of	 fairness	 to	 situations	
that	do	not	fit	neatly	within	the	traditional	requirement	for	[issue]	preclusion”.262	This	
																																																													
256	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	116.	
257	Id.,	123-124.	
258	Polasky	(1954)	(n.	106),	222.	
259	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	127.	
260	Cunningham,	Missouri	 Law	 Review	 (1976),	 521-522.	 See	 also	Moore,	 Currier,	 Tulane	 Law	 Review	
(1961),	 301	 and	 ss.,	 Semmel,	 Columbia	 Law	 Review	 (1968),	 1457	 and	 ss.,	 See	Morris,	 California	 Law	
Review	 (1988),	 1105,	 The	 Mutuality	 Requirement	 in	 Res	 Judicata	 and	 Estoppel	 by	 Record,	 Note	 in	 2	
Washington	and	Lee	Law	Review	233	(1941).	
261	See	Vestal	(1974)	(n.	212),	361-362,	Semmel	(1968)	(n.	260),	1460.	See	also	Crockett	v.	Harrison,	26	Ill.	
App.	2d	9,	13,	167	N.E.2d	428,	430	(1960),	where	it	has	been	stated	that	“[u]nder	the	term	parties	in	this	
connection,	 the	 law	 includes	all	who	are	directly	 interested	 in	 the	 subject	matter,	 and	had	a	 right	 to	
make	a	defense	or	to	control	the	proceedings	and	to	appeal	from	the	judgment”.		
262	Watson	(1990)	(n.	162),	627-628.	
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tendency	has	lead	some	US	courts	(not	UK	courts)	to	abandon	the	rule	of	mutuality;	
the	reason	for	such	an	abandonment	has	been	that	“[t]here	does	not	appear	to	be	a	
constitutional	 prohibition	 against	 allowing	 a	 prior	 judgment	 to	 be	 subsequently	
pleaded	by	a	non-party	to	the	initial	action”	(so-called	Bernhard	doctrine).263		
However,	the	abandonment	of	mutuality	has	been	criticized	by	Prof.	Currie,	as	
well	as	by	Casad	and	Clermont,264	due	to	the	necessity	to	respect	the	requirement	of	
due	process,	 i.e.	 the	 possibility	 for	 each	party	 to	 have	 a	 full	 and	 fair	 opportunity	 to	
present	its	case.265	Indeed,	the	respect	of	due	process	 is	the	last	requirement	in	order	
to	apply	 collateral	 estoppel.	As	we	have	 seen	above	with	 regard	 to	 res	 judicata,	 the	
respect	of	due	process	is	something	that	shall	be	ascertained	on	a	case-by-case	basis	
and	cannot	be	described	a	priori.	It	is,	indeed,	necessary	to	ascertain	that	such	a	party	
(or	privy,	or,	 if	 one	 should	accept	 the	abandonment	of	mutuality,	 stranger)	has	had	
concretely	 the	 opportunity	 to	 present	 its	 claim.266	It	 is,	 in	 conclusion,	 impossible	 to	
take	 in	 abstracto	 a	 position	 on	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 Bernhard	 doctrine.	 Even	 if	 it	
could	seem	very	difficult	that	a	stranger’s	interests	are	fully	represented	in	a	judgment	
(and,	 therefore,	 due	process	 is	 respected)	between	 two	other	parties,	 the	prevalent	
approach	in	the	US	seems	to	require	an	ascertainment	of	the	concrete	representation	
of	a	non-party	in	the	previous	judgment.267	
Having	 introduced	 the	 main	 features	 and	 requirements	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	
collateral	estoppel,	it	is	now	necessary	to	ascertain	whether	and	how	such	a	doctrine	
applies	in	international	law.	
	
3.7.2	 Collateral	estoppel	in	international	investment	law:	The	RSM	and	Apotex	
cases,	 the	 call	 for	 a	 more	 flexible	 approach	 and	 the	 source	 of	 judges’	
power	to	apply	such	an	approach	
	
There	is	very	few	literature268	regarding	the	applicability	of	collateral	estoppel	
in	 international	 investment	 law	 and,	more	 generally,	 in	 international	 law.	However,	
there	are	some	international	authorities	that	could	be	taken	into	account	as	a	starting	
																																																													
263	Cunningham	(1976)	(n.	260),	527.	See	Bernhard	v.	Bank	of	America	Nat.Trust	&	Savings	Assn.,	122	P.	
2d	 892	 (S.C.	 Cal.	 1942),	 894-895,	 in	 which	 the	 Court	 allowed	 a	 non-party	 plaintiff	 to	 benefit	 of	 the	
results	 of	 a	 prior	 judgment	 in	 favour	 of	 another	 plaintiff	 (offensive	 use	 of	 collateral	 estoppel).	 In	
Blonder-Tongue	Labs.	 Inc.	v.	University	of	 Illinois	Foundation	402	U.S.	313,	collateral	estoppel	has	been	
used	by	a	non-party	defendant	in	order	to	preclude	an	action	by	a	plaintiff	who	already	did	not	succeed	
in	the	same	action	against	another	defendant	who	was	in	the	same	substantive	and	factual	situation	of	
the	 second	 defendant.	 In	 this	 regard,	 Cunningham,	 at	 530,	 stated	 that	 “[a]bsent	 extraordinary	
circumstances,	there	is	little	reason	to	allow	the	plaintiff	the	opportunity	to	pick	and	choose	among	the	
possible	defendants	and	sue	each	separately	in	hopes	of	eventually	finding	a	kindly	or	confused	jury”.	
See	also	Waggoner,	The	Review	of	Litigation	(1993),	392	and	ss.,	Ellis,	Indiana	Law	Review	(1980),	563	
and	ss.	
264	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	184.	
265	Currie,	Stanford	Law	Review	(1957),	281	and	ss.	
266	Hansberry	v.	Lee,	311	US	32,	42	(1940).	See	also	Vestal,	Michigan	Law	Review	(1963),	49-51.	
267	Casad,	Clermont	(2001)	(n.	98),	184.	
268	See	 Kotuby,	 Egerton-Vernon,	 ICSID	 Review	 FILJ	 (2015),	 486	 and	 ss.,	 Bowett,	 British	 Yearbook	 of	
International	Law	(1957),	178-189,	Andritoi,	Acta	Universitatis	Danubius	(2011),	47	and	ss.	
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point	in	order	to	try	to	understand	whether	and	how	collateral	estoppel	may	be	useful	
in	order	to	prevent	parallel	proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
The	first	case	that,	even	if	without	mentioning	it,	applied	collateral	estoppel	is	
the	 already	 mentioned	Delgado	 case.269	In	 this	 case,	 as	 already	 stated,	 there	 have	
been	two	subsequent	processes	regarding	the	seizure	of	a	property,	one	for	damages	
and	another	 for	 the	value	of	 the	property.	As	noted	by	Bowett,270	while	applying	 res	
judicata,	the	Umpire	of	the	second	arbitration	allowed	to	proceed	a	part	of	the	second	
claim	which	was	not	brought	before	the	first	Umpire.	Such	a	“partial	res	judicata”	has	
been	 considered	 by	 the	 same	 Bowett	 as	 “scarcely	 reconcilable	 wit	 the	 complete	
preclusion	 of	 the	 res	 judicata	 doctrine”	 and	 is,	 indeed,	 an	 application	 of	 collateral	
estoppel.271	
A	 reference	 to	 collateral	 estoppel	 in	 international	 law	 may	 be	 found	 in	 the	
Company	 General	 of	 the	 Orinoco	 Case272,	 in	 which	 the	 Arbitral	 Tribunal	 expressly	
quoted	 the	 United	 States	 Supreme	 Court	 dictum	 in	Southern	 Pacific	 Railroad	 Co.	 v.	
United	States,273	according	 to	which	“[t]he	general	principle	announced	 in	numerous	
cases	is	that	a	right,	question,	or	fact	distinctly	put	in	issue,	and	directly	determined	by	
a	 court	 of	 competent	 jurisdiction	 as	 a	 ground	 of	 recovery	 cannot	 be	 disputed	 in	 a	
subsequent	suit	between	the	same	parties	or	their	privies,	and,	even	if	the	second	suit	
is	for	a	different	cause	of	action,	the	right,	question,	or	fact	once	so	determined	must,	
as	between	the	same	parties	or	their	privies,	be	taken	as	conclusively	established	so	
long	as	the	judgment	in	the	first	suit	remains	unmodified”.	
The	 same	 dictum	 has	 been	 then	 reaffirmed	 by	 a	 Tribunal	 chaired	 by	 Prof.	
Higgins	in	the	Amco	II274	case.	
Another,	and	probably	the	most	important,	case	where	collateral	estoppel	has	
been	 applied	 in	 international	 law	 is	 S	 Grynberg,	 Stephen	 M	 Grynberg,	 Miriam	 Z	
Grynberg,	 and	 RSM	 Production	 Corporation	 v	 Grenada. 275 	This	 case	 regarded	 an	
investment	 treaty	 arbitration	 (under	 the	 USA-Grenada	 BIT)	 that	 was	 commenced	
before	 ICSID	 by	 the	 company	 RSM	 Production	 and	 its	 three	 shareholders,	 who	
collectively,	 in	equal	shares,	owned	100%	of	the	outstanding	capital	of	RSM	(we	will	
tall,	 in	this	regard,	of	the	“treaty	arbitration”).	However,	the	treaty	breaches	claimed	
in	 this	 arbitration	 arose	 from	 the	breach	of	 an	 investment	 contract,	 signed	by	RSM	
and	Grenada,	which	contained	itself	an	ICSID	arbitration	clause.	Such	a	contract	had	
																																																													
269	Delgado	Case,	in	Moore,	International	Arbitrations	to	which	the	United	States	Has	Been	a	Party	2196	
(Spanish	–	US	Claims	Commission	1881).	
270	Bowett	(1957)	(n.	268),	179.	
271	The	same	Bowett	(1957)	(n.	268),	179,	refers	to	the	Haya	de	la	Torre	(Colombia	v.	Peru)	case,	ICJ	Rep,	
1951,	71,	 in	which	the	court	expressly	stated	that	a	certain	issue	(i.e.	whether	or	not	there	was	a	 legal	
obligation	to	surrender	a	refugee)	was	not	decided	in	the	previous	Asylum	(Colombia	v.	Peru)	case,	ICJ	
Rep	1950,	266,	and	therefore	the	discussion	of	that	issue	was	not	precluded.	
272	Award	of	31	July	1905,	available	at	http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_X/184-285.pdf.	
273	168	U.S.	1,	48-49	(1897).	
274	Amco	 Asia	 Corporation	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia	 (ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/81/1(,	 Resubmitted	 Case,	
Decision	on	Jurisdiction,	10	May	1988,	par.	30.	See	also	Gunes	(2015)	(n.	216),	13.	
275	ICSID	Case	No	ARB/10/6,	10	December	2010.	
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already	given	rise	to	an	investment	arbitration	before	the	same	ICSID,	RSM	Production	
Corporation	 v.	 Grenada,276	this	 time	 only	 for	 claims	 arising	 from	 the	 contract	 (this	
arbitration	will	be	referred	to	as	the	“contract	arbitration”).	In	the	contract	arbitration	
a	 final	 award	 was	 rendered	 on	 13	 March	 2009	 in	 favour	 of	 Grenada,	 stating	 that	
Grenada	 did	 not	 breach	 any	 of	 its	 contractual	 obligations.	 RSM,	 then,	 applied	 for	
annulment	and	–	at	the	time	of	the	commencement	of	the	treaty	arbitration	–	such	an	
application	was	still	outstanding.277	The	case,	therefore,	can	be	classified	as	a	case	of	
parallel	contract	and	treaty	claims,	where	the	contract	claims	was	started	only	by	the	
investor	 company,	while	 the	 treaty	 claim	was	 started	by	 the	 same	company	and	 its	
shareholders.	
During	the	treaty	arbitration,	Grenada	contended	that	all	the	legal	and	factual	
arguments	 raised	 by	 the	 claimants	 had	 been	 already	 litigated	 in	 the	 contract	
arbitration	and,	therefore,	the	treaty	arbitration	was	started	in	violation	of	Art.	53	of	
the	ICSID	Convention,	according	to	which	awards	are	final,	binding	and	not	subject	to	
appeal	 or	 review.	 Grenada	 asked	 for	 an	 application	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 collateral	
estoppel	and,	based	on	the	fact	that	the	three	shareholders	were	privies	of	RSM,	for	
the	dismissal	of	the	proceedings	on	the	basis	of	the	inherent	powers	of	the	Tribunal	to	
protect	the	integrity	of	its	own	process	(par.	4.6.16).	
The	 claimants	 replied	 that	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 was	 not	 met	 and	 that	 to	
dismiss	 the	process	would	have	been	an	 “obscuration”	of	 the	 independent	 interests	
that	the	three	individual	claimants	possessed	under	the	Treaty,	i.e.	a	violation	of	due	
process	(par.	5.3.6).	
The	Tribunal	started	its	reasoning	by	saying	that	“[i]t	 is	(…)	not	disputed	that	
the	doctrine	of	collateral	estoppel	 is	now	well	established	as	a	general	principle	of	 law	
applicable	 in	the	 international	courts	and	tribunals	such	as	this	one”	(emphasis	added)	
(par.	7.1.2).	The	Tribunal	also	recognized	that	the	shareholders	were	privies	of	RSM	at	
the	time	of	the	contract	arbitration	and,	therefore,	were	bound	by	those	factual	and	
other	 determinations	 regarding	 questions	 and	 rights	 arising	 out	 or	 relating	 to	 the	
agreement	(par.	7.1.5).	The	tribunal	stated	that	“[o]f	course,	RSM	is	a	 juridical	entity	
with	a	 legal	personality	separate	 from	its	 three	shareholders.	But	this	does	not	alter	
the	analysis.	(…)	It	is	true	that	shareholders,	under	many	systems	of	law,	may	undertake	
litigation	to	pursue	or	defend	rights	belonging	to	the	corporation.	However,	shareholders	
cannot	use	such	opportunities	as	both	a	sword	and	shield.	If	they	wish	to	claim	standing	
on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 indirect	 interest	 in	 corporate	 assets,	 they	 must	 be	 subject	 to	
defences	 that	 would	 be	 available	 against	 the	 corporation	 –	 including	 collateral	
estoppel”	(emphasis	added)	(paras.	7.1.6	and	7.1.7).	Hence,	the	tribunal	declared	that	
the	claims	were	manifestly	without	legal	merit	and	dismissed	all	the	claims.	
																																																													
276	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/14.	
277	However,	 the	ad	hoc	Committee	discontinued	the	annulment	proceedings	 in	a	decision	of	28	April	
2011.	
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The	 reasoning	 of	 the	 RSM	 treaty	 arbitration	 has	 been	 applied	 also	 by	 the	
Tribunal	 in	Apotex	Holdings	 Inc.	and	Apotex	 Inc.	v.	United	States	of	America.278	In	this	
case	 the	 Claimants	 made	 claims	 for	 breach	 by	 the	 Respondent	 of	 several	 of	 its	
obligations	under	NAFTA	and	the	Jamaica-USA	BIT	both	for	themselves	and	also	(by	
Apotex-Holdings)	 for	 Apotex-US	 (we	 will	 refer	 to	 this	 arbitration	 as	 the	 “second	
arbitration”).	However,	Apotex	 Inc.	had	already	started	a	NAFTA	arbitration	against	
the	USA	according	 to	 the	UNCITRAL	Arbitration	Rules,	 in	which	many	of	 the	 issues	
claimed	 in	 the	 second	 arbitration	 had	 been	 already	 decided	 (this	 arbitration	will	 be	
referred	to	as	the	“first	arbitration”).279	The	first	arbitration	was	not	concluded	when	
the	 second	 arbitration	 was	 started.	 However,	 when	 the	 award	 in	 the	 second	
arbitration	 was	 rendered,	 an	 award	 on	 jurisdiction	 and	 admissibility	 in	 the	 first	
arbitration	was	rendered	and	denied	jurisdiction	on	the	basis	of	the	non-existence	of	
an	investment	according	to	the	NAFTA.	
US	asked	for	an	application	of	collateral	estoppel	with	regard	to	all	the	issues	
already	discussed	 and	decided	 in	 the	 first	 arbitration,	 i.e.	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 investment	
according	 to	 the	 NAFTA	 wording	 (actually,	 the	 US	 asked	 for	 an	 application	 of	 the	
principle	of	 res	 judicata	 but	only	with	 regard	 to	 issues	already	discussed	by	 the	 first	
tribunal.	 It	 is	 therefore	possible	 to	 conclude	 that	 the	US	asked	 for	 an	application	of	
collateral	 estoppel	 and	 that	 the	 references	 to	 res	 judicata	 in	 the	 Award	 should	 be	
actually	intended	as	references	to	collateral	estoppel).	
The	claimants	contended	that	“notions	of	issue	estoppel	found	in	common	law	
systems	are	not	found	in	civil	law	systems,	which	typically	limit	res	judicata	effects	to	
matters	 addressed	 in	 the	 dispositif	 of	 an	 award	 or	 judgment”	 (par.	 7.22).	 For	 this	
reason	the	Claimants	stated	that	collateral	estoppel	cannot	be	said	to	be	an	aspect	of	
res	judicata	as	a	general	principle	of	law	recognised	by	civil	nations.	Furthermore,	the	
claimants	 argued	 that	 –	 even	 if	 the	 Tribunal	 should	 have	 considered	 collateral	
estoppel	 applicable	 to	 the	 case	 at	 hand	 –	 the	 triple	 identity	 test	 was	 not	 met,	 in	
particular	because	the	parties	were	different.	
The	Tribunal	 recognized	the	historical	differences	between	civil	and	common	
law	 systems,	 but	 also	 stated	 that	 there	 is	 a	 general	 tendency,	 even	 in	 civil	 law	
countries,	to	recognize	res	 judicata	effects	to	the	reasoning	of	awards	and	decisions.	
According	to	the	Tribunal,	this	approach	renders	civil	and	common	law	systems	more	
similar	 and	 allows	 an	 international	 tribunal	 to	 give	 res	 judicata	 effects	 to	 the	 issues	
decided	within	a	previous	award/decision	on	the	same	dispute,	which	can	therefore	be	
the	legal	basis	to	apply	collateral	estoppel.280	The	Tribunal	also	extensively	referred	to	
																																																													
278	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB(AF)/12/1,	Award,	25	August	2014.	
279	See	the	award	on	jurisdiction	and	admissibility	of	14	June	2013	made	by	the	NAFTA	Tribunal	(Toby	T.	
Landau,	Clifford	M.	Davidson,	Fern	M.	Smith)	 in	 the	UNCITRAL	Arbitration	between	Apotex	 Inc.	and	
the	Respondent.	
280	The	 Tribunal,	 at	 par.	 7.24-7.29	 cited	 several	 Authorities	 supporting	 its	 view	 that	 the	 reasoning	 of	
international	Awards	has	the	force	of	res	judicata	and	can	therefore	be	the	basis	for	the	application	of	
collateral	estoppel.	In	particular,	it	cited	the	Pious	Fund	Arbitration	(United	States	of	America	v.	Mexico),	
Award,	14	October	1902,	the	Polish	Postal	Service	in	Danzig,	Advisory	Opinion,	1925	PCIJ	(Ser.	B)	No.	11,	
16	May	1925,	par.	86,	 the	Case	Concerning	 the	Delimitation	of	 the	Continental	Shelf	 (UK	v.	France),	 18	
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the	 abovementioned	RSM	 treaty	 arbitration	 (as	 well	 as	 to	 the	Orinoco	 and	Amco	 II	
cases)	 in	order	to	give	a	 legal	foundation	to	the	applicability	of	collateral	estoppel	 in	
international	law.	
Given	 the	 above,	 the	 Tribunal	 also	 recognized	 that	 privies	 are	 bound	 by	
decisions	to	which	they	did	not	 formally	took	part.	The	Tribunal,	at	par.	7.38,	stated	
that	“[t]he	two	named	Claimants	 in	this	arbitration	stand	 in	similar	shoes	as	regards	
the	effect	of	res	judicata	resulting	from	the	[first	arbitration],	notwithstanding	the	fact	
that	only	one	of	them	was	a	named	party	to	the	[first	arbitration]”.	Apotex-Holdings	
was	therefore	considered	a	privy	of	Apotex	 Inc.	and	both	the	parties	were	therefore	
bound	by	re-discuss	the	matters	already	decided	in	the	first	arbitration.	
All	the	awards	described	above	are	of	extreme	importance	for	policy	reasons.	
Indeed,	they	followed	a	substantive/transactional	approach	which	allows	to	safeguard	
all	 the	 policy	 considerations	 outlined	 in	 Chapter	 1	 above	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 is	
essential	 for	ensuring	the	 legitimacy	of	 investment	arbitration.	 Indeed,	the	RSM	and	
Apotex	 awards	have	been	warmly	welcome	by	 scholars.281	These	Authors	have	even	
talked	about	an	emerging	trend	based	on	the	adoption	of	a	substantive/transactional	
test	for	the	determination	of	res	judicata	issues	in	international	investment	law.	
It	 is	 maybe	 too	 early	 to	 arrive	 to	 such	 a	 conclusion	 (which,	 however,	 if	
confirmed,	 should	be	warmly	welcome).	Similarly,	 the	 scarcity	of	 the	 case	 law	does	
not	allow	us	 to	state	 that	collateral	estoppel	has	assumed	the	standing	of	a	general	
principle	of	international	law,	as	some	Tribunals	have	stated.	
However,	what	is	important	for	the	sake	of	the	present	book	is	that	these	cases	
prove	 that	 arbitral	 tribunals	 do	 have	 the	 inherent	 powers	 to	 dismiss	 a	 claim	on	 the	
basis	 of	 the	 application	of	 the	doctrine	of	 collateral	 estoppel.	 Such	 an	 approach,	 as	
already	said,	is	strongly	desirable282	and,	if	confirmed	in	the	future,	would	surely	raise	
the	legitimacy	of	international	investment	arbitration.	
	
3.8	 Concrete	applications	of	the	proposed	solutions	in	investment	arbitration	
	
It	is	now	time	to	check	how	the	proposed	tools	may	concretely	apply	in	order	
to	prevent	and	limit	parallel	proceedings	in	international	investment	arbitration.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
RIAA	272,	14	March	1978,	295,	par.	28,	the	Request	for	Interpretation	of	the	Judgment	of	20	November	
1950	 in	 the	Asylum	Case	 (Colombia	v.	Peru),	 Judgment	of	27	November	 1950,	 ICJ	Rep.	 1950,	 395,	 the	
Corfù	 Channel	 Case,	 Judgment	 of	 9	 April	 1949,	 ICJ	 Rep	 1949,	 4,	 the	Request	 for	 Interpretation	 of	 the	
Judgment	 of	 15	 June	 1962	 in	 the	 case	 concerning	 the	 Temple	 of	 Preah	 Vihear	 (Cambodia	 v.	 Thailand),	
Judgment	of	11	November	2013	(ICJ).	The	Tribunal	also	mentioned	the	CJEU	cases	Asteris	&	Greece	v.	
Commission,	 [1988]	 ECR	 2181,	 par.	 27,	 and	 Commission	 of	 the	 European	 Communities	 v.	 BASF	 AG	 &	
Others,	[1994]	ECR	I-2555,	par.	67.	
281	See	Kotuby,	Egerton-Vernon	(2015)	(n.	268),	486	and	ss.	It	is	worth	noting	that,	even	in	1957	Bowett	
(1957)	 (n.	 268),	 170	 stated	 that	 collateral	 estoppel	 “is	 a	 notion	 which	 international	 tribunals	 might	
usefully	adopt”.		
282 	Bowett	 (1957)	 (n.	 268),	 180	 stated	 that	 “much	 might	 be	 gained	 by	 a	 clear	 recognition	 by	
international	courts	of	this	distinction	between	the	total	bar	of	res	judicata	and	partial	bar	of	collateral	
estoppel	or	issue	estoppel”.	
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It	is,	first	of	all,	necessary	to	understand	whether	such	tools	are	all	applicable	in	
cases	 of	 subsequent	 proceedings	 and	 in	 cases	 of	 concurring	proceedings	 (i.e.	which	
run	 in	 parallel).	 In	 this	 regard	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 while	 abuse	 of	 process	 and	
collateral	 estoppel	 may	 apply	 in	 both	 the	 described	 situations,	 as	 we	 have	 seen	 in	
Paragraph	3.6.1	above,	res	judicata	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	first	claim	has	
been	finally	decided.	For	this	reason	in	case	of	concurring	proceedings	arbitrators	may	
have	the	possibility	to	rely	only	on	the	more	flexible	doctrines	of	abuse	of	process	and	
collateral	estoppel.	
We	 will	 now	 analyse	 how	 any	 of	 the	 proposed	 criteria	 apply	 to	 the	 various	
sources	 of	 parallel	 proceedings,	 namely	 a)	 contract	 and	 treaty	 claims;	 b)	 chain	 of	
companies	of	the	same	group;	c)	majority	and	minority	shareholders	(or	company	and	
its	shareholders);	and	d)	claims	started	under	the	same	treaty.	
	
a)	 Contract	and	treaty	claims	
In	case	of	 contract	and	 treaty	claims,	as	we	have	seen,	 the	main	problem	 (in	
particular	concerning	the	applicability	of	res	 judicata	and	collateral	estoppel)	regards	
the	abstract	possibility	to	suppose	the	existence	of	a	conflict	of	 jurisdiction	between	
two	 proceedings	 which	 allegedly	 arise	 from	 different	 legal	 orders.	 However,	 as	
demonstrated	 in	paragraph	3.6.5	above,	 the	better	approach	 (i.e.	 the	one	applied	 in	
the	 RSM	 second	 arbitration)	 is	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 the	 two	 parallel	 contract	 and	
treaty	claims	are	substantially	identical	and	if	they	constitute	a	way	to	circumvent	the	
correct	 application	 of	 the	 principles	 of	 finality	 and	 judicial	 economy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	
credibility	of	investment	arbitration	as	a	dispute	settlement	mechanism.	
If	 the	above	approach	 is	accepted,	 it	 is	 submitted	 that	all	 the	proposed	 tools	
are	applicable	to	the	case	of	contract	and	treaty	claims	(with	the	obvious	limit	that	res	
judicata	requires	the	prior	conclusion	of	the	first	arbitration).	
If	only	some	of	the	claims	filed	in	the	first	arbitration	are	proposed	also	in	the	
second	arbitration,	as	we	have	seen	in	the	Apotex	case,	collateral	estoppel	may	be	a	
very	useful	tool	in	order	to	avoid	the	re-discussion	of	the	already	settled	issues.	
Due	to	the	substantial	 identity	of	the	parties,	we	cannot	see	any	due	process	
problem	in	this	case.	
	
b)		 Chain	of	companies	of	the	same	group	
The	 CME	 and	 Lauder	 cases	 are	 the	 paradigm	 of	 this	 scenario.	 Taking	 into	
account	what	happened	in	such	cases,	 it	 is	submitted	that	all	the	proposed	tools	are	
applicable	 by	 arbitrators	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 parallel	 proceedings	 that	 are	 formally	
different	but	substantially	identical.	
In	 this	 case,	 if	 the	 parallel	 claims	 are	 all	 arising	 from	 violation	 of	 treaty	
obligations,	the	degree	of	identity	between	the	two	proceedings	will	be	probably	very	
high,	mainly	due	to	the	already	discussed	circumstances	that	BITs	usually	contain	very	
poor	formulation	of	standards	of	treatment	and	such	standards	are	now	considered	to	
have	an	autonomous	content	and	standing	in	international	investment	law.	
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However,	also	in	this	case,	if	only	certain	claims	are	present	in	the	two	parallel	
claims,	the	application	of	collateral	estoppel	is	the	suggested	alternative.	
Also	 in	 this	 case,	 finally,	 due	 to	 the	 substantial	 identity	 of	 the	 party,	 there	
seems	not	to	exist	any	due	process	concern.	
	
c)		 Majority	and	minority	shareholders	(or	company	and	its	shareholders)	
This	 is	 the	 most	 problematic	 case,	 due	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that	 the	 privity	
relationship	 between	 the	 various	 shareholders	 of	 the	 company	 (or	 between	 the	
company	 and	 its	 shareholders)	 shall	 be	 necessarily	 ascertained	 on	 a	 case-by-case	
basis.		
It	is	here	necessary	to	make	some	distinctions.		
In	case	an	unsuccessful	claim	is	brought	against	a	State,	by	a	shareholder	or	by	
the	 company,	 and	 such	 a	 shareholder	 (or	 company)	 it	 considered	 to	 be	 in	 concreto	
representing	the	interests	of	the	other	shareholders	(or	of	the	entire	company),	i.e.	in	
privity	with	them,	we	cannot	see	reasons	to	not	apply	the	proposed	tools	in	case	the	
claim	fails	and	the	State’s	defences	prevail.	Indeed,	it	seems	unfair	to	oblige	the	State	
to	have	to	defend	its	position	in	several	substantially	identical	claims.	The	State	will	be	
then	entitled	to	ask	for	an	application	of	abuse	of	process,	res	 judicata	 (if	applicable)	
and	collateral	estoppel.	
If	the	State	looses	the	first	arbitration,	it	is	necessary	to	distinguish:	(i)	if	one	of	
several	shareholders	is	successful	pro	rata	(i.e.	for	an	amount	of	claim	proportional	to	
its	 shares),	 and	 the	 allegedly	 violated	 standards	 of	 treatment	 are	 substantially	
identical,	 the	other	 shareholders	 should	be	entitled	 to	 rely	on	 the	previous	decision	
and	to	make	an	offensive	use	of	collateral	estoppel	(i.e.	an	application	of	the	Bernhard	
doctrine);	 (ii)	 if	 the	 first	 claim	 is	 brought	by	 the	entire	 company,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	
company,	 representing	 all	 its	 shareholders,283	will	 be	 awarded	 an	 amount	 which	
encompasses	also	 the	 rights	of	 the	shareholders.	Therefore,	once	 the	State	has	 lost	
the	 first	 arbitration	 against	 the	 company,	 it	 should	 be	 entitled	 to	 invoke	 all	 the	
proposed	tools	in	subsequent	claims	started	by	the	shareholders	(otherwise	the	State	
would	 run	 the	 risk	 to	 be	 condemned	more	 than	 one	 time	 for	 the	 same	damage).	 If	
when	the	claim	of	the	shareholders	is	started	the	company’s	claim	is	still	pending,	the	
State	will	 be	 obviously	 able	 to	 rely	 only	 on	 collateral	 estoppel	 (if	 some	 issues	 have	
been	decided)	and	abuse	of	process.	
However,	if	a	commonality	of	interest	is	not	present	in	concreto,	it	is	submitted	
that	 serious	 due	process	 concerns	may	 arise.	 In	 this	 case,	 the	only	 possible	 remedy	
seems	to	be	the	development	of	a	form	of	intervention	by	way	of	amendment	of	the	
relevant	arbitration	rules.	Such	a	tool	will	be	analysed	in	Paragraph	3.9	below.	
	
d)		 Claims	started	under	the	same	treaty.	
																																																													
283	This	subject	has	been	studied	by	Gottlieb,	California	Law	Review	(1978),	1093-1094.	
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As	 we	 have	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 this	 case	 is	 of	 mere	 academic	 interest.	
However,	it	is	obvious	that	in	this	case,	due	the	formal	and	substantial	identity	of	both	
parties	and	cause	of	action,	all	the	proposed	tools	are	applicable.	
	
3.9	 A	 solution	 de	 jure	 condendo	 in	 order	 to	 preserve	 due	 process	 in	 case	 of	
multiple	 claims	 by	 shareholders:	 the	 possible	 third	 parties’	 right	 to	 be	
informed	and	to	intervene	in	the	proceedings		
	
As	we	have	 seen	 in	 the	preceding	Paragraph,	 in	 case	of	 parallel	 proceedings	
started	 by	 various	 shareholders	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 various	 claimants	 are	 not	
considered	 to	 be	 in	 privity	 and,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 the	 proposed	 solutions	 cannot	
properly	work,	because	they	would	amount	to	an	unduly	violation	of	the	principle	of	
due	process.	
If	a	situation	like	this	arises	before	a	national	court,	the	solution	would	be	very	
simple.	All	procedural	laws	provide	for	compulsory	joinder	of	third	parties:	in	this	case,	
in	order	to	safeguard	the	canon	of	judicial	economy,	the	third	party	shareholder	would	
be	subject	to	a	compulsory	joinder.	
Would	 this	 be	 possible	 in	 international	 investment	 arbitration?	 The	 straight	
answer	 seems	 to	 be	 no,	 due	 to	 the	 necessity	 to	 respect	 the	 principle	 of	 party	
autonomy	 in	 arbitration.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 a	 third	 party,	 the	 arbitration	
agreement	is	res	inter	alios	acta	and	he	cannot	be	forced	to	join	a	process	that	he	does	
not	 want	 to	 join	 (also	 in	 light	 that	 the	 pre-existing	 parties	 might	 not	 want	 an	
involvement	 of	 the	 third	 party).	 However,	 this	 answer	 is	 very	 simplistic	 because	 it	
completely	 ignores	 the	 circumstance	 that,	 as	 we	 have	 already	 demonstrated,	
regardless	 of	 its	 willingness	 the	 third	 party	 may	 suffer	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 decision	
rendered	between	other	parties.	There	 is,	 therefore,	a	conflict	of	values:	on	 the	one	
side,	party	autonomy	and,	on	the	other	side,	the	necessity	to	protect	the	rights	of	the	
third	 party	which	may	 be	 subject	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 an	 arbitral	 award	without	 having	
participated	 to	 the	 issuance	of	 the	 same	award.	As	 it	has	been	noted,	 this	 situation	
reveals	 the	 “intrinsic	 weakness	 of	 arbitration.	 (…)	 [indeed]	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	
compulsory	 powers	 for	 arbitrators	 reveals	 the	 fragility	 of	 arbitration	 when	 facing	
external	obstacles”.284	
One	 could	 therefore	 wonder	 whether	 there	 could	 be	 a	 solution	 to	 such	 a	
situation	of	impasse.	Several	scholars	have	recognized	that	“[w]here	an	award	may	be,	
or	 has	 been	made	 against	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 third	 party,	 it	 is	 reasonable	 to	 allow	
access	to	the	arbitral	chamber”.285	However,	it	is	difficult	to	give	a	legal	foundation	to	
such	a	power	to	intervene	or	to	be	compulsorily	joined	in	the	arbitration.	One	Author	
has	tried	to	found	such	a	possibility	on	the	 inherent	powers	of	the	arbitral	 tribunals,	
																																																													
284	Piergrossi,	Studi	in	onore	di	Enrico	Tullio	Liebman	(1979),	2572.	
285	Olatawura,	 The	 American	 Review	 of	 International	 Arbitration	 (2005),	 440.	 See	 also	 Gradi,	 Rivista	
dell’arbitrato	 (2010),	 301,	 Ruffini	 (1995)	 (n.	 217),	 648	 and	 ss.,	 Consolo,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 processuale	
(2013),	 1413,	 Fazzalari	 (1995)	 (n.	 217),	 619	 and	 ss.,	 Zucconi	Galli	 Fonseca	 (2004)	 (n.	 209),	 728	 and	 ss.	
Contra	see	Tarzia,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2004),	350.	
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stating	 that	 “the	 fact	 that	 the	 arbitration	 statute	 does	 not	 expressly	 provide	 such	
power	does	not	establish	that	it	is	forbidden	to	a	tribunal.	(…)	An	arbitral	tribunal	acts	
not	only	on	the	application	of	a	party	to	the	arbitration,	but	also	on	its	own	initiative.	
The	principle	of	arbitral	effectiveness	makes	 it	 imperative	 for	 the	arbitral	 tribunal	 to	
join	parties	where	necessary	or	desirable	or	to	allow	a	third	party	to	commence	claims	
under	an	arbitration	agreement”.286	Such	a	solution	does	not	seem	feasible	because,	
in	applying	 it,	 the	arbitral	 tribunal	would	unduly	extend	 its	 jurisdiction	beyond	what	
has	been	expressly	agreed	by	the	parties.		
However,	 a	 solution	 could	 be	 found	 by	 way	 of	 amending	 the	 relevant	
arbitration	rules	(e.g.	the	ICSID	Arbitration	Rules	or	the	UNCITRAL	Rules)	in	order	to	
offer	a	form	of	protection	for	the	interests	of	third	parties.287	
Indeed,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 duly	 noted,288	several	 rules	 regulating	 international	
dispute	 settlement	 proceedings	 do	 provide	 a	 form	 of	 intervention	 in	 order	 to	 offer	
protection	 to	 the	 rights	 of	 third	 parties.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	 refer	 to	 the	
Statute	of	the	ICJ,289	the	Statute	of	the	ITLOS,290	and	the	DSU	of	the	WTO.291	
The	proposed	amendment	to	arbitration	rules	could	be	made	providing	for	the	
following	proceedings:	
1)	the	request	to	join	the	third	party	should	be	made	by	only	a	party	(and	not	
both	of	them),	 i.e.,	 in	our	case,	the	respondent	State.	The	fact	that	the	request	shall	
not	 come	 from	 both	 the	 parties	 is	 based	 on	 the	 circumstance	 that,	 if	 the	 request	
should	 come	 from	 both	 of	 the	 parties,	 the	 claimant	 would	 not	 probably	 give	 its	
consent	to	such	a	request;292	
2)	 upon	 request	 of	 a	 party,	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 will	 have	 to	make	 a	 second	
request	 to	 the	 third	 party	 in	 order	 to	 ask	whether	 if	 such	 a	 third	 party	 is	willing	 to	
intervene	in	the	arbitration;	
3)	 if	 the	 third	 party	 refuses	 to	 intervene	 in	 the	 arbitration,	 it	will	 be	 then	 be	
estopped293	to	 claim	 that	 the	 award	 does	 not	 have	 a	 res	 judicata	 (or	 collateral	
estoppel)	effect	on	it;294	
																																																													
286	Olatawura	(2005)	(n.	285),	451-452.	
287	This	way	of	extending	the	possibility	to	intervene	to	third	parties	was	already	proposed	by	Piergrossi	
(1979)	(n.	284),	2591.	
288	Bonafè	(2014)	(n.	158),	16.	
289	See	 Art.	 62	 and	 63	 of	 the	 ICJ	 Statute,	 on	which	 see	Wolfrum,	 Liber	 Amicorum	Günther	 Jaenicke	
(1998),	 427	 and	 ss.,	 Bonafè	 (2014)	 (n.	 158),	 18	 and	 ss.,	 Palchetti	 (2002)	 (n.	 215),	 139	 and	 ss.,	 Forlati	
(2002)	(n.	215),	99	and	ss.	
290	See	Art.	31	and	32	of	the	ITLOS	Statute,	on	which	see	Wolfrum	(1998)	(n.	289),	439	and	ss.	
291	See	Art.	10(2)	of	the	DSU.	
292	This	has	been	stated	by	Gradi	(2010)	(n.	285),	304.		
293	The	principle	of	estoppel,	expressed	by	the	Latin	maxim	non	venire	contra	factum	proprium,	has	been	
largely	 recognized	 in	 international	 law.	 See	 Cottier,	Müller,	Max	Planck	 Encyclopedia	 of	 International	
Law	 (2007),	 Bowett	 (1957)	 (n.	 268),	 176	 and	 ss.	 McGibbon,	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Law	
Quarterly	 (1958),	468	and	ss.,	Wagner,	California	Law	Review	(1986),	1777	and	ss.,	Ovchar,	Bond	Law	
Review	(2009),	1	and	ss.	According	to	such	a	principle,	if	a	party	in	a	process	expresses	its	willingness	in	
a	 certain	 sense,	 such	a	party	will	 be	 estopped	 to	 claim	 something	 contrary	 to	 the	declaration	 that	 it	
made	before.	
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4)	if	the	third	party	accepts	to	intervene	in	the	proceedings,	it	will	be	entitled	to	
file	its	defences	and	will	be	bound	by	the	award	as	if	it	is	a	party.295	
However,	this	 last	case	leaves	us	with	the	problem	of	the	appointment	of	the	
arbitral	tribunal.	 Is	 it	fair	to	consider	that	the	joined	third	party	will	be	subject	to	the	
tribunal	 selected	 by	 the	 other	 two	 parties?	 As	 a	matter	 of	 principle,	 even	 if	 from	 a	
merely	 psychological	 point	 of	 view	 the	 third	 party	 might	 feel	 prejudiced	 by	 the	
impossibility	 to	 choose	 its	 arbitrator,296	it	 does	 not	 seem	 that	 this	 circumstance	
corresponds	to	an	actual	prejudice.	Indeed,	as	it	has	been	noted,297	arbitrators	have	a	
general	 duty	 of	 independence	 and	 impartiality.	 Arbitrators	 shall	 act	 as	 impartial	
judges	 and	 treat	 equally	 all	 the	 parties,	 regardless	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 have	 been	
appointed	 by	 a	 certain	 party.	 The	 joined	 third	 party,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 should	 not	
suffer	a	prejudice	by	the	fact	that	it	did	not	concur	in	the	appointment	of	the	tribunal.		
However,	 if	one	only	accepts	that	all	the	parties	shall	have	equal	rights	in	the	
appointment	of	 the	Tribunal,	 the	only	possible	solution	seems	to	be	that	–	after	 the	
joinder	 –	 the	 original	 tribunal	 (or	 the	 sole	 arbitrator)	 is	 replaced	 by	 another	 one,	
chosen	 and	 appointed	 by	 an	 appointing	 authority.	 Such	 authority	 could	 be	 the	
relevant	 arbitral	 institution	or	 a	 person	 such	 as	 the	President	 of	 the	Tribunal	 of	 the	
seat	of	arbitration	 (in	case	of	ad	hoc	arbitration).	This	solution,	which	seems	equally	
fair,	 is	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	principle	of	equality	of	the	parties	does	not	
mean	that	any	party	shall	appoint	its	own	arbitrator,	but	that	all	the	parties	shall	have	
the	 same	 rights	 regarding	 the	 appointment	 of	 the	 tribunal.	 If	 a	 neutral	 authority	
appoints	the	tribunal,	the	principle	of	equality	is	not	impaired.298	
	
3.10	 Conclusions	
	
The	present	Chapter	has	analysed	whether	arbitral	tribunals	have	the	inherent	
power	 to	 not	 exercise	 their	 jurisdiction	 at	 the	 admissibility	 stage	 in	 case	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	Such	powers	should	find	their	legitimacy	in	the	
circumstance	that	the	continuance	of	duplicative	litigation	constitutes	a	threat	to	the	
integrity	of	the	judicial	process	and	a	violation	of	the	principle	of	good	administration	
of	 justice.	 It	 is	 arguable	 that	arbitrators	do	have	 such	a	power	and	 that	 they	 should	
exercise	 it	 if	 the	 continuance	 of	 the	 proceedings	 runs	 against	 general	 principles	 of	
international	law.	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
294	This	has	been	stated	by	Fazzalari	 (1995)	 (n.	217),	658,	according	to	whom	once	the	third	party	has	
had	the	opportunity	to	join	the	arbitration	and	has	refused	such	an	opportunity,	he	will	be	subject	to	res	
judicata.		
295	A	similar	provision	is	now	set	forth	by	Art.	45(8)	of	the	new	Russian	Arbitration	Law,	enacted	on	29	
December	 2015.	 See,	 in	 this	 regard,	 the	 comment	 by	 Karimullin	 at	www.kluwerarbitrationblog.com,	
posted	on	11	February	2016.	
296	Chiu,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(1990),	58.	
297	Tizi,	 Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2008),	 486	 and	 ss.	 This	 Author	 has	 explained	 that	 there	 is	 a	 duty	 of	
impartiality	both	for	the	tribunal	as	a	whole	and	for	arbitrators	as	single	professionals.	
298	Id.,	488.	
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There	are,	 indeed,	certain	general	principles,	namely	good	 faith	and	ne	bis	 in	
idem,	whose	 concrete	 application	 seems	 to	 preclude	 the	 continuance	 of	 duplicative	
arbitrations.		
In	fact	the	concrete	application	of	good	faith	in	procedural	matters	generates	
the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process,	which	imposes	to	the	parties	to	not	make	recourse	to	
investment	arbitration	with	the	aim	of	getting	unfair	advantages	and/or	to	harass	the	
other	party.	If	procedural	rights	are	not	exercised	for	their	proper	scope,	it	is	arguable	
that	a	claim	does	not	deserve	the	protection	of	the	law	and	that	such	a	claim	should	
be	declared	inadmissible.	
Turning	 on	 the	 concrete	 application	 of	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem,	 it	 can	 lead	 to	 an	
application	of	claim	preclusion	(res	judicata)	and	issue	preclusion	(collateral	estoppel),	
two	doctrines	which	are	aimed	at	ensuring	finality	of	judicial	decisions	(respectively	on	
entire	 claims	 or	 single	 issues),	 coherence	 and	 stability.	 After	 having	 analysed	 the	
various	possible	applications	of	such	doctrines,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	the	res	
judicata	and	collateral	estoppel	effects	of	arbitral	decisions	are	ipso	facto	extensible	on	
third	 parties	 who	 are	 in	 privity	 with	 one	 of	 the	 parties	 of	 the	 first	 claim.	 If	 a	 third	
party’s	interests	have	been	adequately	represented	by	the	claimant	in	the	first	action,	
such	 a	 third	 party	 will	 be	 therefore	 precluded	 to	 start	 a	 second	 claim	 which	 is	
substantially	 identical	 to	what	has	been	already	decided.	 In	 such	a	case,	 the	 second	
claim	should	be	declared	 inadmissible.	Therefore,	 if	broadly	 interpreted,	 res	 judicata	
and	collateral	estoppel	can	be	very	useful	in	order	to	prevent	parallel	proceedings	and	
conflicting	decisions.	
Having	ascertained	that	arbitrators	have	the	power	to	apply	these	doctrines	in	
order	to	prevent	parallel	proceedings,	the	Chapter	has	moved	to	analyse	whether	and	
how	 they	 are	 applicable	 in	 the	 various	 scenarios	 of	 parallel	 proceedings	 outlined	 in	
Chapter	1,	as	well	as,	how	they	can	be	reconciled	with	the	principle	of	due	process.	
The	 Chapter	 has	 been	 finally	 concluded	 with	 a	 proposal	 of	 amendment	 of	
arbitration	 rules	 in	 order	 to	 simplify	 the	 involvement	 of	 third	 parties	 (which	 would	
anyway	suffer	the	effects	of	arbitration	awards)	in	arbitration	proceedings.	
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Chapter	4	
Post-award	remedies	
	
This	 concluding	Chapter	will	 regard	 the	 possible	 (if	 any)	 remedies	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	at	the	post-award	phase	of	investment	arbitration.	
As	 a	 preliminary	 remark,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 if	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	 comes	 to	 this	 stage,	 it	 is	 often	 too	 late	 to	 find	 a	 solution	 to	 it	 (in	
particular,	as	we	will	 see	below,	 in	case	one	would	 try	 to	preclude	enforcement	of	a	
duplicative	 ICSID	 award).	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 arguable	 that	 a	 solution	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	shall	be	found	at	prior	stages.	
The	 analysis	 of	 post	 award	 remedies	 to	 parallel	 proceedings	 requires	 that	 a	
clear	distinction	is	made	between	the	post	award	remedies	in	ICSID	arbitration	and	in	
non-ICSID	arbitration.1	The	main	difference	stays	 in	the	fact	that	 ICSID	is	considered	
to	be	a	 “self-contained	 system	of	 arbitration,	 fully	 autonomous	and	 independent	of	
any	 national	 systems,	 including	 the	 system	prevailing	 at	 the	 place	 of	 an	 arbitration	
conducted	 under	 the	 [1965	Washington]	 Convention.	 This	 self-contained	 regulation	
covers	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 arbitral	 proceedings	 and	 extends	 to	 the	 challenge	 of	 the	
awards,	 the	 latter	being	regulated	only	by	the	Convention,	without	any	 interference	
by	 national	 courts	 or	 other	 national	 authorities,	 no	 room	 for	 the	 application	 of	 the	
New	 York	 Convention	 being	 made	 regarding	 enforcement	 of	 an	 ICSID	 award”.2	
Hence,	when	an	ICSID	award	is	issued,	the	only	available	remedies	to	limit	the	efficacy	
or	 the	 validity	 of	 such	 an	 award	 are	 set	 forth	 in	 the	 Washington	 Convention.	 The	
award	 is	 final	 and	 binding	 for	 the	 courts	 of	 all	 the	 contracting	 States	 and	 shall	 be	
recognized	as	a	national	decision	having	res	judicata	effects.	
On	 the	 contrary,	 non-ICSID	awards	may	be	either	 challenged	at	 the	place	of	
the	seat	of	the	arbitration3	or,	if	one	of	the	grounds	set	forth	in	Art.	V	of	the	New	York	
Convention	 1958,	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 State	 where	 such	 enforcement	 is	 required	may	
refuse	their	enforcement.4	
In	 light	 of	 the	 different	 regulations	 of	 the	 post	 award	 stage,	 the	 analysis	 of	
possible	post-award	remedies	aimed	at	avoiding	the	existence	of	two	awards	arising	
from	two	parallel	proceedings	shall	be	conducted	separately	on	the	basis	of	whether	
the	 second	 (duplicative)	award	 is	 issued	within	 the	 ICSID	 framework	or	not.	We	will	
firstly	 examine	 the	 remedies	 available	 within	 the	 ICSID	 self-contained	 system,	 and	
then	examine:	 (i)	whether	 the	enforcement	of	an	award	 resulting	 from	a	duplicative	
proceeding	may	be	refused	according	to	the	provisions	of	the	New	York	Convention;	
																																																													
1 	Bernardini,	 http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12970223709030/bernardini_icsid-vs-non-icsid-
investent.pdf	(2009),	4	and	ss.	
2	Id.,	5.	
3	See	 Lew,	 Mistelis,	 Kroll,	 International	 and	 Comparative	 Commercial	 Arbitration	 (2003),	 663	 and	 ss.,	
Blackaby,	Partasides,	Redfern,	Hunter,	Redfern	and	Hunter	on	International	Arbitration	(2015),	569	and	
ss.,	Rubino-Sammartano,	International	Arbitration	Law	and	Practice	(2014),	1273	and	ss.	
4	See	Lew,	Mistelis,	Kroll	(2003)	(n.	3),	687	and	ss.,	Blackaby,	Partasides,	Redfern,	Hunter	(2015)	(n.	3),	
605	and	ss.,	Rubino-Sammartano	(2014)	(n.	3),	1351	and	ss.	
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or	(ii)	in	brief,	whether	the	same	award	may	be	set	aside	at	the	place	of	the	seat	of	the	
arbitration.	
	
4.1	 ICSID	 arbitration	 as	 a	 self	 contained	 regime	 and	 the	 necessity	 to	 find	 a	
solution	to	parallel	proceedings	within	its	boundaries	
	
The	 ICSID	Convention	 provides	 for	 several	 possible	 remedies	 after	 an	 award	
has	 been	 rendered,	 namely	 supplementation	 and	 rectification	 of	 awards	 (Art.	 49),	
interpretation	(Art.	50),	revision	(Art.	51)	and	annulment	(Art.	52).	As	already	stated,	
an	ICSID	award	is	not	subject	to	any	other	appeal	or	remedy	(Art.	53).5	
Among	the	abovementioned	remedies,	annulment	 is	the	only	one	that	might	
bring	to	set	aside	an	award	issued	within	the	ICSID	framework.	“Annulment	results	in	
the	legal	destruction	of	the	original	decision	without	replacing	it”.6	Such	a	destruction	
(which	may	regard	only	awards	or	any	part	 thereof	and	not	preliminary	decisions)	 is	
operated	 by	 an	 ad	 hoc	 committee	 composed	 of	 three	 people,	 appointed	 by	 the	
Chairman	of	ICSID	and	chosen	from	the	panel	of	ICSID	arbitrators.	In	this	regard,	it	is	
worth	noting	that	“[a]n	ad	hoc	committee	acting	under	the	ICSID	Convention	may	not	
amend	or	replace	the	award	by	its	own	decision	on	the	merits”,7	i.e.	annulment	is	not	a	
form	of	appeal.	
According	to	Art.	52(1),	annulment	may	derive	only	from	limited	grounds	and	
namely	that:	
(a)	the	Tribunal	was	not	properly	constituted;		
(b)	the	Tribunal	has	manifestly	exceeded	its	powers;8	
(c)	there	was	corruption	on	the	part	of	a	member	of	the	Tribunal;		
(d)	there	has	been	a	serious	departure	from	a	fundamental	rule	of	procedure;	
or		
(e)	the	award	has	failed	to	state	the	reasons	on	which	it	is	based.9	
It	 is	 questionable	whether,	 among	 these	grounds,	 there	 could	be	one	 that	 is	
helpful	 in	order	 to	seek	 for	 the	annulment	of	an	award	 regarding	a	dispute	 that	has	
been	already	settled	by	a	previous	 (either	 ICSID	or	non-ICSID)	award.	 In	 this	 regard,	
due	to	the	fact	that	the	present	book	has	proposed	a	solution	to	parallel	proceedings	
based	on	the	application	of	certain	rules	of	international	law,	the	possible	ground	for	
																																																													
5	For	 an	 analysis	 of	 all	 these	 remedies,	 see	 Wang	 Dong,	 Post-Award	 Remedies,	 UNCTAD	 Course	 on	
Dispute	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Trade,	 Investment	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	 (2003),	 7	 and	 ss.	With	
regard	 to	 finality	 and	 enforceability	 of	 awards,	 see	 Wang	 Dong,	 Binding	 Force	 and	 Enforcement,	
UNCTAD	 Course	 on	 Dispute	 Settlement	 in	 International	 Trade,	 Investment	 and	 Intellectual	 Property	
(2003).	
6	Wang	Dong,	Post	Award	Remedies	(2003)	(n.	5),	13.	
7	Ibid.	
8	Schreuer	(et	al.),	The	ICSID	Convention:	A	Commentary	(2009),	938	and	ss.,	have	clearly	explained	that	
the	 meaning	 of	 the	 word	 “manifest”	 shall	 be	 intended	 as	 “plain”,	 “clear”,	 “obvious”,	 “evident”.	
“Therefore	 the	manifest	 nature	of	 an	 excess	 of	 powers	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	 indication	of	 its	 gravity.	
Rather,	it	relates	to	the	ease	with	which	it	is	perceived”.	
9	A	detailed	analysis	of	any	of	these	grounds	may	be	found	in	Schreuer	(et	al.)	(2009)	(n.	8),	890	and	ss.	
See	also	Wang	Dong,	Post	Award	Remedies	(2003)	(n.	5),	17	and	ss.	
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annulment	 of	 an	 ICSID	 decision	 resulting	 from	 proceedings	 that	 are	 duplicative	 of	
other	 proceedings	 shall	 be	 related	 to	 a	 failure	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 proper	 law	
(namely,	the	general	principles	of	good	faith	and	ne	bis	in	idem).	
In	this	regard,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	“[a]lthough	the	Washington	Convention	
does	not	provide	for	a	specific	ground	for	annulment	of	arbitral	awards	regarding	the	
issue	of	applicable	 law,	 ICSID	case	law	has	admitted	that	a	tribunal’s	failure	to	apply	
the	 proper	 law	 –	 as	 opposed	 to	 a	 mere	 mistake	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law	 –	 is	
subject	to	review	under	the	manifest	excess	of	powers	standard	of	Article	52(1)(b)	of	
the	Washington	Convention”.10	It	emerges	that	the	failure	to	apply	the	proper	law	(i.e.	
the	 issuance	of	a	decision	that	does	not	keep	 into	account	the	 law	applicable	to	the	
dispute	according	to	Art.	42	of	the	Convention)	may	bring	to	a	decision	of	annulment,	
while	an	incorrect	application	of	the	proper	law	(i.e.	a	mere	error)	is	not	considered	to	
be	a	ground	for	annulment.11	
Given	the	above,	Prof.	Schreuer	(et	al.)	have	stated	that	“[a]	general	failure	to	
apply	international	law,	if	it	is	part	of	the	applicable	law,	would	amount	to	an	excess	of	
powers	 exposing	 the	 award	 to	 annulment.	 A	 mere	 error	 in	 the	 application	 of	
international	 law	 would	 not	 have	 this	 effect.	 (…)	 [A]	 non-application	 of	 individual	
provisions	of	international	law	would	not,	in	principle,	furnish	a	ground	for	annulment.	
However,	a	case	can	be	made	that	certain	fundamental	rules	of	 international	 law	do	
by	 themselves	 form	 an	 appropriate	 and	 necessary	 standard	 for	 review	 of	 awards.	
These	 fundamental	 rules	may	 be	 described	 as	 the	 public	 policy	 of	 the	 international	
community.	They	would	include	peremptory	rules	of	international	law	[i.e.	jus	cogens].	
(…)	 It	 is	 an	 open	 question	 whether	 a	 non-application	 of	 other	 important	 rules	 of	
international	law	should	be	seen	as	an	excess	of	powers	for	failure	to	apply	the	proper	
law.	Examples	are	the	principles	of	pacta	sunt	servanda,	prohibition	of	bad	faith	and	
denial	of	justice,	the	international	minimum	standard	for	the	treatment	of	foreigners	
and	 the	 rules	 on	 state	 responsibility.	 It	may	 be	 argued	 that	 at	 least	 some	 of	 these	
principles	 are	 so	 basic	 to	 the	 structure	 of	 international	 law	 that	 their	 disregard	
amounts	 to	a	non-application	of	 international	 law	as	a	whole.	On	 the	other	hand,	 it	
must	be	admitted	that	such	an	approach	runs	the	risk	of	blurring	the	 line	between	a	
non-application	of	international	law	and	its	erroneous	application”.12	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above	 it	 is	 self-evident	 that	 it	 is	 very	 uncertain	 (i.e.	 actually	
unlikely)	that	the	failure	to	apply	general	principles	of	international	law	such	as	good	
faith	and	ne	bis	in	idem	can	be	the	basis	for	the	existence	of	manifest	excess	of	powers	
and	of	the	issuance	of	a	consequent	declaration	of	annulment.	
Such	 uncertainties	 increase	 also	 in	 light	 of	 the	 very	 doubtful	 function	 of	
annulment	 in	 the	 ICSID	 framework.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 usually	 said	 that	 “Art.	 52	
constitutes	a	very	limited	exception	to	the	principle	of	the	finality	of	awards”.13	It	is	also	
																																																													
10	Gaillard,	Annulment	of	ICSID	Awards	(2004),	236.	
11	Caron,	World	Arbitration	&	Mediation	Review	(2012),	183.	
12	Schreuer	(et	al.)	(2009)	(n.	8),	975-976.	
13	Wang	Dong,	Post	Award	Remedies	(2003)	(n.	5),	13.	
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said	that	annulment	is	not	a	form	of	appeal	and	shall	be	limited	to	an	analysis	of	the	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 arbitral	 process.14	Annulment	 is	 not	 concerned	
with	 the	 correctness	 of	 the	 decision	 reached	 within	 that	 framework.15	For	 these	
reasons,	 “[a]	 number	 of	 recent	 annulment	decisions	 have	been	 sharply	 criticized	by	
scholars	 (and	 others	 not	 associated	 with	 a	 particular	 case)	 as	 overly	 intrusive	 and	
undisciplined”.16	In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 worth	 noting	 that	 ad	 hoc	 committees	 have	 not	
assumed	 a	 constant	 approach.	 It	 is	 in	 fact	 possible	 to	 identify	 four	 generations	 of	
annulment	 proceedings, 17 	each	 of	 them	 has	 been	 characterized	 by	 a	 different	
approach	to	the	question	of	the	limits	of	review	of	ad	hoc	committees:	
- the	first	generation,	represented	by	the	Klockner	v.	Cameroon	(I)18	and	
Amco	 v.	 Indonesia	 (I)19	ad	 hoc	 committees’	 decisions	 has	 adopted	 a	
very	 broad	 approach.	 Indeed,	 ad	 hoc	 committees	 have	 in	 fact	 re-
examined	the	merits	of	the	dispute	brought	before	the	Tribunals;	
- the	second	generation,	mainly	 represented	by	 the	decision	of	 the	ad	
hoc	 committee	 in	 MINE	 v.	 Guinea20	has	 adopted	 a	 more	 cautious	
approach,	stating	that	it	is	not	for	ad	hoc	committees	to	examine	the	
adequacy	of	tribunals’	reasoning;	
- the	third	generation,	represented	by	ad	hoc	committees’	decisions	 in	
Wena	 Hotels	 v.	 Egypt, 21 	Vivendi	 v.	 Argentina	 (I) 22 	and	 CMS	 v.	
Argentina,23 	has	 been	 welcomed	 for	 its	 more	 balanced	 approach.	
These	ad	hoc	committees	specified	 that	 they	would	have	 intervened	
																																																													
14	Indeed,	as	stated	by	Gaillard	(2004)	(n.	10),	241,	“an	ad	hoc	committee	constituted	under	Article	52	of	
the	Washington	Convention	should	be	extremely	mindful	of	the	thin	line	between	what	constitutes	an	
annulment	and	what	constitutes	an	appeal,	and	limit	its	control	to	the	“manifest”	nature	of	any	excess	
of	powers”.	See	also	Schreuer,	The	Law	and	Practice	of	International	Courts	and	Tribunals	(2011),	211	
and	ss.	
15	Caron	(2012)	(n.	11),	183.	
16	Id.,	173.	Cheng,	Berkeley	Journal	of	 International	Law	(2013),	236	and	ss.	has	stated	that	annulment	
proceedings	should	be	driven	by	 justice	and	not	only	by	finality.	For	this	reason	this	Author	seems	to	
foster	a	less	strict	approach	to	annulment.	
17 	Nair,	 Ludwig,	 www.lexology.com	 (2011).	 This	 article	 follows	 the	 article	 written	 by	 Schreuer,	
Annulment	of	ICSID	Awards	(2004),	17	and	ss.,	which	identified	the	first	three	generations	of	annulment	
and	the	article	written	by	Marboe,	International	Investment	Law	for	the	21st	Century:	Essays	in	Honour	of	
Christoph	Schreuer	(2009),	200	and	ss.,	which	has	examined	the	case	law	between	2005	and	2009.	See	
also,	in	this	regard,	Friedland,	Brumpton,	American	University	International	Law	Review	(2012),	727	and	
ss.	
18	Klockner	Industrie-Anlagen	GmbH	and	others	v.	United	Republic	of	Cameroon	and	Société	Camerounaise	
des	Engrais,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/81/2,	Ad	Hoc	Committee	Decision	on	Annullment,	3	May	1985.	
19	Amco	 Asia	 Corporation	 and	 Others	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Indonesia,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/81/1,	 Ad	 hoc	
Committee	Decision	on	the	Application	for	Annulment,	16	May	1986.	
20	Maritime	 International	 Nominees	 Establishment	 v.	 Republic	 of	 Guinea,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/84/4,	
Decision	of	the	Ad	hoc	Annulment	Committee,	22	December	1989.	
21 	Wena	 Hotels	 Ltd.	 v.	 Arab	 Republic	 of	 Egypt,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/98/4,	 Decision	 (Annulment	
Proceeding),	5	February	2002.	
22	Compañía	de	Aguas	del	Aconquija	S.A.	and	Vivendi	Universal	S.A.	v.	Argentine	Republic,	ICSID	Case	No.	
ARB/97/3,	Decision	on	the	Argentine	Republic’s	Request	for	Annulment	of	the	Award,	3	July	2007.	
23	CMS	Gas	Transmission	Company	v.	The	Republic	of	Argentina,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/01/8,	Decision	of	
the	 Ad	Hoc	 Committee	 on	 the	 Application	 for	 Annulment	 of	 the	 Argentine	 Republic,	 25	 September	
2007.	
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only	in	serious	and	important	cases	and	could	not	anyway	re-examine	
the	merits;	
- finally,	the	fourth	generation,	represented	by	the	ad	hoc	committee’s	
decisions	 in	Sempra	v.	Argentina,24	Enron	v.	Argentina25	and	Helnan	v.	
Egypt,26	has	 generated	 some	 concerns	 because	 have	 lowered	 the	
threshold	 of	 review	 in	 annulment	 proceedings	 and	 have,	 one	 more	
time,	in	fact	re-examined	the	merits	of	the	dispute.	
In	light	of	the	above,	it	is	self-evident	that,	until	it	will	be	not	clarified	how	deep	
can	be	the	margin	of	review	of	ad	hoc	committees	in	ICSID	annulment	proceedings,	it	
will	 not	 be	 possible	 to	 understand	whether	ad	 hoc	 committees	 could	 play	 a	 role	 in	
limiting	 the	 effects	 of	 parallel	 proceedings.27	In	 the	 present	 legal	 framework,	 the	
answer	seems	to	be	negative.	
	
4.2	 Non-ICSID	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 possible	 remedies	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	at	the	enforcement	and	set	aside	stages	of	arbitral	awards	
	
4.2.1	 The	 regime	 of	 the	 1958	 New	 York	 Convention	 and	 the	 possible	
applicability	 of	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 to	 avoid	 the	 enforcement	 of	
duplicative	awards	
	
The	 1958	 New	 York	 Convention	 on	 the	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	
Foreign	Arbitral	Awards	is	one	of	the	most	successful	treaties	in	the	world;	indeed,	as	
of	 today,	 it	has	been	enforced	by	156	States.	The	New	York	Convention	 is	probably	
one	of	the	main	reasons	of	the	popularity	of	international	arbitration	as	a	method	of	
dispute	 settlement	 and	 has	 created	 a	 pro	 enforcement	 regime,	 according	 to	which	
enforcement	 of	 arbitral	 awards	 “should	 be	 refused	 only	 in	 exceptional	
circumstances”.28	Indeed,	as	set	forth	in	Art.	III	of	the	Convention,	the	basic	obligation	
arising	 from	 the	 Treaty	 is	 the	 following:	 “[e]ach	 Contracting	 State	 shall	 recognize	
arbitral	awards	as	binding	and	enforce	them	in	accordance	with	the	rules	of	procedure	
of	the	territory	where	the	award	is	relied	upon,	under	the	conditions	laid	down	in	the	
following	articles.	There	shall	not	be	 imposed	substantially	more	onerous	conditions	or	
higher	fees	or	charges	on	the	recognition	or	enforcement	of	arbitral	awards	to	which	
																																																													
24	Sempra	 Energy	 International	 v.	 The	Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/02/16,	Decision	 on	 the	
Argentine	Republic’s	Application	for	Annulment	of	the	Award	29	June	2010. 
25	Enron	 Corporation	 and	 Ponderosa	 Assets,	 L.P.	 v.	 Argentine	 Republic,	 ICSID	 Case	 No.	 ARB/01/3,	
Decision	on	the	Application	for	Annulment	of	the	Argentine	Republic,	30	July	2010.	
26	Helnan	International	Hotels	A/S	v.	Arab	Republic	of	Egypt,	ICSID	Case	No.	ARB/05/19,	Decision	of	the	
Ad	Hoc	Committee,	14	June	2010.	
27	Indeed,	the	lack	of	consistency	and	the	unforeseeability	of	the	decisions	of	ad	hoc	committees	is	one	
of	 the	 reasons	 why	 some	 commentators	 have	 proposed	 to	 reform	 the	 whole	 ICSID	 system.	 The	
criticisms	 and	 the	 proposals	 of	 reform	 may	 be	 found	 in	 Schreuer,	
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/wordpress/pdf/99_rev_invest_awards.pdf	(2009),	1	and	ss.	and	in	Tams,	
http://telc.jura.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft57.pdf	(2006),	1	and	ss.	
28	International	Law	Association,	Final	Report	on	Public	Policy	as	a	Bar	 to	Enforcement	of	 International	
Arbitral	Awards,	New	Delhi	Conference	(2002),	Recommendation	1(a).	
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this	 Convention	 applies	 than	 are	 imposed	 on	 the	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 of	
domestic	arbitral	awards”	(emphasis	added).	
The	 only	 exceptions	 to	 such	 an	 obligation	 are	 set	 forth	 in	 Art.	 V	 of	 the	
Convention,	according	to	which:		
	
1.	Recognition	and	enforcement	of	the	award	may	be	refused,	at	
the	request	of	the	party	against	whom	it	is	invoked,	only	 if	that	party	
furnishes	 to	 the	 competent	 authority	 where	 the	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	is	sought,	proof	that:		
(a)	The	parties	 to	 the	agreement	 referred	to	 in	article	 II	were,	
under	the	law	applicable	to	them,	under	some	incapacity,	or	the	said	
agreement	 is	 not	 valid	 under	 the	 law	 to	 which	 the	 parties	 have	
subjected	 it	 or,	 failing	 any	 indication	 thereon,	 under	 the	 law	 of	 the	
country	where	the	award	was	made;	or		
(b)	The	party	against	whom	the	award	is	invoked	was	not	given	
proper	notice	of	the	appointment	of	the	arbitrator	or	of	the	arbitration	
proceedings	or	was	otherwise	unable	to	present	his	case;	or		
(c)	The	award	deals	with	a	difference	not	contemplated	by	or	
not	 falling	 within	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 submission	 to	 arbitration,	 or	 it	
contains	decisions	on	matters	beyond	the	scope	of	the	submission	to	
arbitration,	 provided	 that,	 if	 the	 decisions	 on	 matters	 submitted	 to	
arbitration	can	be	separated	from	those	not	so	submitted,	that	part	of	
the	 award	 which	 contains	 decisions	 on	 matters	 submitted	 to	
arbitration	may	be	recognized	and	enforced;	or		
(d)	 The	 composition	 of	 the	 arbitral	 authority	 or	 the	 arbitral	
procedure	was	not	 in	accordance	with	 the	agreement	of	 the	parties,	
or,	failing	such	agreement,	was	not	in	accordance	with	the	law	of	the	
country	where	the	arbitration	took	place;	or		
(e)	 The	 award	 has	 not	 yet	 become	 binding	 on	 the	 parties,	 or	
has	 been	 set	 aside	 or	 suspended	 by	 a	 competent	 authority	 of	 the	
country	in	which,	or	under	the	law	of	which,	that	award	was	made.	
2.	Recognition	and	enforcement	of	an	arbitral	award	may	also	
be	 refused	 if	 the	 competent	 authority	 in	 the	 country	 where	
recognition	and	enforcement	is	sought	finds	that:	
(a)	 The	 subject	 matter	 of	 the	 difference	 is	 not	 capable	 of	
settlement	by	arbitration	under	the	law	of	that	country;	or		
(b)	 The	 recognition	 or	 enforcement	 of	 the	 award	 would	 be	
contrary	to	the	public	policy	of	that	country	(emphasis	added).	
	
From	a	reading	of	Art.	V,	and	as	confirmed	from	an	analysis	of	the	preparatory	
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works,29	it	 emerges	 that	 the	drafters	of	 the	Convention	did	not	analyse	 the	 issue	of	
parallel	 proceedings.	 There	 is	 no	 express	 ground	 for	 refusing	 the	 enforcement	 of	
awards	that	are	in	fact	duplicative	of	an	already	existing	enforced	award.	
The	only	possible	 solution	 is,	 therefore,	 to	 refer	 to	 the	general	 clause	of	Art.	
V(2)(b),	 namely	 the	 public	 policy	 exception.	 However,	 it	 is	 well	 known	 that	 public	
policy	has	“unclear	boundaries	and	[is]	subject	to	different	interpretations	in	different	
jurisdictions”.30	In	 Richardson	 v.	 Mellish,31	public	 policy	 has	 been	 defined	 as	 “a	 very	
unruly	horse,	and	once	you	get	astride	it	you	never	know	where	it	will	carry	you.	It	may	
lead	 you	 from	 sound	 law”.	 Similarly,	 Arfazadeh	 has	 defined	 public	 policy	 as	 a	
“chameleon”.32	
The	most	 convincing	 definition	 of	 public	 policy	 has	 been	 provided	 by	 Lew,33	
according	to	whom	public	policy	represents	“the	fundamental	economic,	legal,	moral,	
political,	 religious	 	 and	 social	 standards	of	 every	 state	or	 extra-national	 community.	
Naturally,	public	policy	differs	according	to	the	character	and	structure	of	the	state	or	
community	 to	which	 it	 appertains,	 and	 covers	 those	principles	 and	 standards	which	
are	so	sacrosanct	as	to	require	their	maintenance	at	all	costs	and	without	exception”.	
As	a	consequence,	“public	policy	consists	in	acting	as	a	limit	(…)	to	the	recognition	of	
foreign	 judgments	 and	 awards”	 (emphasis	 in	 original).34	In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	 worth	
clarifying	 that,	 when	 referring	 to	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 in	 the	 New	 York	
Convention,	 we	 refer	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 international	 public	 policy,	 i.e.	 “issues	 of	
domestic	 public	 policy	 that	 the	 country	 feels	 so	 strongly	 about	 as	 to	 insist	 that	
[international]	 transactions	or	awards	that	have	a	connection	with	the	country	must	
conform	with”.35		
This	concept	is	more	restricted	than	the	concept	of	domestic	public	policy	(i.e.	
the	 most	 important	 social,	 legal	 and	 political	 values	 that	 have	 to	 be	 respected	 in	
internal	transactions);	this	is	due	to	the	circumstance	that	international	public	policy	is	
related	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 international	 commerce	 and,	 therefore,	 shall	 lead	 to	 non-
enforcement	only	 in	exceptional	circumstances.	However,	 international	public	policy	
is	 a	 different	 concept	 also	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 so-called	 transnational	 (or	 truly	
international)	 public	 policy,	 the	 scope	 of	 application	 of	which	 is	 even	 stricter.36	This	
concept	 has	 been	 developed	 mainly	 by	 Prof.	 Pierre	 Lalive	 and	 refers	 to	 “certain	
superior	 and	 fundamental	 norms	 or	 principles	 essential	 in	 the	 law	 of	 international	
																																																													
29	Published	in	Gaja,	International	Commercial	Arbitration	–	New	York	Convention,	Oceana,	1978-96.	
30	Lo,	Contemporary	Asia	Arbitration	Journal	(2008),	70.	
31	1824	WL	2555	(CCP),	(1824)	2	Bing.	229,	[1824]	All	E.R.	Rep.	258,	130	E.R.	294.	
32	Arfazadeh,	The	American	Review	of	International	Arbitration	(2003),	43.	
33	Lew,	Applicable	Law	in	International	Commercial	Arbitration	(1978),	532.	See	also	Lew,	Mistelis,	Kroll,	
International	and	Comparative	Commercial	Arbitration	(2003),	422	and	ss.	
34	Rubino-Sammartano,	International	Arbitration	Law	and	Practice	(2014),	721.	See	also	Feraci,	L’ordine	
pubblico	nel	diritto	dell’Unione	europea	(2012),	7	and	ss.	
35 	Okekeifere,	 International	 Arbitration	 Law	 Review	 (1999),	 71.	 See,	 in	 this	 regard,	 Atteritano,	
L’enforcement	 delle	 sentenze	 arbitrali	 del	 commercio	 internazionale	 (2009),	 329	 and	 ss.,	 Blackaby,	
Partasides,	Redfern,	Hunter	(2015)	(n.	3),	641	and	ss.,	Lew,	Mistelis,	Kroll	(2003)	(n.	3),	720	and	ss.	
36	See	Lo	(2008)	(n.	30),	84	and	ss.	
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trade”.37	Such	 principles	 and	 norms	 (such	 as,	 the	 rules	 against	 corruption,	 privacy,	
slavery	and	violation	of	human	rights,	as	well	as	general	principles	as	good	faith,	pacta	
sunt	 servanda	 and	 the	 prohibition	 of	 discriminations)38	should	 be,	 according	 to	 the	
scholars	who	 accept	 the	 existence	 of	 transnational	 public	 policy,	 always	 applied	 by	
international	 arbitrators	 and	 should	 be	 the	 main	 parameter	 in	 order	 to	 apply	 Art.	
V(2)(b)	of	the	New	York	Convention.	
For	the	sake	of	the	present	book,	it	is	interestingly	to	understand	whether	the	
principles	of	good	faith	(and	abuse	of	process)	and	finality	(i.e.	ne	bis	in	idem)	may	be	
considered,	 in	general	terms,	as	part	of	the	 international	public	policy	of	States.	 It	 is	
obviously	impossible	to	give	a	complete	picture	of	public	policy	in	all	States;	however,	
we	will	refer,	firstly,	to	the	ILA	Recommendations	on	International	Public	Policy39	and	
on	Lis	Pendens	and	Res	Judicata	and	Arbitration40	and,	then,	to	some	significant	legal	
systems.	 In	 particular	we	will	make	 reference	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 public	 policy	 in	 the	
European	Union	 and	 in	 some	exemplary	 common	and	 civil	 law	 systems.	 Finally,	 for	
the	 sake	 of	 completeness,	 we	 will	 try	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 good	 faith	 and	 finality	
might	be	considered	as	part	of	transnational	public	policy.	
	
ILA	Recommendations	
Starting	from	the	ILA	Recommendations,	as	a	preliminary	remark,	it	should	be	
noted	that	 they	are	not	anyway	binding	 for	national	 judges	or	arbitrators.	They	are,	
indeed,	an	authoritative	soft-law	tool	aimed	at	offering	guidance	to	practitioners	and	
decision	makers.	
With	regard	to	good	faith	it	is	worth	noting	that	Recommendation	1(e)	of	the	
Recommendations	on	International	Public	Policy	expressly	states	that	“[a]n	example	of	
a	 substantive	 fundamental	 principles	 is	 prohibition	 of	 abuse	 of	 rights”.	 Considering	
that,	as	already	explained	in	Chapter	3,	abuse	of	rights	is	an	expression	of	the	general	
principle	of	good	faith,	 it	seems	possible	to	say	that	good	faith	 is	–	 in	 ILA’s	view	–	a	
rule	of	public	policy.	Due	to	the	obvious	links	between	good	faith,	abuse	of	rights	and	
abuse	of	process,	it	might	be	concluded	that	–	in	the	ILA’s	view	–	the	enforcement	an	
award	which	is	the	result	of	an	abuse	of	process,	being	such	an	award	also	an	abuse	of	
rights,	could	be	refused.	
Moving	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 ne	 bis	 in	 idem,	 it	 is	 quite	 surprising	 to	 find	 that	
Recommendation	N.	7	of	 the	Final	Report	on	Res	Judicata	and	Arbitration	 states	that	
“[t]he	preclusive	effects	of	an	arbitral	award	need	not	be	raised	on	its	own	motion	by	an	
arbitral	 tribunal.	 If	 not	 waived,	 such	 preclusive	 effects	 should	 be	 raised	 as	 soon	 as	
possible	 by	 a	 party”	 (emphasis	 added).	 Even	 if	 such	 a	 recommendation	 refers	 to	
																																																													
37	Lalive,	 ICCA	Congress	Series	No.	3	 (1986),	286.	The	concept	of	transnational	public	policy	has	been	
often	criticized	for	its	murky	boundaries.	See	Feraci	(2012)	(n.	34),	24,	according	to	whom	it	is	not	easy	
to	understand	which	principles	and	rules	should	be	considered	as	part	of	transnational	public	policy.		
38	See	Feraci	(2012)	(n.	34),	25.	
39	See	supra	footnote	28.	
40	International	Law	Association,	Final	Report	on	Lis	Pendens	and	Res	Judicata	and	Arbitration,	Toronto	
Conference	(2006).	See	also	Interim	Report:	“Res	Judicata”	and	Arbitration,	Berlin	Conference	(2004).	
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arbitrators	(and	not	to	national	courts),	keeping	 into	account	that	Art.	V(2)(b)	of	the	
New	York	Convention	provides	that	public	policy	exceptions	can	be	raised	ex	officio	by	
national	courts,	it	seems	that	the	ILA	has	not	treated	finality	as	a	rule	of	public	policy.	
However,	as	already	stated	by	other	Authors,41	from	a	deeper	analysis	it	is	possible	to	
say	 that	 such	 a	 conclusion	 is	 not	 convincing	 and	 that	 the	 ILA	 Recommendations	
provide	 for	 a	 different	 solution.	 Indeed,	 Recommendation	 1(d)	 of	 the	
Recommendations	 on	 International	 Public	 Policy	 states	 that	 “[t]he	 international	
public	policy	of	any	State	includes:	(i)	fundamental	principles,	pertaining	to	justice	or	
morality,	that	the	State	wishes	to	protect	even	when	it	 is	not	directly	concerned;	(ii)	
rules	designed	to	serve	the	essential	political,	social	or	economic	interests	of	the	State	
(…)”.	 In	 this	 regard,	 it	 has	 been	 noted	 that	 finality	 is	 an	 essential	 value	 in	 order	 to	
preserve	justice	and	to	serve	essential	social	and	economic	interests	of	a	State.	This	is	
further	 confirmed	by	 the	 Interim	Report	on	Res	 Judicata,	where	 the	 same	 ILA	stated	
that	“res	judicata	(…)	pertains	both	to	public	policy	and	to	private	justice”.42	In	light	of	
the	above,	“one	would	assume	that	the	interests	of	arbitral	finality	and	justice	would	
also	qualify	as	public	policy”.43	Hence,	it	would	seem	that	the	ILA	Recommendations,	
if	applied,	would	suggest	a	national	judge	to	refuse	the	enforcement	of	a	duplicative	
arbitration	award	by	applying	the	public	policy	exception.	
	
European	Union	
It	 has	 been	 recently	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 public	 policy	 has	
acquired	autonomous	standing	and	meaning	within	the	framework	of	European	Union	
law.44	This	 is	 confirmed	 by	 a	 Communication	 of	 the	 Commission	 of	 14	 July	 1998,	
entitled	 “Towards	 an	 Area	 of	 Freedom	Security	 and	 Justice”	 in	which	 it	 was	 stated	
that	“[i]t	is	in	the	framework	of	the	consolidation	of	an	area	of	freedom,	security	and	
justice	that	the	concept	of	public	order	appears	as	a	common	denominator	in	a	society	
based	on	democracy	and	the	rule	of	law.	With	the	entry	into	force	of	the	Amsterdam	
Treaty,	this	concept	which	has	hitherto	been	determined	principally	by	each	individual	
Member	 State	 will	 also	 have	 to	 be	 assessed	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 new	 European	 area.	
Independently	of	the	responsibilities	of	Member	States	for	maintaining	public	order,	we	
will	gradually	have	to	shape	a	"European	public	order"	based	on	an	assessment	of	shared	
fundamental	interests”	(emphasis	added).45	The	concept	of	European	public	order	(i.e.	
European	public	policy)	is	functional	to	reach	the	goals	of	the	European	Union,	which	
involve,	 inter	 alia,	 for	 what	 is	 of	 interest	 in	 this	 book,	 harmony	 and	 coherence	 of	
judicial	decisions.	
																																																													
41	See,	inter	alia,	Ma,	Contemporary	Asia	Arbitration	Journal	(2009),	70	and	ss.	
42	See	ILA	(2004)	(n.	40),	25.	
43	See	Ma	(2009)	(n.	41),	71.	
44	Feraci	(2012)	(n.	34),	78	and	ss.	
45 	The	 whole	 communication	 is	 available	 at	 http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:1998:0459:FIN:EN:PDF.	Feraci	(2012)	(n.	34),	79	has	
perfectly	 explained	 that	 the	 concept	 of	 European	 public	 order	 shall	 be	 intended	 as	 a	 synonym	 of	
European	public	policy.	
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In	 the	 well-known	 EcoSwiss	 decision,46	the	 Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	
Union	has	clarified	that,	even	when	enforcing	foreign	arbitral	awards	according	to	the	
New	York	Convention,	Member	States	 have	 to	 respect	 European	public	 policy.	This	
means	 that	 national	 judges	 of	 the	 member	 States,	 when	 enforcing	 an	 international	
arbitral	 award,	 have	 to	 ascertain	 that	 such	 an	 award	 does	 not	 run	 against	 the	 public	
policy	of	the	European	Union,	due	to	the	fact	that	European	Union	Law	is	part	of	national	
law	of	 the	Member	States.	The	 content	of	European	public	policy	may	be	 found	out	
both	 by	 the	 European	 treaties	 (and	 other	 written	 sources	 of	 law)	 and	 by	 general	
principles	set	forth	in	relevant	decisions	of	the	Court	of	Justice.	
With	regard	to	good	faith,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that,	both	on	the	basis	of	
legal	sources	and	on	the	basis	of	the	case	law	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	
Union,	the	prohibition	of	abuse	of	right	has	gradually	emerged	as	a	general	principle	
of	European	Union	law.47	However,	 it	does	not	seem	possible	to	say	that	in	EU	law	a	
principle	of	public	policy	militates	against	 the	enforcement	of	arbitral	 awards	which	
are	the	result	of	an	abuse	of	process.	Such	a	conclusion	 is	due	to	two	main	reasons:	
first	of	all,	 in	general	terms,	it	has	never	been	stated	that	the	prohibition	of	abuse	of	
rights	is	a	principle	of	public	policy	of	EU	law;	and,	secondly,	because	there	is	no	case	
law	 or	 scholars’	 work	 suggesting	 such	 a	 conclusion.	 Hence,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	
enforcement	of	a	duplicative	arbitration	award	cannot	be	refused	on	the	basis	of	an	
alleged	public	policy	providing	for	the	prohibition	of	abuse	of	rights/process.	
Moving	to	the	principle	of	finality,	it	is	worth	noting	that	in	Italian	Leather	the	
Court	 of	 Justice	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 has	 expressly	 stated	 that	 “as	 stated	 in	 the	
Jenard	Report	on	the	Brussels	Convention	(OJ	1979	C	59,	p.	1,	at	p.	45),	'there	can	be	no	
doubt	 that	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 a	 State	 would	 be	 disturbed	 if	 it	 were	 possible	 to	 take	
advantage	 of	 two	 conflicting	 judgments’”	 (emphasis	 added).48	This	 has	 been	 further	
confirmed	by	other	decisions	and	by	scholars’	opinion.49		
Thus,	it	seems	possible	to	conclude	that	the	principle	of	ne	bis	in	idem	–	being	a	
principle	 ensuring	 consistency	 and	 legal	 certainty,	 as	 well	 as	 harmony	 between	
decisions	in	various	Member	States	–	might	be	considered	as	a	principle	of	European	
public	policy.	This	has	been	expressly	confirmed	by	the	Court	of	Justice	by	the	already	
mentioned	EcoSwiss	case.50	In	this	regard,	 it	 is	worth	noting	that	European	law,	case	
law	and	scholars	only	refer	to	the	principle	of	claim	preclusion	and	never	to	collateral	
estoppel.	The	latter,	being	a	principle	applied	only	in	common	law	countries,	has	not	
been	–	as	of	today	–	taken	into	consideration	in	European	Union	law.		
																																																													
46	EcoSwiss	China	Time	Ltd	v	Benetton	International	NV,	Case	C-126/97,	Rep.	1999	I-03055,	Judgment	of	
1	June	1999.	See,	in	particular,	par.	38	of	the	decision.	The	approach	fostered	in	EcoSwiss	has	been	then	
applied	in	a	number	of	national	judgments	mentioned	in	Feraci	(2012)	(n.	34),	185.	
47	See	 Gestri,	 Abuso	 del	 diritto	 e	 frode	 alla	 legge	 nell’ordinamento	 comunitario	 (2003),	 197	 and	 ss.,	
Losurdo,	Il	divieto	dell’abuso	del	diritto	nell’ordinamento	europeo	(2011),	123	and	ss.	
48	Italian	Leather	SpA	v	WECO	Polstermöbel	GmbH	&	Co.,	Case	C-80/00,	Rep.	2002	I-04995,	Judgment	of	
6	June	2002,	par.	48.	
49	See	Tonolo,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2008),	1277	and	ss.	
50	See	 the	 abovementioned	 EcoSwiss	 decision,	 par.	 43	 and	 ss.	 (and	 in	 particular	 par.	 48).	 See	 also	
Muroni,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(2000),	761.	
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In	conclusion,	in	light	of	what	has	been	stated	in	EcoSwiss,	the	enforcement	of	
a	duplicative	arbitration	award	might	be	refused	by	a	national	judge	on	the	basis	of	res	
judicata,	 being	 this	 principle	 part	 of	 the	 European	 concept	 of	 international	 public	
policy.	
	
Common	law	systems	
“The	 principle	 of	 abuse	 of	 rights	 is	 not	 so	 readily	 apparent	 in	 common	 law	
systems”.51		
In	English	 law	 this	 is	 traditionally	due	 to	 the	 circumstance	 that	 there	was	no	
general	recognition	of	the	principle	according	to	which	rights	have	to	be	exercised	in	
good	faith.52	However,	it	has	been	noted	that	today	things	have	gradually	changed,	so	
that	 some	 Authors	 have	 said	 that	 English	 courts	 are	 now	 often	 applying	 doctrines	
which	are,	in	their	content,	analogous	to	the	principle	of	abuse	of	rights.53	Similarly,	as	
we	have	already	seen,	English	courts	usually	apply	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process.54	
However,	 it	 is	not	possible	to	say	that	a	general	principle	prohibiting	abuse	of	rights	
(and/or	abuse	of	process)	has	emerged	in	English	law.55	
Similarly,	 with	 regard	 to	 US	 law,	 Prosser	 wrote	 that	 "[i]n	 all	 but	 a	 few	
jurisdictions,	 it	 is	 now	 settled	 that	 where	 the	 defendant	 acts	 out	 of	 pure	malice	 or	
spite,	as	by	erecting	a	fence	for	the	sole	purpose	of	shutting	off	the	plaintiff's	view,	or	
drilling	 a	 well	 to	 cut	 off	 the	 plaintiff's	 underground	 water	 [...]	 such	 conduct	 is	
indefensible	from	a	social	point	of	view,	and	there	is	liability	for	nuisance".56	Hence,	it	
is	commonly	said	that	also	US	law	recognizes	some	forms	of	abuse	of	rights	(namely	
nuisance)	but,	in	light	of	the	available	case	law,	it	is	not	possible	to	say	that	a	general	
principle	emerged	in	this	regard.57	
It	follows	that,	due	to	the	uncertainty	in	the	application	of	the	notions	of	good	
faith	and	abuse	of	rights	in	common	law	systems,	it	is	obviously	impossible	to	say	that	
such	 principles	 (as	well	 as	 the	 related	 doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 process)	may	 constitute	
part	of	the	international	public	policy	of	these	countries.	
Moving	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 finality	 (that,	 in	 common	 law	 systems,	 shall	 be	
intended	both	as	claim	and	issue	preclusion),	the	situation	is	different.		
With	 regard	 to	 English	 common	 law,	 it	 is	 usually	 stated	 that	 finality	may	 be	
considered	as	part	of	international	public	policy.	Such	a	conclusion	is	supported	both	
by	Authors	and	by	the	case	law.58	As	a	consequence,	according	to	such	an	approach,	
																																																													
51	Byers,	McGill	Law	Journal	(2002),	395.	
52	Gestri	(2003)	(n.	47),	46.	
53	See	Byers	(2002)	(n.	51),	395,	Gestri	(2003)	(n.	47),	47	and	ss.,	Losurdo	(2011)	(n.	47),	33	and	ss.	
54	See	Paragraph	3.5	above.	See	also	ILA	Interim	Report	(2004)	(n.	40),	8.	
55	Losurdo	(2011)	(n.	47),	33.	
56	Prosser,	Law	of	Torts	(1964),	618-19.		
57	Australia	has	recognized	a	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	but	the	principle	of	abuse	of	rights	has	never	
been	directly	employed.	See,	in	this	regard,	Byers	(2002)	(n.	51),	396.	
58	See	 ILA	 Interim	 Report	 (2004)	 (n.	 40),	 7,	 and	 He,	 Hong	 Kong	 Law	 Journal	 (2013),	 1055.	 See	 also	
Varvaeke	v.	Smith,	 [1983]	1	AC	145;	ED	&	F	Man	 (Sugar)	Ltd.	v.	Haryanto	 (No.	2),	 [1991]	1	Lloyd’s	Rep	
429.	
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national	 courts	would	 be	 entitled	 also	 to	 raise	 ex	 officio	 the	 res	 judicata	 defence	 as	
part	 of	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 set	 forth	 in	 Art.	 V(2)(b)	 of	 the	 New	 York	
Convention.	
Concerning	US	common	 law	 it	seems	possible	 to	gather	a	similar	conclusion.	
Indeed,	 the	 First	 Restatement	 on	 Judgments,	 at	 par.	 1,	 already	 talked	 about	 “the	
public	policy	of	putting	an	end	 to	 litigation”;59	in	 this	 regard,	 it	has	been	also	stated	
that	 “if	 a	 judgment	 [is]	 not	 conclusive	 as	 to	 what	 it	 actually	 determined,	 the	
adjudicative	process	would	 fail	 to	serve	 its	 social	 function	of	 resolving	disputes”.60	A	
claimant	shall	no	have	more	than	a	full	and	fair	opportunity	for	 judicial	 resolution	of	
the	same	dispute.61	Indeed,	the	US	Supreme	Court	has	clarified	that	res	 judicata	 (i.e.	
both	 claim	 preclusion	 and	 issue	 preclusion)	 may	 be	 raised	 ex	 officio	 by	 a	 court	 of	
competent	 jurisdiction.62	Hence,	 also	 in	 US	 law,	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a	 duplicative	
arbitral	award	may	be	refused	by	applying	the	public	policy	exception	provided	in	the	
New	York	Convention.	
The	same	has	been	also	said	with	 regard	to	 the	 Indian	system63	and	 it	 seems	
that	a	similar	conclusion	has	been	recently	reached	also	in	Hong	Kong.64	
	
Civil	law	systems	
Civil	 law	systems	largely	recognize	the	principle	of	good	faith	and	the	related	
doctrine	of	abuse	of	rights.	Several	national	laws	expressly	recognize	the	existence	of	
good	 faith	 and/or	 abuse	 of	 rights,	 namely	 Germany,65	Greece,66	Portugal,67	Spain68	
and	 The	 Netherlands.69	In	 other	 systems,	 such	 as	 France,	 Belgium	 and	 Italy,	 these	
principles	have	been	recognized	by	way	of	 judicial	decisions.70	However,	 the	present	
author	has	not	been	able	to	find	any	statement	declaring	that	such	principles	(as	well	
as	 the	 related	 doctrine	 of	 abuse	 of	 process)	 are	 to	 be	 considered	 part	 of	 such	
Countries’	 international	 public	 policy.	 It	 is	 therefore	 not	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 the	
enforcement	of	a	duplicative	arbitral	award	might	be	refused	according	to	Art.	V(2)(b)	
of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 by	 applying	 the	 abuse	 of	 process	 doctrine.	 The	 only	
																																																													
59	See	also	Gottlieb,	California	Law	Review	(1978),	1099.	
60	Currie,	The	University	of	Chicago	Law	Review	(1978),	325.	
61	See	Blonder-Tongue	Laboratories,	Inc.	v.	University	of	Ill.	Foundation,	402	U.S.	313,	328	(1971).	
62	See	Arizona	 v.	 California,	 530	U.S.	 392,	 412	 (2000).	 See	 also	Martinez-Fraga,	 Samra,	Northwestern	
Journal	of	International	Law	of	Business	(2012),	428-429.	
63	See	He	 (2013)	 (n.	 58),	 1055.	See	also	Renusagar	Power	Co.	Ltd.	 v.	General	Electric	Co.,	AIR	1994	SC	
860.	
64	See	Astro	Nusantara	International	B.V.	v.	PT	First	Media	TBK	HCCT	45/2010.	
65	See	par.	242	of	the	BGB.	
66	See	Art.	281	of	the	Greek	Civil	Code.	
67	See	Art.	334	of	the	Portuguese	Civil	Code.	
68	See	 Art.	 7	 of	 the	Título	 Preliminar	 to	 the	 Spanish	 Civil	 Code.	 See	 also	 the	 decision	 of	 the	Tribunal	
Supremo	issued	on	14	February	1944	(R.	293).	
69	See	Art.	13	of	the	third	book	of	the	Dutch	Civil	Code.	
70	See	Gestri	(2003)	(n.	47),	40	and	ss.,	Losurdo	(2011)	(n.	47),	25	and	ss.	With	regard	to	Italy	it	is	possible	
to	say	that	the	case	law	has	gradually	applied	also	the	doctrine	abuse	of	process.	See	Scarselli,	Rivista	di	
diritto	 processuale	 (2012),	 1450	 and	 ss.,	 Comoglio,	 Rivista	 di	 diritto	 processuale	 (2008),	 319	 and	 ss.,	
Cordopatri,	Rivista	di	diritto	processuale	(2012),	874	and	ss.	
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exception	 to	 what	 has	 been	 just	 stated	 seems	 to	 be	 Switzerland.	 As	 reported	 by	
Einhorn, 71 	the	 Swiss	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 stated	 that	 “an	 award	 is	 contrary	 to	
substantive	public	policy	when	it	violates	fundamental	principles	of	law	to	the	point	of	
not	being	reconcilable	with	a	 juridical	order	of	basic	values,	 including	principles	such	
as	sanctity	of	contract,	respect	for	the	principle	of	good	faith,	forbidding	l’abuse	de	droit,	
prohibiting	 discriminatory	 or	 exploitative	 measures,	 and	 protecting	 vulnerable	
persons”	 (emphasis	 added).72	This	 would	 seem	 to	 allow	 to	 include	 good	 faith	 and	
abuse	of	rights	(and	process)	within	the	Swiss	concept	of	international	public	policy.	
Moving	to	the	principle	of	finality,	that	in	civil	 law	countries	shall	be	intended	
only	 as	 claim	 preclusion	 (due	 to	 the	 inapplicability	 of	 collateral	 estoppel	 these	
systems),	it	is	possible	to	say	that	several	civil	law	systems	consider	res	judicata	as	part	
of	 their	 public	 policy.	 This	 can	 be	 said	 with	 certainty	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 German,73	
Swiss,74	Egyptian75	and	Hungarian76	system.	It	seems	that	a	similar	conclusion	can	be	
drawn,	today,	also	with	regard	to	France77	and	Italy.78	On	the	contrary,	in	Belgium	and	
																																																													
71	See	Einhorn,	Yearbook	of	Private	International	Law	(2010),	50.	
72	X	SpA	v.	Y	Srl,	BGE	132	III,	389,	8	March	2006,	mentioned	in	Einhorn	(2010)	(n.	71),	50.	
73	Koch,	Diedrich,	Civil	Procedure	in	Germany	(1998),	70.	See	also	ILA	Interim	Report	(2004)	(n.	40),	15.	
74	See	 Swiss	 Federal	 Supreme	 Court,	 3	 April	 2002,	 ATF	 128	 III	 191;	 see	 also	 Swiss	 Federal	 Supreme	
Court,	27	May	2015,	4A_374/2014;	Club	Atlético	de	Madrid	SAD	v.	Sport	Lisboa	E	Benfica	and	Fédération	
Internationale	de	Football	Association	 (FIFA),	Tribunal	Federal,	23	April	2010,	4A_490/2009.	Finally	see	
the	well-known	case	of	the	Swiss	Federal	Supreme	Court	Fomento	de	Construcciones	y	Contratas	S.A.	v.	
Colon	Container	Terminal	S.A.,	DSFSC	127	(2001)	III	at	279.	In	this	regard	see	also	Söderlund,	Journal	of	
International	Arbitration	(2007),	311-312.	
75	See	Art.	58(2)(a)	of	the	Law	Concerning	Arbitration	in	Civil	and	Commercial	Matters.	
76	See	 Legefelsöbb	 Biróság	 (LB)	 [Supreme	 Court]	 BH.2010.191,	 mentioned	 in	 Walters,	 Journal	 of	
International	Arbitration	(2012),	669.	
77	Traditionally	res	judicata	was	not	considered	as	part	of	public	policy	in	France.	See	ILA	Interim	Report	
(2004)	(n.	40),	15.	A	different	conclusion	may	be,	however,	drawn	by	reading	the	decision	Marriott	Int’l	
Hotels,	 Inc.	v.	 J.N.A.H.	Dev.	S.A.,	no.	09/13559,	Cour	d’appel	de	Paris,	9	September	2010,	where	 it	has	
been	 stated	 that	 res	 judicata	 could	 create	a	basis	 to	annul	or	 refuse	enforcement	of	 an	award	under	
section	1502(5)	of	the	French	Code	of	Civil	Procedure,	which	provides	for	annulment	of	an	award	that	is	
contrary	to	international	public	policy.	The	court	expressly	explained	that	such	a	situation	would	arise	if	
a	second	arbitral	award	contradicts	a	previous	arbitral	award	that	 is	enforceable	in	France.	See	in	this	
regard,	Walters	(2012)	(n.	76),	665-666.	In	this	regard,	it	is	worth	noting	that	since	January	2005	Art.	125	
of	the	French	Code	of	Civil	Procedure	has	been	modified,	on	the	basis	of	considerations	of	procedural	
economy	and	efficiency,	and	it	now	allows	courts	to	consider	res	judicata	 issues	ex	officio.	There	is	no,	
however,	obligations	for	national	courts	to	do	so.	
The	enforcement	of	a	duplicative	arbitration	award	contrary	 to	 the	principle	of	res	 judicata	has	 taken	
place	also	in	the	well-known	Hilmarton	case.	See	Société	OTV	v.	Société	Hilmarton,	Cour	de	Cassation,	
10	June	1997,	in	6	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(1997),	385	and	ss.	
78	See	Italian	Corte	di	Cassazione	13475/2014	and	26482/2007	in	which	it	has	been	expressly	stated	that	
res	 judicata	may	 be	 raised	 ex	 officio	 by	 judges.	 Considering	 that	 res	 judicata	 is	 already	 a	 ground	 for	
refusing	 the	execution	of	 foreign	decisions	 according	 to	Art.	 64	of	 Italian	 law	218	of	 1995	on	private	
international	 law,	 it	 seems	 possible	 to	 say	 that	 Italian	 judges	 may	 raise	 ex	 officio	 the	 res	 judicata	
exception	 (as	 part	 of	 Italian	 international	 public	 policy)	 when	 enforcing	 a	 foreign	 arbitral	 award	
according	 to	 the	New	York	 Convention.	 Such	 a	 conclusion	 could	 seem	 to	 be	 denied	 by	 the	 decision	
Tema-Frugoli	 S.p.a.	 c.	 Hubei	 Space	Quarry	 Industry	 Co.	 Ltd.	 of	 2	 July	 1999	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 Appeal	 of	
Milan,	 in	 9	 Rivista	 dell’arbitrato	 (2000),	 753	 and	 ss.	 However,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	 party	 opposing	 the	
enforcement	of	the	duplicative	award	did	not	raise	the	public	policy	exception;	for	this	reason	it	is	not	
possible	 to	 say	 that	 this	 award	 runs	 against	 the	 opinion	 fostered	 by	 the	 present	 author.	 See,	 in	 this	
regard,	Muroni	(2000)	(n.	50),	755	and	ss.,	who	–	at	761	–	has	expressly	stated	that	in	Italy	courts	shall	ex	
officio	 refuse	 enforcement	 of	 duplicative	 arbitral	 awards,	 which	 shall	 be	 considered	 contrary	 to	
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The	Netherlands	res	 judicata	shall	be	raised	by	a	party	and	not	by	a	court	on	its	own	
motion	and	this	has	lead	some	commentators	to	refuse	the	idea	that	res	judicata	may	
be	part	of	international	public	policy.	79	
It	 seems,	 in	 conclusion,	 that	 res	 judicata	 may	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	
international	 public	 policy	 of	 several	 civil	 law	 systems.	 In	 such	 systems,	 therefore,	
national	 courts	 may	 refuse	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a	 duplicative	 arbitration	 award	 by	
applying	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 set	 forth	 in	 Art.	 V(2)(b)	 of	 the	 New	 York	
Convention.80	
	
Transnational	public	policy	
It	 is	finally	 interesting	to	understand	whether	good	faith	and	finality	could	be	
considered	as	part	of	public	policy	in	case	a	judge	would	apply	the	already	discussed	
concept	of	transnational	public	policy.	
In	this	regard,	it	is	worth	noting	that,	in	his	seminal	work	on	the	subject	(which	
has	inspired	all	the	subsequent	works	in	subiecta	materia),	Pierre	Lalive	has	stated	that	
good	 faith	 and	 abuse	 of	 rights	 are	 to	 be	 considered	 as	 part	 of	 transnational	 public	
policy,	but	he	never	mentioned	the	largely	more	recognized	principle	of	finality.81	This	
seems	 surprising,	due	 to	 the	very	high	 importance	 that	 the	principle	of	 finality	may	
have	in	ensuring	legal	certainty	in	an	ideal	system	of	transnational	commerce.	
However,	it	is	worth	noting	that	–	as	of	today	–	transnational	public	policy	has	
been	 a	 concept	 of	 academic	 rather	 than	 practical	 interest	 (and	 application).	 As	 a	
consequence,	 the	 above	 classification	 is	 not	 very	 helpful	 in	 offering	 guidelines	 to	
national	courts	facing	the	situation	of	two	duplicative	arbitral	awards.	
	
4.2.2	 Concrete	application	of	the	proposed	solution	
	
In	 order	 to	 understand	 how	 could	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	 operate	 in	
concrete	 in	order	 to	prevent	 the	enforcement	of	duplicative	arbitration	awards,	 it	 is	
necessary	to	proceed	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	We	will,	first	of	all,	distinguish	between	
cases	in	which	only	one	(of	two	or	more)	parallel	arbitrations	has	been	concluded	and	
cases	 in	which	 there	 are	 two	 (or	more)	 validly	 rendered	 awards.	Within	 this	 second	
category,	it	will	be	then	necessary	to	identify	several	other	sub-categories.	
	
Hypothesis	1:	one	award	and	one	pending	process	
If	 there	 is	 an	 award	 and	 a	 pending	 proceeding	 (perhaps	 commenced	 earlier	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
international	public	policy.	 Indeed,	according	to	this	Author,	ne	bis	 in	 idem	 is	to	be	considered	part	of	
international	public	policy	in	the	Italian	law	system.	
79	Concerning	Belgium	and	The	Netherlands	see	ILA	Interim	Report	(2004)	(n.	40),	15.	
80	However,	 it	 is	 worth	 remembering	 that	 in	 all	 systems	 which	 are	 part	 of	 the	 European	 Union	 the	
enforcement	of	a	duplicative	arbitration	award	may	be	refused	on	the	basis	of	the	European	concept	of	
international	public	policy;	with	regard	to	these	countries,	it	is	therefore	irrelevant	whether	the	national	
laws	consider	(or	not)	finality	as	part	of	their	international	public	policy.	
81	See	Lalive	(1986)	(n.	37),	305.		
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than	 the	 process	 which	 lead	 to	 the	 rendered	 award),	 the	 question	 is	 whether	 a	
national	 court	 may	 refuse	 enforcement	 of	 the	 already	 rendered	 award	 due	 to	 the	
existence	of	another	process	on	the	same	dispute.	The	answer,	in	the	majority	of	the	
cases,	seems	quite	straight:	no.	Has	 it	has	been	stated,	“parallel	proceedings	do	not	
obstruct	 the	 enforcement	 of	 a	 divergent	 judgment.	 Therefore	 judges	 (…)	 will	
generally	enforce	a	judgments	despite	the	existence	of	parallel	proceedings	in	a	third	
country”.82	This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	unlikely	that	a	country	would	include	the	lis	
pendens	 rule	within	 its	 international	public	policy.	A	 recourse	 to	abuse	of	process	as	
part	of	 international	public	policy	of	a	country	 is,	as	we	have	already	demonstrated,	
quite	limited	(i.e.,	as	we	have	seen,	it	seems	that	only	in	Switzerland	an	application	of	
the	doctrine	as	part	of	international	public	policy	is	allowed).	Similarly,	the	application	
of	collateral	estoppel	might	at	most	regard	the	issues	that	have	already	been	decided	
(by	means	 of	 an	 interlocutory	 award)	 in	 the	 pending	 arbitration;	 however,	 such	 an	
approach	 seems	applicable	only	 in	 the	US,	where	 –	 as	we	have	 seen	 in	Chapter	 3	 –	
collateral	estoppel	is	applicable	even	in	lack	of	a	final	judgment	on	the	main	claim.		
As	it	has	been	noted,	“[t]his	legalistic	standpoint	is	unsatisfactory”.83	However,	
it	does	not	seem	that	the	current	legal	framework	offers	different	solution.	
	
Hypothesis	2:	two	validly	issued	awards	
In	 case	 there	 are	 two	 validly	 issued	 awards,	 the	 public	 policy	 exception	may	
fully	operate.	Obviously,	 the	applicability	of	 such	exception	will	 depend	on	whether	
every	single	State	considers	 res	 judicata,	 collateral	estoppel	and	abuse	of	process	as	
part	 of	 its	 public	 policy	 and,	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 applicability	 of	 res	 judicata	 and	
collateral	estoppel,	on	how	broadly	the	triple	identity	test	is	applied	in	a	country.	The	
broader	is	the	application	of	the	triple	identity	test	in	a	country,	the	greater	will	be	the	
possibility	that	the	enforcement	of	a	duplicative	award	 is	 refused	on	the	basis	of	res	
judicata	and	collateral	estoppel.	
Some	sub-categorizations	are	required.	We	will	first	of	all	distinguish	the	cases	
in	which	the	first	award	is	an	ICSID	award	and	the	cases	in	which	the	first	award	shall	
be	enforced	according	to	the	1958	New	York	Convention.	Within	this	last	category,	we	
will	 distinguish	 the	 cases	 in	which	 the	 first	 award	has	been	 recognized,	 enforced	or	
confirmed	at	 the	State	of	 the	 seat,	 from	 the	 cases	 in	which	 the	 first	 award	has	 not	
been	 recognized,	 enforced	 or	 confirmed.	 A	 final	 distinction	 shall	 be	 made	 for	 the	
cases	in	which	the	first	award	has	been	recognized,	enforced	or	confirmed:	there	are	
differences	on	the	basis	of	whether	the	first	award	has	been	recognized,	enforced	or	
confirmed	in	the	same	country	where	the	enforcement	of	the	second	award	is	sought,	
or	the	first	award	has	been	enforced	(or	confirmed)	in	a	country	that	is	different	from	
the	one	where	enforcement	of	the	second	award	 is	sought.	Finally,	 the	hypothetical	
case	in	which	the	first	non-ICSID	award	has	been	annulled	in	the	country	of	the	seat	
will	be	analysed.	
																																																													
82	See	Balkanyi-Nordmann,	AAA	Handbook	on	International	Arbitration	and	ADR	(2010),	179.	
83	Ibid.	
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Hypothesis	2.1:	the	first	issued	award	is	an	ICSID	award	
If	 the	 first	 issued	 award	 is	 an	 ICSID	 award,	 according	 to	 Art.	 54	 of	 the	 1965	
Washington	Convention	“[e]ach	Contracting	State	shall	recognize	an	award	rendered	
pursuant	to	this	Convention	as	binding	and	enforce	the	pecuniary	obligations	imposed	
by	 that	 award	 within	 its	 territories	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 final	 judgment	 of	 a	 court	 in	 that	
State”.	This	means	an	ICSID	award	is	fully	effective	and	enforceable	in	all	States	which	
are	parties	of	the	ICSID	Convention.	As	a	consequence,	the	enforcement	of	a	second	
(non-ICSID)	award	may	be	refused	in	all	these	States	on	the	basis	of	the	public	policy	
exception,	 provided	 that	 such	 States	 recognize	 one	 or	 more	 of	 the	 res	 judicata,	
collateral	 estoppel	 and/or	 abuse	 of	 process	 doctrines	 as	 part	 of	 their	 international	
public	policy.	
	
Hypothesis	2.2:	the	first	issued	award	is	not	an	ICSID	award	
As	already	stated,	this	hypothesis	requires	a	further	distinction,	on	the	basis	of	
whether	the	first	award	has	been	recognized,	enforced	or	confirmed	or	not.	
	
Hypotesis	 2.2.1:	 the	 first	 non-ICSID	 award	 has	 been	 recognized,	 enforced	 or	
confirmed	
If	 the	first	non-ICSID	award	 is	enforced,	recognized	or	confirmed	in	the	same	
country	where	 the	enforcement	of	 the	second	award	 is	 sought,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 first	
award	 will	 be	 probably	 considered	 as	 merged	 in	 the	 judgment	 that	
recognized/enforced/confirmed	it.	This	means	that	the	award	will	be	considered	as	a	
state	 judgment,	 which	 can	 preclude	 a	 second	 discussion	 on	 claims/issues	 already	
discussed	 in	 the	 first	arbitration	and	decided	 in	 the	 first	award.	For	 this	 reason	 (and	
also	 by	 applying	 an	 analogy	with	 national	 rules	 on	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	
foreign	 judgments)	 it	 seems	 likely	 that	 in	 all	 States	 where	 res	 judicata,	 collateral	
estoppel	and/or	abuse	of	process	are	considered	as	part	of	international	public	policy,	
the	enforcement	of	the	second	duplicative	award	will	be	precluded.	
If	the	first	non-ICSID	award	is	recognized,	enforced	or	confirmed	in	a	country	
that	is	different	from	the	one	where	the	enforcement	of	the	second	award	is	sought,	
the	situation	appears	more	complex.	When	the	enforcement	of	 the	second	award	 is	
sought,	 the	 opposing	 party	may	 try	 to	 oppose	 the	 circumstance	 that	 there	 already	
exists	 an	 award	 on	 the	 same	 dispute	 and	 that	 such	 award	 has	 been	 merged	 in	 a	
foreign	 judgment	 (i.e.	 the	 judgment	 recognizing,	 enforcing	 and/or	 confirming	 the	
award	 in	 another	 country)	 on	 the	 same	 dispute.	 At	 this	 point,	 the	 second	 national	
court	 may,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 its	 rules	 on	 recognition	 and	 enforcement	 of	 foreign	
judgments,	as	well	as	on	the	basis	of	considerations	of	comity,	recognize	the	foreign	
judgment	(recognizing,	enforcing	or	confirming	the	first	award)	and	give	it	preclusive	
effects.84	However,	 it	 should	 be	 noted	 that	 such	 a	 possibility,	 that	 has	 been	 called	
																																																													
84	In	this	regard	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	EU	Regulation	1215/2012	regarding,	inter	alia,	enforcement	of	
foreign	 judgments	 within	 the	 EU	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 matters	 related	 to	 arbitration,	 i.e.	 also	 to	 the	
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“judgment	route”	of	arbitral	awards,	is	contested	by	some	Authors	on	the	basis	of	the	
fact	that	a	national	judgment	based	on	an	arbitral	award	has	only	an	ancillary	nature	
and	should	not	be	entitled	to	circulate.85	
	
Hypotesis	2.2.2:	the	first	non-ICSID	award	has	not	been	recognized,	enforced	or	
confirmed	
If	 the	 first	 award	 has	 not	 been	 recognized,	 enforced	 or	 confirmed,	 it	 seems	
unlikely	that	the	second	national	court	may	give	preclusive	effects	to	the	first	award	
(thus	 refusing	 enforcement	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 public	 policy,	 if	 applicable)	 in	 order	 to	
preserve	coherence	and	harmony	of	decisions	on	an	 international	 level.	What	seems	
more	likely	is	that	the	second	court	will	enforce	the	second	issued	award.	
	
Hypothesis	2.3:	the	first	non-ICSID	award	has	been	annulled	by	the	Court	of	the	
seat	
This	hypothesis	is	one	of	the	most	discussed	topics	in	international	arbitration	
scholarship.	 This	 is	 not	 the	 place	 where	 to	 reconstruct	 the	 entire	 debate	 on	 this	
matter.	 However,	 as	 this	 author	 has	 already	 stated	 elsewhere,86	it	 appears	 that	 the	
New	 York	 Convention,	 which	 has	 created	 a	 pro-enforcement	 regime,	 authorizes	
national	 courts	 to	enforce	arbitral	awards	which	have	been	enforced	at	 the	place	of	
the	 seat.	 This	 means	 that,	 even	 if	 the	 first	 award	 has	 been	 annulled,	 the	 award	
creditor	will	be	still	entitled	to	seek	enforcement	elsewhere.	At	this	point,	on	the	basis	
of	whether	it	is	earlier	enforced	the	first	(annulled)	award	or	the	second	award,	we	will	
fall	back	in	one	of	the	situations	described	above.	
	
4.3	 Challenging	non-ICSID	awards	arising	from	duplicative	proceedings	at	the	
seat	of	arbitration	(in	brief)	
	
The	last	possibility	that	the	award	debtor	of	the	second	duplicative	award	has	
																																																																																																																																																																																		
recognition	and	enforcement	of	national	judgments	which	are	based	on	arbitral	awards.	On	the	scope	
of	the	arbitration	exclusion	see	Zarra,	www.giustiziacivile.com	(2014),	1	and	ss.	
85	The	matter	has	been	extensively	dealt	with	by	Scherer,	Journal	of	 International	Dispute	Settlement	
(2013),	587	and	ss.	This	Author	is	extremely	critic	with	regard	to	the	judgment	route.	On	the	contrary,	
Mosk,	Nelson,	Journal	of	International	Arbitration	(2001),	469	and	ss.,	seems	to	endorse	the	approach	
in	 order	 to	 favour	 considerations	 of	 finality.	 See	 also,	 on	 the	 topic,	DeWitt,	 Texas	 International	 Law	
Journal	 (2015),	 495	 and	 ss.,	 Hill,	 Journal	 of	 Private	 International	 Law	 (2012),	 159	 and	 ss.,	 Nazzini,	
Contemporary	 Asia	 Arbitration	 Journal	 (2014),	 139	 and	 ss.,	 Einhorn	 (2010)	 (n.	 71),	 43	 and	 ss.,	 Anon,	
University	of	Pennsylvania	Law	Review	(1974),	223	and	ss.,	Silberman,	King’s	Law	Journal	 (2008),	235	
and	ss.	It	seems,	however,	that	–	as	of	today	–	the	judgment	route	is	the	preferred	approach	by	national	
courts.	 See,	 in	 this	 regard,	 for	 England	Chantiers	 de	 l’Atlantique	SA	 v.	Gaztransport	&	 Tachnigaz	SAS	
[2011]	 EWHC	 3383	 (Comm);	 Diag	 Human	 SE	 v.	 Czech	 Republic,	 [2014]	 EWHC	 1639	 (Comm),	 Yukos	
Capital	Sarl	v.	OJSC	Rosneft	Oil	Company,	[2011]	EWHC	1461	(Comm).	For	the	US,	see	the	Restatement	
of	the	Law	(Third),	The	US	Law	on	International	Commercial	Arbitration,	Tentative	Draft	No.	2	(April	2012)	
and	Belmont	Partners	LLC	v.	Mina	Mar	Group	Inc.	741	FSupp.	2d	743	(WDVa	2010).	Scherer,	mentioned	
in	 this	 note,	 at	 600	 and	 ss.,	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 approach	 is	 also	 followed	 in	Australia,	 India,	
Israel,	Germany	and	Switzerland.	
86	See,	also	for	an	extensive	bibliography	on	the	topic,	Zarra,	Rivista	dell’arbitrato	(2015),	574	and	ss.	
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in	 order	 to	 avoid	 the	 enforcement	 of	 such	 an	 award	 is	 to	 try	 to	 challenge	 it	 at	 the	
courts	of	the	place	of	the	seat	of	arbitration.	
It	is	largely	recognized	that	the	reasons	for	challenging	an	award	usually	mirror	
the	 reasons	 which	 entitle	 a	 court	 to	 refuse	 enforcement	 under	 the	 New	 York	
Convention.87	It	 is	 therefore	 useless	 to	 recall	 all	 the	 above	 debate:	 in	 case	 a	 State	
(which	 is	 the	 seat	 of	 a	 duplicative	 arbitration)	 recognizes	 res	 judicata,	 collateral	
estoppel	 and/or	 abuse	 of	 process	 as	 part	 of	 its	 international	 public	 policy,	 national	
courts	will	be	entitled	to	annul	the	second	duplicative	award	on	the	basis	of	a	violation	
of	their	State’s	international	public	policy.	
The	case	law	in	this	regard	is	very	limited.	The	only	decision	on	the	challenge	of	
an	arbitral	award	in	the	court	of	the	seat	has	been	the	SVEA	Court	of	Appeal	decision	
in	 the	 CME	 case,	 the	 factual	 background	 of	 which	 has	 been	 already	 discussed	 in	
Chapter	 3	 above.88	By	 applying	 Swedish	 law,	 which	 does	 not	 recognize	 both	 res	
judicata	and	abuse	of	process	as	part	of	its	public	policy,	the	Court	refused	to	annul	the	
CME	award,	issued	in	Stockholm,	that	was	duplicative	of	the	Lauder	award,	issued	in	
London.89	In	 this	 regard,	 it	 is	worth	 noting	 that	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 argued	 that	 res	
judicata	 was	 part	 of	 Swedish	 public	 policy	 and	 that	 the	 requirement	 of	 the	 same	
																																																													
87	See	Lew,	Mistelis,	Kroll	(2003)	(n.	3),	673	and	ss.	See	also	Blackaby,	Partasides,	Redfern,	Hunter	(2015)	
(n.	3),	581	and	ss.,	Bernardini	(2009)	(n.	1),	26	and	ss.	For	example,	Art.	34(2)	and	(3)	of	the	UNCITRAL	
Model	Law	state	that:	
“(2)	An	arbitral	award	may	be	set	aside	by	the	court	specified	in	article	6	[i.e.	the	court	of	the	seat]	only	
if:		
(a)	the	party	making	the	application	furnishes	proof	that:		
(i)	a	 party	 to	 the	 arbitration	 agreement	 referred	 to	 in	 article	 7	 was	 under	 some	
incapacity;	or	the	said	agreement	is	not	valid	under	the	law	to	which	the	parties	have	
subjected	it	or,	failing	any	indication	thereon,	under	the	law	of	this	State;	or		
(ii)	the	party	making	the	application	was	not	given	proper	notice	of	the	appointment	
of	an	arbitrator	or	of	the	arbitral	proceedings	or	was	otherwise	unable	to	present	his	
case;	or		
(iii)	the	award	deals	with	a	dispute	not	contemplated	by	or	not	falling	within	the	terms	
of	the	submission	to	arbitration,	or	contains	decisions	on	matters	beyond	the	scope	of	
the	sub-	mission	to	arbitration,	provided	that,	if	the	decisions	on	matters	submitted	to	
arbitration	can	be	separated	from	those	not	so	submitted,	only	that	part	of	the	award	
which	contains	decisions	on	matters	not	submitted	to	arbitration	may	be	set	aside;	or		
(iv)	 the	 composition	 of	 the	 arbitral	 tribunal	 or	 the	 arbitral	 procedure	 was	 not	 in	
accordance	with	the	agreement	of	the	parties,	unless	such	agreement	was	in	conflict	
with	a	provision	of	 this	Law	from	which	the	parties	cannot	derogate,	or,	 failing	such	
agreement,	was	not	in	accordance	with	this	Law;	or		
(b)	the	court	finds	that:		
(i)		the	subject-matter	of	the	dispute	is	not	capable	of	settlement	by	arbitration	under	
the	law	of	this	State;	or		
(ii)		the	award	is	in	conflict	with	the	public	policy	of	this	State.		
(3)	An	application	for	setting	aside	may	not	be	made	after	three	months	have	elapsed	from	the	date	on	
which	the	party	making	that	application	had	received	the	award	or,	if	a	request	had	been	made	under	
article	33,	from	the	date	on	which	that	request	had	been	disposed	of	by	the	arbitral	tribunal”.		
88	The	 Czech	 Republic	 v.	 CME	 Czech	 Republic	 B.V.,	 SVEA	 Court	 of	 Appeal,	 Department	 16,	 Case	 No.	
T8735-01,	 available	 at	 http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:iic/63-2003.case.1/IIC063(2003)D.pdf.	
The	decision	is	commented	in	Gallagher,	Pervasive	Problems	in	International	Arbitration	(2006),	342	and	
ss.	
89	P.	95	and	ss.	
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parties	was	to	be	interpreted	broadly,	on	the	basis	of	the	already	discussed	concept	of	
privity	 (according	 to	 which	 CME	 and	 Mr.	 Lauder	 should	 have	 been	 considered	
representing	 the	 same	 interests	 and	 therefore	 substantially	 identical	 parties).	 Both	
these	arguments	were	refused.	The	Court	of	Appeal	declined	the	idea	that	res	judicata	
was	part	of	public	policy	on	the	basis	of	the	fact	that	in	Sweden	res	judicata	exception	
may	 not	 be	 raised	 ex	 officio.	 Furthermore,	 the	 Court	 said	 that	 in	 Sweden	 formal	
identity	between	 the	parties	 is	 required	and	 therefore	 it	 is	not	possible	 to	apply	 the	
concept	of	privity	developed	in	common	law	systems.	
This	 decision,	 which	 does	 not	 keep	 into	 account	 the	 policy	 considerations	
endorsed	in	this	book,	is	anyway	an	isolated	precedent	(to	be	strongly	criticized	for	its	
extremely	 formal	 reasoning).	Only	with	 the	emergence	of	 further	case	 law	 it	will	be	
possible	to	understand	whether	and	to	what	extent	considerations	related	to	abuse	of	
process,	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel	may	play	a	role	in	the	challenge	of	arbitral	
awards	 at	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 seat	 (and	 in	 allowing	 to	 refuse	 the	 enforcement	 of	
international	arbitral	awards).	
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Conclusions	
	
This	 book	 has	 tried	 to	 give	 some	 solutions	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 parallel	
proceedings	in	investment	arbitration.	
After	having	demonstrated,	in	the	introduction	to	Section	1,	that	a	dissertation	
on	 parallel	 proceedings	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 is	 very	 necessary,	 Chapter	 1	 has	
given	a	definition	of	the	problem	and	has	provided	the	reader	with	an	analysis	of	the	
taxonomy	of	parallel	proceedings.	 In	this	regard,	 it	has	been	demonstrated	that	–	as	
investment	arbitration	is	today	configured	–	it	is	quite	inevitable	to	have	(at	least	the	
risk	of)	parallel/multiple	proceedings	related	to	the	same	claim.	Secondly,	and	mainly,	
Chapter	 1	 has	 demonstrated	why	 parallel	 proceedings	 shall	 be	 avoided,	 namely	 for	
protecting	 values	 such	as	 finality,	 coherence,	 legal	 certainty,	 as	well	 as	 saving	 costs	
and	efficiency.	As	a	consequence,	 it	 is	possible	to	say	that	parallel	proceedings	have	
not	 only	 procedural	 implications,	 but	 involve	 also	 substantive	 implications	 on	 the	
rights	of	the	parties	 involved	in	the	dispute	from	which	parallel	proceedings	arise.	 In	
light	of	these	reasons,	Chapter	1	has	demonstrated	why	a	policy-oriented	analysis	of	
the	solutions	to	parallel	proceedings	is	highly	desirable.	
	 Chapter	 2	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 legal	 instruments	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	
parallel	 proceedings	 that	 are	 applicable	 at	 the	 jurisdictional	 phase	 of	 investment	
arbitration	 proceedings	 are	 not	 well	 fitted	 to	 offer	 such	 a	 remedy	 in	 international	
arbitration.	 The	main	 reason	 for	which	 such	 tools	 are	 unsuitable	 for	 the	 aim	 of	 our	
research	is	that	they	are	always	based	on	consent,	i.e.	on	an	expression	of	autonomy	
of	the	same	parties	that	commenced	the	parallel	proceedings.		
	 Indeed,	 there	 is	 a	 strong	 contrast	 between	 the	 consensual	 paradigm	 of	
international	 arbitration,	 which	 is	 the	 “grundnorm”	 of	 international	 arbitration,	 and	
the	necessity	that	arbitration	–	having	de	facto	become	the	natural	judge	for	disputes	
related	 to	 international	 commerce	 and	 in	 particular	 to	 international	 investments	 –	
adapts	 to	 the	 substantial	 needs	 of	 modern	 transactions.	 The	 formalism	 related	 to	
consent,	indeed,	often	does	not	allow	arbitration	to	adapt	to	the	substantive	reality	of	
complex	disputes,	thus	generating	an	“artificial	discrepancy	between	the	substantive	
and	 the	 procedural	 aspect	 of	 the	 same	 multiparty	 relationship”. 1 	This	 situation	
generates	the	paradox	that	“[e]conomy	and	efficiency	may	be	frustrated	by	a	number	
of	dilatory	 factors	before,	during	and	after	 the	arbitration.	 Ironically,	many	of	 these	
potential	 causes	 of	 delay	 are	 rooted	 in	 those	 characteristics	 of	 arbitration	 that	
distinguish	 it	 from	traditional	adjudication	processes.	Nowhere	 is	 this	paradox	more	
evident	that	in	disputes	involving	multiple	parties”.2	
In	 light	 of	 the	 above,	 remedies	 such	 as	 consolidation	 and	 joinder	 cannot	 be	
considered	as	general	solutions	to	the	problem	of	parallel	proceedings,	due	to	the	fact	
that	it	is	highly	probable	that	one	of	the	parties	will	not	give	its	consent	to	these	form	
of	coordination.	Furthermore	–	and	most	 importantly	–	 ICSID	Convention	and	Rules	
																																																													
1	Brekoulakis,	Penn	State	Law	Review	(2009),	1182.	
2	Stipanowich,	Iowa	Law	Review	(1987),	475.	
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are	completely	silent	on	the	possibility	to	coordinate	parallel/multiple	proceedings	or	
to	join	third	parties.	This	means	that	the	only	plausible	solution	is	quasi-consolidation,	
i.e.	 the	 appointment	of	 the	 same	arbitrators	 for	 two	parallel	 disputes	 (that,	 indeed,	
seems	the	only	one	 that	has	been	applied	 in	a	certain	number	of	cases).	Due	to	 the	
fact	that	the	majority	of	investment	arbitrations	are	held	in	the	ICSID	framework,	we	
are	 today	 stuck	 in	 a	 situation	 of	 total	 lack	 of	 rules	 providing	 for	 coordination	 of	
proceedings	and/or	possible	 involvement	of	 third	parties.	Other	 forms	of	arbitration	
are	 even	 more	 based	 on	 consent	 and	 therefore	 still	 strictly	 anchored	 to	 the	
impossibility	 to	 extend	 the	 proceedings	 to	 third	 parties	 without	 consent	 by	 all	 of	
them.	
However,	 as	we	have	 seen	 in	Chapter	 3,	 this	 cannot	be	 the	end	of	 the	 story.	
The	 already	 mentioned	 policy	 considerations	 (i.e.	 reliability	 and	 legitimacy	 of	
arbitration	 as	 an	 adjudication	 process,	 judicial	 economy,	 efficiency	 and	 finality)	
impose	 to	 avoid	 and	 limit	 parallel	 proceedings.	 If	 such	 policy	 considerations	 cannot	
find	a	place	when	arbitrators	consider	their	jurisdiction,	this	does	not	mean	that	they	
cannot	be	kept	 into	account	at	a	 later	stage	in	the	proceedings,	 i.e.	the	admissibility	
phase.		
	 Chapter	3	has	 started	with	an	analysis	of	 the	distinction	between	 jurisdiction	
and	 admissibility	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 and	 of	 the	 possible	 sources	 of	 such	
distinction.	 Having	 identified	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 such	 distinction,	 the	 research	 has	
analysed	 the	 law	 applicable	 in	 investment	 arbitration	 and,	 in	 particular,	 the	
applicability	of	general	principles	of	international	law.	It	has	been	demonstrated	that,	
at	 the	 admissibility	 phase,	 arbitrators	 have	 the	 inherent	 power	 to	 preclude	 the	
continuation	of	proceedings	that	run	against	general	principles	of	international	law.	
	 The	analysis	has	then	turned	to	the	specific	general	principles	of	international	
law	whose	 violation	may	 be	 at	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 declaration	 of	 inadmissibility,	 namely	
good	faith	and	ne	bis	in	idem.	As	we	have	seen,	both	of	these	principles	may	be	applied	
differently	and	may	be	specified	in	other	more	specific	principles	or	rules.	In	particular,	
the	principle	of	good	faith	can	give	rise	to	the	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process,	while	the	
ne	 bis	 in	 idem	 principle	 has	 generated	 the	 principles	 of	 claim	 preclusion	 and	 issue	
preclusion.		
	 The	assumption	at	the	basis	of	Chapter	3	has	been	that	arbitral	awards,	as	any	
judicial	decisions,	may	have	effect	on	all	third	parties	that	are	substantially	connected	
to	the	parties	involved	in	the	proceedings.	Indeed,	it	has	been	demonstrated	that	the	
effects	of	arbitral	decisions	are	ipso	facto	extensible	on	third	parties	who	are	in	privity	
with	 one	 of	 the	 parties	 of	 the	 first	 claim.	 If	 a	 third	 party’s	 interests	 have	 been	
adequately	 represented	by	 the	claimant	 in	 the	 first	action,	such	a	 third	party	will	be	
therefore	precluded	to	start	a	second	claim	which	is	substantially	identical	to	what	has	
been	 already	 decided.	 In	 such	 a	 case,	 the	 second	 claim	 should	 be	 declared	
inadmissible.	
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Given	 the	 above,	 Chapter	 3	 has	 been	 demonstrated	 that	 abuse	 of	 process,	
issue	 estoppel	 and,	 if	 interpreted	broadly,	 res	 judicata	 are	 valuable	 tools	 in	 order	 to	
avoid,	or	at	least	limit,	the	effects	of	parallel	proceedings.		
The	doctrine	of	abuse	of	process	imposes	to	the	parties	to	not	make	recourse	
to	 investment	arbitration	with	the	aim	of	getting	unfair	advantages	and/or	to	harass	
the	 other	 party.	 If	 procedural	 rights	 are	 not	 exercised	 for	 their	 proper	 scope,	 it	 is	
arguable	that	a	claim	does	not	deserve	the	protection	of	the	law	and	that	such	a	claim	
should	be	declared	inadmissible.	
Claim	preclusion	(res	judicata)	and	issue	preclusion	(collateral	estoppel)	are	two	
doctrines	 which	 are	 aimed	 at	 ensuring	 finality	 of	 judicial	 decisions	 (respectively	 on	
entire	 claims	 or	 single	 issues),	 coherence	 and	 stability.	 After	 having	 analysed	 the	
various	possible	applications	of	such	doctrines	we	have	demonstrated	that,	if	broadly	
interpreted,	res	judicata	and	collateral	estoppel	can	be	very	useful	in	order	to	prevent	
parallel	proceedings	and	conflicting	decisions.	
However,	prior	to	apply	all	such	doctrines,	it	is	essential	to	make,	on	a	case-by-
case	basis,	a	coordination	of	any	of	them	with	the	principle	of	due	process.	
Finally,	 and	 keeping	 into	 account	 all	 the	 above	 discussion,	 Chapter	 3	 has	
introduced	a	proposal	to	amend	investment	arbitration	rules	in	order	to	render	them	
more	effective	and	policy	oriented	will	be	made;	such	a	proposal	is	based	on	a	form	of	
intervention	of	third	parties	subject	to	the	award	on	the	basis	of	an	 invitation	of	the	
arbitrators.	If	such	third	parties	should	refuse	to	intervene,	they	will	then	be	estopped	
to	claim	that	they	are	not	subject	to	the	effects	of	the	award.		
Chapter	4	has	regarded	the	remedies	to	parallel	proceedings	at	the	post-award	
phase	 of	 investment	 arbitration.	 Such	 an	 analysis	 has	 required	 to	 make	 a	 clear	
distinction	 between	 the	 post	 award	 remedies	 in	 ICSID	 arbitration	 and	 in	 non-ICSID	
arbitration.	The	main	difference	stays	in	the	fact	that	ICSID	is	considered	to	be	a	self-
contained	 system	of	 arbitration,	 fully	 autonomous	 and	 independent	of	 any	national	
systems,	 which	 covers	 all	 aspects	 of	 the	 arbitral	 proceedings	 and	 extends	 to	 the	
challenge	of	 the	awards,	 the	 latter	being	regulated	only	by	 the	Convention,	without	
any	 interference	 by	 national	 courts	 or	 other	 national	 authorities,	 no	 room	 for	 the	
application	 of	 the	 New	 York	 Convention	 being	made	 regarding	 enforcement	 of	 an	
ICSID	award.	Thus,	we	have	examined	the	possibility	to	preclude	the	existence	of	two	
duplicative	 proceedings	 in	 light	 of	 the	 ground	 for	 annulment	 given	 by	 the	manifest	
excess	 of	 powers	 of	 arbitrators.	 In	 this	 regard,	 we	 have	 concluded	 that	 it	 is	 very	
unlikely	that	a	remedy	to	parallel	proceedings	may	be	found	at	the	annulment	stage	
of	ICSID	proceedings.	
With	regard	to	non-ICSID	awards,	they	may	be	either	challenged	at	the	place	
of	the	seat	of	the	arbitration	or,	 if	one	of	the	grounds	set	 forth	 in	Art.	V	of	the	New	
York	 Convention	 1958,	 the	 courts	 of	 the	 State	where	 such	 enforcement	 is	 required	
may	refuse	their	enforcement.	The	only	ground	for	refusing	enforcement	on	the	basis	
of	 the	existence	of	duplicative	awards	 is	 the	public	policy	exception	set	 forth	 in	Art.	
V(2)(b)	of	 the	New	York	Convention.	For	 this	 reason,	we	have	 tried	 to	demonstrate	
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whether	 abuse	 of	 process,	 res	 judicata	 and	 collateral	 estoppel	 may	 be	 part	 of	
international	public	policy	in	several	different	legal	systems	and,	thereafter,	we	have	
tried	to	see	how	this	remedy	could	operate	in	concrete.	
In	 conclusion,	 this	 book	 has	 tried	 to	 propose	 an	 approach	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	that	goes	beyond	the	formalities	of	the	dispute	and	is	based	on	the	very	
strong	 substantial	 implications	 that	 exist	 between	 all	 the	 parties	 of	 an	 economical	
transaction,	 regardless	 of	 the	 way	 in	 which	 a	 certain	 dispute	 is	 brought	 before	
arbitrators.	Such	an	approach,	which	finds	legal	basis	both	in	international	law	and	in	
municipal	 law	systems,	 is	 today	highly	desirable	 in	order	 to	ensure	 the	credibility	of	
investment	arbitration	and	to	safeguard	the	interests	of	respondent	States.	
This	 book	has	 not	 covered	 the	 analysis	 and	 the	possible	 solutions	 to	 parallel	
proceedings	 between	 national	 courts	 and	 investment	 arbitration	 tribunals	 and	
between	 investment	 arbitration	 tribunals	 and	 other	 international	 fora.	 While	 the	
former	of	these	topics	has	found	some	analysis	in	other	works	(mentioned	in	the	text),	
the	latter	would	need	some	new	detailed	studies,	even	in	light	of	the	clear	emergence	
of	the	problem	in	disputes	such	as	the	ones	of	the	Yukos	and	Chevron	sagas.	It	could	
maybe	be	the	subject	of	another	book…	
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